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CHAPTER I
While d i f f e r e n t  f i e l d s  ca l l  fo r  d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e l s  of  re sea rch ,  i t  i s  worth noting t h a t  
resea rch  commands only a small f r a c t i o n  of 
1 percent  o f  the  to t a l  expenditure f o r  crime 
c o n t r o l .  There i s  probably no sub jec t  of 
comparable concern to  which the  Nation i s  
devot ing so many resources and so much 
e f f o r t  with so l i t t l e  knowledge of  what i t  
i s  doing.
P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Adminis tra tion of  J u s t i c e ,  The Challenge 
of  Crime in a Free Soc ie ty , p. U T .
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Economics may be re fe r re d  to as the  study of  s a c r i f i c e  and 
choice .  Beginning with the premise t h a t  productive resources  are  
scarce  r e l a t i v e  to  the  wants of s o c ie ty ,  recognit ion o f  the  need fo r  
s a c r i f i c e  i s  made e x p l i c i t  through the use of  a "guns or  bu t te r "  curve 
o r  i t s  contemporary vers ion ,  "miss i les  or margarine." I t  follows t h a t  
employment o f  resources  to produce more of one good requ ires  the 
s a c r i f i c e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  goods, which could otherwise have been 
produced. The a p p l ica t io n  of  economics to  a broad range o f  s i t u a t io n s  
i s  permeated with recognit ion  of  the  s a c r i f i c e  involved in a l t e r n a t i v e  
courses o f  a c t ion .
The preponderant i n t e r e s t  o f  economics has been the  market 
s e c to r  wherein choice i s  e x p l i c i t  in t ransac t ions  involving in d iv id u a ls ,  
households,  and f i rm s ,  and wherein i t  i s  assumed t h a t  a l l  p a r t i e s  are  
motivated by " s e l f - i n t e r e s t "  and a c t  " r a t io n a l ly . "  Although these  
terms may be defined somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y  fo r  d i f f e r e n t  purposes,  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t  i s  considered the  mot iva t ion ,  and ra t iona l  behavior ,  the  
process involved in market dec is ions .  Market t ransac t ions  t h a t  take 
place  generate  o b je c t iv e  data t h a t  are  used to analyze behavior and 
e f f i c i e n c y .  The e x p l i c i t  values and q u a n t i t i e s  generated by market 
t r an sac t io n s  f a c i l i t a t e  economic inves t iga t ions  and help expla in  the  
emphasis t h a t  economists give to  the  p r iva te  sec to r .  This paper is
1
2concerned with an extension of  the  p r in c ip le s  derived from a n a ly s i s  of  
market a c t i v i t y .
A. Extensions o f  Economic Analysis
Although economics has always been concerned with the  publ ic  
sec to r  and nonmarket a c t i v i t i e s ,  the  to o ls  o f  economic ana lys is  
developed in th e  market s ec to r  have not been e a s i l y  applied  to  non- 
market a c t i v i t y  and the  public  s e c to r .  However, co incident  with growth 
in the r e l a t i v e  share  o f  t o t a l  resources devoted to  the publ ic  s ec to r  
has been increased economic a t t e n t io n  to  nonmarket decis ions  and the  
output  of  soc ia l  goods. The r e s u l t s  o f  economic ana lys is  in the  public  
sec to r  a re  hampered by the  lack o f  ob jec t ive  da ta ;  th e re fo re  these  
r e s u l t s  may be l e s s  d e f i n i t i v e  when compared to  the  ana lys is  o f  market 
a c t i v i t y .  Nonetheless,  s tud ies  dealing with highways, water p r o j e c t s ,  
defense ,  and educa t ion ,  have provided information and a viewpoint t h a t  
s t rong ly  encourage recogni t ion  in decis ion  making.
In the  pa s t  decade the re  has developed within  economics a 
number o f  s p ec ia l iz ed  d iv i s io n s ,  each of  which app l ies  economic 
a n a ly s i s  to  a reas  t h a t  previously  had been l a rg e ly  exempt from the 
economic approach. The economics of  hea l th ,  education,  poverty,  
d i s c r im in a t io n ,  and urban t r a n s p o r t a t io n  are  r ep re sen ta t iv e  o f  th e  
sp ec ia l iz ed  extens ion o f  economic ana lys is .^
This paper i s  concerned with  one of  the  most recen t  extens ions  
of economic a n a ly s i s ;  namely, crime and law enforcement a c t i v i t y .  This 
extension could appear to  be a case o f  economic imperialism in to  f i e l d s
An examination o f  c u r re n t  l i t e r a t u r e  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s .  For 
examples r e f e r  t o :  American Economic Assoc ia t ion ,  Journal o f  Economic 
L i t e r a t u r e ,  9 (June,  1971),  pp. 678-83.
3preempted by socio logy,  criminology, and psychology; however, a case  can 
be made on beha l f  o f  an economic approach to  criminal a c t i v i t y  and law 
enforcement.
B. Relat ion o f  Economics to  Crime
Crime has an impact on the l i v e s  o f  a l l  people in the  United 
S ta tes  l a rg e ly  as a r e s u l t  o f  the  co s t s  i t  imposes in the  form o f  l o s t  
o r  phys ica l ly  damaged l i v e s ,  s u f f e r in g ,  f e a r ,  and lo s s  o f  proper ty ,  as 
well as the p r iv a t e  and publ ic  cos t s  involved in avoiding and preventing 
crime. Though a broad conceptual framework fo r  the  study of  these  
cos ts  was developed in the  1930's ,  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  has 
been devoted to  an e x p l i c i t  recogni t ion  or  accounting o f  these  cos ts
p
un t i l  q u i te  r e c e n t ly .
As concern with crime rap id ly  increased in the  1960 's ,  a new 
impetus was given to  varied approaches to  crime and i t s  a t t en d an t  c o s t s .  
The bes t  c u r r e n t  es t im ate  of the  economic impact of  crime and r e la t e d  
expenditures i s  t h a t  of  the  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Adminis tra tion o f  J u s t i c e .  The P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission est imated
3
costs  t o t a l l i n g  near ly  $21 b i l l i o n  f o r  1965. The components o f  t h i s  
es timate  a re  shown in Table 1.
2
U.S.,  National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 
Report on the  Cost o f  Crime, No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
P r in t ing  O f f i ce ,  1931). Tiïis i s  one o f  a s e r i e s  o f  r epo r t s  by the  body 
known popularly  as the  Wickersham Commission.
3
U.S . ,  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra­
t io n  o f  J u s t i c e ,  Crime and I t s  Impact—An Assessment, "Task Force on 
Assessment," (Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t ing  O f f i ce ,  1967), 
pp. 42-59. This Commission i s  h e r e in a f t e r  r e fe r red  to  as the P r e s id e n t ' s  
Commission.
A much l a r g e r  c o s t  f igu re  o f  $51.1 b i l l i o n  fo r  1970 was p u b l i ­
cized re c en t ly  in severa l  magazines. See "Crime Expense Now Up to  51 
B i l l ions  a Year," U.S. News and World Repor t , October 26, 1970, pp. 30-34.
TABLE 1
ECONOMIC COSTS OF CRIME AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN 1965 
(Mill ions of  Dollars)
Type o f  Cost Estimated Cost
Crimes a g a in s t  Persons ......................................................................................... $ 815.
Homicide $ 750.
Assault  and o th e r  ____ 65.
Crimes a g a in s t  P ro p e r ty .......................................................................................  3,932.
Unreported commercial t h e f t  $1,400.
Index proper ty  crimes 600.
Embezzlement 200.
Fraud 1,350.
Forgery and o th e r  82.
Arson and vandalism 300.
Other Crimes............................................................................................................... 2,036.
Driving under inf luence  $1,816.
Tax fraud 100.
Abortion 120.
I l l e g a l  Goods and S e rv ic e s .................................................................................  8,075.
Narcot ics $ 350.
Loansharking 350.
P r o s t i t u t i o n  225.
Alcohol 150.
Gambli ng 7,000.
Public Law Enforcement and Criminal J u s t i c e .............................................  4,212,
Police  $2,792.
Corrections  1,034.
Prosecution and defense 125.
Courts 261.
Pr iva te  Costs Related to  Crime........................................................................  1,910.
Crime prevention  serv ices  $1,350.
Crime prevention  equipment 200.
Insurance 300.
Counsel, b a i l ,  and witness expense 60.
TOTAL............................................................................................................... $20,980.
Source: P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis tra tion
of  J u s t i c e ,  Crime and I t s  Impact—An Assessment, p. 44.
The crime cos t s  ind ica ted  in Table 1 a re  o f  th ree  types:  
d i r e c t  cos ts  of  v ic t im s ,  public  cos ts  assoc ia ted  with the  criminal 
j u s t i c e  system, and p r iv a te  expenditures  t h a t  a re  c lo se ly  r e la ted  to 
crime. A problem may e x i s t  in t h a t  these  es timates  may not rep resen t  
the  t ru e  cos ts  or ne t  damages to  so c ie ty .  For example, t h e f t  could 
be considered as an involunta ry  t r a n s f e r ,  and the  value o f  goods or 
money s to len  may overest imate  what economists consider  as the  t ru e  co s t  
o f  t h e f t .  Conceptually,  economists might consider the  opportuni ty  cos ts  
of  t h i e v e s '  labor  and c ap i t a l  as the  t r u e  cos ts  o f  t h e f t .  A la rge  
overs tatement may e x i s t  in th e  es t imate  of  i l l e g a l  goods and serv ices  
as the  es t imate  takes  no account of  the  u t i l i t y  received by the  buyer. 
The volunta ry  na ture  of  these  so -c a l le d  v ic t im les s  crimes may lead an 
economist to conclude t h a t  the re  a re  no t ru e  cos ts  involved with the  
i l l e g a l  goods and s e rv ice s  category beyond the  ex ternal d i s u t i l i t i e s  
of  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  such as fam i l ie s  o f  gamblers, th e  c l e r g y ,  and so on. 
These f a c to r s  which suggest  an overs tatement on the  p a r t  o f  the 
P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission would id e a l ly  have to be balanced aga ins t  the  
i n a b i l i t y  to es t imate  the  cos ts  o f  f e a r ,  s u f f e r in g ,  and changed modes 
o f  behavior in a ttempts  to  measure the  t ru e  cos ts  o f  crime on American 
so c ie ty .
Using the  es t imates  o f  the  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission, which are  
nonetheless  the  bes t  es t imates  a v a i l a b l e ,  i t  appears t h a t  crime and 
r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  account f o r  approximately 4 percen t  o f  nationa l 
income. Thus i t  appears t h a t  the  magnitude o f  c o s t s  warrants  the  
increased economic a t t e n t i o n  to  crime.
The nature  of  criminal a c t i v i t y  i t s e l f  should be o f  i n t e r e s t  to 
the  economist. All ind iv idua ls  a re  faced d a i ly  with choices requ ir ing
dec is ions  among a l t e r n a t i v e  courses of  a c t i o n .  Although near ly  a l l  
economic a n a ly s i s  of  choice has been concerned with decis ion making 
involved in legal  a c t i v i t i e s ,  th e re  i s  l i t t l e  reason to presume th a t  
most i l l e g a l ,  a c t i v i t y  i s  not s im i la r ly  a mat te r  of  choice where 
comparable c r i t e r i a  are used. Some evidence o f  the  economic motivation 
fo r  criminal a c t i v i t y  i s  offered by the  f a c t  t h a t  about 90 percent of
a l l  crimes a re  economic o r  proper ty crimes.  No a c t  i s  inna te ly  i l l e g a l .
In f a c t ,  the  ex is tence  of  laws def in ing  s o c i a l l y  undesirable  or i l l e g a l  
a c t i v i t y  r e s t s  upon a presumption o f  man's a b i l i t y  to  exerc ise  his own 
f r ee  w i l l .  Note the  pos i t ion  of several  prominent consu l tan ts  in the 
law enforcement f i e l d .
This i s  not to say th a t  a l l  the  a c t s  of  man are  f r e e ,  
but t h a t  in order to  s a t i s f y  some d e s i r e ,  very often  man 
can choose between t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  and t h a t .  I f  such 
were not so ,  commands, p r o h ib i t io n s ,  rewards,  and punish­
ments would be in vain .  I f  such were not so,  law,.and 
law enforcement would be,  indeed, c r u e l ,  or inane.
Holding a person responsib le  fo r  h is  unlawful acts  i s  based upon
the  presumption t h a t  the  person was aware o f  the  nature  of the  a c t  and
knowingly chose to  commit a crime. Since economics has been a c t iv e ly  
concerned with choice in lawful a c t i v i t i e s ,  a p p l ica t io n  of ana lys is  o f  
choice to unlawful a c t i v i t i e s  may provide a f r u i t f u l  approach fo r  an 
understanding o f  crime not provided by the  more t r a d i t i o n a l  viewpoints.
In a much broader sense,  soc ie ty  makes a choice as to  how much 
crime w i l l  e x i s t  through i t s  determination o f  what i s  to be considered 
i l l e g a l  and how much resources wi l l  be devoted to  law enforcement and
4
A. C. Germann, Frank D. Day, and Robert R. J .  Gall an ti  
In t roduc t ion  to Law Enforcement (S p r in g f i e ld ,  111.: Charles C. Thomas 
Pu b l i sh e r s ,  1966),  pp. 1 3 - 1 4 .
7the  adm in is t ra t ion  of j u s t i c e .  As i s  t r u e  f o r  the  in d iv id u a l ,  soc ie ty  
faces a s e t  o f  possib le  a c t i o n s ,  each o f  which leads to  s p e c i f i c  
consequences. By i t s  estab l ishment  of  laws and law enforcement po l icy ,  
soc ie ty  determines the  level  o f  crime th a t  e x i s t s  though the  range of 
choices may involve s a c r i f i c e s  f e l t  to be unacceptable  or  l im i t e d ,  and 
none may be considered id e a l . ^
Although economists have not feared to  explore  new a r e a s ,  t h i s  
extension of  economic in v e s t ig a t io n  has been by i n v i t a t i o n .  The 
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Defense Analyses,  the  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administ rat ion of  J u s t i c e ,  and several  leaders  in the 
crime f i e l d  have given a c l e a r  i n v i t a t i o n  t h a t  an economic approach to 
crime i s  des i red  as p a r t  of the  quest  fo r  a b e t t e r  understanding of  
criminal a c t i v i t y  and law enforcement. In the  words o f  the  P r e s id e n t ' s  
Commission:
The causes of crime, then ,  are  numerous and mysterious 
and in te r tw ined .  Even to  begin to  understand them, one 
must ga ther  s t a t i s t i c s  about the  amounts and t rends  of 
crime, es t imate  the co s t s  o f  crime, study the  condi t ions  
of  l i f e  where crime t h r i v e s ,  id e n t i f y  cr imina ls  and victims 
o f  crime, and survey the  p u b l i c ' s  a t t i t u d e s  toward crime.
No one way of  describ ing crime descr ibes  i t  well enough.
Several leading c r im in o lo g i s t s ,  including  L es l ie  T. Wilkins ,  
a re  c r i t i c a l  of the  p resen t  lack  o f  d e f i n i t i v e  terminology and 
measurement in the  area o f  crime and law enforcement po l icy .  I f  
r a t io n a l  dec is ions  are  to  be made in regard to  p r i o r i t i e s ,  more
^Kenneth J .  Arrow, "A l te rna t ive  Approaches to th e  Theory of 
Choice in Risk-Taking S i t u a t io n s , "  Econometrica, 19 (1951),  p. 404.
®U.S., P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis­
t r a t i o n  of J u s t i c e ,  The Challenge o f  Crime in a Free Society 
(Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t ing  O f f i ce ,  ’1967), p. 18.
8information i s  required  as to  the  c o s t s  and benef i t s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
ac t ions  in o rder  t h a t  the  dramatic event not become the  determinant of 
social  a c t i o n .
The importance of  the  idea o f  co s t  in r e l a t i o n  to  
socia l  b e n e f i t  i s  not due to the  value of  money, but 
only to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  the  concept o f  cos t  i s  the  one 
th ing  which u n i te s  the  whole o f  the  socia l  system of  
a country  or  o r g a n i z a t i o n . . .Money, or  the  idea of 
money, flows through a l l  the  a f f a i r s  of  government 
and management, and the  t r a c in g  o f  the  system which 
i t  s u s ta in s  provides a ready-made and powerful tool 
f o r  r a t io n a l  thought  and social  a c t i o n . '
Admittedly the  extension of  th e  boundaries of  economics to  
include crime and law enforcement may be considered a ques t ionab le  
exe rc i se .  However, the  u l t im ate  worth o f  an economic i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
r e l a t e s  t o  i t s  a b i l i t y  to exp la in .  "A hypothesis i s  important  i f  i t  
' ex p la in s '  much by l i t t l e ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  i t  a b s t r a c t s  the  common and 
c ruc ia l  elements from the mass of  complex and d e ta i led  ci rcumstances 
surrounding the  phenomena to  be explained and permits v a l id  p red ic t ions
O
on the bas is  o f  them a lone ."  I t  i s  on t h i s  basis  t h a t  the  v a l i d i t y  of
an economic approach will  u l t im a te ly  be judged.
C. Organizat ion of the  Paper
I t  i s  d e s i r a b le  to  l i m i t  and to  s t a t e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  the  sub jec t  
o f  t h i s  paper.  For the  purposes o f  t h i s  paper ,  crime c o n s i s t s  o f  t h a t  
v a r i e ty  o f  human a c t s  which a re  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  the  criminal law. There 
are  over 2800 Federal crimes and an even l a rg e r  number o f  S ta t e  and
L e s l i e  T. Wilkins, "Crime Prevention and Costs in National 
Planning: A Discussion o f  Concepts and I s su es , "  In te rn a t io n a l  Review of 
Criminal P o l i c y , No. 25, United Nations (1967),  p. 251
Q
Milton Friedman, "The Methodology o f  Pos i t ive  Economics," in 
Essays in P o s i t iv e  Economics (Chicago: Univers ity  o f  Chicago P res s ,  
1953), p. 14.
9local  crimes.  Some o f  these  involve bodily  harm, some lo s s  o f  proper ty ,
some morals o r  pub l ic  o rder ,  some government revenues,  some the  c rea t io n
g
of hazardous c o n d i t io n s ,  some the r e g u la t io n  of the  economy.
I t  i s  not f e a s ib l e  to attempt an examination of  a l l  the  crimes 
which have been de f ined .  Rather,  t h i s  paper examines p r im ar i ly  those  
crimes t h a t  concern Americans most by a f f e c t i n g  t h e i r  personal s a f e ty  
and s e c u r i t y  o f  p roper ty .  For t h i s  purpose the  most convenient grouping 
of crimes a re  the  seven offenses i d e n t i f i e d  by the  Federal Bureau of  
In v es t ig a t io n  as the  "Index" o ffenses .  These a re :
1. Criminal Homicide or Murder--murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter:  a l l  w i l l f u l  fe lonious  homicides as 
d is t in g u ish ed  from deaths  due to  negligence.
2. Fo rc ib le  Rape—rape by fo rce  including a ttempts  and
a s s a u l t  to rape; excludes s t a t u t o r y  rape.
3.  Robbery-- s t e a l i n g  or  taking th ings  o f  value from
another  by force  of  v io lence  or  pu t t ing  in f e a r ,  
with or  without use of a weapon.
4. Aggravated Assault—a s s a u l t  with i n t e n t  to  k i l l  or
i n f l i c t  severe bodily i n ju r y  by shooting ,  c u t t i n g ,  
s tabb ing ,  maiming, e t c . , ;  excludes simple a s s a u l t ,  
a s s a u l t  and b a t t e ry ,  and f ig h t in g .
5. B urq la ry - -breaking or  e n t e r in g ,  or any unlawful entry
with i n t e n t  to  commit a fe lony o r  t h e f t .
6. L a rcen y - - th e f t  (except auto t h e f t ) ,  (a) o f  $50 or  more
in va lue; (b) of  l e s s  than $50 in value.  Thefts  of  
b i c y c l e s ,  auto a cc e s s o r i e s ,  s h o p l i f t i n g ,  pocket-p icking , 
o r  any s t ea l in g  o f  property  from i t s  lawful owner w i th ­
out f o r c e ,  v io lence ,  or f raud .
7.  Auto Thef t—s tea l in g  or d r iv ing  away a motor veh ic le .
g
P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission, Crime and I t s  Impact-An Assessment, p. 14.
^ % . S . ,  Department o f  J u s t i c e ,  Federal Bureau o f  In v e s t ig a t io n ,  
Uniform Crime Reports-1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t in g  O ff ice ,
T971T; p / "6i . - - - - - - - - - - -
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The Index Offenses a re  g enera l ly  considered fe lo n ie s  (except  
larceny under $50),  al though severa l  s t a t e s  define a fe lony somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t l y .  These seven offenses  appear to be the  most r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  
of  what the  public  considers  se r ious  crimes,  and when compared with 
o ther  o ffenses  b e t t e r  data are  a v a i l a b le  f o r  these  seven. For these  
reasons the  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h i s  paper i s  r e s t r i c t e d  p r im ar i ly  t o  th e  
Index o f fenses .
The purpose o f  t h i s  paper i s  to  examine the criminal a c t i v i t y
and law enforcement from an economic po in t  o f  view. The cen t r a l
hypothesis i s  t h a t  criminal a c t i v i t y  in the  aggregate can be depic ted
through the  economis t ' s  a na ly s is  o f  choice .  A model wil l  be developed
t h a t  d ep ic t s  crime as a function o f  the  expected gains from crime and
the  expected cos ts  as determined by law enforcement po l icy .  The model
i s  p r im ar i ly  concerned with what may be considered a supply o f  crime
and wil l  be formulated along the l i n e s  o f  the  p io ineer ing  work by Gary 
12S. Becker in 1968. The model w i l l  be t e s ted  by using a v a i l a b l e  data  
fo r  48 s t a t e s  on the  cos ts  o f  committing an offense f o r  each o f  the  
Index of fenses  to  determine i f  the re  e x i s t s  a v e r i f i a b l e  r e l a t i o n  
between these  cos ts  and the  level o f  o f fenses .  In a d d i t i o n ,  an a ttempt 
will  be made to measure the e l a s t i c i t y  o f  the supply o f  o ffenses  with 
respec t  to  the  cos ts  to  o f fenders .  This will  be followed by a more
Oddly enough the  most c o s t l y  crime i s  shown to  be " i l l e g a l  
goods and se rv ices"  in Table 1. I t  i s  not  emphasized in t h i s  paper 
f o r  the  fol lowing reasons:  (a) the  da ta  a re  extremely poor ,  (b) the  c o s t  
es t imate  does not rep resen t  a t r u e  c o s t  to  so c ie ty ,  (c) the  popular 
conception o f  the  "crime problem" i s  approximated by the  Index o f f en se s ,  
and (d) involvement o f  organized crime requ ires  a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
approach.
T^Gary S. Becker,  "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," 
Journal of  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 76 (March-April, 1968), pp. 169-217.
n
i n tens ive  a p p l ica t io n  of  the model to  seventeen c i t i e s  in the  s t a t e  of 
Oklahoma using a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  v a r ia b le s .  In t h i s  p u r s u i t ,  
an e f f o r t  w i l l  be made to  appra ise  the value of  t h i s  approach fo r  
policymaking purposes by p ro jec t ing  crime and introducing the r o le  of 
the  c o s t s  of  crime.
The organ iza t ion  of the  paper i s  as follows: Chapter II  presents  
a review o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  approaches t o  crime causation and an examina­
t ion  o f  the  economic approaches which have been recen t ly  undertaken. 
Chapter I I I  develops a model of  criminal a c t i v i t y  and law enforcement 
policy  by using the  ana lys is  of  choice and the  concepts of  socia l  costs  
and b e n e f i t s .  Chapter IV t e s t s  the  model by using da ta  on crime, 
conv ic t ions ,  and punishments fo r  the  Index offenses with f o r ty - e ig h t  
s t a t e s  as observat ions .  In t h i s  chapte r an attempt i s  made to  d e t e r ­
mine the  e l a s t i c i t y  of the  supply of  various  offenses  with re spec t  to 
the  c o s t s  o f  committing an offense .  Chapter V app l ies  the  model more 
i n t e n s iv e ly  t o  a sample of  Oklahoma c i t i e s  in an e f f o r t  to  determine 
the  e f f e c t s  o f  changes in clearance? r a t e s ,  expenditures ,  and population 
on th e  level  o f  offenses in these  c i t i e s .  This examination involves a 
crime p ro je c t io n  and extends well beyond anything e l s e  o f  t h i s  nature  
r e l a t i n g  to the  s t a t e  of  Oklahoma. F in a l ly ,  Chapter VI draws con­
c lus ions  and examines the  implica tions  o f  t h i s  economic in v es t ig a t io n  
o f  criminal a c t i v i t y  and law enforcement.
CHAPTER I I
There i s  no crime o f  which I do 
not deem myself capable.
Johann Wolfgang Goethe
CHAPTER I I
REVIEW OF APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF CRIME
A survey of the  l i t e r a t u r e  on crime reveals  a dominance of 
sociology and psychology. The f i r s t  p a r t  of t h i s  chapte r  t r a c e s  the  
development o f  th e o r i e s  of  crime causa t ion  t h a t  at tempt to  answer the 
quest ion: why does crime occur? This survey i s  r e p re se n ta t iv e  r a th e r  
than exhaustive  as i t  summarizes the  primary types of  th e o r ie s  t h a t  
have achieved broad-based support .  The second major por t ion  of  the  
chapter  examines several  economic approaches t h a t  have been used in 
the  study o f  crime and law enforcement.
I t  i s  th e  purpose o f  t h i s  examination to  provide a background 
r e l a t i n g  to  th e  av a i l ab le  approaches to  crime and law enforcement and 
i d e n t i f y  some o f  the  considera t ions  involved in an economic approach.
This base w i l l  be useful in e s t a b l i s h in g  the  model in the  chapte r t h a t  
follows.
A. Conventional Theories of  Criminal Behavior
1. C lass ica l
Cesare Becarria (1738-1794),  Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832),  and 
S i r  Samuel Romilly (1757-1818) were ch i ld ren  of  the  Enlightenment wherein 
nationali sm became embedded in the  soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  philosophy. One 
area  which was s ing led  out  fo r  reform was the criminal ju r i sprudence  and 
penal system. The French p u b l i c i s t  Montesquieu condemned the a r b i t r a r y  
r e t r i b u t i v e  na tu re  o f  the  French penal code when he urged t h a t  reforms
12
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be i n s t i t u t e d  in o rde r  t h a t  punishments be based on the crime ra th e r  
than on r e t r i b u t i o n  or  socia l  r e t a l i a t i o n .  Montesquieu's Pers ian 
L e t te rs  and The S p i r i t  o f  th e  Laws a t t r a c t e d  the  a t t e n t i o n  o f  Becarria  
who in 1764 publ ished Crimes and Punishments, which soon became the 
most i n f l u e n t i a l  p iece  in e ighteenth  century law reform.
Jeremy Bentham was influenced by John Locke, Montesquieu, and 
Becarria as he developed B ec a r r i a ' s  pos i t ion  to  i t s  highest  l e v e l .  The 
Whig lawyer Romilly supported Bentham's reform plans in Parliament and 
played an important  ro le  in  gaining many legal  reforms th a t  led away 
from s u p e r s t i t i o n  and revenge to a system based on r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .
The movement, which was l a t e r  to become known as the c l a s s i c a l  or 
d e te r r e n t  school ,  i s  bes t  represented by an examination o f  the  ideas 
of  Bentham.^
Jeremy Bentham was a humanitarian who devoted his  l i f e  to  the 
removal o f  pain.  He f e l t  t h a t  human natu re  was conditioned by two 
u l t im a te  fo rce s :  pain and p leasure .  "The p r in c ip l e  of  u t i l i t y  recog­
nizes  t h i s  s u b jec t io n ,  and assumes i t  f o r  the  foundation o f  t h a t  system,
the  ob jec t  of which i s  to  r e a r  the f a b r i c  o f  f e l i c i t y  by th e  hands of
2
reason and o f  law." Man's only motives a re  d e s i r e  fo r  p leasure  and
avoidance o f  pa in ,  and "The business of  government i s  to  promote the
3
happiness o f  s o c i e t y ,  by punishing and rewarding." Motives a re  not in
The bes t  s in g le  work on development o f  the  c l a s s i c a l  school is :  
Coleman Phi H opson ,  Three Criminal Law Reformers: Becarr ia ,  Bentham, 
Romilly (London: Dent, 1923).
2
Jeremy Bentham, ihe Pr inc ip les  of  Morals and L eg is la t ion  (New 
York: Hafner Publ ish ing Co.,  1948, o r ig in a l  1789),  pp. 1 - 2 .
3
I b i d . , p. 70. One may a lso  follow the  Bentham p os i t ion  in his  
l a t e r  s im p l i f ied  work. Theory of  L eg is la t ion  (London: Kegan Paul,  
Trench, Trubner and Co.,  1904, o r ig inal  1802).
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themselves good o r  bad and any analys is  o f  motives dependent upon t h e i r  
goodness o r  badness i s  sub jec t  to d i f f i c u l t y  and imprecision.  The 
purpose o f  the  law should be to  increase the  happiness of soc ie ty  by 
excluding those th ings  t h a t  sub t rac t  from happiness,  such as mischief .
But a l l  punishment i s  mischief:  a l l  punishment in 
i t s e l f  i s  e v i l .  Upon the p r in c ip le  o f  u t i l i t y ,  i f  i t  
ought a t  a l l  to  be admitted,  i t  ought only to  be ad­
mit ted  in as f a r  as i t  promises to  exclude some g re a te r  
e v i l .
To t h i s  end, punishment should be in accord with th e  following
ru le s :
1. The punishment must not be l e s s  than t h a t  
necessary  to  o u t l iv e  the p r o f i t  o f  the  offense  
and should be g rea te r  fo r  l a r g e r  o ffenses .
2. The punishment should discourage l a r g e r  offenses  
and m u l t ip le  offenses by f i n e l y  d iv id ing  offenses  
and r e s t r a i n i n g  the  offender.
3.  Punishment should not exceed t h a t  necessary fo r  
conformance and should be in accord with d i f f e r e n t  
s e n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  offenders .
4.  Punishment should be in verse ly  r e l a t e d  to  the  degree 
o f  unce r ta in ty  of  punishment and should be g re a te r  
f o r  habitua l  and more d i s t a n t  (t ime) o f fenses .
5. The amount of  punishment should be r e l a t e d  to  i t s  
e f fe c t iv e n e s s  (q u a l i t y ) ;  t h i s  i s  e sp e c ia l l y  the  
case when a moral lesson i s  involved.
4
Bentham, The P r inc ip les  of Morals and L e g i s l a t i o n , p. 170.
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6. In cases  where punishment i s  u n p ro f i tab le  as fo r  
un in ten t iona l  a c t s ,  o r  in cases where i n t r i c a c y  
o f  the  punishment becomes burdensome, these
5
r u le s  should be modified.
The c l a s s i c a l  pos i t ion  was considered humanitarian in i t s  day 
as i t  provided a d e f i n i t e  and uniform scheme encouraging no more pun­
ishment than t h a t  necessary  to prevent occurrence o f  crime. The purpose 
o f  punishment was de te r rence  ra th e r  than an emotional penalty based on 
revenge. I t  was assumed th a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers o f  po ten t ia l  offenders  
would contemplate the  punishment and on th i s  basis  decide ag a in s t  
commission o f  the  o f f en se ;  consequently,  when an of fense  was committed, 
t h e r e  would be encouragement to  commit a l e s s  se r ious  crime.
The c l a s s i c a l  approach became fi rmly  entrenched in the  criminal 
law system o f  the  United S ta tes  and has re ta ined  t h a t  p o s i t io n  even 
though i t  has faced severe c r i t i c i s m .  C r i t i c s  of the  c l a s s i c a l  
pos i t ion  argue t h a t  the  t h r e a t  of  punishment f a i l s  t o  d e te r  crime 
except fo r  those people who are  mature,  i n t e l l i g e n t ,  s e l f - c o n t r o l l e d ,  
and under no ex t rao rd ina ry  p ressures .  Rising crime r a t e s  a t  t imes of 
more police  and inc reas ing  punishments, evidence of  pickpockets a t  the 
gallows, and concern over the  r e l a t i o n  between the  d e t e r r e n t  approach 
and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  have added to  the  impetus fo r  d i f f e r e n t  explana tions  
o f  crime.^
^ I b i d . ,  pp. 179-87.
S h e  d ive rgen t  pos i t ions  a re  evident  in:  U .S . ,  Report o f  the 
Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement to the  National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention o f  Violence,  Law and Order Reconsidered (Washington,
D.C.: Government P r in t in g  O ff ice ,  1969), pp. 5-8.
Andrew S. Watson, "A C r i t ique  of  the  Legal Approach to  Crime and 
Correc t ion ,"  Law and Contemporary Problems, 23 (Autumn, 1958), pp. 618-21.
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2. Biological  and Psychological
Although i t  i s  of ten  useful to  s epa ra te  biological  explana­
t io n s  from those  o f  a psychological o r i e n t a t i o n ,  fo r  present purposes 
they w il l  be t r e a t e d  toge ther .  Within t h i s  broad category there  e x i s t s  
s u b s tan t ia l  v a r i a t i o n  in t h e i r  explanation o f  crime causation as each 
in v e s t ig a t io n  tends to  emphasize the importance o f  f a c to r s  assoc ia ted  
with the  s p e c i a l t y  o f  the  i n v e s t ig a to r .  For example, th e re  a re  (a) the  
o r g a n ic i s t s  emphasizing anatomy, physiology, and pathology, (b) psycho­
ana lys ts  s t r e s s in g  the  concepts o f  Freud, in t r apsych ic  dynamics and 
mental d i s t o r t i o n s ,  and (c) physicians  using theory  and c l i n i c a l  exper­
iences o f  both a psychological and p s y c h ia t r i c  na tu re .^
Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909) played the  major ro le  in ear ly
development o f  b io logica l  theo r ies  and emergence o f  what became known
8
as the  p o s i t i v e  school.  William H. Sheldon c a r r i e d  t h i s  type o f  explana-
9
t ion  to  i t s  h ighes t  l e v e l .  According to  t h i s  p o s i t io n ,  one can be 
born criminal s ince  a t a v i s t i c  or b io log ica l  d i f f e r en c es  in makeup 
determine o r  mot ivate  criminal a c t s .  However, b io log ica l  and an th ro ­
pological  models genera l ly  have a t t r a c t e d  b i t t e r  opposit ion .  The 
popu la r i ty  o f  th e  bio logical  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  with i t s  dependence upon 
anatomical o r  physiological  d i f f e r en ce  began to  wane in the twentie th
^Thomas J .  Meyers, "The Riddle o f  Legal In san i ty , "  Journal of 
Criminal Law, 44 (1953), pp. 330-33.
g
Cesare Lombroso, Crime, I t s  Causes and Remedies (Boston: L i t t l e ,  
Brown, and Co.,  1911). The p o s i t i v i s t  p o s i t io n  i s  t h a t  crime i s  a 
s o c i a l ,  b i o l o g i c a l ,  or natural  phenomenon t h a t  i s  bes t  understood by 
study o f  ind iv idua ls  as a means of  id e n t i fy in g  the causes of crime.
9
William H. Sheldon, V ar ie t i e s  o f  Delinquent Youth: An I n t r o ­
duct ion to  Const i tu t iona l  Psychia t ry  (New York: Harper,  1949).
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century as i t  was supplanted by the  emergence of  Freud 's  e f f o r t s ,  which 
emphasized the  psyche.
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) st imula ted these  new developments 
through his  e f f o r t s  aimed a t  an understanding o f  psychodynamics. The 
neuro tic  may be so overcome by his unconscious as to  be unable to  a c t  
d e l ib e r a t e ly ;  o r  the  aim o f  self-punishment may encourage the  commission 
of c r i m e . M o d e r n  proponents of  t h i s  approach usua l ly  begin with 
c r i t i c i s m  of the  c l a s s i c a l  d e te r r e n t  approach imbedded in  the  legal 
s t ru c tu r e .
I t  i s  a well-known f a c t  t h a t  r e l a t i v e l y  few offenders  
a re  caught,  and most o f  those a r re s ted  a re  r e l e a se d .  But 
soc ie ty  makes a f e t i s h  o f  wreaking "punishment," as i t  i s  
c a l l e d ,  on an occasional captured and convicted one. This 
i s  supposed to  "control  crime" by de ter rence .  The more 
va l id  and obvious co n c lu s io n - - th a t  g e t t ing  caught i s  thus 
made the  unth inkable  th in g —i s  overlooked by a l l  but the  
o f f e n d e r s .
I t  i s  held t h a t  r ega rd le ss  of any physical  d i so rd e r  the  psyche or
mind i s  r e spons ib le  fo r  th e  lack of  conformance to  the  legal  o rde r .
Psychopathic d i s o r d e r ,  degenera t ion ,  emotional d i s tu rb a n ce ,  e t c . ,  are
considered determinants  o f  crime. Numerous in v e s t ig a t io n s  have been
undertaken to i d e n t i f y  an i n v i s i b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  the  mind. Such
12approaches may be highly  p a r t i c u l a r i z e d  or e c l e c t i c  in o r i e n t a t i o n .
^^Paul Roazen, Freud; P o l i t i c a l  and Social Thought (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1968),  pp. 139-47.
^^Karl Menninger, The Crime of  Punishment (New York: Viking 
Press,  1968), p. v i i i .
12For an example o f  a highly e c l e c t i c  approach involving  over 
400 f a c to r s  o f  va r ious  types  see:  Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, 
Unraveling Juven i le  Delinquency (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1950).
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V e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  bio logica l  and psychological  explanat ions  
usual ly  proceed along l in e s  t h a t  seek to i d e n t i f y  f a c to r s  in groups of 
offenders  as compared to  nonoffenders. However, the  r e s u l t s  tend to  
demonstrate t h a t  offenders  d i f f e r  as much from one another as they do 
from nonoffenders .  This has encouraged s tud ie s  which a ttempt to  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  th ie v e s  from non-criminals ,  r a p i s t s  from non-criminals ,  
and so on. However, e f f o r t s  aimed a t  e s t a b l i s h in g  indiv idua l ized  
tendencies  toward c r im in a l i t y  do not appear to  have provided s a t i s ­
fac to ry  r e s u l t s .
. . . t h e  in d iv idua l ized  approach has f a i l e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  
s tandards  of  p s y c h ia t r i c  or social  normality  and of  non­
c r i m i n a l i t y ,  so t h a t  one cannot determine from these  
s tu d ie s  what d i f f e r en c es  or  what degrees of v a r i a t io n  
d i s t i n g u i s h  th e  de linquent from the nonoffender .  Where 
e t i o l o g i c a l  s ig n i f i c a n ce  i s  imputed to  a neuro t ic  t r a i t ,  
a psychopathic t r e n d ,  or  some emotional d e v ia t io n ,  i t  i s  
g en e ra l ly  impossible to  determine to  what e x t e n t ,  i f  a t  
a l l ,  t h i s  q u a l i t y  in the  offender can be d is t ingu ished  
from ih e ^ q u a l i t i e s  in o ther  ind iv idua ls  who do not commit 
crimes.
Lombroso, F e r r i ,  and Freud, each modified t h e i r  own pos i t ion
several  t im es ,  and adherents  of the  b io log ica l -psycho log ica l  approach
have expressed d i sp le a su re  with t h e i r  own in v e s t ig a t i o n s .  One outcome
has been the  development o f  multi f a c to r  approaches,  even though the
14
r e s u l t  may be the  s a c r i f i c e  of  a t r u e  theory .  I t  w il l  be worthwhile 
to  examine two popular theor ie s  of criminal behavior t h a t  command la rge  
numbers o f  advocates  in socio logica l  s tu d ie s  of crime.
13 Paul W. Tappan, Crime, J u s t i c e ,  and Correc tion  (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co.,  1960), p. 11.
14Stephen Schafer ,  Theories in  Criminology (New York: Random 
House, 1969),  pp. 220-21.
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3. D i f f e r e n t i a l  Association
There a re  many th e o r i e s  of  crime causa t ion  t h a t  are  concerned 
with broad aspec ts  of c u l tu re  and soc ie ty .  Usually the  theory i s  derived 
a b s t r a c t l y ,  i s  e c l e c t i c ,  and attempts  in some sense t o  place the  blame 
fo r  crime on the  c u l tu re .  In 1939 the  l a t e  P rofessor  E. H. Sutherland 
s e t  f o r th  the  theory o f  " d i f f e r e n t i a l  a s s o c i a t i o n , "  which i s  p resen t ly  
a very popular r ep re sen ta t iv e  o f  t h i s  group.
This approach denies t h a t  in d iv idua ls  a re  born criminal or  t h a t  
t r a i t s  lead  to  crime, r a th e r  i t  supports the  theory  t h a t  s i tu a t io n s  
lead to  crime. C l in ical  methods a re  considered inappropr ia te  fo r  the  
study o f  crime,  and the  b io l o g i s t  and psychologis t  a re  assumed to  lack 
the  proper background fo r  the  study o f  crime. In Su ther land 's  theory ,  
i t  i s  held t h a t  crime i s  learned in an ord inary  learn ing  s i t u a t i o n .
In i t s  modern ve rs ion ,  " . . . t h e  condi t ions  which are  sa id  to
cause crime should always be p resen t  when crime i s  p re sen t ,  and they
15should always be absent when crime i s  absen t . "  Sutherland and 
Cressey f ind  f a u l t  with th e o r ie s  t h a t  a re  ope ra t ive  a t  the time of  the  
crime occurrence and r e f e r  to  such explanations  as s i tu a t io n a l  or 
mechanis tic .  Ins tead ,  they provide a theory  t h a t  i s  concerned with 
processes taking place over a considerable  time per iod p r io r  to  the 
criminal a c t  i t s e l f .  They a lso  propose t h a t  criminal behavior i s  
learned through a process o f  communication w i th in  in timate  personal 
groups. A t t i tu d e s  toward v io la t io n  o f  the  law, as well as criminal
15Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey,  P r inc ip les  of 
Criminology, 5th ed. (Chicago: J .  B. L ipp inco t t  Co. ,  1955), p. 74. 
Donald Cressey played a ro le  in l a t e r  development o f  the  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
a s so c ia t i o n  explanation and has continued to  promote the pos i t ion  
since  the  death  o f  Professor  Sutherland.
20
techniques ,  a re  acquired in an ordinary  learn ing  s i t u a t i o n  in which the  
frequency, d u ra t io n ,  p r i o r i t y ,  and i n t e n s i t y  vary
Subs tan t ia l  crime reduct ion can come about only through preven­
t ion  as punishment and trea tment are  expected to  have l i t t l e  e f f e c t ,  
and i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  changes in social  organ iza t ion  o f f e r  the  only 
hope fo r  s i g n i f i c a n t  reductions  in crime r a t e s
Although the theory continues to  enjoy broad support ,  i t  has
not been subjec ted to extensive v e r i f i c a t i o n  l a rg e ly  because of  the  
i n a b i l i t y  to  make i t s  concepts (du ra t ion ,  p r i o r i t y ,  i n t e n s i t y )
o p e ra t io n a l .  The empirical  r e s u l t s  which a re  a v a i l a b le  a t  present
18appear inde termina te .  Another major shortcoming o f  t h i s  p roposit ion
l i e s  in i t s  f a i l u r e  to  reveal why some ind iv idua ls  who are  exposed to
evil  ways accept and t ransm i t  them while o thers  do n o t ;  t h a t  i s ,  the
19contagious na ture  of  a s soc ia t ion  i s  not i d e n t i f i a b l e .
4. Anomie
Another explanat ion of  crime causation in  the  United S ta te s  
r e l a t e s  crime to  the gap between a sp i r a t i o n s  and o p p o r tu n i t i e s .  Though 
Cesare Beccaria and Fr iedr ich  Engels had c i t e d  t h i s  f a c t o r  e a r l i e r ,
Emilie Durkheim (1858-1917) developed and popularized the explanation.
In more recen t  t imes,  Robert K. Merton continued the  development of  t h i s  
approach to  i t s  h ighest  stage  of  development.
I b i d . , pp. 77-80. The term " d i f f e r e n t i a l "  in t h i s  theory  
r e f e r s  t o  the  r a t i o  o f  a ssoc ia t ions  with cr iminal to  an t ic r imina l  
p a t te rn s  o f  behavior.
^ ^ I b i d . ,  pp. 600-07.
18Don C. Gibbons, "Observations on the Study of  Crime Causation," 
American Journal o f  Sociology, 77 (September, 1971), pp. 263-64.
19Tappan, p. 180.
21
According to  th e  modern vers ion ,  the  soc ia l  s t r u c t u r e  exer ts  
pressure  to  achieve des i red  socia l  rewards through acceptab le  means.
But some lack  the  oppor tuni ty  necessary f o r  successful  achievement.
I t  i s  only when a system of  cu l tu ra l  values e x t o l s ,  
v i r t u a l l y  above a l l  e l s e ,  c e r t a in  common symbols of 
success f o r  the  population a t  la rge  while i t s  socia l  
s t r u c t u r e  r igo rous ly  r e s t r i c t s  or completely e l imina tes  
access  to  approved modes of  acquiring these symbols fo r  
a considerable  p a r t  of  the  same popu la t ion , t h a t  a n t i ­
socia l  behavior ensues on a considerable  s e a l e . . . The 
American s t r e s s  on pecuniary success and ambitiousness  
fo r  a l l  thus in v i t e s  exaggerated a n x i e t i e s ,  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  
neuroses ,  and a n t i s o c ia l  behavior.
As socia l  i s o l a t i o n  of mass urban s o c ie ty  reduces the  control  of 
social  norms, some ind iv idua ls  attempt to  achieve rewards along a 
normless path and crime i s  the  r e s u l t .  There a re  v a r i e t i e s  o f  the  
anomie approach as Cohen's "delinquent sub cu l tu re ,"  O h l in ' s  "theory of  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  opportuni ty  systems," and Reckless '  " ca tegor ic  r i s k . "
However, th e  approach o f f e r s  l i t t l e  systematic  or  opera tional
content useable  f o r  explana tion o f  crime causa t ion .  There i s  a c l e a r
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a sso c ia t in g  normlessness with crime,  a tau to logy  t h a t
does l i t t l e  to  f u r th e r  understanding of crime. Although i t  i s  c e r t a in
t h a t  people o f  a l l  coun t r ie s  experience f r u s t r a t i o n s  in t h e i r  at tempts
to achieve goa ls ,  most inves t iga t ions  aimed a t  ve r i fy in g  t h i s  theory
proceed as  i f  American crime can be explained by t h i s  approach as
21
though the  theory i s  novel to  the  American scene.
B. Economic Approaches to  the  Study of  Crime
I t  has long been recognized t h a t  economic condi t ions  were
20
Robert K. Merton, "Social S t ruc tu re  and Anomie," American 
Sociological  Review, 3 (October, 1938), p. 680.
21
Schafe r,  pp. 248-51.
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r e l a t e d  to  unlawful a c t i v i t y .  Xenophon, P la to ,  A r i s t o t l e ,  Horace, and 
S i r  Thomas More, a l l  o f  whom commented on the  observed r e l a t i o n s h ip  
between poverty and cr iminal a c t i v i t y  were ea r ly  in  t h i s  observa t ion .  
Today few i f  any w r i t e r s  n eg lec t  the  ro le  of  income level in c r im in a l i t y .  
Nonetheless,  not u n t i l  q u i te  r e cen t ly  was economic ana lys is  applied  
d i r e c t l y  in a p rec ise  and organized manner to  criminal dec is ion  making 
and the  e f f e c t s  o f  law enforcement a c t i v i t y .
There a re  th ree  types of  approaches used in the economic study 
of  crime: (a) aggregate  models which f ind f a u l t  in the  economic system
i t s e l f ,  (b) public  f inance  models t h a t  examine the r e s u l t s  o f  law 
enforcement a c t i v i t y ,  and (c) crime output models t h a t  t r e a t  the 
criminal as a producer and government as determining the  demand. Though 
th e  approaches blend to g e th e r  to  var ious degrees ,  each i s  t r e a t e d  
sep a ra te ly  below.
1. Aggregate Models
The f i r s t  s t r i c t l y  economic examination of  the  r e l a t i o n  
between economic condit ions  and crime began as an offshoot o f  the  work 
of  F r ied r ich  Engels and Karl Marx.
Marx s t r e s s e d  t h a t  a l l  socia l  phenomena were the r e s u l t  o f  
economic c o n d i t io n s ,  and t h a t  crime was one of  the  social  i l l s  a s soc ia ted
O p
with d e s t ru c t io n  o f  the  workmen's v i t a l i t y ,  freedom, and independence.  
Engels was more s p e c i f i c  in i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  the  r e l a t i o n  between crime 
and the  economic system. Speaking of  the  vas t  pools of  unemployed,
Engels noted a sevenfold inc rease  in criminal t r i a l s  in England and 
Wales between 1805 and 1842, which he f e l t  was an ind ica t ion  of  the
22
Karl Marx, C a p i t a l , Vol. II  (New York: In te rna t iona l  P ub l i she rs ,  
1949, o r ig in a l  e d i t io n  1047), Chapter 15.
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degree o f  economic demora l iza t ion .
I f  the  demoralization  o f  the  worker passes beyond a 
c e r t a i n  po in t  then i t  i s  j u s t  as na tura l  t h a t  he w il l  tu rn  
in to  a c r im in a l—as in e v i t a b ly  as water tu r n s  in to  steam 
a t  b o i l ing  po in t .  Owing to  the  bru ta l  and demoralizing 
way in which he i s  t r e a t e d  by the bourgeois ie  the  worker 
loses  a l l  w il l  o f  h is  own and, l i k e  water ,  he i s  forced
to  follow b l in d ly  the  laws o f  na tu re .
Crime was a na tu ra l  outcome of  the  economic system t h a t  i t s e l f  
s t e a l s  from th e  worker.  Violence was viewed as a frank and undisguised 
r e t a l i a t i o n  fo r  the  t h e f t  from the  working c l a s s  by th e  bourgeois ie .^*
William A. Bonger appl ied  the  Marxian scheme to  crime in a more
d e t a i l e d  fashion in an a t t a c k  on the  economic system. Crime was viewed
as the  d i r e c t  outgrowth o f  the  c a p i t a l i s t  economic system t h a t  s t r e s se s
egoism as i t  promotes th e  condi t ions  of  unemployment and l im i ted  oppor-
25t u n i t y  t h a t  Bonger f e l t  were c o r r e l a t e s  with c ap i t a l i sm .  Though
Bonger e x p l i c i t l y  noted t h a t  th e  opportuni ty  cos ts  o f  crime were le ss  
fo r  the  lower income c l a s s e s ,  such were considered as demoralizing 
in f luences  t h a t  weakened socia l  i n s t i n c t s .  Bonger was i n t e n t  on dep ic t ­
ing crime as a f a u l t  o f  the  economic system so did  not  pursue t h i s  
avenue f o r  economic a n a ly s i s .
The f i r s t  h ighly  e x p l i c i t  model r e l a t i n g  crime to  economic v a r i a ­
b les  was to  appear in the  1960s in several  p ieces  by Belton M. Fleisher.^®
23
F r ied r ich  Engels ,  The Condition o f  the  Working Class in 
England (New York: The Macmillan Co.,  1958, o r ig in a l  e d i t io n  1845), 
pp. 145-46.
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I b i d . ,  p.  242.
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William A. Bonger, Crimina l i ty  and Economic Conditions (Boston: 
L i t t l e ,  Brown, and Co. ,  1916),  pp. 377-82.
26
Belton M. F l e i s h e r ,  "The Ef fec t  o f  Income on Juven i le  Delin­
quency," Journal o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 71 (December, 1963),  pp. 543-55. 
Also,  "The É f fec t  o f  Income on Delinquency," American Economic Review,
56 (March, 1966),  pp. 118-37.
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He assumed t h a t  the  choice between legal  and i l l e g a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  is  
decided on the  ba s i s  of r e l a t i v e  co s t s  and ben e f i t s  in a ra t iona l  
manner according to  some t a s t e  func t ion .  The consummation of  
F l e i s h e r ' s  work was the  Economics o f  Delinquency, which i s  a good 
r e p re se n ta t iv e  o f  the  methodology used in aggregate approaches.
F le i s h e r  suggests t h a t  the  dec is ions  of young people in regard 
to  crime can be examined through an a p p l ica t io n  of  supply and demand.
The economist sees delinquency as the  r e s u l t  of  two 
i n t e r a c t in g  fo rce s :  the  tendency or  propens ity  of
people to  commit de linquent a c t s  on the  one hand, and 
the  number and value o f  op p o r tu n i t i e s  f o r  the  commission 
o f  such a c t s ,  on the  o the r .  Using the  language of  labor-  
supply a n a l y s i s ,  we may say t h a t  a causal re la t io n sh ip  
between economic and o ther  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of persons 
and t h e i r  tendencies  to  commit de l inquen t  a c t s —other  
th ings  remaining unchanged—rep re sen ts  supply of 
delinquency o r  de l inquen ts .  A l t e r n a t i v e ly ,  i t  r ep re ­
sen ts  the  demand fo r  engaging in  delinquent a c t s .  I 
have chosen to  c a l l  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h ip  the  demand 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , meaning t h a t  the  demand f o r  engaging in 
de l inquent  a c t s  i s  a function o f  t a s t e s  fo r  delinquency 
and o f  l e g i t im a te  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to  criminal behavior.
F le i sh e r  goes on to  d iscuss  the  supply of  delinquency as a 
func t ion  of  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  a v a i l a b le .  These oppor tun i t ie s  depend upon 
av a i l ab le  booty,  p ro tec t ion  of p o te n t i a l  v ic t im s ,  and a v a r i e ty  of  
economic and soc ia l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  environment. However, 
p ro tec t io n  appears to  be re l a t e d  to  both demand and supply,  as these  
have been de f in ed ,  and a s im i la r  problem may e x i s t  with o the r  economic 
v a r i a b l e s .  For example, low income i s  a demand f a c to r  in F l e i s h e r ' s  
a n a ly s i s  while income d ispers ion  i s  supposed to  r e f l e c t  a supply f a c t o r .
The gains  from crime may bring e i t h e r  f inanc ia l  gain or  psychic 
p leasure :  however, F le i sh e r  notes t h a t  90 percent  of crime of the  young
27Belton M. F le i s h e r ,  The Economics of  Delinquency (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1966), p. 23.
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are  property crimes where booty i s  involved. Costs c o n s i s t  of the  
d i r e c t  cos ts  o r  s a c r i f i c e  o f  income and reduction of  expected l i f e t im e  
earnings due to  apprehension as well as the  stigma of a criminal 
record.  Tastes a re  considered " a t t i t u d e  toward crime."
In examining these  r e l a t i o n s  using both time s e r i e s  and c ro ss -  
sec tional reg ress ion  a n a ly s i s ,  F le isher  uses Chicago and Cook County,
101 c i t i e s  with populat ion of 25,000 or over,  a comparison of  th ree  
la rge  c i t i e s  (Chicago, Boston, and C inc inna t i ) ,  each with the  o th e r ,  
and England and Wales.
The level and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of income i s  t r e a te d  as the  primary 
causal f a c to r  with unemployment the  secondary f a c to r .  Tastes  a re  rep­
resented by the  surroga te  va r iab les :  (a) separa ted or  divorced females,
(b) mobil i ty  o f  popula t ion ,  (c) percent  of  nonwhite popula tion,
(d) proportion of  home ownership, (e) median school years  per a d u l t ,  
and ( f )  a dummy va r iab le  fo r  north-south d i f f e r en ces .
Using both the  time s e r i e s  and the c ros s -sec t iona l  analyses to  
i s o l a t e  the  e f f e c t s  of  each va r iab le ,  F le isher  concludes t h a t
(1) A 1 percent r i s e  in income may well cause a 2.5 
pe rcen t  decl ine  in delinquency; a 10 percent 
r i s e  in  family income in highly de linquent 
areas  may r e s u l t  in a 15 percent  reduction in 
j u v e n i l e  a r r e s t  while e f f e c t s  due to  reduced
po
unemployment are  r e l a t i v e l y  lower; and
(2) A $500 increase  in income would r e s u l t  in a 
reduced a r r e s t  r a t e  of  5.2 per 1,000 popula tion.
no
F le i s h e r ,  American Economic Review, pp. 134-35.
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and a 1 percent reduction in unemployment wil l
r e s u l t  in a .15 percent reduction in the  
29delinquency r a t e .
This approach has been c r i t i c i z e d  on several  grounds. One 
c r i t i c i s m  i s  t h a t  the  r e s u l t s  a re  too dependent on t a s t e  v a r iab le s  to 
ex e rc i se  a r e la t io n s h ip  between income and c r i m e . O t h e r  c r i t i c i s m s  
r e l a t e  to  the  i n a b i l i t y  to  s ep a ra te  demand and supply f a c t o r s ,  f a i l u r e  
t o  hypothesize r e l a t io n s h ip s  among v a r i a b l e s ,  lack  of  a f irm t h e o r e t i ­
cal basis  in choice o f  t a s t e s ,  questionable  assumptions,  and narrow- 
31ness .  Nonetheless,  t h i s  general  type of  approach continues  to  be 
pursued by ind iv idua ls  from economics, sociology, and p o l i t i c a l  sc ience.
Much of  the  empirical  work involving crime production models 
becomes involved in examinations o f  t a s t e  va r iab le s  lead ing to  a 
s i m i l a r i t y  with aggregate models. I t  i s  questionable  i f  s tud ie s  t h a t  
concen tra te  on t a s t e s  are  s u i t a b l e  fo r  law enforcement po l icy  m a t te rs .
2. Public Finance Models
One approach o f  economics to  the  problem of  crime and law 
enforcement has been concerned with the e f f e c t s  o f  public  expenditure .  
An examination of  t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  revea ls  management s t u d i e s ,  s tud ies
29
F le i s h e r ,  The Economics of  Delinquency, p. 117.
30John C. Weicher, "The Ef fec t  of  Income on Delinquency: 
Comment," American Economic Review, 60 (March, 1970), pp. 249-56.
31 Geoffrey Mil le rson ,  "The Economics of  Delinquency: Review," 
The B r i t i s h  Journal of  Criminology. 6 (October,  1966),  pp. 443-44.
Austin T. Turk, "The Economics of Delinquency: Review," 
Journal of  Criminal Law. Criminology, and Police  Sc ience , 58 
(September, 1967), pp. 388-90.
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concerned with de te rmina tion  of  the  level of  expendi ture ,  and s tud ie s
concerned with po l ice  ou tpu t .
Management s tu d ie s  were begun in the  1930s in a high crime era
when i t  had become fash ionab le  to  study the  e f f e c t s  o f  employing more
po l ice  and applying d i f f e r e n t  opera tional  techniques .  Most of  these
s tu d ie s  attempted to  determine i f  po l ice  output could be measured and
how pol ice  se rv ices  might be bes t  d i s t r i b u t e d .  One may consider  most
of  the  e a r ly  management s tu d ie s  as exclus ive ly  concerned with enhancing
32the  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i ty  o f  p ro tec t ion .  Recent work along these  l in e s  
attempts  to in troduce  more an a ly t ic a l  techniques to  improve resource  
a l l o c a t io n .  Schumate and Crowther 's  paper rep resen ts  a typ ica l  approach 
using queueing theory and p ro b a b i l i ty .  However, a recognized s h o r t ­
coming of  such approaches i s  absence of  a su ccess fu l ly  defined "success
. .  . 1,33c r i t e r i a .
A v a r i a t i o n  i s  concerned with the  matte r o f  equ i ty  and e f f i c i e n c y
in the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p o l ice  s e r v ic e ,  a development which i s  p a r t l y
34the r e s u l t  o f  questions  r a i s e d  by Musgrave. Some o f  the  i n t e r e s t i n g
32Donald C. Stone,  "Can Police  Effec t iveness  Be Measured?", 
Public Management, 12 (September, 1930), pp. 465-71.
Clarence E. Ridley and Herbert  E. Simon, "Measuring Pol ice  
A c t i v i t i e s , "  Public Management, 19 (May, 1937), pp. 134-39.
33Robert P. Shumate and Richard F. Crowther, "Q uan t i ta t ive  
Methods fo r  Optimizing th e  Allocat ion o f  Po lice  Resources," Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police  Sc ience , 57 (June,  196F)1 
pp. 197-206.
34Carl Shoup, "Standards fo r  D is t r ibu t ing  a Free Governmental 
Serv ice:  Crime Prevention ,"  Public Finance. 19 (December, 1964), 
pp. 383-92.
John G. Head, "Equity and Eff ic iency  in Public  Goods Supply," 
Public Finance, 25 (January ,  1970),  pp. 24-37.
28
aspec ts  t h a t  a re  generated r e l a t e  to  the  need to  i d e n t i f y  the  r o l e  of 
equity  o r  j u s t i c e .  Is  the  goal of  law enforcement to be maximizing the 
capture  o f  c r im in a l s ,  minimizing the  crime l e v e l ,  o r  equaliz ing  proba­
b i l i t i e s  o f  v ic t im iz a t io n ,  and how does soc ie ty  determine i t s  canons
35of  equ i ty  with re sp ec t  to  vic tims and c r iminals?  Such thorny quest ions  
have been h igh l igh ted  through the incurs ions  of  Professor Shoup and 
o the rs  in to  an examination o f  crime prevention as a socia l  good.
Another group of  s tu d ie s  i s  concerned with the  determinants  of 
expendi ture  level condi t ions  under which law enforcement se rv ices  are  
generated .  Werner Z. Hirsch uses a c ro s s - s e c t io n  ana lys i s  fo r  a number 
of communities to  conclude t h a t  s ince  cos t  per c ap i t a  showed no s i g n i ­
f i c a n t  v a r i a t i o n  with s i z e  o f  po l ice  department,  economies of s ca le  
36were not p re sen t .  Questions were r a i s ed  as to  the appropr ia te
measure o f  ou tp u t ,  and a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches have been sought.
H. J .  Schmandt and G. R. Stephens measure output as the  number o f
func t ions  in a p o l ice  department in reaching the  conclusion t h a t
37economies of  s c a l e  do e x i s t .  One o f  the  more recen t  in v es t ig a t io n s  
follows th e  method o f  Hirsch and obta ins  r e s u l t s  t h a t  tend to  re in fo rce
the e a r l i e r  conclusion  t h a t  economies o f  s ca le  do not e x i s t  in law
* 38 enforcement.
35Les ter  C. Thurow, "Equity versus  Ef f ic iency  in Law Enforcement," 
Public P o l i cy , 18 (Summer, 1970), pp. 451-62.
36
Werner Z. Hirsch,  "Expenditure Implica tions  o f  Metropolitan 
Growth and C onso l ida t ion ,"  Review o f  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , 41 
(August, 1959),  pp. 232-41.
37Henry J .  Schmandt and G. Ross Stephens,  "Measuring Municipal 
Output," National Tax J o u r n a l , 13 (December, 1960),  pp. 369-75.
38L. R. Gabier ,  "Economies and Diseconomies o f  Scale in Urban 
Public S ec to r s , "  Land Economics, 45 (November, 1969),  pp. 425-34.
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Studies o f  t h i s  type devote considerable  e f f o r t  to  developing
measures o f  po l ice  output as they  at tempt to  determine the  cos t
condit ions  under which the  ou tpu t  i s  generated.  Extensions of  the
approach o f ten  become involved in determination of  the s p e c i f i c  level
of output through an examination of  expendi ture.  As an example,
Roy W. Bahl uses da ta  from 198 c i t i e s  to  id e n t i fy  nine s i g n i f i c a n t
v a r iab les  t h a t  expla in  v a r i a t i o n s  in per cap i ta  expenditures  fo r  
39pol ice  p ro tec t io n .
The common element in  the  publ ic  f inance approach to study of 
crime and law enforcement i s  a t t e n t i o n  to  the  q u a l i ty  and quan t i ty  of 
output fo r  a given expendi ture  level and in some cases a t t e n t i o n  to 
the  determination of  the  expenditure  level  i t s e l f .  Such s tud ie s  do not 
e x p l i c i t l y  analyze criminal dec is ions  and the e f f e c t s  of  law enforcement 
on these  dec i s ions .
3. Crime Output Models
This approach to  crime and law enforcement t r e a t s  the  
criminal as a producer o f  cr ime, an output which imposes cos ts  on 
s o c ie ty .  The dec is ion  to  produce i s  analyzed as a typica l  economic 
decis ion  based on expected re tu rns  and c o s t s .  Costs o f  both crime and 
law enforcement become germane in  analyzing the des i red  le v e l s  of  law 
enforcement a c t i v i t y .
As f a r  back as the  1930s,  the  cos ts  o f  crime were conceptua­
l i z ed  by the  Wickersham Commission in an e f f o r t  to  develop some 
gu ide l ines  fo r  policy-making purposes.  However, fo r  over t h i r t y  years
^^Roy W. Bahl, Metropol itan City  Expenditures (Lexington, Ky. 
Univers ity  o f  Kentucky P re s s ,  1969),  pp. 67-69.
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e x p l i c i t  concern over the  economic impact o f  crime and law enforcement
were n e g l ig ib le .
In the  1960s, J .  P. Martin and J .  Bradley i n i t i a t e d  a study of
40
crime cos ts  in Great B r i t a in .  Their  purpose was to  begin development
of  a foundation th a t  would be useful in a more ra t io n a l  approach to
policymaking. The developments in B r i ta in  appear to  have begun with
an in tens ive  study o f  the  co s t s  o f  crime without f irm commitment to  a
th e o re t i c a l  foundation.  At the  present t ime, major surveys of  manpower
41
a l lo c a t io n  have been completed in an i n i t i a l  undertaking. The
B r i t i sh  a c t i v i t i e s  appear to  be l a rge ly  independent of American
inf luence ,  and v ice  ve rsa .
In 1967 Thomas C. Sche l l ing  developed a paper for  the  P re s id e n t ' s
Commission analyzing underworld e n te rp r i s e s  opera ting  in the  area  of
42i l l e g a l  goods and s e r v ic e s .  Using the  pe rspec t ive  of economics, the 
paper i s  concerned with  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  market and functions  of 
the  firm as Schell ing at tempts  to  deal with mat te rs  of  overhead co s t s ,  
monopolist ic p r i c in g ,  i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n  o f  c o s t s ,  and governance o f  the 
market.  Sche l l ing  i d e n t i f i e s  the  condit ions  encouraging development of 
criminal e n te r p r i s e s  and the  advantages and disadvantages t h a t  such 
organiza t ions  generate  to  so c ie ty .  Although th e  model i s  concerned with
40J .  P. Martin and J .  Bradley,  "Design of  a Study o f  the  Cost of 
Crime," B r i t i s h  Journal o f  Criminology (October,  1964), pp. 591-603.
P. Martin and Gail Wilson, The Po l ice ;  A Study in Man­
power (London: Heinemann, 1969).
42Thomas C. S che l l ing ,  "Economic Analysis and Organized Crime," 
appendix 0 in ;  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis­
t r a t i o n  o f  J u s t i c e ,  Organized Crime, "Task Force Report ," (Washington,
B.C.: Government P r in t in g  O f f i ce ,  1967), pp. 114-26.
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o u tpu t ,  S c h e l l i n g 's  model i s  conceptua lly  o r ien ted  and deals primari ly  
with criminal a c t i v i t y  c a r r i e d  on by o rgan iza t ions  (f irms) r a th e r  than 
in d iv idua ls ;  and the  crimes a re  l a rg e ly  o u ts ide  the  Index offense  
category.
A s im i l a r  a p p l ic a t io n  of  economic a n a ly s i s  to  na rco t ics  d i s t r i ­
bution was pursued by Simon Rottenberg in e a r ly  1968.^^ Rottenberg 
examined quasimonopoly firms involved in d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  a nominal 
product,  he ro in ,  and a se rv ice  ou tpu t ,  concealment. P r o f i t  maximiza­
t ion  and cos t  minimization using marginal revenue and marginal cos t  a re  
used to  expla in  how th e  criminal e n t e r p r i s e  decides upon i t s  level of  
ope ra t ions ,  with  high p r o f i t s  being the  r e s u l t  o f  c a r t e l l i z a t i o n  and 
the  high r i s k  na ture  of  the  f i r m 's  a c t i v i t i e s .
Both Sche l l ing  and Rottenberg concentra te  on the  "vic timless"  
type of  cr iminal a c t i v i t y  where a marketable good o r  se rv ice  i s  involved 
as opposed to  the  more t r a d i t i o n a l  criminal of fenses  o f  the Index 
offense  category .  Although o thers  had used economic concepts and 
terminology, i t  was the appearance of the  model o f  Gary S. Becker t h a t  
marked the  in t roduc t ion  o f  a d e ta i l e d  output model app l icab le  to  a l l  
forms o f  criminal  a c t i v i t y .
In Professor  Becker ' s  d e f i n i t i v e  a r t i c l e ,  the  ob jec t ive  of  the
criminal j u s t i c e  system i s  minimization o f  the  t o t a l  social  loss  from
44crime and the  criminal j u s t i c e  system. He f i r s t  p o s i t s  a model of
43Simon Rottenberg,  "The Clandest ine  D is t r ib u t io n  of Heroin,
I t s  Discovery and Suppression,"  Journal o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 76 
(January -  February,  1968),  pp. 78-90.
44Gary S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," 
Journal of  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 76 (March -  A p r i l ,  1968), pp. 169-217.
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criminal behavior wherein the  level  of crime i s  determined by th e  proba­
b i l i t y  of convic t ion and th e  amount of  punishment in a manner 
reminiscent of  Jeremy Bentham.
Becker assumes th e  same motivat ions are  involved as in legal 
a c t i v i t y .  For each criminal o f f en s e ,  there  i s  a supply func t ion  which 
r e l a t e s  the crime r a t e  t o  the  p ro b a b i l i ty  of  conv ic t ion ,  punishment, 
and t a s t e s  or o the r  v a r i a b l e s ,  such as a l t e r n a t iv e  sources of  income. 
Offenses will  be committed as long as the expected u t i l i t y  o f  th e  
offense  exceeds the expected u t i l i t y  from a l t e r n a t i v e  uses o f  h is
resources .  Since only a f r a c t i o n  of  the  offenders a re  punished,
45th e re  i s  u n cer ta in ty  and p r i c e  d isc r im ina t ion .
The p r o b a b i l i ty  o f  convic t ion  and amount of  punishment a re  two 
policy  va r iab les  through which th e  level of each crime can be regu la ted .  
That the output o f  c r im ina ls  genera tes  harm or a d i r e c t  soc ia l  cos t  
has long been recognized; however, the  two policy v a r ia b le s  themselves 
involve socia l  co s t s  t h a t  must be considered in enforcement. Consid­
ering the to ta l  soc ia l  c o s t  func t ion  as the  sum of  d i r e c t  crime c o s t s ,  
apprehension c o s t s ,  and punishment c o s t s ,  Becker minimizes th e  cos t  
function  with re sp ec t  to  th e  two policy  v a r iab le s .  The optimal 
condit ions  i d e n t i fy  the  marginal socia l  cos t  and marginal socia l  
b e n e f i t  of  a change in e i t h e r  o f  the  policy v a r ia b le s .
One v i r t u e  o f  Professor  Becker 's  approach i s  i t s  e x p l i c i t  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  contro l  v a r i a b le s  in a complete model o f  the  cr iminal 
j u s t i c e  system, a development which provides r ig o r  and the  oppor tuni ty  
fo r  empirical i n v e s t ig a t i o n .  Three o f  his students  have c a r r i e d  on
45
I b i d . ,  pp. 176-77.
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separa te  i n v e s t ig a t i o n s  of  the  implica tions  of  the  model. Arleen Smigel
Leibowitz used a reg ress ion  fo r  48 s t a t e s  and found evidence supporting
Becker 's  hypothesi s  t h a t  criminal responses to  changes in the  p ro b a b i l i ty
46of  convic t ion  were g re a te r  than responses to  changes in punishments.
Ephraim Kleiman used data from Pa le s t in e  to  examine another matte r
ra ised  by Becker, the  r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  between f in e s  and pr ison  
47sentences .  However, the  most s i g n i f i c a n t  empirical work i s  cu r re n t ly  
being c a r r i e d  on by Dr. Isaac Ehrlich a t  the  National Bureau of  Economic 
Research.
Ehr lich  a p p l i e s  a s im i la r  model to determine the  d e t e r r e n t
e f f e c t s  of  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  convic t ion and punishment then examines
48
the components o f  t a s t e s  fo r  crime. An extens ion of  the  ana lys is  
a t tempts  to  determine the  p roduc t iv i ty  o f  public  expenditure  on law 
enforcement. Despite  the  shortcomings o f  h is  d a ta ,  the  r e s u l t s  thus 
f a r  appear to  be encouraging.
Although th e  approach developed by Professor Becker i s  of  
q u i te  r e c en t  o r i g i n ,  i t  i s  recognized as the  most soph is t i ca ted  
approach y e t  taken  in  an economic ana lys i s  of  crime as i t  has generated
46
Arleen Smigel Leibowitz,  "Does Crime Pay? An Economic Analysis ,"  
(unpublished M.A. t h e s i s ,  Columbia U nive rs i ty ,  1965).
47
Ephraim Kleiman, "The Choice Between Two Bads: Some Economic 
Aspects o f  Criminal Sentencing," (unpublished manuscript ,  Hebrew 
U nive rs i ty ,  1967).
48
Issac  E hr l ich ,  "P a r t i c ip a t io n  in I l l e g i t i m a t e  A c t iv i t i e s  and 
th e  Ef fec t iveness  o f  Law Enforcement," National Bureau o f  Economic 
Research: 50th Annual Report (New York: N8Ek, 1970),  pp. 76-77.
Summaries o f  c u r r e n t  e f f o r t s  a lso  appear in the  1969 and 1971 r e p o r t s .
and will  l i k e l y  continue  to  generate  f u r th e r  empirical  i n v e s t ig a t i o n s .
John R. Harr is  extends the  approach by in v e s t ig a t in g  the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l
50framework as a pol icy  v a r i a b l e .  William M. Landes has begun an
51extension  o f  the  a n a ly s i s  to  the  court  and bail  system.
While s t i l l  in a developmental s tage ,  the  output  approach 
developments, l a r g e ly  in sp i red  by Professor Becker 's  model, appear to  
be br idging the  gap between theory of the  offender  and the  a l l o c a t io n  
of law enforcement.  The incorpora tion of  the  theory  of  the  offender  
through a supply func t ion  with the  socia l  cos t  func t ion  provides th e  
necessary l i nk .
C. Model to Be Developed and Examined
The concern over crime in the United S ta t e s  and the  increased
34
49
w il l ingness  to  extend economic analys is  have r e s u l t e d  in expanded
52d iscuss ion  in profess ional c i r c l e s .  There i s  ample evidence t h a t  
d i v e r s i t y  wi l l  r u l e  fo r  some time before a syn thes is  begins to  p resen t
49Several Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n s  have a l ready  been completed.  Also, 
s im i la r  types o f  in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  de ter rence  and t a s t e s  i s  evidenced 
in the work of  some s o c io l o g i s t s .  For example: Frank D. Bean and
Robert G. Cushing, "Criminal Homicide, Punishment, and Deterrence:
Methodological and Substantive  Reconsiderations ,"  Social Science 
Q u a r te r ly , 52 (September, 1971), pp. 277-89.
Jack P. Gibbs, "Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence,"  Social  
Science Q u a r t e r ly , 48 (March, 1968), pp. 515-30.
50John R. H a r r i s ,  "On the  Economics o f  Law and Order," Journal
of  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 78 (January-February,  1970),  pp. 165-74.
51 William M. Landes, "An Economic Analysis of  the  Courts ,"
Journal o f  Law and Economics. 14 (Apri l ,  1971), pp. 61-107.
52Thomas C. S che l l ing ,  chairman, "Round Table on A l locat ion  of  
Resources in Law Enforcement," American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings , 59 (May, 1969), pp. 504-12.
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a more un ited  f r o n t .  One must begin to face t h i s  quest ion: What
does economics o f f e r  to  the  understanding of crime and law enforcement 
t h a t  i s n ' t  p re sen t ly  a v a i l a b l e  through more t r a d i t i o n a l  ways?
I t  i s  o f ten  expressed t h a t  criminals  a re  a s ick  l o t ,  or a t  l e a s t  
t h a t  "something" i s  wrong with them. One simply does not o rd in a r i l y  
assume criminal a c t ions  in regard to crime as normal. The examination 
of  t r a d i t i o n a l  t h e o r i e s  o f  crime causation provides a glimpse a t  the 
cu r ren t  exp lana t ions ,  each of  which appears to  lead to  a logical  policy 
choice.
In the c l a s s i c a l  d e t e r r e n t  approach, which i s  imbedded in our 
legal system, the  s o lu t io n  to  crime problems i s  through changed leve l s  
of pol ice  or punishment of  "law and order ."  The b io log ica l  and 
psychological explanations  lead to  remedial measures,  such as c l i n i c a l  
trea tment ,  psychotherapy, e t c .  D i f fe ren t ia l  a s so c ia t io n  and anomie 
would suggest  modif ica t ions  o f  the  environment, inc luding  perhaps the
53
For examples o f  the  d iverse  f ro n ts  in t h i s  development see:
J .  J .  Tobias,  "The Crime Indus t ry ,"  B r i t i s h  Journal o f  Criminology, 8 
( Ju ly ,  1968), pp. 247-58.
Martin T. Katzman, "The Economics of  Defense Against Crime,"
Land Economics, 44 (November, 1968), pp. 431-40.
Gordon Tul lock ,  "An Economic Approach to  Crime," Social Science 
Q uar te r ly , 50 (June,  1969),  pp. 59-71.
Les ter  C. Thurow and Carl Rappaport,  "Law Enforcement and 
Cost-Benefit  A na lys is ,"  Public Finance, 24 (Summer, 1969),  pp. 48-64.
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economic system i t s e l f .  Ind iv idual ized  trea tment with in  the  co r rec t io n a l  
system as opposed to uniform punishment i s  s trongly encouraged in most 
of the recent  socio log ica l  t h e o r i e s .
Each spec ia l ized  approach tends  to  exaggerate some in f luences  
and ignore o th e r s ,  while multi causal explanat ions may tend to lack  the 
abs t rac t ion  necessary fo r  a more useful theory.  There has thus  f a r  
been l i t t l e  harmonization in the d iverse  viewpoints. Nonetheless,  the 
law continues to  f i x  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on the  individual as he i s  assumed 
culpable fo r  h is  a c t s .
While a l l  recognize t h a t  criminal a c t i v i t y  and the  criminal 
j u s t i c e  system are  c o s t l y ,  l i t t l e  i s  known about the e f f e c t s  o f  i n ­
creasing the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  resources  to  combat crime. C er ta in ly  
objec t ive  measures are  d e s i r ab le  when th e re  i s  increased employment of 
resources fo r  any purpose; and an economic approach to  crime and law 
enforcement promises a viewpoint t h a t  presents  some quest ions  t h a t  
otherwise may not be made e x p l i c i t .
The model to  be developed and examined below i s  based upon th a t  
of  Gary S. Becker. Although the  supply o f  crime function in the  
approach resembles the c l a s s i c a l  de ter rence  pos it ion  which has received 
sustained c r i t i c i s m ,  the  model does r e l a t e  c lose ly  to  the  p resen t  
s t ru c tu re  of  the  law and law enforcement policy.  I t  does not examine 
the e f f e c t s  of changes in the  criminal j u s t i c e  system. The model 
i d e n t i f i e s  the p ra c t ic a l  policy  v a r iab le s  involved in cu r re n t  e f f o r t s  
to  deal with the  crime problem as a s p e c i f i c  problem o f  the  American 
soc ie ty .  The allowance f o r  t a s t e  va r iab le s  e liminates  s i n g u l a r i t y  and 
enables the  model to  be compatible with a number of spec ia l  t h e o r ie s  
of the offender .  The incorpora t ion  o f  the  crime function with the
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cost  func t ion  provides a useful bridge fo r  obta in ing some guidance in 
the use o f  resources  fo r  th e  control  of  crime.
In th e se  times of increased crime c o s t s ,  no one v/ay of  examining 
crime can be considered s u f f i c i e n t .  The rules-of-thumb approach of  law 
enforcement may be appreciably improved i f  the  t r a d e o f f s  involved in 
decis ion making a re  more c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d .  I t  i s  hoped t h a t  the  
following an a ly s i s  wi l l  make p oss ib le  a b e t t e r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  
quest ions t h a t  a re  i n t r i c a t e l y  involved in use of law enforcement 
resources .
CHAPTER I I I
Economics is  a l l  about how people make cho ices .  
Sociology i s  a l l  about why people d o n ' t  have any 
choices  to  make.
James S. Duesenberry
I f  t h e r e  is  any common denominator f o r  the  minds of 
c r im in a ls ,  i t  i s  t h e i r  i n a b i l i t y  to  face r e a l i t y  
squarely  and t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  r a t i o n a l i z e .  The 
f e e l in g  th a t  " in  some magical way. I ' l l  ge t  away 
with i t ;  I won't  ge t  caught t h i s  t ime ,"  pervades 
t h e i r  th ink ing .  But, perhaps t h i s  i s  not so un­
r e a l i s t i c ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  when one r e a l i z e s  t h a t  only 
one-four th  of major crimes repor ted to the po l ice  
are  followed by conv ic t ions .
Manfred S. Guttmacher
CHAPTER I I I  
THE BASIC MODEL
The model t h a t  follows has been developed to  provide a means fo r  
analyzing th e  e f f e c t s  o f  criminal a c t i v i t y  and th e  ac t ions  aimed a t  
r e s t r i c t i n g  criminal a c t i v i t y .  The model i d e n t i f i e s  the optimum level 
of  crime, along with the  crime r e s t r i c t i n g  a c t i v i t y ,  as th a t  which 
minimizes th e  t o t a l  socia l  cos ts  of  crime,  the  expenditures on criminal 
j u s t i c e ,  and p r iv a t e  expenditures fo r  p ro tec t io n  from criminal a c t i v i t y .  
The model i s  a crime output model s ince  criminal a c t i v i t y  is  viewed as 
producing an output t h a t  imposes costs  on members o f  socie ty  who, on 
the  whole, a r e  unwill ing to bear t h i s  expense. In the model, govern­
ment expenditures  fo r  law enforcement and punishment, in addi t ion  to  
p r iv a te  expenditures  fo r  p ro tec t ion  from crime, determine the level of  
crime t h a t  i s  allowed to  e x i s t .
The model i s  developed in terms o f  one s p e c i f i c  type o f  crime 
and i n i t i a l l y  a b s t r a c t s  from considera t ion  those  p r iv a te  ac t ions  t h a t  
might be used to  r e s t r i c t  criminal a c t i v i t y .  I t  i s  assumed throughout 
t h a t  the re  a r e  no changes in laws def in ing  e i t h e r  criminal a c t i v i t y  or  
offender  a t t i t u d e s  toward obedience to the law. This i n i t i a l  develop­
ment a t  t imes follows c lo se ly  the  th e o re t i c a l  framework of  Gary S.
■j
Becker 's  s o p h i s t i c a te d  model.
^Becker,  Journal o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 76,  pp. 169-84.
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Following t h i s  i n i t i a l  development, a depar tu re  i s  made by
introducing th e  p r iv a te  ac t ions  o f  indiv iduals  who in tend  to  reduce t h e i r
own v u l n e r a b i l i t y  to  crime incidence through the  expenditure  of  resources 
fo r  t h i s  purpose.
In the  model to  fo llow,  the  level of  crime i s  determined by the 
re tu rns  and co s t s  as viewed by th e  poten t ia l  of fender .  Law enforcement 
i s  viewed from the  economic perspec t ive  of costs  and b e n e f i t s .  On t h i s  
b a s i s ,  i t  may be concluded t h a t  the  approach i s  economic in na ture .
A . Supply of  Crime
B as ica l ly ,  d i f f e rences  in individual t a s t e s  and preferences 
d i s t in g u i sh  th e  criminal from the  noncriminal.  A p o te n t ia l  criminal 
wi ll  commit an i l l e g a l  a c t  i f  the  expected gains from the  ac t  exceed the  
expected co s t s  r e s u l t in g  from the  a c t i v i t y .  I t  i s  t h e r e fo re  hypothesized 
th a t  the  p o ten t ia l  criminal wants to  maximize his  u t i l i t y  from criminal 
a c t i v i t y  in a manner descr ibed in the  concept of  the  economic man used 
in analyzing th e  decis ions  t h a t  a re  made in legal a c t i v i t y .
Then the  supply func t ion  fo r  crime may be w r i t t e n  as 
C = C (p,  s ,  u) (1)
when C i s  the  number of  crimes o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  type; when p i s  the
p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  convict ion f o r  each offense;  when s i s  th e  sentence or 
punishment i f  convicted;  and when u i s  a t a s t e  or  s to c h a s t i c  var iab le  
rep resen t ing  a l l  o ther in f luences  such as law-abid ingness ,  income from
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legal a c t i v i t y ,  and so on.
In Chapter II  several  theor ies  o f  criminal behavior were 
examined. Because of i t s  g en era l i ty  the  supply o f  crime func tion as 
i l l u s t r a t e d  may be compatible with many (or a l l )  of these  t h e o r ie s .  
Advocacy of  the  c l a s s i c a l  de te r rence ,  b io lo g ic a l ,  psychological ,  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  a s s o c ia t i o n ,  or anomic approach, i s  not of any question 
in t h i s  supply of  crime func t ion .  I t  should be noted,  however, t h a t  
the  c l a s s i c a l  d e t e r r e n t  approach emphasizes the e f f e c t s  o f  p and s on 
crime, while the  remaining explanations  h igh l igh t  fac to rs  which t h i s  
model includes  in t a s t e s  fo r  crime.
Though c o m pat ib i l i ty  with d iverse  th eo r ie s  of criminal behavior 
i s  expected in the  development of  t h i s  paper, t a s t e s  are  assumed to  be 
fixed by invoking the  condit ion c e t e r i s  p a r ibus , which thereby provides 
an opportuni ty  to  examine in d iv idua l ly  the e f f e c t s  of changes in these  
two components of  cos ts  to  an offender.
Economics expla ins  behavior in decis ion making on the  bas is  of  
r e tu rn s ,  c o s t s ,  and t a s t e s .  To the po ten t ia l  criminal both p and s 
rep resen t  exogenous cos ts  of  committing a crime. Thus, one a n t i c ip a t e s  
an inverse  r e l a t io n s h ip  between the crime level and the  two exogenous 
va r iab les  so t h a t
0, iÇ 0. (2)
3p 98
2
Legal punishment fo r  Index offenses  i s  predominately a prison  
sentence.  Occasional ly ,  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of the  offender ,  such as his 
age, r e s u l t s  in probation r a th e r  than pr ison . In t h i s  paper s should be 
thought of  as a prison term.
In h is  a r t i c l e .  Professor Becker devotes considerable  a t t e n t i o n  
to f ines  and the  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  f ines  fo r  pr ison .  As f ines  a re  seldom 
the  form o f  punishment f o r  Index o f fenses ,  t h i s  form o f  punishment and 
s u b s t i t u t io n  is-  l a rg e ly  ignored in t h i s  paper.
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An indiv idua l  offender may not expect to be caught and punished; 
however, he i s  aware o f  t h i s  r i s k .  Perhaps master offenders  genera l ly  
avoid g e t t i n g  caught,  and i t  i s  only the  unsophis t ica ted  who a re  detec ted 
and punished. Though such a d i s p a r i t y  as t h i s  may occur ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
dep ic ts  average behavior—as i s  the  case with much economic a n a l y s i s — 
and may th e r e f o r e  be explanatory  o f  criminal a c t i v i t y  in genera l .
Law enforcement o f f i c i a l s  through t h e i r  general  a t t i t u d e  t h a t  
c e r t a i n t y  i s  a more important d e t e r r e n t  than s e v e r i t y ,  would i n f e r  t h a t  
the  p a r t i a l  e l a s t i c i t y  of the  supply of  offenses  i s  g r e a t e r  f o r  changes 
in p than f o r  changes in s .  As the se  e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  examined in 
g rea te r  d e t a i l  l a t e r  ( p . 54 ) ,  a complete examination of t h i s  opinion i s  
not made a t  t h i s  po in t .  However, i t  may be noted t h a t  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  
in fe r s  t h a t
p ac  ^ s 3C 
” c 8p " c 9s. (3)
Hence, a given percentage increase  in p has a g re a te r  negative  e f f e c t  on 
the  crime level  than a s im i la r  increase  in s .
Since a s u b s tan t ia l  p a r t  o f  the  c o s t  of punishment to  the  
offender i s  the  stigma of convic t ion and going to p r i son—and t h i s  i s  
la rge ly  independent o f  the  pr ison term—a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  the  
punishment c o s t  to  th e  offender may be f ixed  independently o f  a v a r ia b le  
c o s t ,  the  length  o f  time in p r ison .  Also the re  i s  evidence th a t  beyond
some a t t a i n a b l e  l i m i t  —  = 0.^9s
3
As th e  d iscuss ion  i s  in terms o f  values of  s ex ternal  to  the  
individua l o f f en d e r ,  the  d e t e r r e n t  e f f e c t  i s  considered in the  c r iminolo­
g i s t ' s  ca tegory  o f  "general p reven t ion ."  For examples o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  
dimensions o f  de te r re n ce ,  r e f e r  to  the  following:
Roger Hood and Richard Sparks,  Key Issues in  Criminology (New 
York: World Univers i ty  L ibrary ,  1970),  pp. 172-751
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For punishment to  r e f l e c t  a pos i t iv e  marginal cos t  to  him, the 
po ten t ia l  criminal must be l ieve  the  a u th o r i t i e s  a re  both wi l l i ng  and 
able  to  impose the  punishment on him as a r e s u l t  of  a criminal a c t .
That i s ,  the  t h r e a t  o f  punishment must have both a p p l i c a b i l i t y  and
4
c r e d i b i l i t y .  As the  p o te n t i a l  o f fender  l i k e ly  has an imperfect  know­
ledge o f  p and s ,  i t  i s  the  perceived values of these  v a r i a b le s  t h a t  
a re  r e l e v a n t .  This sugges ts  t h a t  p o l i c i e s  leading to  an exaggerated 
perception of  p o r  s may reduce the  crime level as long as  c r e d i b i l i t y  
e x i s t s .  I t  i s  poss ib le  t h a t  a campaign in the  media c r e a t in g  the 
impression t h a t  offenders  a re  caught and convicted with more r e l a t i v e  
frequency than i s  a c t u a l l y  t h e  case would reduce the  o f fense  level 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  even though ac tua l  l e v e l s  o f  p and s a re  completely 
unchanged. I f  overs ta tement would have a s im i la r  e f f e c t  over long 
periods  o f  time may be an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  matter .
Since some g u i l t y  escape convic t ion and punishment i s  meted out 
only to  those convicted o f  a crime, not to  a l l  who commit a crime, th e re  
i s  u n cer ta in ty  and p r i c e  d i sc r im in a t io n  in the  co s t  o f  committing 
criminal a c t s .
As th e  gains  from a criminal a c t  are  sub jec t  to u n c e r t a in ty ,  
th e re  i s  reason to examine the  c r i m i n a l ' s  a t t i t u d e  toward u n cer ta in ty  
i t s e l f .  Assuming the  o f fender  maximizes u t i l i t y  (U) which i s  a function 
o f  h is  ne t  income from criminal a c t i v i t y  (W^), then h is  expected 
u t i l i t y  (ExU) can be depic ted  as a r e l a t i o n  o f  cr iminal income.
4
Franklin E. Zimring, Perspect ives  on Dete r rence , Publ ic  
Health Service  P ub l ica t ion  No. 2050 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
P r in t ing  O ff ice ,  1971), pp. 65-68.
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th e  p ro b a b i l i ty  of convic t ion (p) ,  and cos t s  of punishment to him ( s ) ,  
as
ExU = pU (W^  -  s)  + (1 - p) U(W^). (4)
Since punishment i s  a co s t  to  the  o f fender ,  s > 0.  D i f f e r e n t i a t ­
ing (4) with respec t  to  p, s ,  and y ie ld s
= u(w^ -  s )  -  U(W_) < 0 
3p ^ ^
8ExU =-pu, (w _ s) < 0 (4a)
9s ^
and
9ExU _ pu* _ s) = (1  -  p )  U'(W ) > 0 .
9W^
An increase  in p or s reduces expected u t i l i t y  and the tendency 
fo r  an offender to commit o f f en se s ,  while an increase  in has the 
e f f e c t  o f  increas ing  th e  u t i l i t y  from offenses  and the  tendency fo r  
offenses  to  occur.  The widely held opinion o f  law enforcement o f f i c i a l s  
t h a t  c r iminals  a re  more de te r red  by increases  in p than by increases  in 
s would i n f e r  than an increase  in  p o f f s e t  by a compensating (equal 
percent)  decrease in s would not change the  expected income from an 
of fense  but would reduce u t i l i t y  expected from of fenses .  This p o s i t ion
5
would mean t h a t  c r imina ls  tend to  be r i s k  p r e f e r r e r s .
This matter  can be shown as fo llows. Using the  e l a s t i c i t y  
expressions involving expected u t i l i t y  y ie ld s




y.ÇWc). :^u(wc-s),  > u ' ( W c - s ) .  (4c)
s <
The term on the l e f t  o f  (4c) denotes th e  average change in 
u t i l i t y  between (Wc) and (Wc-s), the r i g h t  hand term i s  the  marginal 
u t i l i t y  a t  (Wc - s ) . Risk preference i s  expressed by u" > 0,  as the re  
i s  inc reas ing  marginal u t i l i t y  of  income as income inc reases .  Persons 
who e x h ib i t  r i s k  prefe rence  w i l l ,  when given a choice between a sure 
income and f a i r  odds fo r  a higher income, choose the  chance f o r  the 
higher income as th e  ex t ra  d o l l a r s  of  income a re  valued more highly 
than the  d o l l a r s  o f  the c e r t a i n  but lower income. U" > 0 in f e r s  
increas ing  marginal u t i l i t y  of  income, a condi t ion  assoc ia ted  with r i s k  
p re fe rence .^
I t  i s  expected t h a t  the  responses o f  cr imina ls  to  changes in p 
and s wi l l  vary widely fo r  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  crime and may a l so  vary 
widely among ind iv id u a ls  as each contemplates the  same crime. For 
example, th e  person committing the  so -ca l led  "crime of  passion" may 
show l e s s  response to  changes in cos ts  to  the  offender than i f  he were 
committing the  o th e r  cr imes.^
Why might c e r t a in  types o f  crime take  place  with l i t t l e  response 
to the  cos ts  involved or increases  in those costs?  The s to ch a s t ic
The m at te r  of choice under condi t ions  of  uncer ta in ty  i s  
examined ex tens ive ly  in:
Milton Friedman and L. J .  Savage, "The U t i l i t y  Analysis of  
Choices Involving Risk," Journal o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 56 (August, 
1948), pp. 279-304.
^Of the  Index o f f e n s e s ,  "crimes o f  passion" a re  considered to  
be murder,  rap e ,  and aggravated a s s a u l t .
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term (u) in equation (1 ) may rep resen t  in tense  fe e l in g s  t h a t  reduce 
s e n s i t i v i t y  to  th e  values o f  p or s fo r  these  o f fen ses .  In some cases 
u may rep re sen t  s i g n i f i c a n t  v a r i a b le s ,  such as educat ional  a t ta inment ,  
unemployment, income l e v e l ,  e t c . ,  which may be spec i f ied  and examined
Q
em pir ica l ly .
B. R e s t r i c t in g  Crime through Public Action
Since pub l ic  a u t h o r i t i e s  have control  over the  values of  p and 
s ,  the expected gains from crime are  determined by public pol icy .  The 
punishment (s)  can be s e t  p rec i se ly  by the l e g i s l a t u r e  o f  a s t a t e ,  
though in t e r a c t io n  o f  p rosecutor ,  judge,  j u r y ,  and paro le  boards are
9
of ten  impor tant.  In th inking  of the  subs tan t ive  content o f  s in t h i s  
paper,  i t  i s  worthwhile to  consider s as the  time a po ten t ia l  offender 
a n t i c ip a t e s  he w i l l  have to  serve in prison i f  he i s  convicted.  This 
period w il l  r e f l e c t  th e  determination o f  sentence by the  e n t i r e  
criminal j u s t i c e  system.
Determination of  the  p ro b a b i l i ty  of  convic t ion  i s  l e s s  c e r t a in .  
Increas ing the  resources  of  law enforcement,  p r im ar i ly  po l ice  manpower, 
will  undoubtedly,  r a i s e  p,  but by how much? Actual ly ,  p could be 
r a i sed  to  near un i ty  by having a policeman on every block, a policy 
t h a t  would l i k e l y  r e s u l t  in dram at ica l ly  lower crime l e v e l s .
Q
Much o f  the  research  in crime causation by so c io lo g i s t s  and 
c r im ino log is t s  emphasizes such v a r iab les  as do the  s tu d ie s  by F le ishe r  
noted in  Chapter I I .  Since these  aggregates a re  not d i r e c t l y  a p a r t  of 
the  law enforcement system and can be changed only q u i te  slowly with 
imprecise r e s u l t s ,  they a re  not analyzed in t h i s  chap te r .
9
For a p a r t i c u l a r  o f fense ,  th e re  i s  u sua l ly  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r en ce  between the  formal sentence and actual time served. I t  i s  
the  time an o ffender  expects to serve t h a t  i s  considered re lev an t  in 
the  model.
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With p and s r a i s ed  to  s u f f i c i e n t  l e v e l s  th e  supply o f  crime 
could be r e s t r i c t e d  to  very low l e v e l s .  This procedure i s  not followed 
and may not be f e a s i b l e  when th e re  i s  an examination of the  cos ts  o f  
law enforcement. The re sources  necessary fo r  a v i r t u a l l y  crimeless  
soc ie ty  may exceed s o c i e t y ' s  va lua t ion  of  t h i s  near  c r im e-f ree  s t a t e .
An e x p l i c i t  understanding o f  t h i s  mat te r  i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by an examina­
t i o n  o f  the  various c o s t s  a ssoc ia ted  with public crime r e s t r i c t i n g  
ac t ion  as well as the  r e s u l t a n t  harm o f  crime i t s e l f .
C. Costs of Crime and Law Enforcement
The basic  reason f o r  d ec la r ing  c e r t a in  a c t s  i l l e g a l  i s  t h a t  the  
a c t  imposes cos ts  on an unwil l ing v ic tim in a manner t h a t  serves  no 
useful purpose f o r  so c ie ty .^ ^  Death,  i n ju r y ,  and defensive  a c t s ,  such 
as changed modes o f  l i f e ,  f e a r ,  and lo s s  or des t ru c t io n  o f  p roper ty ,  
a re  the vic tim o r  d i r e c t  c o s t s ,  V, o f  crime. These cos ts  to  the  vic tim 
a re  a d i r e c t  func t ion  of  the  supply o f  crimes so t h a t :
V = V ( c ) ,  w i t h  1 ^  > 0 .  ( 5 )
I t  i s  p resen t ly  impossible to  quant i fy  the  cos ts  o f  f e a r  and o f  
most de fensive  a c t i o n s .  Loss o r  damage to  proper ty  i s  more e a s i l y  
ca lcu lab le  and damages due to  in ju ry  or  death have been ca lcu la ted  fo r  
o ther  purposes.  Added complexity i s  introduced by the  e f f e c t  t h a t  
f e a r  may have on r e t a i l  e s tab l i shm en ts ,  r e s t a u r a n t s ,  and th e a t e r s  in 
high crime a reas .  Though the  business  i t s e l f  may face  an element of
Almost any d e f i n i t i o n  o f  crime i s  vulnerable  to  c r i t i c i s m .  
The sta tement  used above i s  s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  the  purposes a t  hand. As 
a beginning fo r  the  i n t e r e s t e d  person r e f e r  to  the  fol lowing:
Henry M. Har t ,  J r . ,  "The Aims of  the  Criminal Law," Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 23 (Summer, 1958), pp. 401-41.
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v ic t im  cos ts  as defined above, th e re  a re  add i t iona l  cos ts  assoc ia ted  
with lo s s  o f  revenue and earn ings .  Analytical  convenience i s  served 
by consider ing  V as inc lu s ive  o f  a l l  these  crime c o s t s ,  whether or not 
measurable ,  with p r iv a te  p ro te c t iv e  expenditures  not included a t  t h i s  
p o in t  in  the  development.
There i s  not reason to  presume t h a t  the  co s t s  to  the vic tim must 
in some way be r e l a t e d  to  the  gains to  th e  o f fender .  The offender may 
t r e a t  the  v ic t im cos ts  p a r t l y  o r  wholly as an e x t e r n a l i t y .  The f a i l u r e  
o f  th e  market mechanism to  i n t e r n a l i z e  the  negative  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  
(diseconomies) may provide a reason fo r  ex is tence  o f  public ac t ion  to 
r e s t r i c t  crime. Also p r iv a te  expenditures  fo r  p ro tec t ion  may bene f i t  
o th e r s  who do not support  the  p ro te c t iv e  a c t i v i t y .^ ^
When a crime i s  committed, the  v ic t im  su s ta in s  a loss  while the  
o f fender  ga ins .  For some crimes,  such as those involving proper ty ,  th e  
d i r e c t  cos ts  to  the  v ic tim may be p a r t l y  or  t o t a l l y  o f f s e t  by the gains 
to  t h e  of fender .  Even in t h i s  c a se ,  however, th e re  i s  a loss  to  
s o c i e ty  equal t o  the  rea l  input o f  the  o ffender  in the  form of  labor  
and c a p i t a l .  For t h i s  reason, as well as f o r  the  socia l  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  
o f  crime i t s e l f ,  the  gains  to  the  offender ( in  t h i s  paper) are  ignored 
when determining the  optimum level of  enforcement.
Although v ic tim c o s t s ,  V, may be reduced to  a very low level  by
r a i s i n g  p to  near u n i ty  and imposing a more severe  punishment, s ,  t h i s
may not be f e a s i b l e  because o f  th e  increased cos ts  of  a higher p and
s .  The c o s t s  o f  convic t ion  f i r s t  involve apprehension so t h a t  law
Often the  v ic tim plays some ro le  in h is  v ic t im iza t io n  from 
cr ime. Keys l e f t  in the  i g n i t io n  o f  an au to ,  unlocked doors ,  and o th e r  
forms o f  c a re le s sness  a re  examples. Some aspec ts  of  these  r e l a t i o n s h ip s  
w i l l  be examined l a t e r  in p a r t  F of t h i s  chapter .
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enforcement,  or p o l ice  a c t i v i t y ,  i s  important in determining p. I f  R 
represen ts  the  level o f  use o f  law enforcement re sou rces ,  then
p =  p ( R ) ,  w i t h  < 0 .  ( 6 )
I f  P re p re se n ts  t h e  cos t  of  law enforcement re sou rces ,  pr im ari ly
po l ice ,  then
P = P ( R ) ,  w i t h  | |  > 0 .  ( 7 )
For reasons t h a t  a re  apparent as i l l u s t r a t e d ,  i t  i s  necessary
12to assume equat ions  ( 6 ) and (7) with each possessing an inverse .
I f  t a s t e s  a re  held c o n s t a n t ,  the d i r e c t  cos ts  of  crime may be 
w r i t t en  as
V =  ( p ,  s )  =  V 2 ( R ,  s ) =  Vg  ( P ,  s ) , ( 8 )
with the  r e s t r i c t i o n  t h a t  each func t ion  possesses an inverse .
Since most o f  th e  expenditures  fo r  law enforcement a re  fo r
personnel ,  increased law enforcement i s  e f fec ted  pr im ar i ly  through an
increased number of  policemen, though expenditures f o r  prosecution and
1 3
courts  may be included.
Costs o f  punishment r e p re se n t  a somewhat more complex va r iab le  
because they involve the  c o s t s  to  those convicted and in c a rce ra ted ,  to  
t h e i r  f a m i l i e s ,  and to  the  s t a t e ;  however, t h e re  a re  poss ib le  bene f i t s  
to o thers  in the  form o f  reduced crime l e v e l s .  To insure  comparab i l i ty .
12
The inverse  o f  each function  wil l  be needed fo r  equation (18) 
below. Le t t ing  e denote  th e  in verse  o f  (6 ) and <|) the  inverse  o f  (7 ) ,  
then R = 9 '  ( p ) , a n d , R  = ())' (P).
13
^  < 0 , a n d ,  3V < 0 . I f  there  a re  decreasing  re tu rn s  to  law 
3R 3P
enforcement re so u rce s ,  < q when the  cos t  of  an add i t iona l  u n i t  of
law enforcement resources  i s  cons tan t  or r i s i n g .
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th e  r e lev an t  co s t s  and b e n e f i t s  n e ce s sa r i ly  must be expressed as monetary
va lues .  In add i t io n  to psychic lo sses  and socia l  stigma t h a t  may reduce
fu tu re  ea rn in g s ,  those convicted face  losses  of  income, consumption,
and freedom f o r  themselves and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s .  Each component may
d i f f e r  considerably  fo r  d i f f e r e n t  indiv idua ls  even f o r  the  same crime.
In the fo llowing, W represen ts  the  cos ts  of imprisonment to  the  offender
and h is  family .  W c o n s i s t s  l a rg e ly  of  l o s t  wages and consumption.
Imprisonment involves a c o s t  o f  punishment which the s t a t e  must
bear .  F a c i l i t i e s ,  guards,  food, and c lo th ing ,  which must be included in
socia l  c o s t s ,  a re  obvious co s t s  to  the  s t a t e .  However, imprisonment
may reduce soc ia l  cos ts  somewhat because of  the  b e n e f i t s  accruing from
imprisonment s ince  those who a re  incarce ra ted  w i l l  be unable to  commit
crimes during the  prison term, and i f  prisons  success fu ly  r e h a b i l i t a t e
inmates, f u tu r e  crime l e v e l s  could be reduced. Let K rep resen t  the
c o s t  of imprisonment to  the  s t a t e ,  ne t  of the  crime reducing e f f e c t s  of
in c a r c e ra t io n .  Depending on th e  r e l a t i v e  magnitude o f  these  crime
reducing e f f e c t s ,  K may be a p o s i t i v e  o r  negat ive value.  As the
sev e r i ty  o f  punishments increases  by increas ing  the  length  o f  imprison-
14
ment, s ,  c o s t s  o f  punishment to  both the  s t a t e  and the  offender r i s e .  
Let t ing  S r ep re sen t  punishment cos ts  to  s o c ie ty ,
S = W + K. (9)
The r e l a t i o n s h ip  between law enforcement resources  and punish­
ment co s t s  remains to  be i d e n t i f i e d .  As th e  p r o b a b i l i ty  of conviction
Becker (pp. 179-180) considers  the  t o t a l  socia l  costs  of f ines  
as near zero when cos ts  o f  c o l l e c t i o n  are  ignored.  As the  Index of fenses  
are  almost exempt from the  use o f  f in e s  as punishment,  t h i s  considera t ion  
does not apply to  the  p resen t  d iscuss ion .
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i s  increased by the  employment of  more resources  fo r  law enforcement,
prison population r i s e s  and leads  t o  an increase  in punishment c o s t s .
Therefore,  th e re  i s  a d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n  between employment o f  law enforce-
15ment personnel and punishment c o s t s .  Recall ing the  r e l a t i o n s h ip  
between law enforcement expenditures (P) and the  p ro b a b i l i ty  of 
convict ion (p ) ,  punishment costs  to  soc ie ty  may be w r i t t en  thus :
S = S (P, s ) .  (10)
The to t a l  or  socia l  cos ts  of  crime, L, may be represented as
follows:
L = V2  +P^-S  = V2  (R , s )  +  P (R) +  S (R) , (1 1 )
With these  r e l a t i o n s  and cos ts  in mind, i t  i s  poss ib le  to  begin 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  optimum leve l s  of  enforcement and punishment.
D. Iden t i fy ing  the  Social Optimum
From an economic poin t of  view, the  optimal level  o f  enforcement 
and punishment i s  t h a t  which minimizes the  socia l  or  t o t a l  cos ts  t h a t  
a re  due to  v ic tim c o s t s ,  law enforcement c o s t s ,  and punishment cos ts .  
Minimizing equation (11) f o r  law enforcement resources  and punishment,
and
^  = 0 .  (1 2  c o n t i n u e d )
3 s  9 s  3 s
15
A case can be made t h a t  the  s ev e r i ty  of  punishment has some 
e f f e c t  on the p ro b a b i l i ty  of convic t ion.  For example, a judge or  ju ry  
may be somewhat r e l u c t a n t  in reaching a judgment o f  g u i l t y  i f  t h i s  means 
the  imposit ion o f  a more severe punishment. No such e f f e c t  i s  assumed 
here because o f  the  uncer ta in ty  of  the  r e l a t i o n s h ip .
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9L 3L
Since and -gg- are  both equal to zero ,
9V2 _ 3P as
W  aR ~ 3R
and ( 13)
aVo _ as
95* '  9 5 -
The f i r s t  equation of (13) in d ic a te s  th a t  a t  the optimum level 
of enforcement,  th e  marginal reduction in victim co s t s  will  equal the 
marginal c o s t  of  law enforcement and the  ex t ra  co s t  of  imprisonment 
r e s u l t i n g  from law enforcement r e s o u r c e s . T h e  second equation of 
t h i s  p a i r  in d ic a te s  t h a t  a t  the optimum punishment l e v e l ,  the marginal 
reduction in  v ic tim cos ts  due to  increased punishment equals the  
marginal cos t  of  the  increased punishment. To be c e r t a in  t h a t  (13) 
rep re sen t  minima, i t  would be necessary to  spec ify  the  signs of  the  
second d e r iv a t iv e s .
Though the  r e s u l t s  of equations  (13) a re  obvious,  i t  i s  useful
to  spec i fy  a more t ransparen t  approach. Using equations  (8 ) ,  (7 ) ,  and
( 10 ) ,  the  soc ia l  cos t  funct ion can be rew r i t t en  in t h i s  manner:
L = Vg (R , s )  +  P (R) +  S ( P ,  s ) .  (1 4 )
Although i t  has been t r e a te d  as a length  of  time of  imprison­
ment, s may be transformed in to  a socia l  cos t  measure. Let s '  be 
defined as the  socia l  cos ts  of  punishment cons is t ing  o f  cos ts  of 
imprisonment to  the  s t a t e ,  money cos ts  o f  punishment to  the  offender,  
( inc lus ive  of  the  loss  to o thers  such as t o  his fam ily) ,  minus any
16 —9S
The l a s t  term, , rep re sen ts  the  e f f e c t  o f  a change in p
on S n o t e d  o n  p .  5 0 .
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gain to so c ie ty ,  such as through crime reduc t ion .  Following Becker 's  
approach qu i te  c lo se ly  and using b as a c o e f f i c i e n t  t h a t  transforms 
s in to  s ' ,
s '  = b s ,  (15)
with b as a constan t  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of the  form o f  punishment.
Ignoring c o l l e c t i o n  cos ts  assoc ia ted  with f i n e s ,  bcnQ  f o r  f in e s  
as  gains to o thers  i s  approximately equal to  the  cos t  to  the  of fender .
For imprisonment, p roba t ion ,  and pa ro le ,  b > l  as the  c o s t s  imposed on
the  offender a re  not recovered by o thers .^^
The tr ans fo rm at ion  of  s in to  socia l  cos ts  s '  permits a reformu­
l a t i o n  o f  the  t o t a l  s o c ia l  c o s t  function (equation 14).  As bs rep resen ts  
th e  socia l  cos t  o f  punishment and pC represen ts  the number o f  persons
s u b j e c t  to t h i s  punishment,  socia l  costs  o f  punishment a re  as fo llows:
S = b s p C. (16)
The t o t a l  socia l  co s t  function can now be r e w r i t t e n  in t h i s
way:
L = Vg (R , s )  +  P (R) +  b s  p C. (1 7 )
When p and s a re  considered decis ion  v a r i a b le s ,  th e  f i r s t  order  
op t im a l i ty  condi t ions  a re
3L = i V 2  9R +  9R +  bsC +  bap i Ç  = 0
9p 9R 9p 9R 9p 9p
and
( 1 8 )
^  +  bpC +  b s p  = 0 .
9 s  9 s  9s
This immediate s ec t io n  follows Becker (pp. 180-182) c lo se ly .  
However, Becker does not appear to  consider the  crime reducing e f f e c t s  
o f  s .  These e f f e c t s  could  r e s u l t  in a value o f  b l e s s  than un i ty  fo r  
punishments o the r  than  f i n e s .
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LIST OF SYMBOLS
C - number o f  crimes o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  type.
p - p r o b a b i l i t y  of  convict ion for  each of fense .
s - sentence o r  punishment when convicted.
u - t a s t e  or  s to c h a s t i c  v a r i a b le ,  represen t ing  a l l  o the r  in f luences .
V - v ic tim o r  d i r e c t  cos ts  or crime, loss  of  p roper ty ,  i n ju r y ,  death ,  
and changed modes o f  l i f e .
R - law enforcement resources ,  pr im ari ly  po l ice .
P - cos t  of  law enforcement resources ,  p r im ar i ly  po l ice .
W - cos ts  o f  imprisonment to  the  of fender and his  family,  l a rg e ly  
lo s s  o f  wages and consumption.
K - cos t  o f  imprisonment to  the  s t a t e  ne t  of  crime reducing e f f e c t s  
of  in c a r c e r a t i o n ,  c o n s i s t s  pr im ari ly  of  guards ,  sustenance of  
p r i s o n e r s ,  and pri sons .
S - punishment cos ts  to  so c ie ty ,  socia l  cos ts  o f  punishment t o  s t a t e .
L - t o t a l  or  socia l  cos ts  of  crime to  so c ie ty .
s '  - money c o s t s  o f  punishment to  the  o f fender ,  inc lu s ive  of  lo s s  to
o the rs  minus any gain to  soc ie ty  as through crime reduct ion .
b - a c o e f f i c i e n t  t h a t  transforms punishment (s)  in to  money cos ts  
( s ' ) ,  r e p re se n ta t iv e  o f  the  form of punishment.
£ p  -  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  supply o f  crime with r e spec t  to  p ro b a b i l i ty  (p ) .
£ s  - e l a s t i c i t y  o f  supply o f  crime with r e sp ec t  to  punishment ( s ) .
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E. E l a s t i c i t y  o f  Supply o f  Crime to  p and s
Much of  the  e f f e c t  of changes in cos ts  o f  criminal a c t i v i t y
r e l a t e  d i r e c t l y  to  responses o f  of fenders  to  p and s .  This response i s
analogous to  e l a s t i c i t y  of supply in economic theory .  Deriving a
measure o f  the  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  supply i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by using the
18e l a s t i c i t y  concepts :
and (19)
e -  s  ac 
" = c a l  •
Rearranging equat ion (18) s l i g h t l y  and using the  e l a s t i c i t y  
concept y ie ld s
aR avo ap aR , „
3p 3R +  3R 3p =  " Ij- +  C If J = -  bsC (1 -  6 p )
and
( 20)
aVn r  8 a c l  A ^
aZ = - b p c  \ i+ c  aij = -bpC ( 1  -  t s ) .
Although the  e l a s t i c i t y  of  the  supply o f  crime to  p and s i s  
conveniently i d e n t i f i e d  in equation ( 20 ) ,  severa l  of the  terms lack 
sp ec i f i c  coun terpar ts  in the  terminology o f  economic t h e o r y . This 
shortcoming^^ can be remedied by using equations  (5 ) ,  (7 ) ,  and (16) 
to  obta in
L = V(C) +  F(R) +  b sp C , (2 1 )
18
Becker, p.  182.
19This approach has been suggested by J .F .  G ie r tz  in a study 
supported by the  Law Enforcement Assistance  Adminis tra tion.  Please 
r e f e r  to :
J .F .  G ie r t z ,  "An Economic Analysis o f  the  D is t r ib u t io n  of 
Patrol  Forces ,"  NI 69-080 (S p r ing f ie ld ,  Va.: National Technical In fo r ­
mation Serv ices ,  1970), o r ,  "An Economic Approach to  th e  Allocat ion of  
Police  Resources," (unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n .  Northwestern 
Univers i ty ,  1970).
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w h i c h  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 7 ) .  T h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  c a n  be  m i n i m i z e d  f o r  
l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  r e s o u r c e s  (R) a n d  p u n i s h m e n t  ( s )  t o  y i e l d  t h e  more  
e a s i l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  r e s u l t
a n d (22)
The  f o l l o w i n g  l i s t  i s  u s e f u l  i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  shown
i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 2 ) :  ( a s s u m i n g  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  r e s o u r c e s
o r  p o l i c e  a n d  i n c r e a s e d  p u n i s h m e n t s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .
3L = m a r g i n a l  b e n e f i t  o f  i n c r e a s e d  p o l i c e ,  r e d u c t i o n  i n
9R s o c i a l  l o s s .
av = m a r g i n a l  r e d u c t i o n  i n  d i r e c t  c r i m e  c o s t s  a s  a  r e s u l t  
9C o f  c r i m e  r e d u c t i o n ,  m a r g i n a l  v i c t i m  c o s t s .
9C = m a r g i n a l  e f f e c t  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  p o l i c e  on  c r i m e ,  m a r g i n a l
9R p r o d u c t  o f  p o l i c e  i n  t e r m s  o f  c r i m e .
9P = m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  p o l i c e .
9R
b s c | | -  = i n c r e a s e d  p u n i s h m e n t  c o s t s  d u e  t o  p r o b a b i l i t y  i n c r e a s i n g  
e f f e c t s  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  p o l i c e .
b s p | ^  = d e c r e a s e  i n  p u n i s h m e n t  c o s t s  d u e  t o  c r i m e  d e c r e a s i n g  
e f f e c t s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  p o l i c e .
9L = m a r g i n a l  b e n e f i t  o f  i n c r e a s e d  p u n i s h m e n t ,  r e d u c t i o n  i n
9s s o c i a l  l o s s .
9c = m a r g i n a l  r e d u c t i o n  i n  num ber  o f  c r i m e s  d ue  t o  i n c r e a s e d
9s  p u n i s h m e n t ,  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  o f  p u n i s h m e n t  i n  t e r m s  o f
c r i m e .
bpC = f o r m  o f  p u n i s h m e n t  t i m e s  num ber  o f  p u n i s h m e n t s  a d m i n i s ­
t e r e d  .
b s p ^  = d e c r e a s e  i n  p u n i s h m e n t  c o s t s  d u e  t o  c r i m e  d e c r e a s i n g  
8s  e f f e c t s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  p u n i s h m e n t .
56
In the  examination t h a t  follows (Chapters IV and V) several  o f  
the  r e l a t i o n s  i d e n t i f i e d  above wi l l  be examined in more d e t a i l .  One 
very important s e t  o f  r e l a t i o n s  i s  the  e l a s t i c i t y  of the  supply of  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  crime to  changes in p or  s ,  the  r e l a t i o n s  i d e n t i f i e d  as Ep 
and Es  in equation (20) .  The g en e ra l iz a t io n  th a t  c e r t a in t y  i s  a more 
important d e t e r r e n t  than s e v e r i ty  implies t h a t  the  value o f  6 p i s  
g re a te r  than t h a t  of  £ s  and t h a t  c r imina ls  a re  r i s k  p r e f e r r e r s .  Also,  
as Becker demonstrates ,  optimal public  po l icy  wil l  r equ i re  t h a t  
enforcement and punishment be in a region where crime does not pay and 
where i t  i s  highly l i k e l y  t h a t  both 8 p and £ s  are l e s s  than un i ty .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  p u b l i c  d e m a n d s  t h a t  s o m e t h i n g  (more  p o l i c e  a n d / o r  
s t i f f e r  p u n i s h m e n t s )  b e  d o n e  a b o u t  t h e  c r i m e  p r o b l e m  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  i n  
new F e d e r a l  p r o g r a m s  a i m e d  a t  r e d u c i n g  c r i m e .  T h e s e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o f  
r e s o u r c e s  c a n  b e  r a t i o n a l l y  a p p l i e d  o n l y  when k n o w l e d g e  o f  p o l i c e  e f f e c t s  
on c o s t s  a r e  known,  t h a t  i s ,  when t h e r e  i s  some k n o w le d g e  o f  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  i d e n t i f i e d  on p a g e  5 5 .  Do m o re  p o l i c e  h a v e  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
m a r g i n a l  e f f e c t  o n  c r i m e  (9C/9r) a n d  d o e s  t h i s  e f f e c t  h a v e  a n  a p p r e ­
c i a b l e  i m p a c t  on  d i r e c t  c r i m e  c o s t s  (9V/9C) t h a t  w i l l  be  j u s t i f i e d  by  
t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  p o l i c e ?  U n d e r l y i n g  t h i s  r e l a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  
i s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  m o re  p o l i c e  o n  p a n d  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  
c r i m e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p ,  o r  £ p .
Similar m at te rs  are  o f  concern when changes in punishments a re  
considered.  I f  much o f  the  c o s t  o f  imprisonment i s  f ixed i r r e s p e c t iv e  
o f  the  length  o f  th e  term, t h i s  assumes the  marginal e f f e c t  o f  g re a te r  
punishment (9C/9s) to  be small .  Once more i t  becomes necessary to
20Becker, pp. 182-83.
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examine an e l a s t i c i t y ,  in t h i s  case  6 s.
Before beginning an examination which at tempts to  approximate 
these  r e l a t i o n s  i t  i s  worthwhile to  introduce the general  e f f e c t  of  
p r iv a te  an t i -c r im e  e f f o r t s .
F. P r iva te  Expenditures and Defensive Actions
As developed to  t h i s  po in t ,  the  model takes  no account of
p r iv a te  expenditures and defensive  ac t ions  which may be undertaken to
avoid v ic t im iz a t io n .  In t h i s  s e c t io n ,  a c t i v i t i e s  of  a p r iv a te  nature
are  i ntroduced i nto the model.
Ind iv iduals  (or bus inesses)  may expend sums f o r  p r iv a t e  po l ice
se rv ice s ,  watchdogs, locks ,  alarms, weapons, l i g h t i n g ,  and s e c u r i t y
devices .  Such ac t ions  make the commission o f  crime more c o s t l y  to  the
offender in two ways. F i r s t ,  the  chance of a successful  crime i s
reduced somewhat as the  p ro b a b i l i t y  of  conviction i s  increased s ince
p r iv a te  p o l i c e ,  l i g h t s ,  and alarms increase  the  chances t h a t  law
enforcement personnel w il l  be able  to  apprehend and conv ic t .  P r iva te
pol ice  ( s e cu r i ty  se rv ices  o r  watchmen) may d e t e c t  or d e ta in  o f f en d e rs ,
provide informat ion,  or otherwise  genera te  evidence t h a t  can be used
21by the  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  ob ta in  a convic t ion .  L ighting,  watchdogs, and 
alarms may have the  e f f e c t  o f  increas ing  criminal exposure so as to  
cause s im i l a r  r e s u l t s .
21 T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  p r iv a te  p o l ice  play a minor 
ro le  in the  United S ta t e s .  However, the  following statement  questions  
t h i s  popular b e l i e f .
"The s ec u r i ty  indus t ry  i t s e l f  claims th a t  two ou t  of  every 
th ree  law enforcement o f f i c e r s  in the  nation a re  a c tu a l ly  on p r iv a te  
p a y ro l l s . "
"Creeping Capi ta l i sm ,"  Forbes, September, 1970, p. 22.
One d i f f i c u l t y  in  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h i s  s ta tement  i s  concerned with 
those p r iv a te  po l ice  d u t ie s  not d i r e c t l y  r e l a t ed  to  crime contro l  such as 
answering te lephones ,  watching f o r  f i r e s ,  courtesy  s e r v i c e s ,  e t c .
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For convenience t h i s  aspect  o f  p r iv a te ly  obtained p ro tec t iv e  
goods and se rv ices  t h a t  provides some e f f e c t  on th e  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  
convic t ion  i s  r e f e r r e d  to  as the  "apprehens ion-re la ted"  e f f e c t .
I f  p r iv a t e  p ro tec t ion  goods and se rv ices  a re  represented by A 
and expenditures  on them by E, then
E =  E ( A ) ,  w i t h  I I  > 0 . ^ ^  ( 2 3 )
Since the  employment of  these  p r iv a te  resources  a f f e c t s  the
p ro b a b i l i t y  o f  convic t ion  i t  becomes necessary to  rew r i te  equation ( 6 ) 
as
p =  p ( R ,  E ) , 1 ^  > 0 .  ( 2 4 )
The second way in which p r iv a te  expenditures  have an e f f e c t  on
crime i s  by inc reas ing  the  r e s i s t a n c e  o f  p o ten t ia l  vic tims or  t a r g e t s .  
This e f f e c t  inc reases  the  cos t  of committing an offense  in several  ways. 
F i r s t ,  the  cr iminal must determine the  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  the  t a r g e t  
through some form o f  search and t h i s  i s  i t s e l f  a c o s t l y  a c t i v i t y .
Second, the  increased r e s i s t a n c e  of  some p o ten t ia l  t a r g e t s  will  a t  
times cause the  cr iminal to  choose a d i f f e r e n t  v i c t im ,  a decis ion t h a t  
involves a s h i f t i n g  o f  resources  and in troduces  an add i t iona l  co s t  
element to  the  o f fende r .  F in a l ly ,  i f  the  dec is ion  i s  made to  v ic t imize  
a t a r g e t  with  some added element of p r iv a te  p ro tec t io n  more of the  
c r i m i n a l ' s  re sources  must be used to  overcome the  now more r e s i s t a n t  
t a r g e t .  This general  e f f e c t  of  p r iv a te  p ro te c t iv e  expenditures  will
22 I t  i s  assumed in t h i s  sec t ion  t h a t  p r iv a t e  expenditures ,  E, 
do not depend upon R and s .  Though t h i s  may not appear accura te  f o r  
extreme l e v e l s  o f  R and s ,  f o r  moderate and gen e ra l ly  p reva i l ing  
le v e l s  t h i s  assumption appears reasonable .  Also,  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  
public  expenditures  a re  not  determined by any awareness of  E.
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be r e fe r r e d  to  as a " ta rget -hardening"  e f f e c t .
When the  ta rge t -ha rden ing  e f f e c t s  of p r iv a te  p ro tec t ive  
expenditures  a re  introduced equation (1 ) may be rew r i t ten
C = f  (p ,  s ,  E) = g (R. s .  E). (25)
In add i t ion  to  p r iv a te  expenditures t h a t  have an e f f e c t  on p as 
well as a d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on C (o ther  than through p ) ,  ind iv idua ls  might 
spend money fo r  goods o r  serv ices  t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e i r  v u ln e ra b i l i ty  to 
crime without any e f f e c t  on p. Such items are  assumed to  impact on 
the  amount o f  crime exc lus ive ly  and the  r e l a t i o n  between E and p of  
equation (24) would be n e g l ig ib le  or  zero .  I t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  many 
p r iv a te  a c t i v i t i e s  and expenditures  have e f f e c t s  t h a t  are  exclus ively  
of  a t a rge t -ha rden ing  type .
In add i t ion  to  a c t i v i t i e s  involving the use of money there  a re  
many ac t ions  which a person might undertake t h a t  do not involve d i r e c t  
out lays  y e t  have e f f e c t s  s im i la r  t o  those  goods and serv ices  cost ing 
money. Staying o f f  s t r e e t s  a t  n ig h t ,  avoiding high r i s k  neighborhoods,  
keeping valuables  hidden, and t ime devoted to  securing doors and windows 
are  examples. Although the re  i s  no known way to  measure the  cost  of  
th ese  s a c r i f i c e s ,  they may be assumed measurable and included in E.
I t  may be noted t h a t  expenditures o f  ind iv idua ls  a re  usually  
intended to  have ta rge t -ha rden ing  e f f e c t s  and any apprehension-re la ted  
e f f e c t s  a re  i n c id e n ta l .  For example, people with alarms o r  watchdogs 
usua l ly  hope t h a t  th e  sound o f  the  alarm wil l  scare  the  offender away. 
The use o f  locks ,  l i g h t s ,  and v i s i b l e  s e c u r i t y  personnel wi l l  l i k e ly  
have t h i s  e f f e c t  exc lu s iv e ly .  However, business expenditures fo r  two- 
way mir rors  and cameras ( t h a t  a re  opera t ive)  would l i k e l y  have both 
e f f e c t s .  And i t  i s  q u i t e  c e r t a in  t h a t  business alarm systems (such as
6 0
ADT) th a t  a re  s i l e n t  but connected d i r e c t l y  to po l ice  s t a t i o n s  are
pq
intended as apprehens ion-re la ted  expenditures .
In id en t i fy in g  the  optimal a l lo c a t io n  o f  law enforcement
resources of  both a public  and p r iv a te  natu re  i t  i s  f i r s t  necessary to
rewri te  vic tim cos ts  o f  equation (8 ) as
V = Vi (p, s ,  E) = Vg (R, s ,  E) = V3 (P,  s ,  E) (26)
and punishment cos ts  o f  equation ( 10) as
S = S (P, s ,  E). (27)
Defining the  to t a l  social  loss  function  of  equat ion (11) to 
include p r iv a te  ac t ions  provides
L = V + P + S + E = Vg (R, s ,  E) + P(R) + S(P, s ,  E) + E. (28)
Minimizing th e  socia l  lo s s  function fo r  both public  and p r iva te  
resources  r e s u l t s  in
9L 9V, ^  9P ^  9S 3P ^  _
9E = 9R2  ^ +  âR  +  +  o  °
and
9L ^  dE ^  9S dE ^ dE ^
9A “  9E dA 9E dA dA *
Rearranging the  l a s t  p a r t  of equation (29) provides
f e .  9S]
[_9E ^  9 E J .dA “  “  dA I " . (3 0 )
This in d ica te s  t h a t  the  optimal a l l o c a t io n  o f  p r iv a te  resources 
r e s u l t s  when the  marginal cos t  of  p r iva te  p ro tec t ion  i s  equal to
p q
Nonetheless,  even when the  device i t s e l f  f a i l s  to  scare  the  
offender away as i t  a ids  apprehension, t h i s  i s  u sua l ly  a consequence 
o f  f a i l u r e  of  ta rge t -ha rden ing .  Most businesses d isp lay  signs ind ica ­
t ing  t h a t  a s i l e n t  alarm system i s  in use ,  the  c l e a r  i n t e n t  o f  the 
sign i s  ta rge t -ha rden ing .
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the  marginal b enef i t s  which c o n s i s t  o f  reductions  in v ic tim cos ts  net
24of  increased punishment c o s t s .  But p r iva te  p a r t i e s  would be very 
un l ike ly  to  consider increased punishment cos ts  in p ro tec t ion  dec is ions .  
This i so la ted  f a c to r  would suggest  t h a t  the re  would be ove ra l loca t ion  
o f  p r iva te  p ro tec t io n .  However, o th e r  opposi te  e f f e c t s  would l i k e l y  
e x i s t .
I f ,  as is  highly l i k e l y ,  p r iv a te  p a r t i e s  consider only t h e i r  
own victim cos ts  the re  w i l l  l i k e l y  be an undera l loca t ion  of  p r iv a te  
p ro tec t ion .  The impl ica t ions  of  equations (24) ,  (25),  and (26) are  
t h a t  apprehension-re la ted  p r iv a te  p ro tec t ion  resources a f f e c t  the 
p ro b a b i l i ty  of  convic t ion and th e re fo re  the general crime level and 
s o c i e ty ' s  v ic tim c o s t s .  These apprehens ion-re la ted  e f f e c t s  exceed the  
b enef i t s  impacting upon the  p a r t i e s  expending sums fo r  p ro tec t io n .
Would the  p a r t i e s  incurr ing  expenditures  take in to  account a l l  o f  the 
reduction in v ic tim cos ts  o r  only the  expected reduction in t h e i r  own 
vic tim costs?  I f  the  l a t t e r  case  holds ,  p r iv a te  p ro tec t ion  produces 
a p o s i t iv e  e x t e r n a l i t y  and th e re  wil l  be undera l loca t ion  o f  p r iva te  
resources .
On the bas is  of  t h i s  d iscuss ion  i t  would appear t h a t  p r iv a te  
resources w il l  be a l lo c a te d  a t  optimum leve l s  only when these  resources  
have e f f e c t s  t h a t  a re  exc lu s ive ly  o f  a ta rge t -harden ing  type .  Whether 
t h i s  i s  the  nature  of  most p r iv a t e  p ro tec t ion  i s  an empirical matte r 
beyond the  scope o f  t h i s  paper .  Casual observation suggests t h a t
24When the re  a re  apprehens ion-re la ted  e f f e c t s  o f  p r iv a te  
resources ,  1 |  > Thus f o r  increased A, vic tim cos ts  f a l l  but 
punishment cos ts  r i s e ,  hence marginal b e n e f i t s ,  the  r i g h t  hand s ide  
o f  equation ( 3 0 ) , r e f l e c t s  the  ne t  e f f e c t s  of  decreased vic tim cos ts  
and increased punishment c o s t s .
62
most p r iv a t e  p ro tec t io n  i s  intended as pr im ari ly  of  the  ta rge t -harden ing  
type.
Based on the  above i t  appears t h a t  p r iv a te  resources  w il l  be 
undera lloca ted  when they have an apprehens ion-re la ted  e f f e c t .  However, 
the re  was some o f f s e t  i d e n t i f i e d  in equation (30). P r iva te  p a r t i e s  
would not l i k e l y  consider the  impact on punishment cos ts  t h a t  p r iv a te  a c t s  
(apprehens ion-re la ted)  have. This f a c t o r  alone would tend to  lead to  
ove ra l lo ca t io n  and could o f f s e t  some o f  the  tendency f o r  undera l loca­
t io n  noted above.
Fur ther  complications a re  involved when a r e l a t i o n  between 
public and p r iv a te  a c t i v i t i e s  e x i s t s .  I f  p r iv a te  expendi tures a f f e c t  
p and hence C, would not publ ic  a u t h o r i t i e s  consider p r iv a te  p ro tec ­
t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  as parameters in t h e i r  decis ions? And would not 
p r iv a te  ac t ions  be dependent upon public  a c t i v i t i e s ?  Though these  
r e l a t i o n s  were assumed nonexis tent e a r l i e r  (footnote  22 ) ,  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  
between p r iv a te  and public  expenditures would in troduce  new problems 
requ i r ing  examination in s tud ies  t h a t  a t tempt to  f u l l y  in te g ra te  
p r iv a te  p ro te c t io n .
Experience shows th a t  th e re  a re  usually  some loca l ized  neigh­
borhood e f f e c t s  t h a t  d i f f e r  somewhat from those i d e n t i f i e d  e a r l i e r .
Nearly always these  a re  regarded as benef ic ia l  e f f e c t s  conferred on
25those located  proximate to the  purchaser  of p r iv a te  p ro tec t io n .
Since i t  may be assumed th a t  the  purchaser  f a i l s  to  take  these  b e n e f i t s  
to h is  neighbors in to  account t h i s  suggests underprovision as a r e s u l t .
25
When r e t r i b u t i o n  provides s a t i s f a c t i o n  to  the  individua l 
spending money fo r  p r iv a te  resources these  statements  may requ ire  
modif ica t ion .
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However, a new problem a r i s e s  when the re  i s  a change in crime incidence ,  
a problem o f  a d i s t r i b u t i v e  nature  i s  in t roduced.  I t  i s  l i k e l y  th a t  
p r iv a te  p r o te c t io n  does b e n e f i t  the immediate neighborhood but l a rg e ly  
a t  the  expense o f  o th e r  a reas  t h a t  will  now be v ic t im ized .  This 
in troduces  another  complexity.
I t  may be t h a t  p r iv a te  expenditures have an e f f e c t  only on 
crime incidence  with  l i t t l e  or  no e f f e c t  on the  amount of crime. For 
example, ind iv idua l  X may use l i g h t s ,  locks ,  and p r iv a te  secu r i ty  
serv ices  t o  reduce h i s  own v ic t im iza t ion  from crime. These may reduce 
his  v i c t i m i z a t i o n ,  however, ins tead o f  X being v ic timized  Y becomes 
v ic t imized .
The exper ience o f  Chicago in t h i s  m at te r  may be r e lev an t  to
the  po in t  being made. Chicago began a b a t t l e  a g a in s t  a l l e y  crime by
spending $20 m i l l io n  fo r  l ig h t in g  a l l e y s  in 1969-70. A pol ice  survey
ind ica ted  a t h i r t y  percent  decrease in a f t e r - d a r k  a l l e y  crime, but
26a f t e r - d a r k  s t r e e t  crime rose  t h i r t y - t h r e e  pe rcen t .
An a t tempt to  minimize the social  loss  from crime and crime 
prevention should inc lude  a t t e n t i o n  to p r iv a te  a c t io n s  to  be complete.  
Nonetheless,  the  in t ro d u c t io n  of p r iv a te  ac t io n s  in troduce  a number of  
problems which may lead to  imprecise r e s u l t s  in the  model. I t  is  
l i k e l y  t h a t  t h i s  i s  th e  reason the p r iv a te  s e c to r  i s  so o f ten  ignored 
in economic s tu d ie s  o f  crime and law enforcement.  However, by the 
in t roduc t ion  o f  p r iv a t e  a c t ions  in to  the  model as in t h i s  s ec t io n ,  i t  
i s  poss ib le  to  gain some in s ig h t  in to  the  m a t te r .
^^Raymond A. Joseph, "Let There Be Light :  Then Crime Will F a l l — 
I f  I t  Doesn ' t  Go Up," Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l , January 6 , 1970, p. 1.
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CHAPTER IV
IDENTIFICATION OF A SUPPLY OF CRIME FUNCTION
The model developed in Chapter I I I  i l l u s t r a t e s  the r e l a t i o n  
between the supply of  offenses  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  type and the  expected 
cos ts  o f  committing an offense;  the  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conviction (p ) ,  
and the  punishment ( s ) .  Based upon the  data  gathered from f o r ty - e ig h t  
s t a t e s ,  the d iscuss ion  in t h i s  chapter provides es t imates  of these  
r e l a t io n s h ip s  fo r  the  seven Index offenses .
Before journeying f a r  in to  an empirical  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  crime, 
law enforcement,and punishment, i t  becomes apparent t h a t  even the  best  
av a i l ab le  sources of  data  do not provide the des i red  measures. In 
many cases ,  the  needed data  have been c o l le c te d  only infrequent ly  or 
not a t  a l l .  The approach followed in t h i s  chap te r  i s  highly dependent 
upon the a v a i l a b le  measures of p and s .  There i s  c le a r  evidence to 
support  the  p red ic t io n  t h a t  with in  the next severa l  yea r s ,  much b e t t e r  
d a ta ,  which wi l l  enhance the t e s t a b i l i t y  of  economic models of  crime 
and law enforcement,  w i l l  be ava i lab le .^  At t h a t  t ime, the  t e n t a t i v e  
r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  chapte r may requ i re  modif ica t ion .
S ig n i f i c a n t  con t r ibu t ions  a re  expected from recen t ly  e s t a b ­
l i sh ed  o rgan iza t ions  charged with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to c o l l e c t  such 
d a ta ;  namely, th e  Law Enforcement Assis tance  Adminis tra tion (National 
I n s t i t u t e  of  Law Enforcement and Criminal J u s t i c e  S t a t i s t i c s  D iv is ion) ,  




A. Relevant Criminal J u s t ic e  System
The model in Chapter I I I  i d e n t i f i e s  two s t r a t e g i c  independent 
v a r i a b l e s ,  p and s ,  t h a t  a f f e c t  the c o s t  to  an offender committing a 
crime. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  values fo r  these  va r iab le s  presupposes a 
s p e c i f i c  j u r i s d i c t i o n  in which these  values a re  determined through a 
criminal j u s t i c e  system involving the  processes  of apprehension, 
p rosecu t ion ,  convic t ion ,  sentencing, and pa ro le .
The American criminal j u s t i c e  system was not created  with a 
s p e c i f i c  design in mind a t  any one p a r t i c u l a r  t ime. From the ph i lo ­
sophic base t h a t  a person may be punished f o r  v io la t io n  of a law only 
a f t e r  proof has been demonstrated through an impart ia l  and d e l i b e r a t i v e  
p rocess ,  lay e r s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and procedures have accumulated.  Some 
were in sp i red  by p r in c ip le s ;  o thers  r e s u l t e d  from expediency or 
im i ta t io n .  The American criminal j u s t i c e  system represen ts  America's 
own novel adap ta t ion  of  English common law to  the  American scene with 
emphasis on local  community dete rmination.  As a r e s u l t ,  each local
community and s t a t e  has i t s  own criminal j u s t i c e  system; and th e re  i s
2
a Federal system as we l l .
Figure 1 provides a general overview o f  the  criminal j u s t i c e  
system in  the  United S ta t e s .  Generally speaking , the  criminal j u s t i c e  
system c o n s i s t s  o f  th ree  separa te ly  organized y e t  in terdependent 
d i v i s io n s :  p o l i c e ,  c o u r t s ,  and c o r re c t io n s .  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a
supply o f  crime as developed in Chapter I I I  requ ires  information
2
U.S. ,  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis­
t r a t i o n  o f  J u s t i c e ,  The Challenge o f  Crime in a Free Soc ie ty , pp. 7-12.
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regarding th e  values  of  p and s ;  and i t  i s  here t h a t  the  f i r s t  d i f f i ­
c u l ty  a r i s e s  in applying the ana lys is  to  a pa r t  o f  the  criminal j u s t i c e  
system.
The value  o f  the  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  convic t ion i s  determined la rg e ly  
by m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  through t h e i r  determinat ion o f  the  level o f  expendi-
3
tu re s  fo r  law enforcement o r  p o l ice .  Determination of  th e  punishment
r e s u l t s  from an i n t e r p l a y  of  fo rces  involving p rosecu t ion ,  c o u r t s ,  and
c o r re c t io n a l  o rgan iza t ions  with j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  a reas  t h a t  a r e  usua l ly
d i f f e r e n t  from those  o f  the  p o l ice .  Thus, one i s  faced with a
s i t u a t i o n  wherein p and s a re  determined fo r  d i f f e r e n t  a reas  of
j u r i s d i c t i o n .  For t h i s  reason, an in v es t ig a t io n  using p and s i s  most
f e a s i b l e  when using s t a t e s  f o r  observations .  Though they may somewhat
l i m i t  s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t io n  of  the  theory to  the  d a ta ,  t h e r e  i s  log ica l
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  using o f  s t a t e s  as they possess i d e n t i f i a b l e
4p o l i t i c a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  uniformity .
Although the  model i s  compatible with a l l  kinds o f  c r i m e -  
v io l e n t  crime, p roper ty  crime, organized crime, white c o l l a r  crime, and 
tax  evasion—lack o f  da ta  prevents  an empirical i n v e s t ig a t i o n  in to  a l l  
types of  crime.  Acceptable s t a t i s t i c s  a re  a v a i l a b le  f o r  only the  seven 
offenses  i d e n t i f i e d  by the Federal Bureau of In v e s t ig a t io n  as represen­
t a t i v e  o f  s e r io u s  crimes,  commonly re fe r re d  to as  the  Index o f fenses .
3
One harsh way to  put t h i s  i s  as follows: "In 1969 the  S e a t t l e
City  Council voted to  permit 21 murders,  104 rapes ,  962 ro b b e r i e s ,  417 
a s s a u l t s ,  as well as  various  numbers of  l e s s e r  crimes,  in the  f i r s t  ha l f  
o f  1970."
Douglass C. North and Roger Leroy M i l le r ,  The Economics o f  Public 
Issues  (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 114.
4
Thomas R. Dye, P o l i t i c s ,  Economics and the  Publ ic :  Policy  Out­
comes in the  S ta t e s  (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966),  pp. 11-14.
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The Index offenses  a re :
1. Criminal Homicide or Murder—murder and nonnegligent man- 
s laugh te r :  a l l  w i l l f u l  fe lonious  homicides as d is t ingu ished  
from deaths due to negligence .  Excludes attempts to k i l l ,  
a s s a u l t s  to  k i l l ,  s u i c i d e s ,  acc identa l  deaths ,  o r  j u s t i f i a b l e  
homicides.
2. Forc ib le  Rape—rape by f o r c e ,  a s s a u l t  to rape ,  and attempted 
rape .  Excludes s t a t u t o r y  offenses  (no force  used—vic tim under 
age o f  consent) .
3. Robbery—s tea l in g  or  tak ing  th ings  from another  by fo rce  or 
vio lence  or by pu t t ing  in f e a r ,  such as strong-arm robbery,  
s t i ck u p s ,  armed robbery,  a s s a u l t  to  rob,  and at tempts  to  rob.
4.  Aggravated Assaul t—a s s a u l t  with i n t e n t  to  k i l l  or fo r  the  
purpose of  i n f l i c t i n g  severe bodily in ju ry  by shooting,  c u t t i n g ,  
s tabb ing ,  maiming, poisoning, sca ld ing ;  or by the  use o f  a c id s ,  
exp los ives ,  or o the r  means. Excludes simple a s s a u l t ,  a s s a u l t  
and b a t t e ry ,  f i g h t i n g ,  e t c .
5. Burglary or Breaking o r  Enter ing—burg la ry ,  housebreaking, 
safecracking ,  o r  any breaking o r  unlawful en t ry  of  a s t r u c tu r e  
with the  i n t e n t  to  commit a fe lony or  a t h e f t .  Includes 
a t t e m p ts .
6 . Larceny or Theft  (except  auto  t h e f t ) - - ( a )  o f  $50 or  more in 
value; (b) of  l e s s  than $50 in value.  Thefts  o f  b ic y c l e s ,  
automobile acc e s so r ie s ,  s h o p l i f t i n g ,  pocket-picking, o r  any 
s t e a l i n g  of proper ty o r  a r t i c l e  of  value t h a t  i s  not taken by 
fo rce  and violence or  by f raud .  Excludes embezzlement, "con" 
games, forgery ,  worth less  checks, e t c .
7. Auto Thef t - - s t e a l i n g  o r  d r iv ing  away and abandoning a motor 
veh ic le .  Excludes tak ing  f o r  temporary or  unauthorized use 
by those having lawful access to  the veh ic le .
Var ia t ions  among s t a t e s  in d e f in i t i o n s  of each crime introduce
an ob s tac le  t h a t  i s  l a rg e ly  removed by use of  t h i s  standard ized s e t  of
d e f i n i t i o n s  used fo r  repor t ing  crime to  the  FBI. These seven, known as
the  Index Offenses,  a re  i n t e rp re te d  as th e  "Crime Index," much l i k e  a
c o s t - o f - l i v i n g  index used fo r  p r i c e  changes.
U .S . ,  Department o f  J u s t i c e ,  Federal Bureau o f  In v e s t ig a t io n ,  
Uniform Crime Reports—1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t ing
O ff ic? ,  1971), p. 61. H ere inaf te r  r e f e r r e d  to as Uniform Crime Repor ts ,
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B. Use of  Available S ta te  Data to  Derive a
Supply of Crime Function
In the  supply of  crime func tion developed in Chapter I I I ,  the 
dependent va r iab le  i s  the  number of  crimes of a p a r t i c u l a r  type (C). In
the United S ta te s  the  systematic  c o l le c t io n  o f  crime s t a t i s t i c s  has been
vested p r im ar i ly  in the  FBI. For each year since  1930 the FBI has 
published the  Uniform Crime Reports which p resen t  summaries of  crime data 
t h a t  have been v o lu n ta r i ly  submitted by pol ice  departments,  s h e r i f f  
o f f i c e s ,  and s t a t e s .  As of  1971 approximately 9200 d i f f e r e n t  j u r i s ­
d ic t io n s  covering 91 percent of  the  population were represented in the 
Uniform Crime Report . This source and f igures  provided by the Federal 
Bureau o f  Prisons a r e  used to  generate  values fo r  the  v a r ia b le s  t h a t  are
necessary f o r  the examination of t h i s  chapter.  Due to  the  lack  of
s tandard da ta  fo r  t h i s  type o f  examination,  some d iscuss ion  of  th e  data 
i s  d e s i r a b l e .
1 . Dependent Variable:  Crime--C
The Uniform Crime Reports represen t  the  bes t  a v a i l a b le  source of 
information on the dependent v a r i a b l e ,  C. Nonetheless,  th e re  a re  several 
problems. In 1958, s i g n i f i c a n t  rev is ions  were made in the  method of 
r e p o r t in g .  Increased e f f o r t s  were made to assure  accuracy, thus 
providing r e l i a b l e  comparisons fo r  only the post-1958 per iod .  To 
e s ta b l i s h  acceptable  uniformity ,  of fenses  are  defined broadly enough so 
t h a t  crimes committed under varying s t a t u t e s  of  the  several  s t a t e s  will  
be included in the same category ,  while v io la t io n s  of  federa l  law per se
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are  excluded.^
The major de f ic iency  of the data  i s  t h a t  only those  crimes 
repor ted to  the  p o l i c e  are  included. A r ecen t  study by the  National 
Opinion Research Center (NORC) of  the U nivers i ty  o f  Chicago f o r  the  
P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis tra tion o f  J u s t i c e  
v e r i f i e d  the  expec ta t ion  of  subs tan t ia l  underrepor ting  to  p o l ice .^  Table 
2 provides an e s t im a te  of  the  degree of  underrepor t ing  in d i f f e r e n t  
pa r t s  o f  the  United S ta t e s .
Table 3 provides an ind ica t ion  of  the  poss ib le  level of  under­
repor t ing  f o r  the  na t ion  as a whole. Auto t h e f t  appears to  be over­
reported while a l l  o the r  crimes on which NORC obtained s i g n i f i c a n t
g
information appear to  be very much underreported .  Especia l ly  worthy of  
note i s  the  evidence t h a t  fo r c ib l e  rape appears t o  occur a t  more than 
th ree  and on e -h a l f  times the  reported r a t e ;  bu rg la ry ,  th re e  t imes; 
aggravated a s s a u l t  and la rceny ($50 and o v e r ) ,  more than double. Total 
Index offenses  appear to  be about double those reported in the  Uniform 
Crime Repor ts .
6
Federal offenses  overlapping in to  s t a t e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  a re  
reported as s t a t e  o f f en ses .  U.S.,  S t a f f  Report t o  the National Commis­
sion on the  Causes and Prevention of Violence,  Crimes o f  Vio lence ,
Vol. I I .  Donald J .  Mulvihi l l  and Melvin M. Tumin, Direc tors  (Washington,
D.C.: Government P r in t in g  O ff ice ,  1969), pp. 14-16.
^National Opinion Research Center,  Criminal Vic timizat ion in 
the  United S t a te s :  A Report o f  a National Survey, Field  Surveys I I ,  
Directed by P h i l l i p  H. Ennis (Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t ing  
O ff ice ,  1967).
Comparabil i ty i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by using offenses  per 100,000 
populat ion.
®There a r e  th r e e  reasons fo r  over repo r t ing  of  auto t h e f t :  (1)
auto t h e f t  insurance  p o l i c i e s  require  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  p o l ic e ,  (2) the 
l ike l ihood  o f  p o l ice  find ing  and iden t i fy in g  th e  auto i s  r e l a t i v e l y  high, 
and, (3) some repor ted  t h e f t s  a re  cases o f  misplacing  the  auto or  un­
authorized use by a family member, not r e l a t e d  to  the  po l ice  a f t e r  the  
i n i t i a l  r e p o r t  o f  auto  t h e f t .
TABLE 2
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN REPORTING OF INDEX 
CRIMES AND NORC ESTIMATES OF INDEX CRIMES; 1965-66' 
(Rate per 100,000 Population)


















Homicide^ 3.4 3.5 10 7.7 3.9
Forcib le
Rape 25 7.9 42 10.5 48 10.2 57 16.3
Robbery 139 44.5 85 76.2 48 44.0 133 76.2
Aggravated
Assault 164 76.9 233 82.3 173 134.9 361 109.6
Burglary 746 486.5 987 505.8 866 544.6 1,348 894.8
Larceny 
($50 and over) 480 365.0 594 319.0 596 305.9 855 573.1
Auto Theft 278 263.2 170 234.7 96 178.7 380 341.2
Total 1,832 1,247.4 2,111 1,232.0 1,837.0 1 ,236.0 3,134 2,015.1
(N = 7,911) (N = 9,411) (N = 10,398) (N = 5,266)
Uniform Crime Report f ig u r e s  a re  fo r  1965, NORC es t im ates  f o r  1965-66.
^The NORC homicide sample i s  too small to  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  useful fo r  th re e  reg ions .
Source: National Opinion Research Center,  Criminal V ic t imizat ion  in the  United S t a t e s ,  p. 21
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATED UNDERREPORTING OF INDEX OFFENSES 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1965-66
Crime
NORC Estimated 
Rate per  100,000 
Population 










As Percent of 
NORC Rate 
(3)
Homicide (3.0)3 5.1 • -
Forcible  Rape 42.5 11.6 0.27
Robbery 94.0 61.4 0.65
Aggravated
Assault 218.3 106.6 0.49
Burglary 949.1 296.6 0.31
Larceny 
($50 and over) 606.5 267.4 0.44
Auto Theft 206.2 226.0 1.10
Total 2,119.6 974.7 0.46
^The s i n g l e  homicide in the sample i s  too small 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  use fu l .
to be
Source: National Opinion Research Center,  Criminal V ic timizat ion  in 
the  United S t a t e s ,  p. 8.
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There are  many reasons fo r  underreport ing by v ic tims: a nega­
t i v e  view o f  po l ic e  e f f e c t iv en e s s ;  lack o f  t ime or apathy; f e e l in g s  t h a t  
the  crime was not a po l ice  mat te r ;  embarrassment; fe a r  o f  harm to  the
9
offender ;  and f e a r  o f  r e p r i s a l .  The po l ice  themselves may be a cause 
of underrepor ting  as they inadver ten t ly  f a i l  t o  record rep o r t s  of  crime 
or i n t e n t i o n a l l y  underrepor t  to  minimize the  evidence of  crime in t h e i r  
j u r i s d i c t i o n . ^ ^  Systematic underreport ing a l so  gives an impression of  
increased po l ice  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  through a higher c learance  r a t e ,  hence 
underreport ing by po l ice  may be s e l f - s e r v i n g .
The r a t i o  x in column (3) of  Table 3 can be used to a d ju s t  the  
Uniform Crime Reports es t imates  to  e l im ina te  the  e f f e c t s  of  underreport ing.  
This wi l l  not be done when examining s t a t e  data  in t h i s  chapter  as values 
fo r  X are  not a v a i l a b le  by s t a t e  as o f  t h i s  t ime.  The underreport ing 
f a c to r  (1/  X ) may be useful l a t e r  when examining aggregate crime.
^ I b i d . ,  p. 44.
^^Until 1950, Chicago, with h a l f  th e  population o f  New York
City ,  repor ted  severa l  times as many robber ies  as did New York. In 1960
New York discont inued  i t s  p ra c t i c e  of al lowing p rec inc ts  to  handle 
complaints d i r e c t l y ,  as a r e s u l t  o f  the  i n s t a l l a t i o n  of  a cen tra l  
repor t ing  system. In the  f i r s t  year o f  opera tion  of  the  system, 
robberies  rose  400 percent and b u rg la r ie s  1300 percen t ,  with both s u r ­
passing the  number o f  robber ies  and b u rg la r ie s  in Chicago! In 1960, 
Chicago i n s t a l l e d  a cen t r a l  complaint  system o f  i t s  own and t h e r e a f t e r  
robberies  in Chicago again exceeded those in New York.
For tuna te ly ,  th e  s t a f f  of  the  Uniform Crime Reports uses a
carefu l system o f  checks to  i d e n t i f y  u n i t s  repo r t ing  on a d i f f e r e n t  basis
from t h a t  o f  previous years  and r e s t r i c t s  t rends  to  agencies t h a t  have 
had comparable records  and repor t ing  p r a c t i c e s .
U.S . ,  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis­
t r a t i o n  o f  J u s t i c e ,  Crime and I t s  Impact--An Assessment. "Task Force on 
Assessment," (Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t ing  O f f i ce ,  1967), 
pp. 2 2 -  23.
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As th e  u n i ts  o f  observation a re  s t a t e s  o f  d i f f e r in g  popu la tions , 
uniform ity  in  the  dependent v a r ia b le  is  obtained by d iv id ing  the  
o ffenses in each s t a t e  by a population f a c to r  to  y ie ld  offenses per
100,000 popu la tion , popularly  re fe r re d  to  as the  crime r a t e .  C in the  
reg ress ions  re fe r s  to  t h i s  measure.
2 . Independent V ariab le: P ro b ab il i ty  o f  Conviction—p
One c o s t  o f  committing an o ffense  i s  the  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  con­
v ic t io n  (p ) ,  a co s t  t h a t  i s  not d i r e c t ly  a v a i la b le .  Both the  FBI and 
po lice  a u th o r i t i e s  emphasize a r a te  r e fe r re d  to  as the  c learance r a t e .
A crime i s  "cleared" when po lice  have id e n t i f i e d  an offender with 
s u f f i c i e n t  evidence to  put him in custody and p re fe r  charges , o r  when 
some unusual element precludes formal charges a g a in s t  the  accused. 
Although th e  c learance  r a te  may bear a r e la t io n s h ip  with p in the model, 
t h i s  r e la t io n s h ip  i s  not known and the  c lea rance  r a t e  i s  not a v a i lab le  
by s t a t e .  (Out o f  n e ce ss i ty ,  however, th e  c learance  r a te  i s  used in 
the  examination of the  following c h ap te r .  )
As a r e s u l t  th e  decis ion  was made to  compute a value fo r  p 
using two sources. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports provides data fo r  each 
year  on the  number of crimes per s t a t e  by type o f  o ffense . Until
re cen tly  the  Bureau of Prisons provided data  on p risoners  received from
12court  by s t a t e  prisons by type o f  offense  fo r  f o r ty - e ig h t  s t a t e s .
Recent da ta  on admissions a re  only a v a i la b le  fo r  1960, 1964, and 1970.
Uni form Crime Reports—1970, p. 30.
^^The Law Enforcement A ssis tance  Adm inistra tion (LEAA) has 
rec en t ly  taken over th e  program and i s  p re sen t ly  r e v i t a l i z in g  the 
program of p r iso n e r  s t a t i s t i c s .  Data fo r  1970 was received l a t e  and 
was not as complete as fo r  the  years  1960 and 1964. For th i s  reason 
1970 i s  t r e a te d  in a somewhat l im ited  fash ion  as compared to  1960 and 
1964.
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As a r e s u l t  the  examination using s ta t e s  w ill be r e s t r i c t e d  to  those 
13th ree  years .
Using the  number o f  admissions to  s t a t e  prison  by crime per 
s t a t e  divided by the  number o f  th e se  crimes (C) in the  s t a t e ,  a value o f 
p fo r  each s t a t e  can be conveniently  c a lcu la ted .  Though i t  i s  expected 
t h a t  the values o f  p so computed may appear s t r ik in g ly  low fo r  several 
o ffen ses ,  th e  ca lcu la ted  values o f  p are the  bes t  a v a i la b le  measure 
o f  p.T4
I t  i s  expected t h a t  th e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  the  c a lc u la te d  values o f  
p are  weakest fo r  f o r c ib le  rape . For obscure reasons the  Federal Bureau 
o f  Prisons does not re p o r t  a s ep a ra te  f ig u re  fo r  fo r c ib le  rape; r a th e r
15t h i s  offense i s  included in the  more general category , "sex o f fen se s ."
13U .S., Department o f  J u s t i c e ,  Federal Bureau o f  P r isons , 
National P risoner S t a t i s t i c s :  C h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  S ta te  P r iso n e rs ,  1960 
(Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t in g  O ff ice , 1965).
, National P r iso n e r  S t a t i s t i c s ;  S ta te  P r iso n e rs :  
Admissions and Releases, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t in a  
O ffice ,  1967).
, National P r isoner  S t a t i s t i c s :  S ta te  P r iso n e rs :  
Admissions and Releases, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t in g  
O ffice , 1972). ~
H ere inafte r  th e se  a re  re fe r re d  to  as National P risoner 
S t a t i s t i c s . Data fo r  Alaska and New Jersey  a re  not rep o rted .
^*The denominator, C, p resen ts  two problems. F i r s t ,  th e re  i s  
measurement e r ro r  in  C as th e  NORC survey demonstrates. This e r r o r  i s  
not random but c o n s is ts  o f  system atic  understatement o f  the  t r u e  value of 
C fo r  a l l  crimes except auto t h e f t .  Nonetheless, as long as th e  d i s ­
cussion proceeds in  terms o f "known" crim es, i t  i s  not expected th a t  
t h i s  f a c to r  w il l  be unduly troublesome.
Second, the  dependent v a r ia b le  i s  the  crime r a t e  per 100,000 
while the denominator o f  p i s  th e  number o f  crimes. Thus, the  dependent 
v a r iab le  and p a re  not completely independent and some b ias  i s  a n t i c i ­
pated.
T^Sex o ffenses  include fo r c ib le  rape , s ta tu to ry  rape , indecent 
a s s a u l t ,  carnal abuse, sodomy, a d u l te ry ,  c o h ab i ta t io n ,  in c e s t ,  indecent 
l i b e r t i e s ,  indecent exposure, lewdness (male), peeping Tom, seduc tion , 
s o l i c i t in g  (male), commercialized v ic e ,  pandering, obscen ity , and 
pornography. National P r isoner S t a t i s t i c s :  1960, p. 8 .
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Although breakdowns of more s p e c if ic  o ffenses  w ith in  t h i s  category are  
not a v a i la b le  by s t a t e ,  f o r c ib le  rape comprises more than e ig h ty - f iv e  
percent o f  a l l  admissions to  s t a t e  prison  fo r  sex offenses  and th i s  
measure i s  th e re fo re  used as a re p re se n ta t io n  fo r  fo r c ib le  rape convic­
t io n s .
Comparison of the  average ca lc u la te d  value fo r  p by offense  with 
a f ig u re  c a lc u la te d  from the  Uniform Crime Reports is  presented in 
Table 4. The values ca lc u la te d  fo r  t h i s  paper using National Prisoner 
S t a t i s t i c s  a re  g en e ra l ly  lower than those derived from the  Uniform Crime 
Reports.^^ The values ca lcu la ted  fo r  t h i s  paper a re  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  lower 
fo r  robbery, aggravated  a s s a u l t ,  bu rg la ry , la rceny , and auto t h e f t .  
Several reasons fo r  these  d i s p a r i t i e s  are  ev iden t: (1) p o lice  reporting
of court  a c t io n  i s  questionab le  as most p o lic e  departments do not 
sy s tem a tica l ly  record  f in a l  d isp o s i t io n  o f  c ase s ,  and, ( 2 ) th e  c learance 
r a t e s ,  from which th e  FBI estim ates  a re  c a lc u la te d ,  a re  o ften  in f l a te d .  
These would suggest th a t  th e  FBI f ig u res  a re  inaccura te  and would over­
s t a t e  the  value o f  p.
I t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  provide some support fo r  the  values o f  p 
ca lcu la ted  from Bureau of Prisons data in several ways. F i r s t ,  the 
P re s id e n t 's  Commission independently c a lc u la te d  an "overa ll"  value of 
p, b a s ic a l ly  an average value of p fo r  a l l  o ffen ses .  Using comprehen­
sive  court records and o ffense  data  the  P r e s id e n t 's  Commission estim ated 
an average value f o r  p o f between 2.5 and 5 .0  percent in 1 9 6 5 . The
^®The values t h a t  can be c a lc u la te d  from the Uniform Crime 
Reports a re  based on a sample of c i t i e s  over 25,000 population .
^^U.S., P r e s id e n t 's  Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis­
t r a t i o n  o f  J u s t i c e ,  Science and Technology, "Task Force on Science and 




COMPARISON OF CALCULATED PROBABILITY 









Homicide 0.42 0.58 0.45 0.42 0.38 0.35
Forcible
Rape 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.21 0.11 0.16
Robbery 0.13 0.25 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.07
Aggravated
A ssault 0 .08 0.27 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.17
Burglary 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.04
Larceny 0.03 0.11 0 .0 2 0.06 0.006 0.06
Auto Theft 0 . 0 2 0.14 0.01 0.06 0.004 0.03
Sources: Federal Bureau o f  P r iso n s ,  National P risoner S t a t i s t i c s :  1960,
p. 41.
Federal Bureau o f  P r iso n s ,  National P risoner S t a t i s t i c s ;  1964, 
p. 17.
Federal Bureau o f  P r iso n s ,  National P risoner S t a t i s t i c s :  1970, 
pp. 47-81.
Federal Bureau o f In v e s t ig a t io n ,  Uniform Crime Reports-1960, 
pp. 85 " 8 6 .
Federal Bureau o f In v e s t ig a t io n ,  Uniform Crime Reports-1964,
p. 1 0 1 .
Federal Bureau o f  In v e s t ig a t io n ,  Uniform Crime Reports-1970, 
p. 115.
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(weighted) average fo r  p using Bureau o f  Prisons da ta  and FBI offense  
f igu res  i s  2 .8  percen t fo r  1960 and 2.0 percen t in  1964. These appear 
much c lo se r  to  the  P r e s id e n t 's  Commission f ig u re s  than do FBI p ro b a b i l i ty  
(weighted) averages o f  over 10 percent fo r  these  two y e a r s .  The f ig u res  
of the  P re s id e n t 's  Commission a re  considered the  most a u th o r i t a t iv e  in 
the  f i e l d .
Secondly, th e  FBI f ig u re  i s  a p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conviction  th a t  
does not take  account of the  punishment. Many tim es the  charge is  
reduced o r the  penalty  i s  not prison  but p roba tion . A re fe ren ce  to  
Figure 1 w ill  v e r i fy  th e  many a l t e r n a t iv e s .  For the  p a s t  few years  the  
FBI has provided a breakdown o f  case d is p o s i t io n  from a sample o f  la rg e  
c i t i e s .  Table 5 provides a summary of t h i s  inform ation fo r  1970. I t  
may be noted t h a t  e s tim ates  of p taken from t h i s  inform ation fo r  1970 are  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  lower than were those of 1960 and 1964.
Comparison o f  th e se  FBI estim ates  and th e  c a lc u la te d  values fo r  
aggravated a s s a u l t ,  b u rg la ry , la rceny , and auto t h e f t  shows su b s ta n t ia l  
d if fe ren ces  (Table 4 ) .  However, th ese  a re  the  o ffenses  fo r  which 
suspended sen tences , p roba tion , and (although in freq u e n t ly )  f in e s  a re  
more l i k e ly .  In a d d i t io n ,  in  the  case o f  auto t h e f t  many offenses  (about 
ha lf )  o f  a l l  auto t h e f t s  a re  committed by ju v e n i le s ,  and ju v e n i le s  a re  
f a r  le s s  l i k e ly  to  be s en t  to  p rison  fo r  t h i s  o f fen se .
For these  reasons and due to  the  f a c t  t h a t  th e re  i s  no o ther  
source fo r  values o f p fo r  s t a t e s ,  ca lcu la ted  values o f  p using Bureau 
of Prisons data  a re  used in  the  examination.
In the  c a lc u la t io n  o f  p in t h i s  paper th e re  was no way to  take 
m ultip le  crimes in to  account, one admission to  p r ison  may c le a r  several 
crimes. As th e re  i s  not reason to  assume t h i s  f a c to r  d i f f e r s  among
TABLE 5
CLEARANCES, ARRESTS, AND GUILTY PER 100 
CRIMES, BY TYPE OF CRIME: 1970&
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Homicide 85.6 102 .0 25.9 9.0 34.9
Forcible
Rape 56.2 51.3 10.4 5.3 15.7
Robbery 27.7 32.1 5.7 1 .6 7.3
Aggravated
A ssault 66.3 49.6 12.7 4.7 17.4
Burglary 18.6 16.0 2 .6 0.9 3.5
Larceny 17.4 18.2 5.6 0.4 6 .0
Auto Theft 16.5 16.3 2.3 0 .6 2.9
Total
Index
Offenses 19.8 19.2 4.8 0 .8 5.6
Based on a sample o f  2221 c i t i e s  with to ta l  population of 
59,532,000.
Source: Federal Bureau of In v e s t ig a t io n ,  Uniform Crime Reports-1970,
p. 115.
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States i t  need not introduce any complication.
As long as the cos t of committing an o ffense  i s  considered as
the  chance of  going to p r ison , the  ca lc u la te d  values o f  p are  ap p ro p ria te .
In t h i s  framework, po lice  harassment, j a i l ,  t r i a l s ,  suspended sentences,
and probation  a re  p a r t  of the d i s u t i l i t i e s  o f  the  t ra d e  c u rre n t ly  not 
18q u a n t i f ia b le .  I t  i s  assumed t h a t  these  do not d i f f e r  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  
from s t a t e  to  s t a t e .
3. Independent Variable: Punishment—s
The second component of c o s t  to  the  o ffen d e r ,  punishment ( s ) ,  i s  
the p rison  term an offender receives  i f  caught and convic ted . Table 6 
provides an in d ica t io n  of the  sentences received fo r  th e  Index o ffenses ;  
however, th e re  i s  o ften  a su b s tan tia l  d i s p a r i ty  between the  sentence and 
the  time a c tu a l ly  served.
I t  can be sa fe ly  assumed t h a t  the  expected c o s t  of punishment i s  
accu ra te ly  r e f le c te d  by the  time a convicted offender a c tu a l ly  expects 
th a t  he w ill  be required to  serve. The bes t  inform ation on t h i s  co s t  is  
the term p re sen t ly  being served fo r  the  same offense  in  the s t a t e  before 
being re le a se d .
The Bureau o f Prisons has published by s t a t e  fo r  1960, 1964,
and 1970 th e  median time served before  ( f i r s t )  re le a s e  fo r  each offense .
This has been chosen as the  best e s tim ate  o f  s by reason of i t s  r e la t io n
19to  the  ac tua l punishment. The c o n t r a s t  between sentences and actual
18J a i l s  ty p ic a l ly  contain misdemeanants and those  awaiting t r i a l .
19Values fo r  sentences a re  reported  fo r  th e  same s ta t e s  as the  
inform ation on admissions. However, median time served i s  not reported 
fo r  those  o ffenses  in a s t a t e  where le s s  than ten  were re leased . Data fo r  
1970 were presented  in somewhat d i f f e r e n t  form, fo r  t h i s  reason they a re  
not included in  Tables 6 and 7.
TABLE 6
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Served by F i r s t  
Release in  1960
Homicide 235.1 188.0 52.0
Forcib le
Rape 70.8 146.9 30.0
Robbery 97.6 166.0 33.9
Aggravated
Assault 34.2 79.2 19.5
Burglary 43.1 100.5 20.4
Larceny 29.9 68.1 16.7
Auto Theft 32.1 89.8 18.9
All Offenses 77.5 119.8 27.3
Source: Federal Bureau o f  P r iso n s ,  National P risoner S t a t i s t i c s :  1960,
pp. 25, 69.
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times served before  re le a s e  may be noted through comparisons used in  Table
6 . S im ilar comparisons a re  not d i r e c t ly  a v a i la b le  f o r  the  year 1970.
An ad d it io n a l  advantage o f using th e  ac tua l time served i s
t h a t  while sentences a re  determined by a number o f  cou rts  in a s t a t e  and
th ese  sen tences  may vary widely among d i f f e r e n t  j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  paro les
20account fo r  nearly  tw o-th irds  o f  a l l  r e le a s e s .  Paroles  a re  ty p ic a l ly  
granted by a s in g le  agency in  a s t a t e ,  thus in troducing  an element of 
uniform ity  in  the  measure o f  punishment in  the  s t a t e .
Table 7 provides an in d ica t io n  o f  d if f e re n c e s  in punishments 
fo r  d i f f e r e n t  crimes among s t a t e s  and th e  median (o f  the  median) fo r  a l l  
s t a t e s  in  two o f  the  years  under examination.
4. Expected Values vs. True Values o f  p and s
To t h i s  p o in t the  d iscuss ion  has cen tered  on id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f
r e l i a b l e  e s t im a te s  o f  the  t ru e  values o f  p and s .  The model assumes
t h a t  i t  i s  the  o f fe n d e r 's  "im pression," and not n e c e s sa r i ly  the  t ru e
values o f  p and s th a t  m a tte rs .  As evidenced by th e  paucity  of
published inform ation  o f these  measures o f  co s ts  to  the  o ffender , i t  i s
highly doubtful i f  even law enforcement personnel in  a s t a t e  a re  aware
21
of th ese  va lues  f o r  t h e i r  own j u r i s d i c t i o n .  Can one assume p o te n t ia l
20
Federal Bureau o f  P r isons , National P r isone r  S t a t i s t i c s :  1960,
p. 1, and National P risoner S t a t i s t i c s :  1964, p. 4.
21
One reason fo r  not increas ing  inform ation on th ese  values i s  
th a t  they appear s u b s ta n t ia l ly  lower than popular im pressions. Wider 
d issem ina tion  o f  the  chances o f  a successfu l crim inal a c t  (except homicide 
and rape) could encourage crim inal a c ts .
Leonard Goodman, Trudy M il le r ,  and Paul D efo res t ,  A Study o f  the
D eterren t Value o f  Crime Prevention Measures as Perceived by Criminal




RANGE AND MEDIAN OF MEDIAN TIME SERVED 
BY FIRST RELEASE BY OFFENSE FOR STATES: 1960 AND 1964*
(IN MONTHS)
1960 1964
T Median o f  T Median o f
Crime Range All S ta te s  Range All S ta te s
Homicide 23.1 - 180 52.0 15.9 -  180 48.5
Forcib le  Rape 11.3 - 57.0 30.0 11.1 -  180 31.4
Robbery 17.9 - 68.4 33.9 7.2 -  180 36.1
Aggravated
A ssault 8 .4  - 37.3 19.5 8 .2  -  32.7 21.3
Burglary 10.7 - 32.3 20.4 10.0 -  42.0 20.1
Larceny 5.1 - 25.8 16.7 7.4 -  28.0 16.5
Auto Theft 7 .5  - 30.4 18.9 6.7 - 37.4 17.9
Average 27.3 27.4
^Medians fo r  s t a t e s  a re  provided only where the  number o f  
re le a se s  i s  ten  o r  more.
^Medians g re a te r  than 180 months a re  reported  as 180 months.
Source: Federal Bureau o f  P r iso n s ,  National P risoner S t a t i s t i e s :  1960, p. 69 
and National P r iso n e r  S t a t i s t i c s :  1964, p. 52.
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offenders  have knowledge o f  these  costs?
There i s  reason to  assume th a t  in general those  engaging in 
criminal a c ts  a re  much more knowledgeable than the  general pub lic  as to  
the chances o f  conviction  and punishment. In nearly  a l l  forms o f behavior 
p a r t ic ip a n ts  a re  more aware o f  th e  consequences than n o n -p a r t ic ip a n ts .
In a survey of new inmates a t  the  Lorton Reformatory in V irg in ia ,  
a number of in t e r e s t in g  po in ts  in  t h i s  regard were brought in to  l i g h t .  
Although near ly  a l l  inmates in d ica ted  th a t  they were not impressed with 
new techniques o f  po lice  o r  numbers o f  p o l ic e ,  seventy-seven percen t had 
a t  times thought o f  committing a crime but decided a g a in s t  i t  la rg e ly  out 
o f  fe a r  o f  apprehension or p r iso n . N inety-four percen t o f  the  inmates 
knew the  maximum sentence and e ighty-one percen t the  minimum fo r  the  
offense  fo r  which they had been committed. F if ty -seven  percen t of the  
inmates knew th e  maximum sentence fo r  burglary  (versus seven percent fo r  
the  contro l group) and seven ty-four percent o f  the  inmates knew the  
maximum sentence fo r  auto t h e f t  (versus tw enty-four percen t fo r  the 
control group): these  two being th e  most common crimes fo r  inmates a t  
Lorton.
Though i t  i s  not necessary fo r  offenders  to  know the t ru e  value 
of the  two components o f  c o s t ,  t h e i r  perception does appear to  bear a 
re la t io n  with th e  t ru e  va lues . As i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  determine the 
perceived values in any case , the  actual values of th e  v a r ia b le s  must be 
used in  any empirical work.
C. Regression Results
Economic theory  does not suggest a s p e c if ic  func tiona l form fo r  
reg ress ion  purposes. In t h i s  in v e s t ig a t io n  the  two b as ic  models are
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used. The f i r s t  i s  a m u ltip le  l in e a r  reg ress ion  model using the  values 
of the v a r iab le s  as c a lc u la te d  by simple a r i th m e tic  opera tions  which 
have been described . The second model is  the  Cobb-Douglas type , a 
simple exponential form of a m u l t ip l ic a t iv e  model.
1. M ultip le  Linear Model
M ultip le  l in e a r  reg ress ion  was used to  determine how the  crime 
level (C) fo r  each o ffense  responded to  changes in  the  p ro b a b i l i ty  of 
conviction (p) and punishment ( s ) .  A le a s t-sq u a re s  m u lt ip le  l in e a r  
reg ress ion  program o f  the  form
C = a + B-jP + B2S + u (1)
22was applied  to  the data  described  e a r l i e r  in t h i s  c h ap te r .  The r e s u l t ­
ing summary s t a t i s t i c s  fo r  1960, 1964, and 1970 appear in  Tables 8 , 9, 
and 10 re sp e c t iv e ly .  S ign if icance  a t  th e  0.05 or 0.01 level i s  in d i ­
cated by * and ** r e s p e c t iv e ly .
As was expected, the  parameter estim ates fo r  p ro b a b i l i ty ,  which 
may be in te rp re te d  as p a r t i a l  d e r iv a t iv e s ,  are  negative  fo r  a l l  seven 
Index offenses fo r  each o f th e  th ree  y ea rs .  The parameter estim ates  fo r  
punishment a re  negative  fo r  a l l  th ree  years  fo r  homicide, fo rc ib le  rape , 
and robbery. The c o e f f ic ie n ts  are  negative in two o f  th e  th ree  years  
fo r  aggravated a s s a u l t  and burg la ry , negative in 1964 alone fo r  la rceny , 
and p o s i t iv e  in a l l  th re e  years  fo r  auto t h e f t .  In a l l  cases the 
absolu te  value o f the  c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  p ro b a b i l i ty  i s  much g re a te r  than
22The s p e c i f ic  program used was the  IBM System/360 S c ie n t i f i c  
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0.404 0.164 3.34 3.52
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0.289 0.083 2.70 1.55
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( I n te r c e p t ) M ultip le C o e f f ic ien t Standard F-value fo r
Crime and Standard Regression iComputed C orre la tion of E rror of Analysis of
V ariable Mean Deviation C o e f f ic ien t t C o e f f ic ien t Determination Estimate Variance
Homicide
N=33 C 6.4909 3.8385 ( 12.48936)
P 0.3806 0.1224 10.4678* 2.11 0.504 0.254 3.42 5.12
s 48.2121 37.8003 0.0418** 2.60
F orc ib le Rape
N=33 C 15.3394 7.2949 ( 24.53290) 
56.6762%^P 0.1087 0.0809 4.07 0.605 0.366 6 .0 0 8.64
s 36.8182 29.6431 0.0825* 2.17
Robbery
( 189.48749)N=33 C 96.9059 98.9167
P 0.0647 0.0533 - 991.010?** 3.20 0.507 0.257 88.05 5.19
s 35.4849 28.3175 0.8011 1.38
Aggravated A ssau lt
N=33 C 124.2120 63.1959 ( 162.23665)
P 0.0218 0.0136 - 1,103.6846 1.25 0.234 0.055 63.45 0.87
s 22.4545 16.5361 0.6222 0 .8 6
Burglary
( 1,268.79150)N=33 C 908.9653 367.9424
P 0.0104 0.0071 -31,873.9805** 3.97 0.602 0.362 303.49 8.52
s 19.5454 10.2411 -1.4464 0.26
Larceny
( 896.49878)N=33 C 777.0288 309.1184
p 0.0059 0.0048 -23,383.2461* 2.07 0.381 0.146 295.13 2.55
s 17.7879 14.0239 1.0865 0.28
Auto Theft
N=33 C 360.4409 211.1077 ( 366.55469)
P 0.0043 0.0060 - 9,286.4883 1.52 0.304 0.092 207.74 1.52
s 19.4242 15.5444 1.7603 0.74
g
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23th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  fo r  punishment. Before a t ta ch in g  much importance to  
these  c o e f f ic ie n ts  i t  i s  necessary  to  examine the  s ig n if ic a n ce  of the 
e s t im ate s .
The use o f  computed values fo r  S tu d e n t 's  t  allows statem ents on
24the  s ig n if ic an ce  o f  the  parameter e s t im ate s .  The following l i s t i n g  
in d ic a te s  the cases where the  s ig n if ic a n ce  level exceeds 0.85.
1960 1964 1970
Homicide P — — — .90 .95
s .95 ------- .99
Forc ib le  Rape P .99 .99 .99
s -  —- .90 .95
Robbery P .99 .99 .99










Auto Theft p .99 .99 .90
s .85 — — — — — —
At the  5 percen t level punishment i s  s ig n i f i c a n t  in  only four 
cases out of twenty-one and does not appear to  be continuously  s ig n i f ic a n t
23At th i s  p o in t in t e r p r e ta t io n  of  the  c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  somewhat 
confusing and may not be very u s e fu l .  For example, in  1964 th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  
fo r  homicide in  p i s  -7 .0785. This means, c e t e r i s  p a r ib u s ,  a one u n i t  
inc rease  in p w ill  r e s u l t  in  a p red ic ted  decrease in  C o f  7.0785 per
100,000 population. The c o e f f i c i e n t  on s o f  -0.0091 may be in te rp re te d  to  
mean th a t  the  model p re d ic ts  a 0.0091 dec line  in  C when s i s  increased by 
one month. But, p has a range o f  only 0 to  1 and cannot ( in  nearly  a l l  
cases) be increased by 1. I n te rp r e ta t io n  may be aided i f  changes in  p of 
.1 a re  considered, t h i s  change would lead to  a p red ic ted  change in  C o f 
.70785. The second s e t  o f  reg ress io n s  which develop e l a s t i c i t i e s  w ill 




fo r  any indiv idual o ffense  fo r  the years  s tud ied . This r e s u l t ,  which is  
not t o t a l l y  unsuspected, should suggest caution when examining the 
proposals th a t  increased prison  terms be used as a means o f  reducing 
crime. At b e s t  the  d e te r re n t  value o f  punishment appears minimal and 
i s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  in s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  the  conventional level o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  
fo r  most cases .
Quite a d i f f e r e n t  p ic tu re  emerges when viewing the  c o e f f ic ie n t  
fo r  p. In a l l  but fou r o f  the  twenty-one cases the c o e f f i c i e n t  is
pc
s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  th e  5 percen t l e v e l .  As expected, id e n t i fy in g  a 
r e la t io n  between p ro b a b i l i ty  and offense  level i s  weakest fo r  homicide, 
the offense c r im in o lo g is ts  consider l e a s t  ra t io n a l  due to  i t s  a sso c ia t io n  
with passion. For unknown reasons the r e la t io n  between p ro b a b i l i ty  and 
offense le v e ls  fo r  aggravated a s s a u l t  and auto t h e f t  a re  not s ig n i f i c a n t  
fo r  1970.26
However, the  c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  fo rc ib le  rap e ,  robbery, and burglary  
i s  always s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  1 p e rcen t and fo r  larceny i t  i s  always s i g n i f i ­
can t a t  5 percent o r  l e s s .  This suggests th a t  this.m odel i d e n t i f i e s  
p ro b a b il i ty  as an explanatory  fa c to r  fo r  these  p a r t i c u la r  o f fen ses .
Although t h i s  approach allows fo r  statem ents regard ing  the 
r e la t io n  between c e r ta in ty  (p ) ,  sev e r i ty  ( s ) ,  and o ffenses  (C), how much
25The exceptions a re  homicide in 1960 and 1964, aggravated 
a s s a u l t  in 1970, and auto t h e f t  in  1970.
26Data on auto t h e f t  and aggravated a s s a u l t  a re  more ques tio n ­
able  than fo r  the  o th e r  o f fen se s .  This is  due to  the  number o f  ju v en i le s  
involved, a l t e r n a t iv e  punishments used such as p roba tion , and in  the  
case of auto t h e f t  the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  becomes a Federal crime i f  the 
s to len  auto crosses a s t a t e  l in e .
In a d d i t io n ,  th e  data  fo r  1970 a re  l e s s  complete and le s s  
d e ta i led  than fo r  1960 and 1964. For these  reasons 1970 i s  examined 
le s s  in te n t ly  in t h i s  chap te r .
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of the  variance  in offense ra te s  i s  "explained" by the  two independent 
v a riab les?  The f r a c t io n  of the  variance  in  o ffense  r a te s  explained by 
the  two explanatory  v a r iab les  i s  summarized by the  values fo r  the 
c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  determ ination (R ) as shown in the  l i s t i n g  below (p a r t i a l  
c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n ts  appear in paren theses) .
I960 1964 1970
Homicide .16 (- .2 3 )
(- .3 5 )
.08 (- .2 3 )
( - . 11 )
.25 (- .2 9 )
(- .3 8 )
Forcib le  Rape .30 (- .5 4 )  
( .15)
.40 (- .6 1 )
( - . 02 )
.37 (- .5 2 )
( - . 1 2 )
Robbery 1:1 .26 (- .4 9 )( - .0 7 ) .31 (- .5 1 )(- .0 7 ) .26 (- .4 6 )(- .0 5 )
Aggravated A ssault 1:1 .12 ( - .3 4 )  ( .15) .17 (- .4 0 )  ( .09) .06 (- .1 8 )( - .0 8 )
Burglary 1:1 .20 ( - .4 5 )  ( .17) .27 (- .5 1 )  ( .27) .36 (- .6 0 )  ( .16)
Larceny 1:1 .14 ( - .3 8 )  ( .19) .18 (- .4 2 )  ( .16) .15 (- .3 8 )  ( .15)
Auto Theft 1:1 .26 (- .4 7 )  ( .31) .26 (- .5 1 )  ( .19) .09 ( - . 2 1 ) ( .15)
These r e l a t i v e ly  modest R values were not unexpected. This i s
e sp e c ia l ly  th e  case when re a l iz in g  t h a t  most of the  explanation  is  from
a s in g le  independent v a r ia b le ,  p ro b a b i l i ty .  The computed F value may be
used to  ev a lu a te  the  reg ress ion  equations as a whole, t h i s  examination
27would p a ra l le l  e a r l i e r  d iscuss ion  q u i te  c lo se ly .  Likewise, the
27 2
I f  high R s a re  desired  a l l  t h a t  is  requ ired  i s  th e  ad d itio n  of  
independent v a r iab le s  rep resen ting  t a s t e  va r iab les  such a s :  income,
unemployment l e v e l ,  percent nonwhite population, popula tion  m o b ili ty ,  
educational l e v e l s ,  e tc .  The in c lu s io n  o f  these  t a s t e  v a r ia b le s ,  however, 
destroys  the  id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f con tro l v a r iab les  w ith in  a complete model 
as was explained e a r l i e r .
C r i t i c a l  values fo r  F a re  approximately 3 .3  a t  5 percen t and 
5.3 a t  1 percen t ( fo r  2 and N-3 degrees o f  freedom). F0.05 (2.45) and 
FO.Ol (2. 45).
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standard e r r o r  o f  the  es tim ate  may be used to  ob ta in  an impression o f  the  
amount o f  s l ip p ag e  t h a t  e x is t s  in the  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  reg ress ions  to  account 
fo r  v a r ia t io n s  in  o ffense  le v e l s .  As what may be a more f r u i t f u l  form of 
examination remains to  be examined i t  i s  not necessary  to  e lab o ra te  any 
f u r th e r  on the  s t a t i s t i c s  fo r  the  i n i t i a l  re g re ss io n .
2. Cobb-Douglas Form
In an a ttem pt to  render th e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  in v e s t ig a t io n  in a 
form more usefu l fo r  evalua tion  and po licy  purposes, the  decis ion  was 
made to  de rive  parameter estim ates  using a d i f f e r e n t  functional form.
The exponential form o f  a m u l t ip l ic a t iv e  form known as the Cobb-Douglas 
model was used. This simple l in e a r  model was chosen by v ir tu e  o f  i t s  
s im p l ic i ty ,  p o p u la r i ty  among economists, th e  f a c t  t h a t  the  c o e f f ic ie n ts  
generated provide convenient estim ates  o f  c o n s tan t  e l a s t i c i t y  d i r e c t l y ,  
and the  reco g n it io n  th a t  economic theory does not suggest any a l t e r n a t iv e  
form fo r  t h i s  type o f  study.
Due to  problems in ob ta in ing  da ta  fo r  1970, reg ress ions  using 
na tu ra l  logs were run on the  1960 and 1964 da ta  only . The r e s u l t s  o f  
the  m u lt ip le  l i n e a r  reg ress ion  model o f  th e  form
InC = Ina + In p + 82 In s + In u (2)
appear in Tables 11 and 12. In t h i s  form th e  parameter estim ates  in d i ­
ca te  the  percentage change in o ffense  r a t e  expected as a r e s u l t  o f  a 
one percen t change in  the  independent v a r ia b le ,  p o r  s .
The parameter estim ates  fo r  p a re  always negative  with abso lu te  
values ranging between 0.16 and 0.997 which re p re se n t  an in e la s t i c  
response to  changes in p fo r  a l l  o f fen ses .  This leads  to  the  suggestion 
th a t  while th e  supply o f  offenses responds to  changes in  p, th e  supply 
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always le s s  than t h a t  o f  the  corresponding estim ate  fo r  p ( in  abso lu te  
v a lu e ) ,  and in  s ix  cases the  parameter e s tim ate  fo r  punishment is  
p o s i t iv e .
Before a t ta ch in g  too much importance to  the  e l a s t i c i t y  es tim ates  
i t  i s  necessary  to  examine the  s ig n if ic an ce  lev e ls  o f  the  es t im ates .  
Again, the  0.05 and 0.01 s ig n if ican ce  le v e ls  are  in d ica ted  by * and ** 
re sp e c t iv e ly  in  Tables 11 and 12. The following l i s t i n g  provides a 
summary o f  th e  level o f  s ig n if ican ce  fo r  th e  seven o ffenses  in 1960 and 
1964, fo r  those  cases where the  s ig n if ic a n ce  level exceeds 0.85.
1960 1964
Homicide P .95 .95
s .99
Forcib le  Rape P .99 .99
s — -  — .90
Robbery P .99 .99
s — -  — .90








Auto Theft p .99 .99
P ro b a b i l i ty  i s  always s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  5 percent level fo r  
homicide and a t  th e  1 percent level fo r  the  remaining s ix  o f fen se s .  Much 
le s s  c e r ta in  r e s u l t s  appear fo r  punishment. In one o f  the  years  punish­
ment i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  fo r  homicide a t  1 p e rcen t,  and in  one o f  th e  years  
punishment i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  10 percent fo r  fo rc ib le  rap e ,  robbery, and 
aggravated a s s a u l t .  Again, these  r e s u l t s  appear to  be in  l in e  with à 
p r io r i  expec ta tions  regarding the  r e l a t i v e  ro le s  played by c e r ta in ty  and
96
s e v e r i ty .  C er ta in ty  always appears to  be a s ig n i f i c a n t  determ inant o f  
th e  crime leve l while s e v e r i ty  i s  much le s s  s ig n i f i c a n t ,  a t  the  conven­
t io n a l  le v e l s  o f  s ig n if ic a n c e .  I t  i s  poss ib le  to say t h a t  the  proba­
b i l i t y  o f  conv ic tion  i s  a determ inant o f  the  crime level fo r  each of the 
seven Index o ffenses  ( a t  the  0 .05 le v e l ) .
I t  i s  again worthwhile to  examine the  percen t o f  the  v a r ia t io n  in
o ffense  le v e l s  explained by th i s  p a i r  o f  v a r ia b le s .  The l i s t i n g  below
2
in d ic a te s  values o f  R fo r  each reg ress ion  with p a r t i a l  c o r re la t io n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  in  parentheses.
1960 1964
Homicide P .29 (- .2 6 ) .11 (- .3 1 )
s (- .4 5 ) (- .0 1 )
Fo rc ib le  Rape P .36 (- .6 0 ) .52 (- .7 0 )
s ( .28) ( .16)
Robbery P .29 (- .5 4 ) .42 (- .6 2 )
s ( .06) ( .12)
Aggravated A ssault p .53 (- .7 1 ) .39 (- .6 2 )
s ( .33) ( .31)
Burglary p .21 ( - .4 6 ) .27 (- .5 2 )
s ( .23) ( .30)
Larceny p .18 (- .4 1 ) .17 (- .4 1 )
s ( .11) ( .14)
Auto Theft p .25 (- .5 0 ) .41 (- .6 4 )
s ( .19) ( .11)
The R s a re  with two very minor exceptions g re a te r  than was the
28case fo r  th e  f i r s t  model used. Again, most o f  th e  explained v a r ia t io n  
in  th e  crime level i s  due to  th e  s in g le  explanatory  v a r ia b le ,  p ro b a b i l i ty .  
One o f  the  goals of t h i s  s ec t io n  is  to  p r e d ic t  the  impact of
28.aThe exceptions are  au to  t h e f t  in 1960 (a 1 percen t d if fe ren ce )  
and la rceny  in  1964 (again a 1 pe rcen t d i f f e r e n c e ) .
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changing le v e l s  o f  law enforcement on the  crime le v e l .  For t h i s  purpose 
i t  i s  d e s i r a b le  to  co n s tru c t  a confidence in te rv a l  f o r  p ro b a b i l i ty .
Using the s tandard  e r r o r  fo r  the  c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  p ro b a b i l i ty  a t  a 95 
percent confidence in te rv a l  i t  i s  po ss ib le  to  e s ta b l i s h  the  estim ated  
percentage change in  C fo r  a one percen t change in  p. Only 1964 i s  
examined fo r  t h i s  purpose and the  l i b e r t y  o f  some rounding f a c i l i t a t e s  
the  use o f  th ese  e s t im ate s  in l a t e r  d is c u s s io n .  In each case th e  in te rv a l  
rep resen ts  th e  p e rcen t  change in the  o ffense  level expected when p changes 
by one p e rcen t .  These estim ates a re  shown in  Table 13.
The confidence  in te rv a l  i s  q u i te  wide fo r  homicide and may not 
be useful fo r  se r io u s  d iscussion  of the  expected change in th e  homicide 
level due to  a change in  the  value o f  p. However, in o rder to  m aintain  
the  completeness o f  th e  d iscussion  the  examination w ill  continue to  be 
in terms o f  a l l  seven Index o ffenses .
I t  i s  q u es t io n ab le  i f  law enforcement a u th o r i t i e s  a re  in  a 
po s it io n  to  a ttem pt an inc rease  in p as exac ting  as one p e rc en t ,  t h i s  is  
a very small change th a t  would, from a p ra c t ic a l  viewpoint, very u n lik e ly  
be a po licy  t a r g e t .
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t  added manpower, equipment, and support could 
be used to  a ttem pt to  achieve something in th e  o rder o f  a ten percen t 
increase  in  p. How many add itiona l conv ic t ions  would be necessary  to  
r e s u l t  in  a ten  p e rcen t increase  in  p and how much would the  crime level 
be a ffec ted ?  Table 14 provides some t e n t a t i v e  answers to  th ese  qu es t io n s .  
In 1964 th e  average population per s t a t e  was used to  es tim ate  o f fe n se s ,  
co n v ic t io n s ,  change in  convictions per ten  percen t change in p, and the 
r e s u l t a n t  ( a n t ic ip a te d )  change in number o f  o ffenses  fo r  a ty p ica l
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TABLE 13
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF A ONE PERCENT CHANGE IN PROBABILITY ON THE
OFFENSE LEVEL BY OFFENSE, AT 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE IN 1964
Offense
Regression
C o eff ic ien t
Standard Error o f  
Regression C o e f f ic ien t
Percent Change 
in C
Homicide -0.90 0.45 0.01 to  -1.81
F orc ib le  Rape -0.63 0.09 -0 .45  to  -0.81
Robbery -1.00 0.19 -0 .62  to  -1.38
Aggravated
A ssault -0.54 0.13 -0 .28  to  -0.80
Burglary -0.29 0.09 -0.11 to  -0.47
Larceny -0.16 0.06 -0 .04  to  -0.28
Auto Theft -0.22 0.05 -0 .12  to  -0.32
TABLE 14
ESTIMATED EFFECT ON NUMBER OF OFFENSES OF A TEN PERCENT CHANGE 













Range o f  
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Number o f 
Offenses Best Estimate
Homicide 79 185 8 4.400 0.00
-0 .80
0
- 32 - 16
F orc ib le  Rape 72 412 7 9.227 -0 .42
-0 .75
-  17
- 30 - 24






















C onvic tions, o f f e n s e s ,  and the  o r ig in a l  o ffense  ra te s  a re  averages. The popula tion  o f  an average 
s t a t e  i s  taken as 4 m il l io n .




29s t a t e .  These e s tim ates  are  depicted both as in te rv a ls  using the
confidence in te r v a l s  o f  Table 13 and as s p e c i f ic  estim ates  using the 
reg ress ion  c o e f f i c i e n t s  d i r e c t ly .
This procedure suggests th a t  fo r  an average s t a t e  a ten  percent 
increase  in the  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conviction w ill reduce the number of 
offenses by anywhere from 16 to  602 depending upon the  p a r t i c u la r  
o ffense , and t h a t  th e  required number o f  new convictions  r e q u i s i t e  fo r  a 
ten percent in c rease  in p is  from 7 to  41. As was noted e a r l i e r ,  i t  may 
not be possib le  to  in d ic a te  anything with s a t i s f a c to r y  confidence regard ­
ing homicide, however, the  estim ates fo r  th e  o th e r  s ix  o ffenses  are 
deserving o f  a t t e n t i o n .  The reduction in number of o ffenses  provides 
an estim ate  o f  the  b e n e f i t  of a ten percen t inc rease  in p ro b a b i l i ty  of 
conv iction . I t  remains to determine the  economic b e n e f i t  o f  th is  
reduction and th e  increased  costs  a ssoc ia ted  with the  increased 
p ro b a b i l i ty .  The f in a l  sec tion  of t h i s  chap ter  deals  with th e  co s t  of 
increasing  the  number o f  convictions. At t h i s  po in t several points  
regarding th e  c o s ts  o f  th e  offenses can be re c a l le d .
Id ea lly  th e  c o s t  of each crime would include measures of:
1. V ic tim iza t ion  Costs—reduced ea rn ings , lo ss  of 
property , medical expenditures, and o the r  d i r e c t  losses  
assoc ia ted  w ith being a crime victim .
2. Fear o f  V ictim ization—r e s t r i c t e d  personal a c t i v i t y ,  
reduced business a c t i v i t y ,  and changes in  behavior caused by 
fe a r  o f  crime.
3. P r iv a te  P ro tec tion  Costs—c o s t  o f  a larm s, locks , 
re in fo rcem ents , watchdogs, sa fe s ,  watchmen, and the  l ik e  as 
well as insurance  co s ts  ne t of payments received .
p q
The average s t a t e  had a population o f  approximately 4 m ill io n  
in 1964, thus th e  number o f  offenses per s t a t e  averaged 40 tim es the 
offense  r a t e .
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4. Psychic Costs of Victims— in ju ry ,  t e r r o r ,  and o ther  
d iscom fort su ffe red  by being v ic tim ized .
5. Cost o f  Public ly  Provided Services Associated with 
P reven tion , D etection , Conviction , and Treatment o f  
O ffenders .
6 . Other Consequential C osts—a l ie n a t io n ,  s u rv e i l la n c e ,  
b r ib e ry ,  and c r im in a l iz a t io n  c o s ts  generated by criminal 
a c t i v i t y .
I t  i s  not possib le  a t  th e  p re sen t  time to  o b ta in  information on 
most of th e se  co s ts  of crime. Some da ta  a re  a v a i la b le  fo r  v ic t im iz a t io n  
c o s ts ,  p r iv a te  p ro tec tion  c o s t s ,  and the  co s t  o f  pu b lic ly  provided 
s e rv ic e s .  These a re  ind ica ted  in  Table 1 (page 4) and w ill  be r e fe r re d  
to  again l a t e r .
I t  is  somewhat e a s ie r  to  o b ta in  cos ts  o f  conv ic t io n s ,  th e  o th e r  
s ide  o f the  m a tte r  of equating the  marginal c o s t  and b e n e f i t  o f  law 
enforcement. A tten tion  w ill  now be devoted to  th i s  m atte r .
D. Costs o f  Crime
The use o f  economic an a ly s is  in  determ ination o f  ra t io n a l  law
enforcement p o licy  requ ires  some knowledge o f th e  co s ts  o f  crime and law
enforcement. The only comprehensive a ttem pt to  study the  co s t  o f  crime
30
was t h a t  o f  th e  Wickersham Commission in 1931. However, by using some 
of th e  a v a i la b le  c o s t  estim ates  generated by the I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Defense 
Analyses in  a study prepared fo r  th e  P re s id e n t 's  Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration o f  J u s t i c e ,  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  generate  
several t e n t a t i v e  magnitudes.
30U .S .,  National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 
Report on th e  Cost of Crime, No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
P r in t in g  O ff ic e ,  1931).
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The reg re ss io n  c o e f f ic ie n ts  fo r  th e  Index offenses enable 
p red ic t io n  o f  th e  e f f e c t  of a change in  p o r  s on the  number o f  o f fe n s e s .  
At the  p resen t t im e, though l i t t l e  i s  known as to  how much a given 
percentage in c rease  in  p or s would add to  law enforcement c o s ts ,  i t  i s  
possib le  to  approximate the  increased pub lic  c o s ts  of inc reas ing  the 
number o f  conv ic t ions  by one.
Several s trong  assumptions a re  re q u ire d .  F i r s t  i t  i s  necessary  
to  assume th a t  th e  public  sec to r  i s  o pera ting  a t  the  most e f f i c i e n t  
le v e l ,  no rearrangement of resources between p and s could reduce crime, 
and the  p re sen t  le v e ls  of p and s a re  being achieved in th e  most 
e f f i c i e n t  manner. The I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Defense Analyses provided t e n t a t i v e  
co s t  f ig u re s  fo r  th e  Index offenses by e s ta b l i s h in g  a genera lized  
criminal j u s t i c e  system through the  fo llowing process:
1. Aggregating re la te d  s tages  of crim inal processing.
2. Determining the p ro b a b i l i ty  t h a t  an a r re s te d  person 
i s  routed through each p a r t  o f  the  system.
3. Imputing to  each person routed through the system 
c o s ts  o f  processing  a t  each s tag e .
4 . Using a v a i la b le  data  to  determine consequences of 
an ad d i t io n a l  a r r e s t  on c o s ts .
5. A lloca ting  the  d i r e c t  co s t  o f  processing.on the  
ba s is  o f  time a t  each s tage and time u n i t  c o s ts .
Table 15 in d ic a te s  the  percentage d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  criminal j u s t i c e  
expenditures fo r  each o f  the  Index o ffenses  as estimated by the  I n s t i t u t e .
31 Science and Technology, pp. 56-57. Data on p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  
passing through each s tage  were based on a sample of s t a t e  court re p o r ts  
from C a l i fo rn ia ,  p o lic e  costs  were based on da ta  from the  In te rn a t io n a l  
A ssociation o f  Chiefs o f  P o lice , c o u r t  co s ts  were based on Washington,
D.C. f ig u r e s ,  and c o rrec t io n s  costs  were based on the C orrections Task 
Force work.
TABLE 15
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPENDITURES 
IN THE UNITED STATES, BY OFFENSE: 1965
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in M illions 
o f  D ollars
Murder 10 1 8 81 48.
Fo rc ib le  Rape 39 14 5 42 29.
Robbery 42 12 4 42 140.
Aggravated
A ssau lt 54 8 4 34 190.
Burglary 72 11 1 16 820.
Larceny
($50. and over) 76 8 1 15 500.
Auto Theft 67 21 1 11 370.
Average fo r  
All Offenses 51.4 10.7 3.4 34.4
Source: I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Defense Analyses, Science and Technology, p. 62.
104
Though the  r e s u l t  o f  several a r b i t r a r y  assumptions, these  a re  the b e s t  
32a v a i la b le  f ig u r e s .  The e s t im ate s  o f  Table 15 were used to  a l lo c a te
to ta l  criminal j u s t i c e  expenditures  among the Index o ffen ses .
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  a l lo c a t io n  in  terms o f  actual d o l la r  co s ts
appear in Table 16. In terms o f  s e v e r i ty  the  FBI considers  murder th e
most se r ious  crime and rape th e  second most s e r io u s .  Nonetheless, on
th e  bas is  o f  a l lo c a te d  crim inal j u s t i c e  expenditures these  are  the
l e a s t  c o s t ly  crimes due to  th e  fewness o f  these  crimes in comparison to
th e  o ther o ffen ses .
I t  i s  po ss ib le  to  use p r iso n e r  da ta  to determine the  criminal
j u s t i c e  expenditures per co n v ic t io n .  There a re  several adjustments t h a t
must be made before  a law enforcement c o s t  per conviction  can be ob ta ined .
F i r s t ,  s ince  the  p r iso n e r  da ta  includes only a d u l t s ,  ju v e n i le  processing
co s ts  were omitted from the  c a lc u la t io n s .  Second, because p r isoner
f ig u res  a re  fo r  a d u l t s ,  each c o s t  component was reduced by the  percen t
33o f  t o ta l  a r r e s t s  accounted f o r  by ju v en ile s  (persons 11-17). T h ird , 
p r iso n e r  da ta  excludes Alaska and New Jersey  while the  c o s t  f ig u res  a re  
fo r  a l l  f i f t y  s t a t e s .  Admissions to  s t a t e  prison were increased by a 
f a c to r  based on the  percent o f  United S ta te s  population l iv in g  in these
32Time was used as th e  bas is  fo r  most o f  the  a l lo c a t io n s  o f 
c o s t s .  In several cases th e  e s tim ates  a re  q u i te  su b je c t iv e .  For example, 
th e  In te rn a tio n a l  A ssociation o f  Chiefs o f  Police  estim ated  th a t  twenty- 
f iv e  percent of t o t a l  pa tro l  time and one-hundred percen t o f  d e te c t iv e  
time was devoted to  the  Index o f fen ses .
33Percentages used were taken from: The Challenge of Crime.
p. 56.
The percentage of a l l  o ffense  a r r e s t s  accounted fo r  by juven­
i l e s  were: murder 8 .4 ,  f o r c ib le  rape 19 .8 , robbery 28 .0 , aggravated 
a s s a u l t  14 .2 , burg lary  47 .7 , la rceny  49 .2 , and auto t h e f t  61.4.
TABLE 16
ESTIMATED CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPENDITURES 
BY OFFENSE: 1965













in  Millions 
o f  Dollars
Murder 4 .8 0.48 3.84 38.88 48.
F orc ib le  Rape 11.3 4.06 1.45 12.18 29.
Robbery 58.8 16.80 5.60 58.50 140.
Aggravated
A ssau lt 102 .6 15.20 7.60 64.60 190.
Burglary 590.4 90.20 8 .2 0 131.20 820.
Larceny
($50. and over) 380.0 40.00 5.00 75.00 500.
Auto Theft 247.9 77.70 3.70 40.70 370.
Total 1,395.8 244.44 35.39 421.36 2,097.
Source: Computed from. I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Defense Analyses, Science and 
Technology, p. 62.
106
34two s t a t e s .
A fter these  ad justm ents , a t e n ta t iv e  f ig u re  f o r  average p o l ic e ,  
co u r t ,  and co rre c t io n a l  c o s ts  per conviction can be c a lc u la te d  by 
d iv id ing  expenditures fo r  each of these  func tions  by admissions to  s t a t e  
prison in 1964. R esu lts  before  these  adjustments and c a lc u la t io n s  appear 
in Table 17, r e s u l t s  a f t e r  the  adjustments appear in  Table 18. C er ta in ly  
these  r e s u l t s  provide su rp r is in g  r e la t io n s h ip s .  Though murder and 
fo rc ib le  rape a re  considered the  most serious  crimes in  terms of 
sub jec tive  measures o f  s e v e r i ty  as well as v ic tim  c o s ts  measured in 
economic term s, p o l ic e  co s ts  per conviction a re  lowest fo r  these  two 
crimes and to ta l  c rim inal j u s t i c e  expenditures a re  well below those fo r  
the  le s s  se r ious  crimes o f  aggravated a s s a u l t ,  b u rg la ry ,  la rcen y , and 
auto th e f t !  Is th e re  bas is  fo r  an explanation o f  th e se  r e la t io n s  o r  do 
they rep resen t  the  r e s u l t s  o f  too many tenuous p roposit ions?
There a re  many b a r r i e r s  in the  way o f simple ex p lan a tio n s .  The 
P re s id e n t 's  Commission avoids th e  seemingly c o n tra d ic to ry  f ig u re s  in d i ­
cated in Table 18 by f a i l i n g  to repo rt  p o l ic e ,  c o u r t ,  and c o rrec t io n s  
costs  on a "per conv ic tion"  b a s is .  Rather, t o ta l  crim inal j u s t i c e  
system costs  "per crime" a re  reported . The reported  f ig u re s  a re  as in 
Table 19 which i s  presented  fo r  purposes o f f a c i l i t a t i n g  comparisons.
When costs  a re  reported  on a per crime ba s is  th e  criminal 
j u s t i c e  expenditures fo r  each type offense appear very much in  l in e  with 
the  sev e r i ty  o f  each o ffense  as judged su b jec t iv e ly  o r  as measured in 
economic terms. However, because the p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conv ic tion  i s  very 
low po lice  cos ts  per conv ic t ion  i s  very high fo r  aggravated a s s a u l t .
34As 3.6 pe rcen t o f  th e  population l ived  in Alaska and New Je rsey ,  
reported  admissions were increased by a f a c to r  o f  1.0373.
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TABLE 17
AVERAGE LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS PER CONVICTION 
BY OFFENSE: 1965
(Unadjusted D olla rs )
Offense Police  Cost Court Cost Corrections Cost Total Cost
Murder 1,213. 970. 9,826. 12,009.
Forcib le  Rape 3,084. 395. 3,322. 6,801.
Robbery 7,167. 680. 7,167. 15,014.
Aggravated
A ssau lt 25,079. 1,858. 15,790. 42,727.
Burglary 28,540. 396. 6,342. 35,278.
Larceny
($50. and over) 44,330. 583. 8,749. 53,662.
Auto Theft 75,304. 1,123. 12,363. 88,790.
Source: Federal Bureau o f  P r isons , National P r iso n e r  S t a t i s t i c s :  1964, 
p. 17, and computations from Table 16.
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TABLE 18
AVERAGE LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS PER CONVICTION 
BY OFFENSE: 1965
(Adjusted D ollars)
Offense Police  Cost Court Cost Corrections Cost Total Cost
Murder 1 , 111 . 889. 9,000. 1 1 , 00 0 .
Fo rc ib le  Rape 2,474. 317. 2,664. 5,455.
Robbery 5,160. 491. 5,160. 10,812.
Aggravated
A ssau lt 21,560. 1,594. 13,548. 36,661.
Burglary 14,926. 207. 3,317. 18,450.
Larceny
($50. and over) 22,520. 296. 4,445. 27,261.
Auto Theft 29,067. 434. 4,772. 34,273.
Sources: Computations from Tables 16 and 17 involving ju v e n i le  crime 




CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPENDITURES 
PER OFFENSE: 1965 
(D ollars)
Offense System Costs Per Offense
Murder 4,900.
Forc ib le  Rape 1,300.
Robbery 1 , 2 0 0 .
Aggravated A ssault 920.
Burglary 700.
Larceny ($50. and over) 660.
Auto Theft 760.
Average fo r  All Index Offenses 750.
Source: I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Defense Analyses, Science and Technology, p. 63,
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auto t h e f t ,  la rcen y , and burg lary . I t  i s  p oss ib le  to  v e r i fy  ihese
35somewhat alarming f ig u re s  through use o f  P re s id e n t 's  Commission d a ta .
I f  th e  f ig u re s  o f  Table 19 are  m u ltip l ied  by the  rec ip rocal of 
the  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conviction  fo r  each o ffense  (Table 4) the  r e s u l ta n t  
f ig u re  should approximate the  c o s t  per co n v ic t ion , a f t e r  one adjustment. 
Since the  co s ts  o f  Table 19 a re  fo r  a d u l t  o ffen d e rs ,  a reduction  was made 
fo r  crimes committed by ju v e n i le  o ffenders .  The r e s u l t s  appear in Table 
20. A very high degree of s im i la r i ty  e x is t s  as th e re  i s  le s s  than f iv e  
percent d if fe ren c e  fo r  a l l  o ffenses except auto t h e f t .  The following 
caveat appears a p p ro p r ia te ;  the  data upon which th ese  estim ates  a re  
based a re  not h ighly  r e l i a b l e  but they a re  the  bes t  a v a i la b le .  The only 
o the r e s tim ates  o f  co s ts  per conviction  in an economic study a re  q u ite  
compatible.
Using the  information on the  number o f  ad d itio n a l convictions 
required fo r  a ten  percent increase  in the  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conviction 
from Table 14 and the  co s ts  per conviction  o f Table 20 the  following 
emerge as es tim ates  o f  the  co s ts  o f  t h i s  inc rease  in enforcement (with 
some averaging o f  f ig u r e s ) .
35For convenience the  o r ig in a l  method o f computation i s  re fe rre d  
to  as Method A and th e  second method i s  Method B.
36Morgan Reynolds derived the  following conviction  cos ts  fo r  
property  crimes; burg lary  $21,700, robbery $7,800, and larceny $31,000. 
His f ig u res  l i k e ly  o v e rs ta te  the  t ru e  co s t  as no adjustment was made 
fo r  ju v e n i le s  and the  absence of Alaska and New Jersey  from the  data  
base.
Morgan 0. Reynolds, "Crimes fo r  P r o f i t :  Economics o f  T heft ,"  




COMPARISON OF SYSTEM COSTS PER CONVICTION 
FOR INDEX OFFENSES IN 1965












Homicide $4,900. 2.35 (.916)* $10,548. $1 1 ,0 0 0 .
F o rc ib le  Rape 1,300. 5.73 (.802) 5,974. 5,455.
Robbery 1 , 2 0 0 . 13.53 (.720) 11 ,690. 10,812.
Aggravated
A ssault 920. 45.45 (.858) 35,876. 36,661.
Burglary 700. 53.39 (.523) 19,546. 18,450.
Larceny 660. 82.37 (.508) 27,617. 27,261.
Auto Theft 760. 140.45 (.386) 41,202. 34,273.
^The f ig u re s  in  parentheses in d ic a te  the  percen t o f  o ffenses  
committed by a d u l t s .
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Offense AC ( = MC) X Number = Cost Increase
Homicide $1 1 , 0 0 0 . 8 $ 8 8 , 0 0 0 .
F o rc ib le  Rape 5,500. 7 38,500.
Robbery 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 16 176,000.
Aggravated A ssault 36,000. 8 288,000.
Burglary 19,000. 41 779,000.
Larceny 27,500. 17 467,500.
Auto Theft 37,000. 7 259,000.
Using the  e s tim ates  o f  the  reduced number o f  o ffenses  as a
r e s u l t  o f  a ten percen t in c rease  in  p ro b a b i l i ty  from Table 14, i t  i s
po ss ib le  to  s t a t e  t e n t a t i v e l y  how much i s  being paid (o r must be paid)
to  prevent each ad d it io n a l  o f fen se ,  a f ig u re  analogous to  the  average
37c o s t  and marginal co s t  o f  preventing an o ffen se .  These co s ts  a re  as 
in d ica ted  below.
Average Cost of 
Offense Preventing One Offense
Homicide $5,500.
Forcib le  Rape 1,604.
Robbery 1,114.




I t  i s  su rp r is in g  th a t  the  range i s  narrow, from $1,114. to
$2,154. fo r  the  o f fen se s ,  when homicide i s  excluded. Is  the  reduction
37The f ig u re  fo r  homicide should be in te rp re te d  only with con­
s id e ra b le  c au tio n ,  i t  i s  not p o ss ib le  to  es tim ate  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  changes 
in  p fo r  t h i s  p a r t i c u la r  o ffense  with accep tab le  confidence .
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in crime c o s ts  (a marginal b e n e f i t )  le s s  than , g re a te r  th an ,  or equal to
these  amounts? U nfortunate ly  the  reduc tions  in these  co s ts  a re  p re sen tly
impossible to  determine due to  t h e i r  d iv e rse  na tu re  and the  absence of
38a market mechanism through which they can be measured. There a re  
es tim ates  o f  th e  d i r e c t  (o r  victim) co s ts  o f  each o f fe n se ,  however, these  
a re  not adequate . Is  th e re  an a l t e r n a t iv e  source o f  inform ation o r a 
d i f f e r e n t  procedure which may be pursued?
At th e  p resen t  time th e re  does not appear to  be an e x p l i c i t  or 
in d i r e c t  way to  measure to ta l  co s ts  o f  crim inal a c t i v i t y  on American 
s o c ie ty .  Measures o f co s ts  p re sen tly  a v a i la b le  a re  l im ited  to  the  
v ic tim  c o s ts  and p ro tec t io n  expenditures including law enforcement. In 
the  f in a l  ch ap te r  of t h i s  paper some te n ta t iv e  conclusions a re  drawn on 
the b a s is  o f  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th i s  c h ap te r ,  however, the  lack  o f  compre­
hensive f ig u re s  on cos ts  precludes d i r e c t  comparisons o f  marginal 
cos t  and marginal b e n e f i t  a t  t h i s  tim e.
38By r e f e r r in g  back to page 100 i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  ap p rec ia te  
the  d i f f i c u l t y  involved in  obta in ing  even t e n ta t iv e  e s tim ates  fo r  these  
magnitudes.
CHAPTER V
AN APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma has no cen tra l  re p o s i to ry  o f  crime in fo r ­
mation. The only r e l i a b le  source o f  information regard­
ing th e  na tu re  and ex ten t of crime i s  found in the  Uniform 
Crime Reports o f  the  Federal Bureau o f  In v e s t ig a t io n .
While t h i s  supplies  worthwhile in fo rm ation , i t  s t i l l  
f a l l s  sh o r t  o f  providing th e  inform ation needed fo r  
s t a t i s t i c a l  ana lys is  fundamental to  crim inal j u s t i c e  
p lanning.
Oklahoma Crime Commission, 
Annual Report: 1970. p. 11
CHAPTER V
AN APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO OKLAHOMA
The r e s u l t s  o f  Chapter IV tend to  su b s ta n t ia te  the  usefu lness  of 
an explanation  o f  the  supply o f  crime as a function of  c o s ts  and re tu rns  
which a re  determined by law enforcement a u th o r i t i e s .  Though i t  might 
appear log ica l to  continue with an examination of i n t e r s t a t e  d iffe rences  
in costs  o f  committing an o ffense  and d iffe ren ces  in law enforcement 
resou rces , the decis ion  was made to  extend the ana ly s is  by examining the 
economics o f  crime and law enforcement in a s in g le  s t a t e ,  Oklahoma.
There a re  several reasons fo r  t h i s  dec is ion . F i r s t ,  the re  have 
been several s tud ie s  o f  i n t e r s t a t e  v a r ia t io n s  in the  co s ts  o f  committing 
a crime using various economic and demographic v a r iab les  as cos t 
measures. F le ishe r  conducted the  f i r s t  economic in v e s t ig a t io n  in th is  
a rea . Ehrlich  has been a c t iv e ly  engaged in empirical work a t  the 
National Bureau o f Economic Research following the  l in e s  o f  the  Becker 
model. In ad d i t io n ,  several d i s s e r ta t io n s  re la t in g  crime to  economic 
magnitudes have been completed. Most o f  these  s tu d ie s  r e l a t e  the  cos t 
o f  committing crime to  unemployment r a t e s ,  area w ealth , nonwhites as a 
percent o f  to ta l  popula tion , and o ther aggregate measures.^
A b r ie f  review o f th e  s tu d ie s  o f  th is  type was presented in 
Chapter I I  (pp. 23-26 and pp. 33-34). I t  appears th a t  in v e s t ig a t io n s  
along th e se  l in e s  in v a r iab ly  become involved in d is se c t io n  o f  the  t a s t e s  
fo r  crime, a process which lea^s  to  a s im i la r i ty  with soc io log ica l 
in v e s t ig a t io n s .
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As th e  aggregates  in  these  models a re  not su b jec t  to  v a r ia t io n  
due to  law enforcement po licy  (and may not be capable o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  
change as a r e s u l t  o f  any policy) and d ec is ion  making in law enforcement 
i s  not c e n t r a l i z e d  w ith in  individual s t a t e s ,  i n t e r e s t  was d i re c te d  toward 
examination o f  a dimension a ssoc ia ted  w ith  a po licy  making u n i t .
A second reason fo r  the  decis ion  to  examine the  economics of
crime and law enforcement in  the  S ta te  o f  Oklahoma i s  r e la te d  to  the
p resen t paucity  o f  research  in the  a rea .  There has been no economic
an a ly s is  o f  crime o r law enforcement o f  any kind fo r  the  S ta te  of
Oklahoma. For th i s  reason i t  was f e l t  t h a t  a void could be p a r t i a l l y
f i l l e d  and a su b s tan tiv e  co n tr ib u tio n  made through an ex tension  using
2
Oklahoma as th e  u n i t  under examination.
Because law enforcement in  Oklahoma has been under lo ca l  c o n tro l ,  
crime and law enforcement have not been th e  su b jec t  o f  much s ta tew ide  
re sea rch .  As a r e s u l t ,  da ta  a re  q u ite  l im i te d .  Only through coopera­
t io n  received  from the  FBI, O ffice  o f the  S ta te  A uditor, and th e  Okla­
homa S ta te  Crime Commission was i t  p o ss ib le  to  genera te  da ta  s u f f i c i e n t  
fo r  t h i s  ch ap te r .
With the  development o f  s ta te -w id e  planning i t  i s  expected th a t  
in th e  next several years  more useable da ta  w ill become a v a i la b le  fo r  
an a ly s is  as law enforcement decis ions  become le s s  o f  a loca l fun c tio n .
At t h a t  time examinations as t h i s  one may be s u b s ta n t ia l ly  f a c i l i t a t e d .
2
Due to  the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  good d a ta ,  C a l i fo rn ia  and e sp e c ia l ly  
the c i t y  o f  Los Angeles have been the s u b jec t  o f  several economic inves­
t i g a t io n s .  In c o n t r a s t ,  da ta  on crime and law enforcement in  Oklahoma 
are  very l im ited  and d i f f i c u l t  to  o b ta in .  Some da ta  used in  t h i s  chapter 
are  not used by, o r  even a v a i la b le  t o ,  law enforcement groups w ith in  the 
s t a t e  even though th e re  i s  a planning o rg an iza tio n  with r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  
in t h i s  a rea .
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A. Law Enforcement in Oklahoma
At the  p resen t tim e, law enforcement in Oklahoma i s  p r im ari ly  
the  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  m u n ic ip a l i t ie s  and coun ties  though severa l s t a t e  
agencies a re  a v a i la b le  to  provide se rv ices  t h a t  a id  th e  local u n i t s  o f  
law enforcement in  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  A b as ic  understanding o f  th e se  
r e l a t io n s  may be e s ta b l ish e d  by b r ie f ly  examining the  e x is t in g  system of 
law enforcement in  Oklahoma.
Each o f  Oklahoma's seventy-seven coun ties  has a s h e r i f f  who is  
e lec ted  to  a two-year term and i s  re sponsib le  fo r  m ain ta in ing  th e  county 
j a i l ,  processing  c iv i l  and criminal cases ,  and the  general law en fo rce­
ment in  the  county. The s h e r i f f  appoints h is  depu ties  and s t a f f  su b jec t  
only to  budget l im i t a t i o n s .  The s h e r i f f ' s  o f f ic e  i s  concerned p rim ari ly  
with law enforcement in  ru ra l  a re a s .
The c h a r te r s  and ordinances o f  m u n ic ip a l i t ie s  determine the 
system o f  law enforcement in Oklahoma c i t i e s .  The s iz e  o f  p o l ic e  fo rces  
in Oklahoma ranges from 1 to  581 o f f ic e r s  with departmental expenditures
3
ranging from about $20,000 to  over $4% m il l io n .  Very small towns o ften  
have no p o lice  personnel,  and thus are  dependent upon the  county s h e r i f f  
fo r  law enforcement.
The primary ro le  o f  the S ta te  in  law enforcement i s  o f  a 
supportive  n a tu re .  Oklahoma does not have a s t a t e  p o l ic e .  The Depart­
ment o f  Public  Safe ty  has r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  enforcement o f  s t a t e  laws 
regard ing  the  opera tion  o f  motor veh ic les  on a l l  roads in the  s t a t e  
highway system. A d iv is io n  o f  the  department, the  Oklahoma Highway
O
Oklahoma Crime Commission, "Results o f  Q uestionnaires  Sent to  
P o lice  Departments," 1969.
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P a tro l ,  has primary r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  reg u la t io n  o f  motor v eh ic le  opera­
t io n .  Although th e  Highway Patrol does have general p o lice  powers, i t  
has never ac ted  as a s t a t e  p o l ic e .  The only involvement o f  the  Highway 
Pa trc l  with crime (as dep ic ted  by th e  Index o ffenses)  r e l a t e s  to  p a tro l  
cooperation in  s e t t in g  up roadblocks, aiding in  manhunts, a c ting  as a 
c lea r in g  agency fo r  the  s t a t e  rad io  network, serv ing  criminal w a rran ts ,  
and re g u la t in g  waterways in  the  s t a t e .
The Oklahoma Bureau of In v e s t ig a t io n ,  a d iv is io n  o f  the  Governor's 
o f f i c e ,  was c rea ted  to  a s s i s t  o the r  law enforcement agencies carry  ou t 
th e i r  d u t i e s .  The Bureau provides s c i e n t i f i c  lab o ra to ry  se rv ices  and 
id e n t i f i c a t io n  f i l e s  as an a id  to  local law enforcement in the  s t a t e .
In ad d i t io n  the  Bureau provides in s t ru c t io n ,  a id s  in d e tec t io n  and 
apprehension when c a l le d  upon to do so by local p o l ic e ,  a c ts  as the  
s t a t e  inpu t c en te r  fo r  the  National Crime Information Center (NCIC), and
publishes b u l l e t i n s  con tain ing  items th a t  may be o f  i n t e r e s t  to  local
4
law enforcement agenc ies .
In 1968 th e  Congress o f  the  United S ta te s  passed th e  Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe S t r e e ts  Act. This a c t  e s ta b l ish e d  th e  Law 
Enforcement A ssis tance  Adm inistra tion (LEAA) which provides funds to  
s ta t e s  in  an e f f o r t  to :  ( 1 ) encourage comprehensive plans in  the  area
of law enforcem ent, (2 ) improve and s trengthen  law enforcement, and 
(3 ) encourage resea rch  and development of new methods fo r  the  prevention  
and reduc tion  o f  crime and apprehension of c r im in a ls .  P r incipal 
a s s i s ta n c e  i s  provided v ia  LEAA block grants  o f  two types: (1) "planning"
This in tro d u c to ry  sec tion  i s  drawn p rim ari ly  from: Oklahoma 
Crime Commission, Comprehensive Law Enforcement Action Plan: 1972 
(Oklahoma C ity :  Oklahoma Crime Commission, 1972), pp. A12-17.
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gran ts  providing n ine ty  percen t o f  the  co s ts  o f  m aintaining s t a t e  
planning agencies , and ( 2 ) "ac tion" g ran ts  providing seven ty -f ive  percent 
o f  the funds necessary to  ca r ry  out crim inal j u s t i c e  programs contained
5
in  annual plans submitted by the  s t a t e  planning agenc ies .
On January 13, 1968, Governor Dewey F. B a r t l e t t  c rea ted  the 
Oklahoma Crime Commission by executive o rd e r .  The Commission ac ts  as the 
s t a t e  planning agency in Oklahoma in response to  the  requirement o f  the  
Omnibus Crime Act. For planning purposes the  s t a t e  was divided in to  
fourteen  regional planning d i s t r i c t s .  Each reg ion  employs a coord inator 
who secures information concerning needs, problems, and p r i o r i t i e s  from 
local law enforcement and crim inal j u s t i c e  agenc ies . This information 
i s  used fo r  development of p ro je c ts  and programs aimed a t  improving law 
enforcement in the  s t a t e . ^  The Oklahoma Crime Commission has primary 
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  form ulating and subm itting  annual plans and adminis­
te r in g  the  program in the  S ta te  o f  Oklahoma.
Although the  in troduc tion  to  t h i s  sec tion  a s s e r t s  th a t  Oklahoma 
law enforcement i s  a local r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  under loca l c o n tro l ,  th e re  is  
increas ing  evidence th a t  Federal encouragement through LEAA funds and 
th e  estab lishm ent o f  the Oklahoma Crime Commission a re  leading toward a 
change in the  na ture  of law enforcement ad m in is t ra t io n .  Coordination, 
more c e n tra l iz e d  d e c is io n s ,  and broader ad m in is t ra t iv e  control can be
5
The Omnibus Crime Act rep resen ts  a major e f f o r t  a t  the  block 
g ran t system. For a c r i t i c a l  app ra isa l  o f  the  r e s u l t s  o f  the  f i r s t  years  
o f  t h i s  e f f o r t  r e f e r  to :  U .S .,  Congress, House Committee on Government 
O perations, Block Grant Programs o f th e  Law Enforcement Assistance 
A dm inis tra tion , Twelfth Report. 92nd Congress, 2nd se ss io n ,  1972, 
pp. 3-4 and 6-12.
^Oklahoma Crime Commission, Annual Report: 1970 (Oklahoma C ity : 
Oklahoma Crime Commission, 1971), p . T I
119
expected in the  fu tu re .  I f  such c e n t r a l i z a t io n  does take  place s tud ies  
as t h i s  one w il l  be very usefu l.
B. Measuring Crime and Law Enforcement in Oklahoma
As the  P re s id e n t 's  Commission noted and as the  Oklahoma Crime 
Commission in d ica ted  in  the p re fa to ry  s tatem ent to  t h i s  chap te r ,  data  on 
crime and law enforcement are not re a d i ly  a v a i la b le  beyond th a t  found in 
the  Uniform Crime R eports . In the S ta te  o f  Oklahoma the  lack of data 
useful fo r  an an a ly s is  o f  law enforcement from economic or o the r perspec­
t iv e s  has been a long recognized f a c t .
Data on crime, the  amount o f  crime in  the  s t a t e ,  and where i t  i s ;  
was no t c o l le c te d  in  any organized fashion  by th e  s t a t e  from statehood 
u n t i l  1972. Due to  LEAA influence in 1970 a s t a t u t e  was sought by the 
Governor and obtained from the Oklahoma L eg is la tu re  e s ta b l ish in g  a law 
re q u ir in g  t h a t  re p o r ts  be prepared by a l l  law enforcement ju r i s d ic t io n s  
in  th e  s t a t e  and submitted to  a cen tra l  r e p o s i to ry ,  the  Oklahoma S ta te  
Bureau o f  In v e s t ig a t io n .  While t h i s  appears to  be an encouraging 
development, i t  may be noted th a t  no p rov is ion  was made fo r  enforcement 
o f  t h i s  requirem ent.^  Thus f a r  the  r e s u l t s  have been mixed.
1. Dependent Variable: C ity  Offense Rate
An examination o f crime data w ith in  the  s t a t e  must r e s o r t  to  the 
FBI Uniform Crime Reports which provide summary da ta  fo r  the  s t a t e .  Of 
a t o t a l  o f  seventy-seven s h e r i f f s  o f f ic e s  and sev en ty -th ree  police  
departments in  c i t i e s  o f  2,500 or more popu la tion , in  1969 about 45 law 
enforcement agencies covering nearly  n ine ty  percen t o f  th e  to ta l  popula-
^ I b i d . , pp. 11- 1 2 .
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g
t io n  in  the s t a t e  v o lu n ta r i ly  reported  known Index Offenses to  the  FBI. 
Unfortunately the published f ig u res  on crime in  Oklahoma a re  summarized 
to  such an ex ten t so as to  be o f  q u ite  l im ited  u sefu lness  fo r  an analysis  
of crime within the  s t a t e .  However, through cooperation  received  from 
the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Section , o r ig in a l  record  cards  fo r  the 
la rge  c i t i e s  in the  s t a t e  o f  Oklahoma fo r  th e  years  1960 through 1970 
were made av a ilab le  fo r  t h i s  study.
Although somewhat incomplete, the  number o f  Index o ffenses  and 
c learances fo r  the  seventeen la r g e s t  Oklahoma c i t i e s  were made av a ilab le  
fo r the  eleven year pe riod . The c i t i e s  in t h i s  sample con ta in  fo r ty -  
seven percent o f  the  s t a t e  population. S p ec if ic  c i t i e s  fo r  which th is  
information was obtained a re :
1. Ada 10. Muskogee
2. Altus 11. Norman
3. Ardmore 12. Oklahoma City
4. B a r t l e s v i l l e  13. Okmulgee
5. Duncan 14. Ponca City
6 . Enid 15. Shawnee
7. Lawton 16. S t i l lw a te r
8 . McAlester 17. Tulsa
9. Midwest City
Index offenses fo r  each c i t y  were made comparable by computing
the number of offenses o f  each type per 1 , 000 ,000  popula tion  fo r  each 
9
year . Computed crime r a te s  a re  su b jec t  to  the  same b ia s  and inaccuracies  
of p o lice  reporting  as noted e a r l i e r  in Chapter IV. Regardless o f  th i s  
considera tion  these  a re  the  only fe a s ib le  data  as no a l t e r n a t iv e  source 
e x i s t s .
Uniform Crime Report: 1969, p. 71.
%he r e s u l t s  fo r  the  c i t i e s  appear in  Appendix A. As larceny is  
divided in to  two ca teg o r ie s  ( le s s  than $50 and $50 o r  g re a te r )  th e re  are 
,e,ight Index offenses r%tWr than seven in th ^& ^ b # p te r .  Also, th e  inde­
pendent v a riab le  used was th e  offense r a t e  per 1 , 000 ,000  population ra th e r  
than the  more customary offense  r a te  per 100 ,000  popu la tion .
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In t h i s  examination the  dependent v a r ia b le ,  th e  o ffense  r a t e  per 
1,000,000 popu la tion  by c i ty  and o ffense  fo r  1960 through 1970, i s  a 
simple v a r ia t io n  o f  th e  commonly accepted FBI measure o f  p o ten t ia l  
v ic t im iz a t io n .  Due to  the wide acceptance o f  t h i s  type measure, i t  
would be d i f f i c u l t  to  j u s t i f y  using an a l t e r n a t iv e .  However, i t  i s  
p o ss ib le  to  develop an a l te rn a t iv e  t h a t  would f a c i l i t a t e  comparison of 
v ic t im iz a t io n  r a t e s  among the  c i t i e s .  One such a l t e r n a t iv e  i s  explained 
and dep ic ted  in  Appendix B. In t h i s ,  a base incidence fo r  an o ffense  i s  
s e t  equal to  1 .0  f o r  the average o f  a l l  seventeen c i t i e s ,  and the 
o ffense  r a t e  fo r  each c i ty  i s  r e la te d  d i r e c t ly  to  t h i s  base .
2. Independent V ariable: C ity  Clearance Rate
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f the  independent v a r ia b le s  o f  th e  th e o re t ic a l  
model, p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conviction (p) and punishment ( s ) ,  i s  rendered 
d i f f i c u l t  by th e  absence of c e n tr a l iz e d  c o l le c t io n  o f  crime and law 
enforcement d a ta .  There have been two major s tu d ie s  o f  law enforcement 
in  th e  S ta te  o f  Oklahoma, however, n e i th e r  generated measures useable 
as independent v a r ia b le s  approximating p o r  s s ince  th e se  s tu d ie s  were 
conducted f o r  o th e r  purposes.
In 1954 th e  Oklahoma Crime Study Commission examined law enfo rce-
10
ment c o n d it io n s  in  the  s t a t e .  This study was concerned almost exclu­
s iv e ly  w ith  p o l ic e  employee c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  s a l a r i e s ,  equipment, and 
departmental procedures. Only a small amount o f  a t t e n t io n  was devoted 
to  crime. The questions;  where i s  th e  crime and what i s  the  response o f  
crime to  law enforcement?; were not a concern o f  t h i s  commission.
Oklahoma Crime Study Commission, Municipal Law Enforcement in 
Oklahoma; A Survey and E valuation , G ilb e r t  G eis, d i r e c to r  (Oklahoma 
C ity : Oklahoma Crime Study Commission, 1955).
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The in f lu en ce  o f  LEAA led  to  a recen t r e p e t i t i o n  and expansion 
o f the  Oklahoma Crime Study Commission survey. In 1969, the  then newly 
c rea ted  Oklahoma Crime Commission c a r r ie d  on a survey o f  po lice  d e p a r t­
ments in  a l l  c i t i e s  over 2,500 population and th e  seventy-seven county 
s h e r i f f  o f f i c e s . A l t h o u g h  several a b s t r a c t  measures o f  law enforcement
a c t i v i t y  fo r  c i t i e s  could be derived from the  s tu d y , these  a re  a v a i la b le
12only fo r  the  s in g le  year 1969. As i s  the  case  in  the  1954 s tudy ,
p r a c t i c a l l y  no a t t e n t io n  was devoted to  th e  c o l le c t io n  of  information on
crime o r th e  r e l a t io n  between crime and law enforcement a c t i v i t y .  While
generating  f a r  more da ta  than was a v a i lab le  p rev io u s ly ,  the  Crime
Commission emphasized q u a l i t a t iv e  and q u a n t i t a t iv e  measures regarding 
personnel, f a c i l i t i e s ,  and equipment. Although t h i s  type of  inventory 
inform ation i s  very useful in  the quest fo r  funds from th e  Federal 
government the  u s e a b i l i ty  o f  t h i s  information f o r  th e  p resen t a n a ly s is  
i s  q u i te  l im ite d .
Concluding t h a t  da ta  on independent v a r ia b le s  re p re se n ta t iv e  of 
p f o r  Oklahoma c i t i e s  a re  not a v a ilab le  from any c e n tr a l i z e d  source, the  
following procedure was used to  obtain r e la te d  values fo r  the  model. 
Original record  cards  fo r  th e  seventeen c i t i e s  were obtained from the
Oklahoma Crime Commission, Local Law Enforcement in  Oklahoma. 
Survey-study 69-2 (Oklahoma C ity: Oklahoma Crime Commission, 1969).
12Two p o te n t ia l  v a r iab le s  generated were: (a) number o f  p o lice
personnel per thousand and (b) po lice  co s t  per c a p i t a .
13 In a personal d iscussion  with John Robertson, D irec to r  o f  th e  
Research and S t a t i s t i c s  D ivision o f th e  Oklahoma Crime Commission, a 
p o in t  emphasized by Mr. Robertson was t h a t  the  Commission simply had no 
inform ation on, "where th e  crime i s  in  the  S ta te  o f  Oklahoma," beyond 
the  summary inform ation o f  th e  Uniform Crime R eports.
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FBI Uniform Crime Reporting S ec tion . In reporting  offenses  annually  to
th e  FBI, each reporting  agency i s  asked to  re p o r t  the  number o f  crimes
t h a t  have been c lea red . In Chapter IV (p . 74 ) the  d i s t i n c t io n  between
the  p ro b a b i l i ty  of conviction  and th e  c learance  r a t e  was noted and
expla ined . As po lice  departments do not c o l le c t  and record th e  co u r t
a c t io n  necessary  fo r  i d e n t i f i c a t io n  o f  the  number o f  co n v ic t io n s ,  i t  is
not p o ss ib le  to  obtain  the  t r u e  value o f  p from these  reco rd s .  Therefore,
th e  d ec is io n  was made to  compute a c learance  r a te  to  be used as a proxy
fo r  th e  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conv ic t ion .
The seventeen c i t y  sample fo r  an eleven year period would id e a l ly
genera te  187 observations fo r  each o f e ig h t  offenses o r  a t o t a l  o f  1,496 
14o b se rv a tio n s .  As da ta  fo r  a few years  fo r  some c i t i e s  were not 
a v a i la b le  and in several c i t i e s  th e re  were occas iona lly  no o ffenses  o f  a 
c e r t a in  type (and no c lea rances)  th e  actual number of observa tions  was 
somewhat l e s s  than 1,400.
3. Independent V ariab le : Punishment
As noted e a r l i e r ,  p o lic e  departments in the  s t a t e  u su a lly  do not 
keep formal records on d is p o s i t io n s  o f  criminal cases in  t h e i r  j u r i s d i c ­
t io n .  Of th e  seventeen c i t i e s  in  th e  sample, Oklahoma City  and Tulsa 
t r a c e  cases as follows: (1) o f fen se s ,  (2) c lea ran ces ,  (3) number
charged, (4) g u i l ty  as charged, and (5) g u i l ty  o f  l e s s e r  o ffen se .
However, even these  two c i t i e s  keep no record of  punishments imposed.
The remaining f i f t e e n  c i t i e s  in  th e  sample do not maintain records on
In the  departmental re p o r ts  to  the FBI two types o f  larceny 
a re  included: (a) larceny l e s s  than $50, and (b) larceny o f  $50 or 
g r e a te r .  This d iv is io n  exp la ins  th e  reason fo r  examination o f  e ig h t  
o ffen ses  r a th e r  than seven as was th e  case in Chapter IV. C alcu la ted  
values f o r  c learance  ra te s  appear in  Appendix A.
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d is p o s i t io n .
Court records in  the s t a t e  a re  a lso  in s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  any attempt
to  derive  a punishment measure fo r  the c i t i e s  in the sample or fo r  j u r i s -
15d ic t io n s  w ith in  which the  c i t i e s  a re  included. The in s u f f i c i e n t  court 
records regard ing  punishment along with the  discrepancy between the 
c learance  r a t e  and p elim inated the  f e a s ib le  use o f  punishment as an 
independent v a r ia b le  fo r  the sample. In an e f f o r t  to  remedy t h i s  absence 
two ad d i t io n a l  independent v a r ia b le s  were introduced.
4. Independent V ariable: Po lice  Expenditures Per Capita 
To t h i s  poin t the  paper has emphasized the  r e la t io n  between p and 
s and the  o ffen se  r a t e .  I t  is  o f ten  assumed th a t  the re  i s  a r e la t io n  
between expenditures  fo r  po lice  and the  o ffense  r a te  although th e re  does 
not appear to  have been any attempts to  measure t h i s  e f f e c t  in  the  s t a t e .  
The Oklahoma Crime Commission did ob ta in  expenditures fo r  p o lice  d epar t­
ments in  i t s  1969 survey, but these  data  a re  a v a ilab le  only fo r  the 
s in g le  year 1969.^^ As a consequence, in  order fo r  expenditures  to  be 
introduced in to  the  ana lys is  i t  was necessary to  examine annual municipal 
expenditure  re p o r ts  fo r  each of the  seventeen c i t i e s  fo r  each o f  the  
eleven years  under examination.^^
Three f igu res  fo r  po lice  expenditures  are a v a i la b le :  (1) wages
and s a l a r i e s ,  (2) operations and maintenance, and (3) c a p i ta l
15 In d iscussion  with the  ad m in is tra to r  o f  the  Oklahoma S ta te  
Supreme C ourt, th e  poin t was made th a t  the  courts  o f  th e  s t a t e  do not 
c o l l e c t  t h i s  "soc io log ica l"  data  a t  p re sen t .
^\ o c a l  Law Enforcement in  Oklahoma, pp. 10-14.
^^Expenditures fo r  the  th re e  most recen t years  were a v a i lab le  in 
the  S ta te  A u d ito r 's  O ffice . Expenditures fo r  the  previous years  were 
a v a i lab le  a t  the  Oklahoma S ta te  Archives, a p a r t  o f  the Oklahoma S ta te  
L ibrary  system.
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improvements. For purposes o f  t h i s  an a ly s is  two sepa ra te  f ig u re s  were
computed f o r  each c i t y  on a per c a p i ta  b as is :  ( 1 ) wages and s a l a r i e s ,
and (2 ) the  sum o f  the  wages and s a l a r i e s  and the  opera tions  and main- 
18tenance budgets. I t  was assumed a p r io r i  th a t  the re  would be a negative 
r e la t io n  between the  expenditure v a r ia b le s  and offense r a t e s .
5. Independent V ariable: Population
A f in a l  independent v a r ia b le  used is  c i t y  popula tion . Census 
f igu res  f o r  th e  seventeen c i t i e s  were used fo r  1960 and 1970, population 
f igu res  f o r  the  remaining years  were individual year e s t im a te s  th a t  are
•1 19a v a i lab le .
Use o f  t h i s  v a r iab le  in troduces  an aggregate v a r ia b le  in to  the 
ana lys is  which i s  not a control o r  po licy  v a r iab le  as th e re  i s  no way of 
exerc is ing  con tro l  over population in  a c i t y .  Recognition o f  t h i s  
nature  o f  the  population v a r ia b le  becomes important in the  a n a ly s is  th a t  
follows. An a d d i t io n a l  cognizance o f  population is  apparen t in  two of 
the  forms used which exclude the  two l a r g e s t  c i t i e s  from the  d a ta .  I t  
was assumed t h a t  th e re  would be a p o s i t iv e  re la t io n  between population 
and the  dependent v a r ia b le .
C. Regression Results
S tep-wise reg ress ion  a n a ly s is  was used fo r  each o ffense  ind iv id u a lly  
fo r  each o f e ig h t  models. Four d i f f e r e n t  s e ts  o f  da ta  were used, he re in -
18To th e  ex ten t  t h a t  th e  c lea rance  ra te  i s  a fu n c tio n  of expendi­
tu res  on p o lic e  th e re  could be col l i n e a r i t y  between two o f th e  explanatory 
v a r ia b le s ,  a problem of multi col l i n e a r i t y .  The r e la t io n s h ip  between 
expenditures and c learance  i s  examined l a t e r  in the ch ap te r .
19The es tim ates  were obtained from the Bureau o f  Business and 
Economic Research o f the  U nivers ity  o f  Oklahoma.
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a f t e r  r e fe r re d  to  as the  four forms. The f i r s t ,  form A, used data  from 
a l l  seventeen c i t i e s  fo r  the  same y ea r  in  the  re g re s s io n s .  The second, 
form B, in tro d u ces  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  t h a t  o ffense  r a te s  respond to  changes 
in the independent v a r iab le s  only a f t e r  a period o f tim e—s p e c i f i c a l ly ,  
one year .  Thus form B i s  th e  same as A except t h a t  the  dependent 
va r ia b le  i s  always lagged one year behind the  re sp e c t iv e  independent 
v a r ia b le s .  The t h i r d ,  form C-A, takes  cognizance of th e  f a c t  th a t  
Oklahoma C ity  and Tulsa a re  s u b s ta n t i a l ly  la rg e r  and q u a l i t a t i v e ly  
d i f f e r e n t  from th e  remaining f i f t e e n  c i t i e s .  This form i s  th e  same as 
A with th e  excep tion  th a t  i t  excludes th e  two l a r g e s t  c i t i e s  from the 
s e t  of o b se rv a t io n s .  The fo u r th  s e t ,  C-B, is  id e n t ic a l  with s e t  B 
only with th e  exclus ion  o f the  two l a r g e s t  c i t i e s .
Since th e  s t a t e ' s  two m etropo litan  cen te rs  d i f f e r  in  many ways 
from the  o th e r  f i f t e e n  c i t i e s  in  th e  sample th e re  a re  reasons to  suspect 
s ig n i f ic a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  may e x i s t  in  r e s u l t s  t h a t  exclude th e se  two 
c i t i e s  from th e  s e t  o f  observa tions ;  hence, th e  two s e t s  o f  models th a t  
exclude Oklahoma C ity  and Tulsa from the  data s e t .  The mean values fo r  
a l l  v a r ia b le s  a re  d isplayed in Table 21 (pp. 135 and 136 ) w hile  a l l  
o r ig in a l  d a ta  a re  shown in Appendix A.
The follow ing e ig h t  models were used fo r  each o f  th e  s e ts  of 
data (form s).
1 . Y «0 + BiXi + B21X21 + 83*3
2 . Y = + BiXi + 822*22 + 83*3
3 . Y = + BiXi + 821*21
4 . Y = «0 + BiXi + ®22*22
5 . Y S «0 " ¥ i
6 . Y + B21X21
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7. Y = Bg + B22%22
8 . Y .  Bo +
In th e  models the  v a r ia b le s  fo r  each c i t y  a re :
0 = number o f  o ffenses .
P = population .
K = number of offenses  c le a re d .
S = expenditures on p o l ic e  department wages and s a l a r i e s .
M = expenditures on p o l ic e  department opera tions  and maintenance.
Y = (0/p)loG = offense  r a t e  per 1,000,000 popu la tion .
K
= / q = c learance  r a t e .
Xgi = ^/p  = per cap ita  expenditu res  fo r  p o lice  department wages 
and s a l a r i e s .
Xoo = (S + M) = per c a p i t a  expenditures  fo r  p o lice  department 
P
wages, s a l a r i e s ,  o p e ra t io n s ,  and maintenance.
X^  = population.
Values fo r  the  eleven y e a r  period  from 1960 through 1970 were 
20
used in  th e  re g re ss io n s .  The va lues  fo r  expenditures (Xg  ^ and Xg2 ) and 
popula tion  (Xg) were the  same f o r  each indiv idual c i t y  f o r  a l l  e ig h t  
o ffenses  f o r  any p a r t ic u la r  y e a r .  Due to  the problem o f  missing data  fo r  
several c i t i e s  in a few years (c lea ran ce  and/or o ffense  da ta  was missing) 
i t  may be t h a t  the  number o f  ob serv a tio n s  and corresponding f ig u re s  fo r  
th e  v a r ia b le s  d i f f e r  somewhat: t h i s  does not provide any se r io u s  problem.
20 I f  a l l  data  were a v a i l a b le  f o r  a l l  c i t i e s  in a l l  y e a r s ,  fo r
each form th e re  would be a t o t a l  o f  187 observa tions . When K was not
a v a i la b le  o r  0 was zero , the  o b se rva tion  was dropped from th e  reg re ss io n . 
As a r e s u l t ,  th e  actual number o f  observations  ranged from 110 to  181 fo r
form A, 75 to  163 fo r  B, 88  to  159 f o r  C-A, and from 55 to  143 fo r  C-B.
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Since a to ta l  o f  256 reg ress ions  were used in the  four s e t s ,  d iscussion  
th a t  follows re f e r s  to  the  summarized r e s u l t s  o f  the  reg ress io n s  appear­
ing on pages 137-168.
According to  th e  theory developed in  Chapter I I I ,  s ta te d  a p r io r i
expectations which were s ta te d  a re  th a t  the c o e f f ic ie n t  (B-j) on X-| is
negative , r e f l e c t in g  an inverse  re la t io n  between the  c learance  r a te  and
the o ffense  r a t e .  In in te rp re t in g  the  c o e f f ic ie n t  on X-| i t  must be
remembered th a t  B-| can vary only between zero and one. Moving the  decimal
one place to  the  l e f t  a id s  in in te rp re ta t io n  by in d ica t in g  th e  suggested
e f f e c t ,  c e t e r i s  p a r ib u s , o f  a 10 percen t change in the  c learance  r a t e .
F urther , i f  an inc rease  in po lice  or t h e i r  presence and support a re  a
d e te r re n t  one would expect th a t  c o e f f ic ie n ts  (B21 and B2 2 ) on X21 and X22
would a lso  be nega tive . However, i t  i s  c le a r ly  p o ss ib le  t h a t  t h i s
d e te r re n t  e f f e c t  is  small while the  e f f e c t  o f  added p o lice  expenditures
is  increased rep o r t in g  o r  o f f i c i a l  knowledge o f o f fen ses ,  an occurrence
21
th a t  o thers  have observed in some law enforcement s tu d ie s .  I f  t h i s  i s
the  case the  c o e f f ic ie n ts  on X21 and X22 would be p o s i t iv e .  The
c o e f f ic ie n t  (B3 ) on X3 i s  expected to  be p o s i t iv e ,  as g re a te r  population
w ill l ik e ly  be asso c ia ted  with h igher o ffense  l e v e l s .
For convenience in  the  d iscuss ion  o f  the  reg ress ion  r e s u l t s  which 
fo llow s, th e  summarized reg ress ion  r e s u l t s  a re  c o l le c te d  in  the  Tables 
22 through 29 on pages 137 to  168; which a re  a l l  o f  th e  same standard 
form.
21
This i s  a case  where the theory suggests one r e s u l t  y e t  the  
nature  o f  a v a i la b le  da ta  suggests t h a t  opposite  r e s u l t s  may be observed. 
A lte rn a tiv e  in te r p r e ta t io n s  appear l a t e r ,  p p .169-70.
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1. Homicide: Tables 22A to  22C-B
I f  homicide i s  t r u l y  a crime of pass ion , a p r io r i  expecta tions  
would suggest poor r e s u l t s  in  an examination using th e  e ig h t models 
s e le c ted .  The very low values fo r  the  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  determ ination (R^) 
confirms th i s  ex p ec ta t io n s .  For a l l  the  models, only the  c o e f f ic ie n ts  
fo r  expenditures per c ap i ta  and B^^) a re  ever s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  1 
percent le v e l .  A lso, only models including  an expenditure c o e f f ic ie n t  
in forms A and B explain  more than 10 percen t o f  the  v a r ia t io n  in 
homicide r a t e s .  The c o e f f ic ie n t  on c learance  (B^) i s  p o s i t iv e ,  ra th e r  
than negative as was expected, but i s  not s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  the  5 percent 
le v e l .  Population i s  not s ig n i f i c a n t  except fo r  one lim ited  case .
The f a c t  t h a t  .13 is  the h ighes t  g ives adequate evidence th a t  
none o f  the  models possesses s u f f i c i e n t  explanatory  power to  be taken 
very s e r io u s ly .  F o r tu n a te ly ,  these  r e s u l t s  a re  not very su rp r is in g .
2. Forc ib le  Rape: Tables 23A to  23 C-B
The f i r s t  two models o f  forms A and B explain  about 28 percent 
of the  v a r ia t io n  in  rapes per 1 , 000 ,000  population among c i t i e s ,  with 
the  c o e f f ic ie n ts  fo r  both population and expenditures  p o s i t iv e  and 
s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  1 p e rcen t .  The c o e f f i c i e n t  on c learance  is  not s ig n i f i c a n t  
(a t  5 percent) though fo r  forms A and B the  c o e f f ic ie n t  is  c o n s is te n t ly  
negative  as was expected.
That popula tion  by i t s e l f  possesses th e  g r e a te s t  explanatory 
power i s  ev iden t from examination o f  model 8 o f  forms A and B. Removal 
o f  the  two l a r g e s t  c i t i e s  (as was done fo r  models C-A and C-B) thus 
provides poorer o v e ra l l  r e s u l t s ,  because much o f th e  population v a r ia t io n
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22i s  l o s t  from th e  s e t  o f  observations .
The p o s i t iv e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  on expenditures (621 and B2 2 ) which 
a re  highly s ig n i f i c a n t  m erit  fu r th e r  in t e r p r e ta t io n .  When o ffenses  are  
known independent o f  expenditures i t  i s  expected t h a t  g re a te r  per cap ita  
expenditures (X2 i and X2 2 ) would lead to  reduced o ffen se  r a te s  in 
accordance with th e  theory  of Chapter I I I .  A d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t  may be 
witnessed when knowledge of offenses i s  r e la te d  to  expend itu res .  I f  
add itional po lice  expenditures  and more po lice  personnel r e s u l t  in  more 
discovery and rep o r t in g  o f  o ffenses , fo r  whatever reasons , then a 
p o s i t iv e  r e la t io n  between offenses and police  expenditures  may be 
expected. The c o n s i s te n t ly  p o s i t iv e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  on 821 and B22 suggest 
more expenditures r e s u l t  in more reporting  of crime. Or, i t  may be th a t  
more crime leads to  increased p o lice ;  a m atter examined l a t e r .
Since fo r c ib le  rape i s  o ften  considered a crime of pass ion , the
2
modest R values fo r  th e  best models and the in s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  the  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  on c lea rance  a re  not d iscom fortingly  low o v e r a l l .  Nonethe­
l e s s ,  the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  on c learance  i s  no t s ig n i f i c a n t  is  
not in sp ir in g  of  confidence in the theory  as f a r  as exp lanation  of  
fo rc ib le  rape i s  concerned.
3. Robbery: Tables 24 to  24 C-B
Robbery i s  an offense  wherein th e  economic motive i s  c le a r ly
22Since the  two la rg e s t  c i t i e s  a lso  have g re a te r  per c a p i ta  expen­
d i tu re s  than most o f  th e  remaining c i t i e s  in th e  sample, i t  may be sus­
pected th a t  removal o f  Oklahoma City and Tulsa would a lso  remove most 
expenditure v a r i a t io n .  However, th e re  i s  not a s u b s ta n t ia l  d if fe ren c e  in 
per c ap ita  expenditures  fo r  the two la rg e s t  c i t i e s  versus the  remaining 
f i f t e e n ,  u sua lly  only a few d o l la rs  d i f f e re n c e .  A comparison o f expen­
d itu re s  fo r  forms A and B with forms C-A and C-B confirms t h i s .
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involved and th u s ,  an economic explanation i s  expected to  be more 
app licab le  than fo r  th e  so -ca l led  crimes of pass ion ; homicide, f o r c ib le  
rape, and a s s a u l t .
Models 1 and 2 of forms A and B generate  values fo r  o f  .70 or 
more, when th e  two l a r g e s t  c i t i e s  a re  excluded th e  r e s u l t s  a re  appreciably  
le s s  explanatory  o f  th e  v a r ia t io n  in robbery r a t e s .  The c o e f f ic ie n t  on 
clearance (B^) i s  c o n s is te n t ly  negative fo r  a l l  models, though not 
s ig n i f ic a n t  unless population i s  excluded from th e  model. As was the  
case fo r  fo r c ib le  ra p e ,  a p o s i t iv e  and usua lly  h igh ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  
c o e f f ic ie n t  i s  shown fo r  po lice  expenditures per c a p i t a .
I t  i s  worthwhile to  note th e  importance of popula tion  (noting 
model 8 o f  forms A and B). Although the  emphasis o f  t h i s  paper has been 
upon p ro b a b il i ty  o f  co n v ic t io n ,  a control v a r ia b le  which the  c learance  
r a te  may approximate, the  in troduction  o f  population in to  th e  models 
dominates in  exp la in ing  v a r ia t io n  in robbery r a t e s .  Again the  removal
o f  the two l a r g e s t  c i t i e s  removes su b s tan tia l  population v a r ia t io n  and
2
the  r e s u l t  i s  considerab ly  lower R values fo r  forms C-A and C-B.
4. Aggravated A ssau lt:  Tables 25A to  25C-B
When a l l  seventeen c i t i e s  are  included in  th e  da ta  s e t ,  poor 
2
r e s u l t s  occur with low R s fo r  a l l  models and th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on
clearance  having th e  c o r re c t  sign but i s  not s i g n i f i c a n t  in  any of the
models. Population and expenditures are  u sua lly  s i g n i f i c a n t .  However,
2
the low R s fo r  the  b e s t  models o f  forms A and B r a i s e  doubts as to  th e  
usefulness o f  the  models in explaining v a r ia t io n s  in  a s s a u l t  r a t e s .
Considerably improved r e s u l t s  a re  experienced when Oklahoma City 
and Tulsa a re  removed from the  s e t  o f  o b serva tions . Both population and
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expenditures a re  h igh ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  in  two of the  models, however, the 
sign of the  c o e f f i c i e n t  on c learance  becomes p o s i t iv e  though i t  i s  not 
s ig n i f i c a n t .  As was th e  case e a r l i e r ,  popula tion  i s  the  most explanatory 
o f  the independent v a r ia b le s .
5. Burglary: Tables 26A to  26 C-B
The f i r s t  o f  th e  le s s  ser ious  property  o ffenses  to  be considered, 
burg la ry , i s  b e s t  explained with a lag  in the  burg la ry  r a t e  fo r  one 
y ea r .  C learance, expenditures  (Bgi o r  B2 2 ) ,  and population c o e f f ic ie n ts  
a re  a l l  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  0.01 le v e l .  As was th e  case fo r  e a r l i e r  
o ffen ses ,  popula tion  i s  most explanatory . The c lea ran ce  r a te  by i t s e l f  
gives evidence o f  exp la in ing  only about 4 pe rcen t o f  the  v a r ia t io n  which 
i s  not as s trong  an exp lanation  as a p r io r i  expec ta tions  suggest. 
Nonetheless, b u rg la ry  rep resen ts  the  f i r s t  case  ( in  the  lagged v e rs io n ) ,  
where a l l  th re e  o f  th e  independent v a r ia b le s  a re  h ighly  s ig n i f ic a n t  
(0.01  l e v e l ) .
2
While an R o f  .64 i s  not unusually  high compared to  some models 
comprised o f  s ix  to  te n  t a s t e  v a r iab le s  as general s tu d ie s  have used, as 
was the  case  in  t h i s  study concerning robbery, i t  i s  poss ib le  to  explain  
a m ajo rity  o f  the  observed d if fe ren ces  in o ffen se  r a te s  using a very few 
v a r ia b le s  inc lud ing  two va riab les  q u i te  c lo se ly  r e la te d  to  law enforce-
23
ment po licy .
6 . Larceny—$50. and Over: Tables 27A to  27C-B
An examination o f  the  r e s u l t s  fo r  grand la rceny  shows th a t  a l l
2%ome o f  th e  s tu d ie s  generating  R s o f  .80 and above a re  re fe r re d  
to  e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  paper (see pp. 23-26). I t  may be worthy o f mention 
again th a t  th e  t a s t e  d a ta  fo r  s im ila r  s tu d ie s  using the  Oklahoma c i t i e s  
a re  not r e g u la r ly  a v a i l a b le .
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v a r ia b le s  a r e (h ig h ly ) s ig n i f i c a n t  fo r  a l l  four forms. Clearance has the 
expected s ig n ,  and in conjunction with e i th e r  expenditure  va riab le  
appears capable o f  explaining a re sp ec tab le  p roportion  of  the v a r ia t io n  
in o ffen se  r a te s  per 1,000,000 popula tion . I t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  to  note 
th a t  th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  fo r  c lea rance  i s  q u i te  la rge  and i s  highly s ig n i ­
f i c a n t .  While not conclusive , these  r e s u l t s  do lend empirical support
regard ing  th e  impact o f  economic po licy  v a r iab le s  in  determ ination of
24th e  leve l o f  t h i s  criminal a c t i v i t y .
7. Larceny--Under $50.: Tables 28A to  28C-B
Although youth a re  u su a lly  involved in p e t ty  larceny and i t  may 
be expected th a t  poorer r e s u l t s  would be obtained in  t h i s  case as 
compared to  robbery, burg la ry , and grand larceny  ($50. and o v e r) ,  the 
r e s u l t s  a re  in te r e s t in g ly  d i f f e r e n t  from these  e x p ec ta t io n s .  While 
population i s  important and highly  s ig n i f i c a n t ,  th e  c learance  r a te  is  
highly  s ig n i f i c a n t  (0.01  le v e l )  f o r  the  comprehensive forms and 
expenditures  a re  always s ig n i f i c a n t .  There i s  one su rp r is e  compared to  
the  o th e r  o f fen ses ,  the  c o e f f ic ie n ts  on expenditures  a re  always negative 
fo r  t h i s  o ffense .
This would lead to  th e  suggestion th a t  increased  po lice  expen­
d i tu r e s  r e s u l t  in  le s s  p e t ty  la rcen y . Why a s ig n i f i c a n t  negative 
r e l a t io n  e x is t s  fo r  t h i s  o ffense  while th e re  i s  a s ig n i f i c a n t  p o s i t iv e  
r e l a t io n  fo r  the  o the r  o f fen se s ,  i s  a m atter fo r  co n jec tu re  a t  th i s  
po in t .
As t h i s  sec tion  provides an overview o f  th e  r e s u l t s ,  one 
apparen tly  troublesome r e s u l t ,  th e  p o s i t iv e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on expenditures 
has no t been adequately d e a l t  w ith . This i s  explained more completely 
in a l a t e r  s ec t io n .
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8 . Auto Theft: Tables 29A to  29C-B
Auto t h e f t  rep resen ts  the only case where the  c learance  r a t e  can
explain as much as 10 percen t of the v a r ia t io n  in  o ffense  r a te s  when
taken by i t s e l f  as in  the  b iv a r ia te  case (model 5 o f  forms A and B).
All th ree  v a r ia b le s  a re  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  0.01 percen t (forms A and B) and
the  signs o f  a l l  c o e f f ic ie n ts  are as has come to  be expected from the
2
in v e s t ig a t io n .  The R of approximately .70 fo r  the  complete data is  
r e l a t iv e ly  high with population again the most important f a c to r .
Having depicted  and b r ie f ly  explained th e  r e s u l t s  o f  32 reg ress ions  
on each o ffense  i t  i s  helpful to  in d ica te  those  r e s u l t s  which appear to  
have value fo r  in te r p r e ta t io n  and po licy .
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TABLE 21
MEAN VALUES OF VARIABLES BY OFFENSE AND FORM
Form of Model

























































































































































Offense and V ariable

























































































Number o f  observations  i s  shown in  parentheses. 

















Error o f  
Estimate R r 2





( 1 . 6 6 )
27.117 0.342 0 .1 2






27.059 0.347 0 .1 2




27.199 0.321 0 .1 0



















F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts ,
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.











Erro r o f  
Estimate R r 2
Bo Bl B21 B22 B3


















27.382 0.348 0 .1 2





5 51.18 15.98 











( 2 . 2 2 )
28.573 0.172 0.03
Notes :
F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.


















Estimate R r 2

























( 1 . 8 8 )













F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the 0,05 le v e l.




Model I n t e r c e p t
Bo
C l e a r a n c e
Bl
P e r s o n n e l
E x p e n d i t u r e s
B2 I
D e p a r t m e n t a l
E x p e n d i t u r e s
B22
P o p u l a t i o n
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S t a n d a r d  
E r r o r  o f  
E s t i m a t e R r 2



































55.17 0 , 0 0 0 1 9( 0 , 9 0 )
30,250 0.129 0 .0 2
Notes:
F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts
*  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.


















Error o f  
Estimate R R%




8 1 .818 0.531 0.28
































F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t the  0.05 le v e l.

















E rror o f  
Estim ate R R^







































F va lues shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.

































































F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  the 0.05 le v e l.



















Error o f  
Estimate R r 2













86 .202 0.461 0.21
3 48.54 -24.79 
( 0.57)
1 1 . 66* 
( 3.99)
92.355 0.281 0.08





5 114.88 -18.05 
( 0.29)
95.075 0.073 0.005
6 35.29 11.23 
( 3.99)
91.989 0.262 0.07









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  th e  0.05 le v e l.


















E rror o f  
Estimate R R%







2 7.75 -  61.23 
( 1.65)
18.32** 








345.172 0.314 0 .1 0





5 380.62 -165.37* 
( 3.92)











203.926 0.827 0 .6 8
Notes :
F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.


















Error o f  
Estimate R R%
























5 388.48 -191.86* 
( 4.72)
343.013 0.181 0.03
6 72.52 37.72** 
{ 7.38)
339.904 0.224 0.05









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts ,
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.












































5 231.99 -61.02 
( 1.39)
219.274 0.098 0.01
6 112.99 15.60 
( 2.91)
218.127 0.141 0.02









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.











































5 229.93 -72.96 
( 2.13)
191.104 0.132 0.02
6 156.79 6.71 
( 0.61)
192.303 0.071 0.005









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.










































5 838.14 -196.57 
( 1.51)
735.235 0.094 0.01
6 159.36 87.03** 
( 9.70)
718.192 0.233 0.05









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t the  0.05 le v e l.


















E rror of 
Estimate R r2
1 282.45 -86.63 
( 0.23)






















5 873.87 -30.50 
( 2.60)
665.655 0.132 0.02
6 254.13 61.81* 
( 5.10)
660.132 0.184 0.03









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts ,
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.



















E rror o f  
Estimate R r2
























5 699.72 -106.35 
( 0.41)
742.442 0.053 0.003
6 259.55 59.95 
( 3.71)
734.270 0.157 0.03









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.

















E rror o f  
Estimate R
























5 685.42 -150.02 
( 0.57)
666.550 0.067 0.004
6 374.15 31.47 
( 1.09)
665.177 0.093 0.01









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.

















E rror of 
Estimate R r2
























5 6,142.17 -2,414.33 
( 3.86)
3,036.33 0.145 0.02
6 1,673.51 641.92** 
( 36.79)
2,795.10 0.413 0.17









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.


















E rro r  o f  
Estimate R R%
























5 6,005.13 -2,996.32* 
( 6.22)
2,815.641 0.193 0.04
6 1,972.96 530.31** 
( 25.11)
2,668.905 0.367 0.14









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts ,
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.

















E rro r o f  
Estimate R R%
























5 5,028.54 -1,013.15  
( 1.18)
2,271.484 0.086 0.01
6 2,303.40 419.56** 
( 22.83)
2,130.320 0.356 0.13









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.


















E rror o f  
Estim ate R r2













1 ,665.086 0.577 0.33










5 4,904.94 -1,612.61 
( 3.44)
2,000.306 0.154 0.02
6 2,585.05 314.86** 
( 14.24)
1,929.500 0.303 0.09









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.
* *  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  the  0.01 le v e l. CJlas
TABLE 27A
LARCENY— $50 AND OVER
FORM A













E rro r o f  
Estimate R
























5 5,393.21 -5,714.84** 
( 13.52)
3,066.53 0.265 0.07
6 34.19 740.16** 
( 47.88)
2,824.75 0.459 0.21









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.
* *  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.01 le v e l. cn
TABLE 278
LARCENY— $50 AND OVER
FORM B













E rro r o f  
Estimate R R%
























5 4,818.72 -5,016.69** 
( 13.66)
2,563.280 0.280 0.08
6 1,034.09 486.39** 
( 24.29)
2,488.625 0.362 0.13








F values shown in  paren theses  below c o e f f i c i e n t s .  
* s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l .
** s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  0.01 le v e l .
TABLE 27C-A
LARCENY—$50 AND OVER 
FORM C-A













E rror o f  
Estimate R R^
























5 5,020.67 -4,318.09** 
( 7 .53)
2,977.169 0.214 0.05
6 382.86 668.79** 
( 34.59)
2,758.897 0.425 0.18









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.
* *  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.01 le v e l. cn
VD
TABLE 27C-B
LARCENY—$50 AND OVER 
FORM C-B













E rro r o f  
Estimate R R^
























5 4,469.28 -3,808.41** 
( 8 .05)
2,425.690 0.232 0.05
6 1,469.72 395.78** 
( 14.89)
2,371.865 0.309 0.10









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.














E rror of 
Estimate R R%
























5 13,052.16 -7,048.06** 
( 10.97)
4,616.13 0.240 0.06
6 14,160.03 -384.74* 
{ 4 .69)
4,694.43 0.160 0.03









F va lues shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  th e  0.05 le v e l.

















Error o f  
Estimate R r2
























5 13,049.09 -6,900.49** 
{ 9.80)
4,623.53 0.240 0.06
6 14,863.49 -488.69** 
( 6.99)
4,662.10 0.204 0.04









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.


















E rro r o f  
Estimate R R%
























5 12,214.71 -5,840.80** 
( 8.00)
4,424.71 0.220 0.05
6 15,138.46 -677.36** 
( 14.32)
4,342.25 0.289 0.08









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.

















E rro r o f  
Estimate R R%
























5 12,233.31 -5,767.59** 
( 7.11)
4,478.50 0.219 0.05
6 15,870.19 -780.27** 
( 17.35)
4,341.29 0.331 0.11









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts ,
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  th e  0.05 le v e l.















E rror o f  
Estimate R r2























1 ,303.81 0.395 0.16
5 2,513.72 -1,834.87** 
( 19.50)
1,344.20 0.313 0.10
6 926.35 162.74** 
( 9.72)
1,378.59 0.227 0.05
7 949.61 139.05** 
( 9.09)







F va lues shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts ,
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.


















E rror of 
Estim ate R R%























1 ,258.06 0.369 0.14
5 2,450.79 -1,735.21** 
( 17.70)
1,280.54 0.315 0.10
6 1,056.83 131.02* 
( 6.23)
1,323.73 0.193 0.04









F va lues shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.
















E rro r o f  
Estimate R R%
























5 1 ,883.16 -1,095.66** 
{ 16.47)
853.78 0.308 0.10
6 1,319.96 30.73 
( 0.69)
895.46 0.066 0.004









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.

















E rror o f  
Estimate R














3 1,683.85 -978.03** 
( 12.23)
23.86
( 0 4 3 )
840.32 0.287 0.08





5 1,823.38 -969.02** 
( 12.23)
838.62 0.282 0.08
6 1,371.90 17.53 
( 0.22)
873.56 0.039 0.002









F values shown in  parentheses below c o e f f ic ie n ts .
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.05 le v e l.
* *  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  0.01 le v e l.
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D. S ign if icance  o f  the  Results
The c o e f f i c i e n t  on c learance  i s  nearly  always n e g a tiv e ,  though 
s ig n i f i c a n t  only fo r  the  property  o ffen se s .  While not exp lanatory  of as 
much o f the  v a r ia t io n  in  o ffense  r a te s  as had been hoped, th e  s ig n ,  the  
magnitude, and highly s ig n i f i c a n t  s ta tu s  o f  B-| fo r  th e  p roperty  offenses 
lend credence to hypotheses suggesting t i a t  th e re  i s  a r e l a t io n  between 
the  c lea rance  r a te  and offense  r a t e s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  f o r  the  property  crime.
Comparing th e se  r e s u l t s  to  those  o f  Chapter IV, th e  c learance  
r a t e  does not appear to  be as useful in  p red ic tio n  as was th e  p ro b a b i l i ty  
o f  conviction  used in  th e  e a r l i e r  c h ap te r .  Perhaps th e  ac tua l value of 
the  c learance  r a t e  f o r  a c i t y  fo r  a given year does not a f f e c t  the  
perceived value o f  p very s tro n g ly .  That i s ,  the  perceived value of p 
may change only very slowly in  response to  apprehensions un less  these  
a re  h ighly pu b lic ized . These m atters  re q u ire  more examination, however, 
the  evidence suggests t h a t  values fo r  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conv ic t ion  a re  
p re fe rred  to  c learance  r a te s  in research  e f f o r t s  as th e  former more 
n ear ly  rep resen ts  th e  re le v a n t  parameter in  crim inal d ec is io n  making.
Expenditures fo r  po lice  personnel and po lice  departments have 
b a s ic a l ly  equ iva len t r e la t io n s  to  o ffense  r a t e s .  Also th e se  r e la t io n s  
a re  u sua lly  highly s ig n i f i c a n t  fo r  the  o f fen se s .  The s u rp r is in g  evidence 
in regard to  th i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  th a t  the  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  w ith th e  exception 
o f p e t ty  la rceny , a re  u sua lly  p o s i t iv e .  One possib le  in te r p r e ta t io n  is  
the  apparen tly  c o n tra d ic to ry  idea th a t  h ir in g  more p o l ic e  and spending 
more in  the  department r e s u l t s  in more r a th e r  than le s s  crime! A fter 
one spends tim e examining th e  o r ig in s  o f  p o lic e  da ta  severa l  a l t e r n a ­
t i v e  in te rp re ta t io n s  a re  suggested.
Many crimes a re  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  underreported (see pp. 70-73 ) ,
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I t  i s  l i k e ly  t h a t  increased expenditures  r e s u l t  in more discovery and 
re p o r t in g  o f  o ffen ses .  This crime " v i s ib i l i ty - in c r e a s in g "  e f f e c t  of 
more p o l ic e  may appear to  exceed th e  d e te r re n t  e f f e c t  increased police  
l ik e ly  have on o ffen ses .  The exception to  th i s  p o s i t io n  would be p e tty  
la rceny  which i s  o ften  committed by ju v e n i le s .  Perhaps i f  ju v en ile s  
a re  more h ighly  responsive to  ad d it io n a l  p o l ic e ,  i t  i s  possib le  to  
exp la in  th e  negative  c o e f f ic ie n t  on expenditures fo r  t h i s  o ffense.
An a l t e r n a t iv e  in te r p r e ta t io n  i s  to suggest th a t  high crime 
r a te s  lead to  more p o l ic e ,  th a t  i s ;  "crime causes p o l ic e ."  I f  a 
community in c reases  i t s  po lice  expenditures as a consequence of high 
crime r a t e s  a p o s i t iv e  c o e f f ic ie n t  between the crime r a t e  and per cap ita  
p o l ic e  expenditures  would r e s u l t .  I f  t h i s  i s  th e  c a s e ,  po lice  expendi­
tu re s  would no t t r u ly  rep resen t an independent v a r ia b le  in the 
re g re s s io n .  This a l t e r n a t iv e  in te r p r e ta t io n  could be re je c te d  i f  i t  
were p o ss ib le  to  show th a t  po lice  expenditures  were determined by forces 
independent o f  the  o ffense  le v e l .  An examination o f  per cap ita  expen­
d i tu r e s  (Appendix A) suggests t h a t  w ith in  the  eleven year  period under 
exam ination, per cap ita  expenditures do not demonstrate a r e la t io n  in 
response to  o ffense  l e v e l s .  Total expenditures fo r  near ly  a l l  c i t i e s  
show a gradual year-by-year inc rease  over the  p e r io d ,  casu a lly  i n t e r ­
pre ted  to  be th e  consequence of increased tax  revenues with n eg lig ib le  
r e a l lo c a t io n  among d i f f e r e n t  local government fu n c t io n s .
The p o s i t iv e  r e la t io n  between population and offense  ra te s  is  
not a t  a l l  unexpected. The tendency, in the  case o f  some o ffenses , fo r  
popula tion  to  be f a r  more c lo se ly  r e la te d  to  the  dependent v a r iab le  than 
c lea ran ce  o r  expenditures  was not expected. As population  i s  not d e te r ­
mined by government po licy  t h i s  r e l a t io n  i s  not o f  policymaking value to
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those concerned with law enforcement. The removal o f  the  two l a r g e s t  
c i t i e s  from th e  data  (forms C-A and C-B) appreciab ly  reduces the  worth 
of the  r e s u l t s  fo r  homicide, fo r c ib le  rape , robbery, b u rg la ry ,  and auto 
t h e f t .
Models A and B fo r  aggravated a s s a u l t ,  la rceny o f $50. and over,
and la rcen y —under $50.; show b e t t e r  r e s u l t s  when the  two l a r g e s t  c i t i e s
are  excluded. Explanations could be o ffered  to  the  e f f e c t  th a t  th e
supply o f  th e se  offenses  i s  le s s  e l a s t i c  with re sp ec t  to  popula tion  and
add itiona l expenditures r e s u l t  in g re a te r  repo rting  as compared to  the
la rg e r  c i t i e s .  Acceptance o f  such suggested in te r p r e ta t io n s  would
requ ire  more s p e c i f ic  evidence than i s  c u r re n t ly  a v a i la b le .
E a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  ( p p .  1 2 4 - 2 5 ) ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a
r e la t io n  between expenditures and the  c learance  r a t e  was mentioned.
M u l t ic o l l in e a r i ty  between these  two independent v a r ia b le s  would lead to
high s tandard e r ro rs  and parameter e s tim ates  which a re  highly  s e n s i t iv e
to  changes in the  model o r  da ta  s e t .  I t  i s  p oss ib le  to  examine th e
c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  c o r re la t io n  between B-j and B2 1  o r  B-| and B22 when these
are  th e  only two independent v a r iab le s  in the  reg ress ion  model (models 
253 and 4 ) .  This examination does not suggest th a t  a s ig n i f i c a n t  r e la t io n  
e x i s t s ,  and i f  any does, i t  i s  weak.
A r e la te d  problem th a t  may be encountered i s  e r ro r s  in  the  
measurement o f  an independent v a r ia b le  s p e c i f i c a l ly  th e  c lea rance  r a t e .  
This es tim ation  problem may r e s u l t  in downward bias in  the  e s t im a te s .  
Though th e re  a re  techniques t h a t  might reso lve  th i s  problem they a re  not
25An examination o f the  c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n ts  between th ese  
pa irs  show a range o f - .0 8  to  +.14 fo r  th e  s ix teen  p a irs  o f  form A.
26
J .  Johnston , Econometric Methods (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill I n c . ,  1963), 
pp. 148-50.
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highly s a t i s f a c to r y .  The na tu re  of th e  r e s u l t s  does not suggest much
27gain would r e s u l t  from the  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  such procedures.
In t h i s  chap ter  an a ttem pt was made to  determine i f  i t  i s  
possib le  by using a simple model w ith only a few v a r ia b le s  to  explain  
d if fe ren ces  in  o ffense  r a t e s .  I t  was not intended th a t  th e  model merely
p
explain the  v a r ia t io n s  as might be r e f le c te d  by a high R . The purpose 
was to  id e n t i fy  independent v a r ia b le s  th a t  can be c o n tro l le d  through law 
enforcement po licy ,  in p a r t i c u la r  th e  c learance  r a te  and po lice  expen­
d i tu r e s .
What can be concluded? Although the  r e la t io n  involving c lea rance  
is  u sua lly  o f  th e  c o r re c t  s ign  and o f te n  e i th e r  highly s ig n i f i c a n t  or 
s ig n i f i c a n t ,  i t  i s  not p o ss ib le  to  explain  very much o f th e  o ffense  r a te  
d if fe ren ces  by th e  c learance  r a t e .  The su rp r is in g  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  per 
c ap ita  expenditures  appear to  be p o s i t iv e ly  r e la te d  to  o ffense  le v e ls  
and th i s  r e la t io n  ( in  near ly  a l l  cases) i s  s ig n i f ic a n t  o r  h ighly 
s ig n i f ic a n t .  These l e s s  than ideal r e s u l t s  should perhaps be expected 
in cases as t h i s  where the  data  a re  f a r  from ex ce l le n t  and no s e t t l e d  
approaches e x i s t .
E. P ro jec ting  Crime and th e  Cost o f  Crime in Oklahoma
No evidence was found o f a ttem pts  to  p ro je c t  fu tu re  le v e ls  o f  
crime, crime c o s t s ,  and p o ss ib le  e f f e c t s  o f  d i f f e r in g  a p p l ic a t io n s  o f  
law enforcement on these  c o s t s .  The re cen t  implementation o f s ta tew ide  
planning aimed a t  coordinated  improvement o f  law enforcement has not
27An ad d itio n a l change made in  the  program was the  reg ress in g  of 
Y on X, revers ing  the  dependent and independent v a r ia b le s  o f  model 5. 
These r e s u l t s  showed l i t t l e  r e l a t i o n .
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entered  t h i s  area although fu tu re  requirements and c o s ts  would appear to
pQ
rep re sen t  a na tu ra l l i n e  o f  inqu iry .
An examination o f  the  level o f  Index offenses  fo r  the  past pro­
vides a means o f  i n i t i a t i n g  such p ro je c t io n s .  As o ffense  data  have been 
reported  in  compatible terms since 1958, i t  i s  b e s t  to  r e s t r i c t  
a t t e n t io n  to  the  post-1958 period . Table 30 d ep ic ts  Index o ffenses  in 
Oklahoma fo r  each y ea r  from 1958 through 1970. Future o ffense  le v e ls
were p ro jec ted  fo r  the  ten year period 1971 through 1980 by a l in e a r
29e x tra p o la t io n  o f  th e  1958-70 o ffen ses .  Table 31 p resen ts  the  pro jec ted  
level o f  o ffenses  by year through 1980.
A l i n e a r  p ro je c t io n  may appear to  be a gross s im p l i f ic a t io n  of 
r e a l i t y .  N onetheless, i t  i s  possib le  to  es tim ate  how well t h i s  method 
rep resen ts  changes in  o ffense  le v e l s .  Table 32 provides a s e t  of 
summary s t a t i s t i c s  t h a t  a id  in in te rp re ta t io n  o f  th e  usefu lness  of 
th e  p ro je c t io n .
All c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n ts  exceed .85 with th e  exception o f  
murder and fo r c ib le  rape . The l in e a r  re la t io n s h ip  appears to  generate  
a q u i te  good f i t  f o r  th e  remaining f iv e  o f fen ses .  Of p a r t i c u la r
28No p a r t  o f  t h i s  a n a ly s is  goes in to  the  m atte r  o f  r e a l lo c a t io n  
o f  p o lice  resources  among the  c i t i e s .  Nonetheless, increased  Federal 
funding and th e  promotion o f  more c e n tra l iz e d  coord ina tion  may in  the  
fu tu re  lead  to  increased  a t te n t io n  toward the  a l lo c a t io n  o f  po lice  man­
power among c i t i e s .  Several s tu d ie s  have addressed themselves to  t h i s  
m a tte r .  Some o f th e  e f f e c t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  goals and a l lo c a t io n a l  
p a t te rn s  r e l a t in g  to  p o lice  d i s t r i c t s  in Chicago, a re  presented in 
Appendix C.
29P ro jec tio n  o f  the  elements o f  a criminal j u s t i c e  system was 
done by Blumstein and Larson fo r  C a l ifo rn ia  as p a r t  o f  research  done 
through th e  I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Defense Analyses. This rep re sen ts  the  source 
o f  methodology fo r  t h i s  s e c t io n .  Refer to :  A lfred Blumstein and Richard 
Larson, "Models o f  a Total Criminal J u s t ic e  System," Operations Research, 
17 (March-April, 1969), pp. 199-215.
TABLE 30
INDEX OFFENSES IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA: 1958-70
Offense 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Murder 150 154 175 119 126 129 110 110 135 166 162 148 151
Forc ib le
Rape 234 254 299 286 182 200 269 275 336 343 383 366 400
Robbery 645 564 936 804 958 981 1,038 942 999 961 1,221 1,248 1,378
Aggravated
A ssau lt 808 741 838 1,173 1,156 1,431 2,100 1,928 1,995 2,142 2,595 2,890 3,132
Burglary 9,668 9,008 12,495 11,951 11,929 12,659 14,047 13,089 14,278 14,844 17,368 17,657 20,303
Larceny— 
$50. and 
over 6,468 5,956 6,076 5,982 6,284 6,657 7,399 7,482 9,023 10,891 13,434 14,514 17,516
Auto
Theft 3,256 3,181 4,642 4,430 4,826 4,706 4,881 4,717 4,768 4,691 5,343 6,197 7,049
Total In ­
dex ;• 
Offenses 21,229 19,858 25,461 24,745 25,461 26,763 29,844 28,543 31,534 34,038 40,506 43,020 49,929
Source: Federal Bureau o f  In v e s t ig a t io n ,  Uniform Crime R eports , 1958-70.
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TABLE 31
PROJECTED INDEX OFFENSES IN OKLAHOMA: 1971-80
Offense 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Murder 143.6 144.0 144.3 144.7 145.0 145.4 145.7 146.1 146.4 146.8
Forc ib le
Rape 389 402 415 429 442 456 469 483 496 509
Robbery 1,339 1,391 1,443 1,495 1,547 1,600 1,652 1,704 1,756 1,808
Aggravated
A ssau lt 3,179 3,381 3,584 3,786 3,988 4,190 4,392 4,594 4,797 4,999
Burglary 19,190 19,960 20,730 21,500 22,270 23,050 23,820 24,590 25,360 26,130
Larceny— 
$50. and 
over 15,190 16,070 16,940 17,820 18,690 19,570 20,450 21,320 22,200 23,080
Auto Theft 6,411 6,638 6,865 7,092 7,319 7,546 7,773 8,000 8,227 8,454
Total Index 
o f
Offenses 45,842 47,986 50,121 52,267 54,041 56,557 58,702 60,837 62,982 65,127
Source: Computed from Table 30.
cn
TABLE 32
STATISTICS OF LINEAR PROJECTION OF INDEX OFFENSES IN OKLAHOMA












C o e f f ic ie n t
S t a t i s t i c  Standard 
o f  L inear E rror o r  
Term Estimate
C o rre la t io n
C o e f f ic ie n t
r
C o e f f ic ie n t  
o f  D eter- « 
mination r
C o e f f ic ie n t  
a t  95% 
Confidence
Murder 141 21 139 0.35 0.21 22 0.064 0.004 — -
Forc ib le
Rape 294 68 214 13.44 3.94 46 0.77 0.59 6 to  21
Robbery 975 226 663 52.04 6.74 104 0.90 0.81 35 to  69
Aggravated
A ssau lt 1,764 807 551 202.19 14.81 184 0.98 0.95 172 to  232
Burglary 13,792 3,185 9,165 771.18 6.39 1,108 0.94 0.89 590 to  952
Larceny— 
$50. and 
over 9,054 3,843 3,793 876.59 6.42 1,843 0.88 0.79 576 to  1176
Auto Theft 4,822 1,021 3,460 227.03 5.75 533 0.87 0.75 140 to  314
Source: Computed from Table 30.
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importance to  law enforcement and criminal j u s t i c e  planning i s  the l in e a r  
growth c o e f f i c i e n t  which rep resen ts  th e  annual increment o f  o ffenses .
With the  exception o f  homicide, a l l  th e  l in e a r  growth c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  
s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  the  0.01 le v e l .
These growth measures and the  l a s t  column of Table 32 in d ica te  
th a t  la rc e n ie s  and b u rg la r ie s  are growing much more ra p id ly  than any 
o ther  o ffense  in abso lu te  terms. With 95 percen t confidence one can 
s t a t e  th a t  the  annual growth in la rc en ie s  i s  between 576  and 1176 
per year while  b u rg la r ie s  have a growth r a t e  o f  between 5 9 0  and 
9 52  per y e a r .
I f  c o s t  f ig u re s  fo r  individual o ffenses  a re  used to  measure the  
d i r e c t  impact o f  these  o ffenses  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  generate  an estim ate  
of the  fu tu re  co s ts  crime w ill  have on victim s in  the  s t a t e .  Appendix 
D provides an in d ic a t io n  o f  these  estim ated magnitudes. When expected 
offense  le v e l s  and co s ts  a re  important in the  determ ination  of  law 
enforcement po licy  i t  would appear cognizance o f  these  measures is  
necessary f o r  po licy  m atte rs .
CHAPTER VI
Police  departments a re  about the  most poorly managed 
o rg an iza tio n s  in  our so c ie ty .  No business - govern­
ment o r  p r iv a te  -  could survive very long w ithout 
knowledge o f  the  func tions  i t  performs.
John A. Webster, "Police  Task and 
Time Study," Journal o f  Criminal 
Law and Police  Science, 61 (March, 
1970), p. loo.
Demands upon th e  pub lic  purse are  made through a rgu­
ments and dem onstrations having l i t t l e  b a s is  in  f a c t .  
I f  the  crime r a t e  i s  high, i t  i s  contended th a t  l a rg e r  
p o lic e  quotas w il l  lower i t ;  i f  low then more p o l ic e  
a re  needed to  keep i t  low.
Bruce Smith, Police Systems in the  
United S t a t e s , 2nd ed. rev , by Bruce 
Smith, J r . ,  p. 121.
CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Usefulness o f  an Economic Approach
Economic study emphasizes s a c r i f i c e  and th e  need fo r  choice.
This study is  a p a r t  o f  th e  recen t  trend  in  economics which attem pts to  
apply the  t r a d i t io n a l  to o ls  o f  economics to  an area o f  pub lic  a c t i v i ty  
previously  exempt from economic a n a ly s is ,  criminal a c t i v i t y  and law 
enforcement. In general te rm s, th e  goal o f  th is  study was to  analyze 
crime using the  t r a d i t io n a l  economic tool of an a ly s is  o f  choice to  
determine i f  th e re  i s  an id e n t i f i a b le  r e la t io n  between changes in  the 
c o s t  o f  committing crim inal a c ts  and the  level o f  crim inal a c t i v i t y .  
Serious thought and th e o re t ic a l  reasoning provided a convincing basis  
fo r  th e  b e l ie f  t h a t  th e re  i s  a d e f in i t e  inverse  r e l a t io n  between changes 
in the  costs  o f  committing crim inal ac ts  and the number o f  criminal a c ts .
I t  i s  c le a r  from numerous crim inological s tu d ie s  t h a t  c e r ta in  
environmental cond itions  a re  conducive to  the  commission o f  o ffen ses .  
However, i t  i s  not p o ss ib le  to  accu ra te ly  control soc ia l  parameters.
In an attempt to  id e n t i fy  r e la t io n s  wherein a v a r ia b le  capable o f 
control could be i s o la t e d ,  t h i s  study prim arily  emphasized a microeconomic 
o r ie n ta t io n .  Examination of th e  r e la t io n  between c o s ts  o f  committing 
offenses  and th e  number o f  o ffenses  was attempted using two d i f f e r e n t
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empirical bases; data using f o r ty - e ig h t  s ta t e s  and da ta  fo r  seventeen 
Oklahoma c i t i e s .  The r e s u l t s  o f  the  ap p lic a t io n s  have been presented 
e a r l i e r .  Of what value a re  these  re s u l ts ?
In the  examination involving fo r ty -e ig h t  s t a t e s  the modest 
values fo r  the c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  determ ination suggest t h a t  while i t  may 
not be possib le  to  explain  most of the  v a r ia t io n  in  o ffen se  ra te s  by 
th e  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  conviction  and punishment, in  most cases these  appear 
to  be s ig n i f ic a n t  fa c to rs  explain ing  v a r ia t io n s  in  crime r a te s  with the 
p ro b a b i l i ty  being more exp lana tory . Evidence has supported the view 
th a t  th e  supply o f  o ffenses  i s  i n e la s t i c  with re spec t to  p ro b a b i l i ty  
and punishment and th a t  th e re  are  s ig n i f ic a n t  d i f fe ren c es  in criminal 
response to  these  two measures o f  co s ts  fo r  d i f f e r e n t  o f fen ses .
The p a r t  o f  the  study using the  Oklahoma c i t i e s  involving 
c learance  r a t e s ,  po lice  expenditures  per c a p i ta ,  and population 
suggested th a t  the c learance  r a t e ,  a proxy fo r  the  p ro b a b i l i ty  of 
conv ic t ion , often  f a i l s  to  be a s ig n i f ic a n t  f a c to r  determining the 
o ffense  le v e l .  Population appeared to  be most c lo se ly  a sso c ia ted  with 
the  o ffense  le v e l .  A su rp r is in g  r e s u l t  was th e  o ften  observed p o s it ive  
r e l a t io n  between po lice  expenditures  per cap ita  and o ffense  le v e l s .
The examination labored throughout under the disadvantage of  po ten tia l  
inadequacy of the  measurements o f  c o s ts .  As i s  th e  case  fo r  most newer 
a reas  o f  economic study i t  i s  assumed th a t  in the  next severa l years 
b e t t e r  data  w ill become a v a i la b le  th a t  can be used to  improve upon 
the  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  study.
Though numerous q u a l i f i c a t io n s  and problems have been c i te d  
throughout the t e x t  o f  t h i s  in v e s t ig a t io n ,  i t  remains ev iden t th a t  
optimal p o lic ie s  aimed a t  c o n tro l l in g  i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t y  a re  p a r t  o f  the
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problem of a ttem pting  to achieve an optimum a l lo c a t io n  of  resources .
In the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  one may c i t e  examples o f  t h i s .  For example, 
p ro f i t-seek in g  firm s t o l e r a t e  higher le v e ls  of s h o p l i f t in g  than would 
e x i s t  i f  they increased the  number o f  c le rk s  employed. Apparently the 
wages o f  ex tra  c le rk s  exceed the  reduction in lo sse s  from s h o p l i f t in g  
expected when more c le rk s  a re  employed. S o c ia l ly ,  people accep t c e r ta in  
amounts o f  speeding, robbery, burg lary , and auto t h e f t  r a th e r  than allow 
the  law enforcement a u th o r i t i e s  c a r te  blanche in  t h e i r  a ttem pts  to  combat 
i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t y .  Yet pub lic  opinion p o l ls  in  the  l a t e  1960s and ea r ly  
1970s ind ica ted  th a t  crime was c o n s is te n t ly  one o f  th e  major concerns 
of the  pub lic .  Imperatives in s tru c t in g  the p o lice  to  "wipe out" crime 
often  appear to  neg lec t  the  obvious t ra d e o f fs  t h a t  e x i s t  in  law enforce­
ment, as in a l l  a reas  of public  a c t i v i t y .
Perhaps the  dimensions of th e  t r a d e o f f s  a re  not p re sen tly  capable 
o f  measurement, though t h i s  study may have shed some l i g h t  on such 
r e la t io n s .  The goal of law enforcement should be the  p o in t where 
marginal c o s t  i s  equal to  the  marginal b e n e f i t  i f  so c ie ty  i s  to  achieve 
the  level o f  enforcement i t  be lieves i t  can a f fo rd .  The b as ic  l im i t a ­
t io n  of a study as t h i s  in  co n tr ibu ting  to  the  achievement o f  th e  ideal 
i s  the lack o f  meaningful measures of co s ts  to  the  o ffenders  and cos ts  o f  
the  offenses themselves. Costs which th e  economist p re fe rs  a re  id e a l ly  
generated through a market. The cos ts  used in  t h i s  examination may not 
meet th is  id e a l .  While i t  i s  not known how serious  t h i s  d e fe c t  i s  fo r  
research in the crime and law enforcement a re a ,  Buchanan o f f e r s  some 
l i g h t  on the  d i f f i c u l t y .  In re fe r r in g  to  s tu d ie s  o f  crime and law 
enforcement he no te s ,
. . . a n y  c o s ts  which th e  economist may o b je c t i fy  need 
bear l i t t l e  r e la t io n  to  those co s ts  which serve as actual
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o b s tac le s  to  dec is io n s .  Recognition o f  th i s  f a c t  need not 
destroy  th e  usefu lness o f  economic a n a ly s is .  The co s ts  
th a t  the  economist q u a n t i f ie s  may be d i r e c t io n a l ly  r e la te d  
to  those  co s ts  th a t  in h ib i t  choice . In th i s  c ase ,  changes 
in the  level o f  o b je c t i f ie d  co s ts  ( f o r  example, changes in 
the  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  conviction  and in  the  s e v e r i ty  o f  
punishment! w ill produce e f f e c t s  on the  number o f  o ffenses  
com m itted.‘
At a minimum th e  increased  a t t e n t io n  o f  economics w ill  lead to  an 
e lu c id a t io n  of the  t ra d e o ffs  th a t  a re  a lready  involved in  law enforcement 
but a re  o f ten  neg lected . I t  i s  hoped t h a t  th i s  i d e n t i f i c a t io n  o f  
a l t e r n a t iv e s  and the  need fo r  choice w il l  a t  some time a id  in  achieving 
a more e f f i c i e n t  use o f  s o c ie ty 's  re sou rces .
B. Po licy  Im plications
This study does not provide any obvious p rec ise  po licy  suggestions 
though some general im plica tions  a re  generated . Chapter IV provides 
evidence o f  a s ig n i f ic a n t  r e la t io n  between costs  to  o ffenders  and offense 
le v e l s .  I t  i s  v i t a l  in policymaking t h a t  work be done which id e n t i f i e s  
the  impact o f  more po lice  and d i f f e r e n t  techniques on o ffender c o s ts ,  
e sp e c ia l ly  the  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  co n v ic t ion . Very l i t t l e  i s  known about 
th i s  r e l a t i o n ,  y e t  i t  is  the  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  used in seeking la r g e r  police  
budgets. Probably a considerab le  number o f  c o n tro l led  experiments w ill 
be necessary  f o r  knowledge to  be forthcoming on the  is su e .
Perhaps because o f  a sense o f  presumed v i t a l  ness o f  p o lic e  
a c t i v i t y  very l i t t l e  experimentation has been done. Casual observation  
suggests  t h a t  a su b s ta n t ia l  po rtion  o f  law enforcement resources  a re  
used to  deal with v ic tim less  crim es, e s p e c ia l ly  drunkenness.
^James M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice: An Inquiry  in to  Economic 
Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing C o., I960), p. 93.
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Table 33 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o in t .  Index offenses  comprise le s s  than 
twenty pe rcen t o f  a l l  a r r e s t s  and th e re  a re  more a r r e s t s  fo r  drunkenness 
alone than f o r  a l l  Index o ffenses  combined. I t  i s  not known what lo ss  
of a t t e n t io n  to  Index offenses  r e s u l t s  from th e  d ivers ion  o f  p o lice  to  
le s s  se r io u s  o f fe n se s ,  manpower s tu d ie s  may provide a basis  fo r  judgment 
in the  m a tte r .
When examining th e  co s ts  o f  a conv ic tion  (pp. 104 to  10 ) i t
becomes ap p aren t th a t  the  co s t  o f  a conviction  i s  extremely high fo r
several o f f e n s e s .  At p resen t th e re  i s  l i t t l e  o r  no evidence th a t  law
enforcement a u th o r i t i e s  pay a t t e n t io n  to  th i s  c o s t  in decis ions  as to
2
the  r e l a t i v e  concen tra tion  o f  resources  under t h e i r  c o n tro l .  A tten tion  
to the  co s ts  o f  conviction  appears a necessary  r e q u i s i t e  fo r  en lightened  
decis ions  in  law enforcement.
S im i la r ly ,  l i t t l e  evidence can be found t h a t  a u th o r i t i e s  even
attempt to  measure t h e i r  own ou tpu t or v a lua t ion  o f  t h e i r  impact in
o b jec t iv e  te rm s. The typ ica l p o lic e  department keeps t ra c k  o f  i t s  
manpower, a r r e s t s ,  and budgetary inform ation but i t  i s  the  ra re  d e p a r t­
ment th a t  a t tem p ts  to  use t h i s  inform ation fo r  planning and improving 
upon i t s  a c t i v i t y .  Those records t h a t  a re  kept appear a t  times to  be 
in te n t io n a l ly  b iased  so as not to  make the  department look too bad.
The examination o f  crime in  Oklahoma leads  to  the  d iscovery  th a t  
the  ty p ic a l  p o l ic e  department f a i l s  to  keep good records on crim inal 
a c t i v i t y ,  p o l ic e  a c t i v i t y ,  and p o lice  in f lu en ce .  The in flux  o f  federa l
2
As an example, th e  $29,067. e s tim ate  ( p .108 ) fo r  p o l ic e  c o s ts  
per conv ic t ion  fo r  auto t h e f t  appears excess ive . There may be much more 
promising ways o f  preventing t h i s  o ffen se  a s ,  fo r  example, the  transm ission  
lock. I t  i s  expected th a t  in  th e  fu tu re  auto t h e f t s  w ill diminish not 
because o f  th e  p o l ic e  e f f o r t  as much as due to  th e  in troduction  o f  the  
transm ission  lock in  the  l a t e  1960s.
TABLE 33
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TOTAL ARRESTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 








F orc ib le  Rape 19,050 0.2
Robbery 98,210 1.2
Aggravated Assault 155,060 1.9
Burglary 358,100 4.4
Larceny 748,200 9.2
Auto Theft 153,300 1.9
Total Index Offenses 1 ,547,150 19.0
Non-Index Offenses
Drunkenness 1,825,500 22.5
D isorderly  Conduct 710,000 8.8
Driving under Influence 555,700 6.8
Narcotic Drug Laws 415,600 5.1
Other A ssaults 348,900 4.3
Liquor Laws 309,000 3.8
Runaways 232,700 2.9
Vandali sm 141,900 1.8




Gambli ng 91,700 1.1
Suspicion 83,500 1.0
Offenses ag a in s t  Family 78,500 1.0
Stolen Property  (rece iv in g , 
possess ion , e t c . ) 74,000 0.9
Sex Offenses (excluding p r o s t i t u ­
t io n  and rape) 59,700 0.7
Forgery and C oun te rfe it ing 55,500 0.7
P r o s t i tu t io n  and Commercialized Vice 51,700 0.6
All Other (n o n tra f f ic ) 1 ,068,690 13.2
Total Non-Index Offenses 6,570,590 81.0
GRAND TOTAL 8,117,740 100.0
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support through LEAA has re su l ted  in the  c re a t io n  o f a planning group 
which might soon remedy these  d e f ic ie n c ie s ,  the  Oklahoma Crime 
Commission. At th e  p resen t time the Commission i s  p rim arily  concerned 
with procurement o f  Federal funds. Although th e  Commission has y e t  to  
complete a s tudy on the influence of new monies being put in to  law 
enforcement on crime in Oklahoma th e re  i s  hope th a t  the p rev a ilin g  
a t t i t u d e  to  the  e f f e c t  th a t  add itiona l expenditures  will n ece s sa r i ly  
reduce o ffenses  o r  have o ther d e s ira b le  e f f e c t s  i s  changing.
I t  appears possib le  to  fo re c a s t  o ffenses  in Oklahoma with f a i r  
accuracy using a simple s tra igh tfo rw ard  method though th i s  i s  not 
p re sen tly  being done fo r  the  S ta te .  Planning would seem to  req u ire  
such e s tim ates  f o r  a c t io n .  Logic suggests t h a t  the  s ta t e  planning 
agency would ob ta in  data on the  d is p o s i t io n  o f  accused offenders  a f t e r  
t h e i r  i n i t i a l  a r r e s t .  Thus f a r ,  th e re  has not been an in te g ra t io n  of 
cou rt  and p o l ic e  records by anyone in th e  s t a t e .  Contact with the  court  
system dem onstrates a s im ila r  f a i l u r e  to  keep t ra c k  of d is p o s i t io n s .
And the  same p a t te rn  is  apparent with p rison  a u th o r i t i e s ,  a general lack 
o f  coord ina tion  with o ther p a r ts  o f  th e  s t a t e  criminal j u s t i c e  system.
The Commission w il l  l ik e ly  play a major ro le  in  overcoming these  
problems in fu tu re  y ears .
In a ttem pting  to use resources more e f f e c t iv e ly  i t  i s  v i t a l  th a t  
c r i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  in  deterrence  be id e n t i f i e d  and qu an tif ied .
3
S ubsid iz ing  co llege  fo r  p o lice  i s  taken as an obviously bene­
f i c i a l  expenditu re  aimed a t  p ro fes s io n a l iz in g  th e  police  fo rce ;  hence, 
not reg u ir in g  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  The f inancing  o f  a h e lico p te r  fo r  combatting 
crime (no t an e l i g i b l e  LEAA expenditure i f  used fo r  t r a f f i c )  i s  j u s t i ­
f ie d  by using da ta  from he lico p te r  producers. Much money has gone in to  
equipment fo r  r i o t s ,  radio  hardware, and upgrading f a c i l i t i e s ,  w ithout 
c r i t i c a l  a p p ra isa l  o f  impact.
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A u thorit ies  in the  f i e ld  must begin to  generate  b e t t e r  data  in  o rder 
t h a t  the  phenomenon of crime can be b e t t e r  understood and d e a l t  w ith .
This study may provide some t e n t a t i v e  r e s u l t s  and a general approach 
th a t  can be used. However, th e  t r u l y  valuable  r e s u l t s  await b e t t e r  data 
with which to  work. Without b e t t e r  d a ta ,  economic approaches to  the  
study of crime and law enforcement remain "quite  in te re s t in g "  but 
t e n ta t iv e .
C. Concluding Observations
One o ften  hears c r i t ic i s m s  o f academic s tud ie s  o f  pub lic  po licy  
problems to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  "academicians would ra th e r  be r i g h t  than be 
h e lp fu l ,"  as i f  these  two goals a re  somehow mutually ex c lu s iv e .  This 
study was begun with a n t ic ip a t io n  th a t  the  r e s u l t s  would be useable  
fo r  decision-making and th e re fo re  h e lp fu l .  A su b s ta n t ia l  number o f  
in te re s t in g  f a c ts  and impressions have emerged. Casting warnings a s id e  
fo r  th e  moment, th e  following may be noted.
1. Crime costs  exceed $21 b i l l i o n  per year by conserva tive  
e s t im ate s ,  and although t h i s  exceeds the  cost of unemployment, 
l i t t l e  is  known as to  how to  control crime.
2. Resources a re  being in c reas in g ly  devoted to  law 
enforcement with l i t t l e  concern as to  how these  resources 
w ill  impact on crime, i f  a t  a l l .
3. While s t ru c tu ra l  change in law enforcement i s  p o s s ib le ,  
l i t t l e  has been done to  change the  system of d e liv e ry  in  th e  
p a s t  century .
4. Decisions in the  f i e l d  o f  law enforcement a re  made 
every day y e t  only a few o f  th e  most so p h is t ica ted  d e p a r t ­
ments a re  quantify ing  information fo r  decision-making.
5. In s tud ie s  as t h i s  some s ig n i f ic a n t  r e la t io n s  may be 
id e n t i f i e d  but t r u l y  va luab le  r e s u l t s  await b e t t e r  d a ta .
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6. Oklahoma i s  not p re sen tly  generating  an understanding 
o f  crime in  i t s  bo rders ,  nor i s  there  planning in  th e  usual 
use o f  the  term which r e l a t e s  planning to  a goal measured in 
terms o f  o ffense  l e v e l s .
7. The f i e l d  o f  law enforcement possesses many charac­
t e r i s t i c s  o f  a c losed f r a t e r n i t y  and t h i s  may ex p la in  some 
o f the  lack o f  p rogress .
I t  i s  good to  end on an o p t im is t ic  no te . With a l l  o f  the  problems 
and d e fe c ts  economic s tudy confronts  when moving in to  a new a rea ,  the  
inc reas ing  flow o f  l i t e r a t u r e  on the  economics o f  crime gives evidence 
o f  a committment to  continued s tudy. I t  seems in e v i ta b le  th a t  progress 
w ill  be made in overcoming th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I t  i s  hoped th a t  th i s  




The fo llow ing  pages in th i s  appendix con ta in  the  data used fo r 
the  re g re ss io n s  in  t h i s  chap te r .A ll  da ta  a re  coded as ind ica ted  below. 
Where o ffenses  (0) were zero or c learances  (K) were unknown, the  



























16. S t i l lw a te r
17. Tulsa
5. Burglary
6. Larceny—$50. and over
7. Larceny—under $50.
8. Auto Theft
All observa tions  are  ind ica ted  by th e  l a s t  two d ig i t s  fo r  the 
year observed.
CODES I VARIABLES4- Service  Operations and 
City Crime Popula- C lear-  Expendi- Maintenance
Code Code Year t io n  Offenses ances tu re s  Expenditures
(1-9) (10-19) (20-29) (30-39) (40-49) (50-59) (60-69) (70-79)
P 0 K S M
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------------------- — ------ -----------
0 OR K = ZERO
1 1 60 • 1 4 3 4 7 . 0 . 0 . 7 1 6 0 0 . 1 0 9 0 0 .
L 1 . 1 4 3 5 6 . 1 . 0 . 7 7 0 3 1 . 1 6 2 4 0 .
1 1 62 Z 1 4 3 6 5 . 1 . 0 . 7 6 9 2 5 . 1 5 8 1 0 .
1 1 6 3 . 1 4 4 8 9 . 1 . 1 . 8 9 1 0 0 . 1 9 2 0 0 .
C OR K = ZERO
1 1 6 4 . 1 4 6 1 4 . Ü m 0 & 9 2 6 3 0 ^ _ ^ _  ^ 8 8 8 .............. - - - —.. -- —-
1 1 6 5 . 1 5 1 1 2 . 1 . 1 . 9 5 1 2 0 . 1 9 5 8 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
1 1 6 6 . 1 5 4 7 U . 0 . G . 9 8 6 8 5 . 1 8 5 3 6 .
ü OR K = ZERO.
1
1
6 7 . 15 8 2 9 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 8 7 7 0 . 2 1 1 5 6 .
0 OR K = ZERO
1 1 6 8 . 1 5 9 3 5 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 8 4 7 4 . 2 0 0 p 5 .
1 1 6 9 . 1 5 3 9 7 , _. a>—sJL.  - .......... . - - - - - -----—--- - - —--------------
i 1 7 0 . 1 4 8 5 9 . 1 . rZ ■" 1 4 8 6 4 0 . 2 4 9 4 0 .
0 ÜR K = ZERO
1 2 6 0 . 1 4 3 4 7 . 0 . 0 . 7 1 6 0 0 . 1 0 9 0 0 .
____G _ m ^ K _ =.
1
ZERO
2 6 1 . 1 4 3 5 6 . 0 . û . 7 7 0 3 1 . 1 6 2 4 0 .
G OR K = ZERO
1 2 6 2 . 1 4 3 6 5 . 0 . 0 . 7 6 9 2 5 . 1 5 8 1 0 .
1 7 6 3 . 1 4 4 8 9 . 2 . _________2 . ___ _ a 8 i o o . ..... — — — - — — -
0 OR K = ZERO
1 2 6 4 . 1 4 6 1 4 . 0 . 0 . 9 2 6 3 0 . 1 8 8 8 0 .
1 2 6 5 . 1 5 1 1 2 . 6 • 7 . 9 5 1 2 0 . 1 9 5 8 0 .
_...... .. 1 5 4 7 0 . 2 . 2 . 9 8 6 8 5 . 1 8 5 3 6 .
CTW^K = ZERO
1 2 6 7 . 1 5 3 2 9 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 8 7 7 0 . 2 1 1 5 6 .
G OR K = ZERO
1 ? 6 6 . 1 5 9 3 5 . - -________ ü . . .... 1Q8_424. . -2^300-5. ■ -—. - ——........—- —  - — - — - — —
1 2 6 9 . 1 5 3 9 7 . 1 . 1 . 1 2 3 8 0 0 . 2 1 4 0 0 .
1 ? 7 0 . 1 4 8 5 9 . 1 . 1 . 1 4 8 6 4 0 . 2 4 9 4 0 .
0  OR K = ZERO
1 3 6 0 . 1 4 3 4 7 . 0 . Ü. 7 1 6 0 0 . 1 0 9 0 0 .
1 3 6 1 . 1 4 3 5 6 . 1 . 0 . 7 7 0 3 1 . 1 6 2 4 0 .
1 3 6 2 . 1 4 3 6 5 . 1 . 0 . 7 6 9 2 5 . 1 5 8 1 0 .
1 6 3 . 1 4 4 8 9 . 3 . 3 . 8 8 1 0 0 . 1 9 2 0 0 .
1 3 ____ 6 4 . __ _ _ j . 4 6 i 4 . _  . 9 2 6 3 0 .  ^ — —. 1-8-88 . — -—- - - - - - — — — . —.... — — — -----
1 3 6 5 . 1 5 1 1 2 . 3 Z ' ....... zZ 9 5 1 2 0 . 1 9 5 8 0 .
1 3 66 . 1 5 4 7 0 . 4 . 4 . 9 3 6 8 5 . 1 8 5 3 6 .
1 3 6 7 . 1 5 8 2 9 . 2 . 1 . 1 0 8 7 7 0 . 2 1 1 5 6 .
____0 OR K =
1
ZERO
3 68 . 1 5 9 3 5 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 8 4 7 4 . 2 0 0 0 5 .
1 3 6 9 . 1 5 3 9 7 , 2 . 2 . 1 2 3 8 0 0 . 2 1 4 0 0 .
1 3 7 0 . 1 4 8 5 9 . 5 . 3 . 1 4 8 6 4 0 . 2 4 9 4 0 .
1 4 6 0 . ....1.43_47._ _ ...  . 2^ _ ..... -Û. ........... . 716QÛ. .  .. _1-^ l.^ î .  -... — — . — - — — - —  — — ------ -—
0 OR K = ZERO
1 A 6 1 . 1 4 3 5 6 . 0 . 0 . 7 7 0 3 1 . 1 6 2 4 0 .
1 4 6 2 . 1 4 3 6 5 . 4 . 0 . 7 6 9 2 5 . 1 5 8 1 0 .
____________L.... 4 &3. 1 4 4 8 9 . 1 3 . 1 3 . 8 8 1 0 0 . 1 9 2 0 0 .
4 6 4 . 1 4 6 1 4 . 2 . 2 . 9 2 6 3 0 . 1 8 8 8 0 .
1 4 6 5 . 1 5 1 1 2 . 1 5 . 1 4 . 9 5 1 2 0 . 1 9 5 8 0 .
1 4 6 6 . 1 5 4 7 0 . 6 . 6 . 9 8 6 8 5 . 1 8 5 3 6 .  -
1 _ 4___ 6 7 . . 1.5.8.29^ 6 A. 1 0 8 7 7 0 . . _21.15 -6 ..... — - — - — — — — -----------------—
1 4 6 8 . 1 5 9 3 5 . 5 . ... ....5 .  ' 1 0 8 4 7 4 . 2 0 0 0 5 .
1 4 6 9 . 1 5 3 9 7 . 4 . 4 . 1 2 3 8 0 0 . 2 1 4 0 0 .
1 4 7 0 . 1 4 8 5 9 . 3 7 . 3 2 . 1 4 8 6 4 0 . 2 4 9 4 0 .
1 5 60 ...... ^ 1 4 3 4 7 . 2 9 . 0 . 7 1 6 0 0 . 1 0 9 0 0 .
1 5 6 1 . 1 4 3 5 6 . 1 0 . 0 . 7 7 0 3 1 . 1 6 2 4 0 .
i I II:
] 5 6 4 .
1 5 ______________ _ 6 5 ,
5 6 6 .
1 5 6 7 .
1 5 6 8 .
1 5 6 9 .
7 0 .
1 6 60  .
1 6 6 1 .
1 6 6 2 ,
6 6 3 .
1 6 6 4 .
1 6 6 5 .
1 6 _ _ 6 6 .
6 6 7 .
1 6 6 8 .
1 6 6 9 .
6 ... 7D . .. .
7 6 0 .
1 7 6 1 .
1 7 6 2 .
1 7 6 3 .
7 64 .
1 7 6 5 .
1 7 66 .
____________ 1 _____ _ 7 6 7 .
6 8 .
1 7 6 9 .
1 7 7 0 .
1 8 6 0 .. . . . . . . . . . -  T .... .. . .. . 8 61 .
1 8 6 2 .
1 8 6 3 .
_______________________________ 1 __________________ 8 6 4 .
8 6 5V] 8 6 6 .
1 8 6 7 .
1 8 6 8 .
. ... r . . .  ^ 6 9 .
1 8 7 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
2 1 __60,
T Ï  OR K " =  ZERO
2 1 6 1 .
C OR K = ZERO
2 1 6 2 .. . . . . .  . . .  . ^  . . . . . .  . - 1 6 3 .
2 1 6 4 .
0 OR K = ZERO
 2________
0 OR K = ZERO 
2
Q OR K = ZERO
4 4 ^ ^ .  
1 4 6 1 4 .  
1 5 1 1 2 ,  
1 5 4 7 0 .  
1 5 8 2 9 .  
1 5 9 3 5 .




T ?@ ?9 r
1 4 3 4 7 .
1 4 3 5 6 .
1 4 6 1 4 .
1 5 1 1 2 .
1 5 9 3 5 .  
1 5 3 9 7 .  
1 48  5 9 .  
1 4 3 4 7 .  
1 4 3 5 6 .  
1 4 3 6 5 .  
1 4 4 8 9 ,  
1 4 6 1 4 .  
1 5 1 1 2 .  
1 5 4 7 0 .  
1 5 8 2 9 .
15397% 
148  5 9 .  
1 4 3 4 7 .  
T 4 T S 6 ; 
1 4 3 6 5 .  
1 4 4 8 9 .
1 5112*
1 5 4 7 0 .
1 5 8 2 9 .
1 5 9 3 5 .
T53'5T.“
1 4 8 5 9 .
2 1 2 2  5 .
2 1 9 1 7 .
2 2 6 0 9 .
2 4 5 3 0 .  
2 3 4 9 4 .





1 0 7 .
7 8 .
















5 3 .  
9 1 .  
_ 9 8._ 
9 8 .  
1 0 0 . 
1 1 7 .
1 6 7 .  
1 3 1 .
7 5 .
2 6 5 .
141,
2 0 4 .
1 8 9 .
1 6 8 .  
2 1 8 .  
1 5 9 .  
1 0 3 .  



















i 2 : Mlh Hl8:
1 6 . 9 2 6 3 0 . 1 8 8 8 0 .
1 7 . 9 5 1 2 0 . 1 9 5 8 0 .
1 8 . 9 8 6 8 5 . 1 8 5 3 6 .
1 7 . 1 0 8 7 7 0 . 2 1 1 5 6 .
4 2 . 1 0 8 4  7 4 . 2 0 0 0 5 .
3 0 , 1 2 3 m 0 j , _ _21AOO,__
9 6 . 1 4 8 6 4 0 . 2 4 9 4 0 .
0 . 7 1 6 0 0 . 1 0 9 0 0 .
0 . 7 7 0 3 1 . 1 6 2 4 0 .
0 . 7 6 9 2 5 . 1 5 8 1 0 .
1 0 . 8 8 1 0 0 . 1 9 2 0 0 .
1 . 9 2 6 3 0 . 1 8 8 8 0 .
4 2 . 9 5 1 2 0 . 1 9 5 8 0 .
1 3 . 9 8 6 8 5 , . L&53&.
5 . 1 0 6 7 7 0 . 2 1 1 5 6 .
1 5 . 1 0 8 4 7 4 . 2 0 0 0 5 .
2 7 . 1 2 3 8 0 0 . 2 1 4 0 0 .
1 3 . 1 4 8 6 4 0 . 2 4 9 4 0 .
0 . 7 1 6 0 0 . 1 0 9 0 0 .
0 . 7 7 0 3 1 . 1 6 2 4 0 .
0 . 7 6 9 2 5 . 1 5 8 1 0 .
1 5 , .  ... 8 8 1 ) 0 , .  . 1 9 2 0 0 .
1 5 . 9 2 6 3 0 . 1 8 8 8 0 .
4 7 . 9 5 1 2 0 . 1 9 5 8 0 .
3 3 . 9 8 6 8 5 . 1 8 5 3 6 .
5 0 . 1 0 8 7 7 0 . 2 1 1 5 6 .
1 7 . 1 0 8 4 7 4 . 2 0 0 0 5 .
3 4 . 1 2 3 8 0 0 . 2 1 4 0 0 .
2 2 . 1 4 8 6 4 0 . 2 4 9 4 0 .
0 . 7 1 6 0 0 . 1 0 9 0 0 .
0 . 77( 131. 1 6 2 4 0 .
0 . 7 6 9 2 5 . 1 5 8 1 0 .
8 . 8 8 1 0 0 . 1 9 2 J 0 .
1 2 . 9 2 6 3 0 . 1 8 8 8 0 .
1 9 . 9 5 1 2 0 . 1 9 5  8 0 .
1 1 . 9 8 6 8 5 . 1 8 5 3 6 .
5 . 1 0 8 7 7 0 . 2 1 1 5 6 .
1 3 . 1 0  84 7 4 . 2 0 0 0  5 ,
2 3 . rZT80%). 2 1 4 0 0 .
3 3 . 1 4 8 6 4 0 . 2 4 9 4 0 .
0 . 7 8 2 0 0 . 4 6 5 0 .
0 . 7 8 4 8 4 . 6 6 0 8 .
0 . 8 4 5 2 0 . 9 2 8 5 .
OT 8 9 T 9 8 T 93 2  2 .
1 . 102  5 0 0 . 9 4 0 0 .
0 . 9 8 0 4 0 . 1 1 9 6 0 .
1 . 1 0 1 4 2 0 . 1 6 4 3 0 .
0 . 1 1 3 8 6 0 . 1 9 0 0 0 .
uV 1 T 7 3 2 0 . ... - 2 1 9 3 2 .
0 . 1 3 4 1 9 0 . 2 2 8 0 0 .
0 . 1 4 0 0 0 9 . 3 3 6 8 1 .
00
0 OR K = ZERO 
2 2 6 0 , 2 1 2 2 5 , 0 , 0 , 7 0 2 0 0 . 4 6 5 0 ,
0  OR K = ZERO
2 ...6 1 . 2 191 . 7 , 0 . 0 , 7 8 4 8 4 , 6 6 0 8 ,
0 OR K = ZERO 
? 2 6 2 . 2 2 6 U 9 , 0 , 0 , 8 4 5 2 0 , 9 2 8 5 ,
2 2 6 3 , 2 3 3 2 3 , 1 , 0 , 8 9 9 9 8 , 9 3 2 2 .
7 7 6 4 . 2 4 0 3 7 . ............ _____ ________________ 2, #  . _ 1 D Z 5 0 0 ^ — -SAÛÛ.-
0 OR K = ZERO 
2 2 6 5 , 2 4 5 3 0 . 0 , 0 , 9 8 0 4 0 , 1 1 9 6 0 ,
0 ÜR K = ZERO
_____________ ______ ___________2 ... . . . . 2 6 6 , 2 3 4 9 4 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 1 4 2 0 . 1 6 4 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
2 2 6 7 , 2 2 4 5 3 , 0 , 0 , 1 1 3 8 6 0 , 1 9 Ü 0 0 ,
0 OR K = ZERO 
2 ? 6 8 .  _ .  .................. _____ Ou.__________ 0. . _______ A l  7 3,20. . _________ 2 1 9 3 2 .
0 OR K = ZERO
2 2 6 9 , 2 4 5 3 0 , 0 . 0 . 1 3 4 1 9 0 , 2 2 8 0 0 ,
0 OR K = ZERO
______________________________ - ......................................................... - 2 ________ 7 Û « . _ . .  2 3 3 0 2 . 0 . 0 . 1 4 0 0 0 9 , 3 3 6 8 1 ,
C ÜR K = ZERO
2 3 6 ü , 2 1 2 2 5 , 0 . 0 , 7 8 2 0 0 , 4 6 5  0 ,
0  ÜR K = ZERO 
? 'X 6 1 . 2 1 9 1 7 .  ........... .....  ._ . ____0 . __________ û.^ __________ 7 8 4 8 4 . . . . . .  6 6 0 8 .
0 OR K = ZERO
? 3 6 2 , 2 2 6 0 9 , 0 , G, 8 4 5 2 0 , 9 2 8 5 ,
2 3 6 3 , 2 3 3 2 3 , 1 . 0 . 8 9 9 9 8 , 9 3 2 2 ,
Q ÜR K = ZERO
2 3 ' 64  ,  ’ 2 4 0 3  7 , 0 , 0 , 1 0 2 5 0 0 , 9 4 0 0 ,
2 3 6 5 , 2 4 5 3 0 , 4 . 4 , 9 8 0 4 0 , 1 1 9 6 0 ,
2 3 6 6 , 2 3 4 9 4 , 3 . 1 , 1 0 1 4 2 0 , 1 6 4 0 0 ,
0 OR K ,=..^£B-Q_______
? 3 6 7 , 2 2 4 5 8 , " Ô . 0 , r i f ^ 6 Ô I 1 9 0 0 0 ,
2 3 6 8 , 2 5 7 5 9 , 1 . 0 , 1 1 7 3 2 0 , 2 1 9 3 2 ,
0  OR K = ZERO ■3 6 9 .  _ ____________2 4 5 . 3 0 . 0 .  . 0 , 1 3 4 1 9 0 . 2 2 8 0 0 .
Û OR K = ZERO
2 3 7 0 , 2 3 3 0 2 , 0 . 0 , 1 4 0 0 0 9 , 3 3 6 8 1 ,
0 OR K = ZERO
7 4 6 0 . 2 1 2  2 5 . n . . .  . . .  . . .  0 . ___ 7&200u._ ___  4 6 5 0 . -
0 OR K = ZERO
2 4 6 1 , 2 1 9 1 7 , 0 , 0 , 7 8 4 8 4 , 6 6 0 8 ,
0 OR K = ZERO
2 4 6 2 , . 2 2 6 0 9 , 0 . 0 , 8 4 5 2 0 . 9 2 8 5 .
4 6 3 , 2 3 3 2 3 , 3 . 0 , 3 9 9 9 8 , 9 3 2 2 .
2 4 6 4 , 2 4 0 3 7 , 4 2 , 4 2 , 1 0 2 5 0 0 , 9 4 ü 0 ,
2 4 6 5 , 2 4 5 3 0 . 1 3 , 8 , 9 8 0 4 0 , 1 1 9 6 0 .
2 4 6 6 , 2 3 4 5 4 ,  .............................. ......  1 7 . _ 1 0 1 4 2 0 . ___1j6 4 0 0 .
2 4 6 7 , 2 2 4 5 8 , 1 0 , 1 0 . 1 1 3  8 6 0 , 1 9 0 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
2 4 6 8 . 2 5 7 5 9 , 0 , G. 1 1 7 3 2 0 , 2 1 9 3 2 .
4 . ____________________ 6.9,_ .  2 45  3 0 , _________ 1 . 1 . 1 3 4 1 9 0 , 2 2 8 0 0 ,
-----O O R  K"=“ Z“ERO“ ‘
2 4 7 0 , 2 3 3 0 2 , 0 , 0 . 1 4 0 0 0 9 , 3 3 6 8 1 ,
0 ÜR K = ZERO
2 3 ..... 2 1 2  2 5 . _ ............. _ 1.__ ............. . 0.. . 2 8 2 0 0 . . .........4 6 5 0 .
Ü OR K = ZERO
2 5 b l . 2 1 9 1 7 , U. 0 , 7 8 4 8 4 . 6 6 0 8 .
0 OR K = ZERO
5 ____ 6 2 . ____ 2 2 .4 0 9 ,. Q. 0 . 8 4 5 2 0 , 9 2 8 5 ,
2 5 6 3 , 2 3 3 2 3 , 5 3 , û . 8 9 9 9 8 , 9 3 2 2 ,
KO0 “
% ‘ § i a ^ 8 : i m :
2 5 66 a 2 3 4 9 4 . 6 6 . 4 0 . 1 0 1 4 2 0 . 1 6 4 0 0 .
2 5 67«_ 2 2 4 5 8 . 5 1 . 1 5 . 1 1 3 8 6 0 . 1 9 0 0 0 ....... ...... . 2 5 ^ 6 8 . “ 2 57  5 9 . 6 7 . 4 2 . 1 1 7 3 2 0 . 2 1 9 3 2 .
2 5 6 9 , 2 4 5 3 0 . 1 3 1 . 1 0 5 . 1 3 4 1 9 0 . 2 2 8 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO J 4 a O Q 9 . _ 3 3 6 8 1 .2 5 7 0 . 2 3 3 0 2 . . Q «_  ^ -__ __ 0 , __ . . - --- ------- - - — - - ----------------
0 OR R = 
2
-TE?m
6 6 0 . 2 1 2 2 5 . 0 . 0 . 7 8 2 0 0 . 4 6 5 0 .
0 OR K =
2
ZERO




6 6 2 . 2 2 6 0 9 . 0 . 0 . 8 4 5 2 0 . 9 2 8 5 .
2 6 6 3 . 2 3 3 2 3 . 5 8 . 0 . 8 9 9 9 8 . 9 3 2 2 .
2 A 6 4 . 2 4 Ü 3 7 . 2 , 1 0 2 5 0 0 . ..... . 9 4 0 0 . .......1 1 9 6 0 .
. - . - - — . -...... . - - .— ——— -• ——
2 6 6 5 . 2 4 5 3 0 . 4 8 .  ■ "  ^ 0 . 9 8 0 4 0 .
2 6 6 6 . 2 3 4 9 4 . 5 3 . 1 2 . 1 0 1 4 2 0 . 1 6 4 0 0 .
2 6 6 7 . 2 2 4 5 8 . 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 1 3 8 6 0 . 1 9 0 0 0 .
2 6 6 8 , 2 5 7 5 9 . 9 2 . 1 8 . 1 1 7 3 2 0 . M 9 3 2 .
2 6 ......  6 9 .  ^ 2 4 5  3 0 . 1 0 0 . 2 6 . 1 3 4 1 9 0 . 2 2 8 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO 1 4 0 0 0 9 . 3 3 6 8 1 .2 6 7 0 . 2 3 3 0 2 . U. 0 .
D OR = ZERO 4 6 5  0 .
■ — ■ -- ----- - --- -------------
2 -  7 6Ù. 2 1 2 2 5 . 0 . 0 . 78 2 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO 6 6 0 3 .2 7 6 1 . 2 1 9 1 7 . 0 . 0 . 7 8 4 8 4 .
0 OR K = ZERO 8 4 5 2 0 . 9 2 8 5 .2 ... 7 6 2 . 2 2 6 0 9 . 0 . 0 .
2 7 6 3 . 2 3 3 2 3 . 1 2 7 . 0 . 8 9 9 9 8 . 9 3 2 2 .
2 7 6 4 . 2 4 0 3 7 . 9 1 . 1 9 , 1 0 2 5 0 0 . 9 4 0 0 .
2 7 6 5 . 2 4 5 3 0 . 8 9 . 1 3 .  ------- 4 2 7 M : - i i ? o o *
.. . _  . ---  ... ------- . , ,
7 — z ......... 6 6 . 2 3 4 9 4 , 1 3 5 .
2 7 6 7 . 2 2 4 5 8 . 1 3 9 , 4 9 . 1 1 3 8 6 0 . 1 9 0 0 0 .
2 7 68 . 2 5 7 5 9 . 2 0 2 . 7 8 . 1 1 7 3 2 0 . 2 1 9 3 2 .
2 7 6 9 . 2 4 5 3 0 . 2 7 7 . 9 5 . 1 3 4 1 9 0 . 2 2 8 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO 1 4 0 0 0 9 . 3 3 6 8 1 .2 7 7 0 . 2 3 3 0 2 . 0 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO 7 8 2 0 0 . 4 6 5 0 .2__ e 60  . 2 1 2 2 5 . __________ 0 . _____ ...... .....0 . ___ . ..... ....... —----- — - .~.i 1 .1 —
n n PT ~ Z F W 6 6 0 8 .2 a 6 1 . 2 1 9 1 7 . 0 . 0 . 7 8 4 8 4 .
0 OR K = ZERO 8 4 5 2 0 . 9 2 8 5 .? a 6 2 . 2 2 6 0 9 . 0 . 0 .
2 a "63. 2 33 2 3 . 2 9 . 0 . 8 9 9 9 8 . 9 3 2 2 .
2 a 6 4 . 2 4 0 3 7 . 1 9 . 1 7 . 1 0 2 5 0 0 . 9 4 0 0 .
2 a 6 5 . 2 4 5 3 0 . 1 2 . 1 0 . 9 8 0 4 0 . 1 1 9 6 0 .
2 8 6 6 . 2 3 4 9 4 . 1 9 . 1 7 . 1 0 1 4 2 0 .I13T960.
1 6 4 0 0 .  
IVOOO. "
.. _ .... . . .--- 1 . - -——-
2 - n 6 Z. 2 2 4 5 8 . 81. 6 .
2 8 6 8 . 2 5 7 5 9 . 9 . 8 . 1 1 7 3 2 0 . 2 1 9 3 2 .
2 8 6 9 . 2 4 5 3 0 . 9 . 8 . 1 3 4 1 9 0 . 2 2 8 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO 1 4 0 0 0 9 . 3 3 6 8 1 .2 a 7Ü. 2 3 3 0 2 . 0 . 0 .
3 1 6 0 . 2 0 1 8 4 , 1 . 1 . 1 0 3 5 0 0 . 8 5 0 0 .
3 1 b l . 2 0 5 4 6 . 2 . 0 . 1 0 3 0 0 0 . 7 5 0 0 .
3 1 . 6 2 . 2 0 9 0 8 , _ .......-  I t  - 0 . l î o o o o Z
......55JiO^ ^
9 5 0 0 .
_________- ,.. . ..________ .^ 2—
3 ■ 6 3 . 2 1 3 3 3 . TT. 0 .
3 1 6 4 . 2 1 7 5 9 . 1 . 1 . 1 1 8 0 0 0 . 1 2 0 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO 1 0 0 0 0 .3 1 2 1 4  5 8 . ..................  0 . 0 . 1 2 7 0 0 0 . . . .  . .
0 OR K = ZÉRO
I i Ê9: 9: ...............3 ; 1 I 8 Î 1 4 : 1 8 9 % :  ......
3 1 6 8 . 2 2 0 8 8 . 2 . 2 . 1 7 9 0 2 3 . 1 0 4 2 1 .
1 . 6 9 . 2 1 4  8 4 . 2 . • 2 . 1 8 8 2 6 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 .
3 1 7Ü. 2 0 8 8 1 . 2 . 2 . 2 1 3 7 7 2 . 1 2 4 0 0 .
3 2 6 0 . 2 0 1 8 4 . 1 . 0 . 1 0 3 5 0 0 . 8 5 0 0 .
0  OR K = ZERO
3 7 61 . 2 ( 1546 .  . 11» 0 » . 1 0 1 0 0 0 » - .... __ J-5D-0»............. ------------- - - -- - . - — ----- ---—------
3 2 6 2 . 2 0 9 0 8 . 1 . 0 . 1 0 5 0 0 0 . 5 5 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
3 2 6 3 . 2 1 3 3 3 . 0 . 0 . 1 1 0 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 0 .
_ Û QR-K -  ZERO
3 2 6 4 . 2 1 7  5 9 . 0 . 0 . 1 1 8 0 0 0 . 1 2 0 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
3 2 6 3 . 2 1 4 5 8 . 0 . 0 . 1 2 7 0 0 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 .
n OR X = ZERO
3 2 6 6 . 2 1 5 6 6 . o 7  ' 0 . 1 4 0 5 5 1 .  ■ 1 9 6  8 6 .
3 2 6 7 . 2 1 6 7 4 . 3 . 2 . 1 6 0 1 2 9 . 1 0 7 7 8 .
3 2 6 8 . 2 2 0 8 8 . 4 . 1 . 1 7 9 0 2 3 . 1 0 4 2 1 .
2 _6.SL. 2 1 4 8 4 . 1 . 1 . 1 8 8 2 6 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 .
0"0R  K ='  ZERO
3 2 7 0 . 2 0 8 8 1 . 0 . 0 . 2 1 3 7 7 2 . 1 2 4 0 0 .
3 3 6 0 . 2 0 1 8 4 . 7 . 5 . 1 0 3 5 0 0 . 8 5 0 0 .
3 61 . 3 05 4 4 - 0 # 1 0 3 0 0 0 .  .... -7 5 0 0 .________
3 3 6 2 . 2 0 9 0 8 . 7 # 0 . 1 0 5 0 0 0 . 5 5 0 0 .
3 3 6 3 . 2 1 3 3 3 . 5 . 0 . 1 1 0 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 0 .
3 3 6 4 . 2 1 7 5 9 . ? . 3 . 1 1 8 0 0 0 . 1 2 0 0 0 .
0 ORU!L_= ZERO.
3 """3 6 5 . ' 2 1 4 5 8 . .............. C. 0 . 1 2 7 0 0 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 .
C OR K' =  zero
3 3 6 6 . 2 1 5 6 6 . 0 . 0 . 1 4 0 5 5 1 . 1 9 6 8 6 .
3 3 6 7 . 2 1 6 7 4 . 1 6 0 1 2 5 »  . — 1 0  7 7 8 » .....-..... —
3 3 6 8 . 2 2 0 8 8 . 7 . 1 7 9 0 2 3 . 1 0 4 ^ .
3 3 6 9 . 2 1 4 8 4 . 5 . 1 . 1 8 3 2 6 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 .
3 3 7 0 . 2 0 8 8 1 . 1 2 . 5 . 2 1 3 7 7 2 . 1 2 4 U 0 .
- 4 __ Z U 184 . 2 . 6 . 1 0 3 5 0 0 . 8 5 0 0 .
4 6 1 . 2 0 5 4 6 . 1 1 . 0 . 1 0 3 0 0 0 . 7 5 0 0 .
3 4 6 2 . 2 0 9 0 8 . 7 . 0 . 1 0 5 0 0 0 . 5 5 0 0 .
3 4 6 3 . 2 1 3 3 3 . 1 2 . ■J. 1 1 0 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 0 .
3 4 6 4 . 2 1 7 5 9 . ............4 4 . .... . 1 1 3 0 0 0 . ... .1 2 0 0 8 1 . _____ .................. . _
0 OR K = ZERO
3 4 6 3 . 2 1 4 5 8 . 0 • 0 . 127OC0. 1 Ù 0 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
4 6 6 . 2 1 5 6 6 . a . 0 . 1 4 0 5 5 1 . 1 9 6 8 6 .
.....  3 4 6 7 . 2 1 6 7 4 . 1 4 . 1 3 . 1 6 0 1 2 9 . 1 0 7 7 8 .
3 4 6 8 . 2 2 0 8 8 . 8 . 8 . 1 7 9 0 2 3 . 1 0 4 2 1 .
3 4 6 9 . 2 1 4 8 4 . 1 2 . 1 1 . 1 8 8 2 6 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 .
3 4 7 0 . 2 0 8 8 1 . _ - ? 1 3 7 J 2 . , . . 1 2 4 0 0 » .  ..........
. ......... '"T ......  ■ 5 6 0 . 2 0 1 8 4 . 9 0 . 1 0 3 5 0 0 . 8 5 0 0 .
3 5 6 1 . 2 0 5 4 6 . 1 4 1 . Û. 1 0 3 0 0 0 . 7 5 0 0 .
3 5 6 2 . 2 0 9 0 8 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 1 0 5 0 0 0 . 5 5 1 0 .
3 5 6 3 . 2 1 3 3 3 . _ 1 5 4 . 0 . 1 1 0 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 0 .
.............  3 5 6 4 . ' 2 1 7 5 9 . 1 7 2 . 3 5 . 1 1 8 0 0 0 . 1 2 0 0 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
3 5 6 5 . 2 1 4 5 8 , Ü. 0 . 1 2 7 0 0 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 .
□ OR K = ZERO
3 5 6 6 . 2 1 5 6 6 . 0 . ' Ô. 1 4 0 5  5 1 . 1 9 6 8 6 .
3 5 6 7 . 2 1 6 7 4 . 1 5 4 . 4 1 . 1 6 0 1 2 9 . 1 0 7 7 8 .3 5 6 8 . 2 2 0 8 8 . 1 5 0 . 4 3 . 1 7 9 0 2 3 . 1 0 4 2 1 .
3 5 6 9 .  ^ 2 1 .4 8 4 . 2 1 5 . 5 5 . 1 8 8 2 6 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 »
5 7 0 . 2 0 8 8 1 . 2 2 5 . 5]  . 2 1 3 7 7 2 . 1 2 4 0 0 .
36
6
6 6 2 . 2 0 9 0 8 .
3 6 6 3 . 2 1 3 3 3 .
3 6 9 4 . 2 1 7 5 9 .
0 OR K =
3
ZERO
6 6 5 . 2 1 4 5 8 .
0 OR R = ZERO
3 6 6 6 . 2 1 5 6 6 .
3 6 6 7 . 2 1 6 7 4 .
3 6 6 8 . 2 2 0 8 8 .
3 6 6 9 , 2 1 4 8 4 .
3 6 7 0 . 2 0 8 8 1 .
3 7 6 0 . 2 0 1 8 4 .
3 7 6 1 . 2 0 5 4 6 .
3 7 . 6 2 .
3 7 6 3 . 2 1 3 3 3 .
3 7 6 4 . 2 1 7 3 9 .
n ÜR K = ZERO
3 7 65.^^ 2 1 4 5 8 .
0 OK K = ZERO 2 1 5 6 6 .3 7 6 6 .
3 7 6 7 . 2 1 6 7 4 .
._3 . , 7 6 8 . 2 2 0 8 8 .7 ■ 6 9 . F l'4 3 4 ."  "
3 7 7 0 . 2 0 8 8 1 .
3 6 6 0 . 2 0 1 8 4 .
3 8 6 1 . 2 0 5 4 6 .
3 8 ............. 6 2 . 20 9 0 8 .
3 8 6 3 . 2 1 3 3 3 .
3 8 6 4 . 2 1 7 5 9 .
0 ÜR K = ZERO
3 '8" " 6 5 . 2 1 4 5 8 .
0 OR K = ZERO
2 1 5 6 6 .3 8 66  .
3 8 6 7 . 2 1 6 7 4 .
3 8 6 8 . 2 2 0 8 8 .
3 8 6 9 . 2 1 4 8 4 .
3 8 7 0 . 2 0 8 8 1 .
Q OR K = ZEROU 1 60 . 278  9 3 .
4 1 6 1 . 2 7 7 3 3 .
4 1 6 2 . 2 7 5 7 2 .
0 OR K = ZERO
4 1 ^ 3 . ' 2 3 8 5 4 .
0 OR K = ZERO
4 1 6 4 . 3 0 1 3 7 .
0 OR K = ZERO
4 1 6 5 . 30 7 73 .
0 OR K = ZERO
4 1 66  . 3 0 8 4 1 .
___ 0^ OR K = ZERO _£ “ I 6 7 . 3 0 9 1 0 .
Q OR K = ZERO
4 1 6 8 . 3 1 3 5 2 .
0 OR K = ZERO
4 1 6 9 . JCT7'67.
0 OR K = ZERO
4 1 7 0 . 2 9 6 8 3 .
___ 0. OR K = lER.O _









2 2 3 .
3 2 0 .
1 6 7 .
1 8 0 .
U t
1 7 2 .
Ü.
1 3 4 .
2 4 3 .
161'.



























1 0 5 0 0 0 .
1 1 0 0 0 0 .
1 1 8 0 0 0 .
M :
5 5 0 0 .
9 5 0 0 .
1 2 0 ) 0 .
G. 1 2 7 0 0 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 .
‘  0^ 
2 9 .  
2 0 .  
3 9 .  
4 8 .  




1 4 0 5 5 1 .
1 6 0 1 2 9 .
1 7 9 3 2 3 .
1 8 3 2 6 0 .
2 1 3 7 7 2 .
1 0 3 5 0 0 .
1 0 3 0 0 0 .
1 0 5 0 0 0 .
1 1 0 0 0 0 .
i i a o ü o .
1 9 6 8 6 .
1 0 7 7 8 .
1 0 4 2 1 .
1 0 0 0 0 .
1 2 4 0 0 .
8 5 0 0 .
7 5 0 0 .
5 5 1 0 ._
9 5 0 0 .
1 2 0 0 0 .










1 4 0 5 5 1 .
1 6 0 1 2 9 .
1 7 9 0 2 3 .
1 8 8 2 6 0 .
2 1 3 7 7 2 .
1 0 3 5 0 0 .
1 0 3 0 0 0 .
1 0 5 0 0 0 .
1 1 0 0 0 0 .
l l B O ü U .
1 9 6 8 6 .
1 0 7 7 8 .
1 0 4 2 1 . .... .
1 0 0 ) 0 .
1 2 4 0 0 .
8 5 0 0 .
7 5 0 0 .
5 5 0 0 .
9 5 0 0 .
1 2 0 0 0 .
' .............. -






1 4 0 5 5 1 .
1 6 0 1 2 9 .
1 7 9 0 2 3 .
1 8 8 2 6 0 .
2 1 3 7 7 2 .
1 9 6 8 6 .
1 0 7 7 8 .
1 0 4 2 1 .
1 0 0 0 0 .




1 3  2 9 9  8 .  
1 4 4 7 7 6 .  
1 4 9 9 Ü 8 .
2 5 0 2 0 .  
2 5 7 4 0 .  
2 4 0 5 0 .
0 . 1 5 5 5 7 3 . 2 7 0 5 0 .
0 . 1 7 2 4 9 3 . 1 1 9 5 0 .
0 . 1 9 8 4 3 1 . 1 3 0 5 0 . - -• — ' —
0 . 2 0 1 6 8 9 . 1 2 9 5 0 .
0 . 2 3 3 0 9 4 . 1 4 4 5 0 .
0 . 2 7 1 7 6 5 . 1 6 9 5 0 .
û . 2 8 9 2 3 6 .  " 1 9 2 3 0 7
0 . 3 0 8 1 2 9 . 2 1 5 7 5 .
0 . 1 3 2 9 9 8 . 2 5 0 2 0 .
V£>-w
0 GR ZERO 2 6 1 , 2 7 7 3 3 , 0 , 0 , 1 4 4 7 7 6 , 2 5 7 4 0 ,
0 OR K =
- 4  .
ZERO
...2 ....... - 6 2 . ..... 2 7 5 7 2 . Ü, 0 . 1 4 9 9 0 8 , 2 4 0 5 0 ,
G OR K = 
4
ZERO
2 6 3 . 2 8 8 5 4 . 0 , 0 , 1 5 5 5 7 3 , 2 7 0 5 0 .
4 2 6 4 . 3 0 1 3 7 , 1 , 1 , 1 7 2 4 9 3 , 1 1 9 5 0 ,
n OR K = ZERO _______ ________ . — — —
4 2 6 5 . 3 0 7 7 3 , 0 , 0 , 1 9 8 4 3 1 . 1 3 0 5 0 ,
0 OR K =
4
ZERO
2 66  ■ 3 0 8 4 1 , 0 , G, 2 0 1 6 8 9 , 1 2 9 5 0 ,
û OR K = 
4
ZERO
2 6 7 . 3 0 9 1 0 , 0 , 0 . 2 3 3 0 9 4 , 1 4 4 5 0 ,
4 2 6 8 , 3 1 8 5 2 , 4 , 4 , 2 7 1 7 6 5 , 1 6 9 5 0 ,
4 2 6 9 , 3 0 7 6 7 , 1 , 1 , 2 8 9 2 3 6 , 1 9 2 5 0 ,
4 _2 _. 7 0 . 2 9 6 8 3 .  . . _.308JL29j_ . .......215.7.5,
0 OR K =4
ZERO
6 0 , 2 7 8 9 3 , 0 , Ü, 1 3 2 9 9 8 , 2 5 0 2 0 ,
4 6 1 , 2 7 7 3 3 , 2 , 2 , 1 4 4 7 7 6 , 2 5 7 4 0 ,
4 3 6 2 . ___ . 2 7 5 7 2 . 2 . 1 . 1 4 9 9 0 8 , 2 4 0 5 0 .
4 3 6 3 , 2 9 8 5 4 , 3 , 3 , 1 5 5 5 7 3 , 2 7 0 5 0 ,
4 3 6 4 , 3 0 1 3 7 , 5 , 1 . 1 7 2 4 9 3 , 1 1 9 5 0 ,
4 3 6 5 , 3 0 7 7 3 , 1 , 1 , 1 9 8 4 3 1 , 1 3 0 5 0 ,
A 3 6 6 .  . ... 30.8.41. . . .. . . . 4 ^ 2. ^ 2 0 1 2 . 8 9 , L2.950^
4 3 6 7 , 3 0 9 1 0 , 1 , 0 , 2 3 3 0 9 4 , 1 4 4 5 0 ,
4 3 6 8 , 3 1 3 5 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 7 1 7 6 5 , 1 6 9 5 0 ,
4 3 6 9 . 3 0 7 6 7 , 2 , 2 , 2 8 9 2 3 6 , 1 9 2 5 0 ,
4 3 7 0 . 2 9 6 8 3 , 2 , 1 , 3 0 8 1 2 9 , 2 1 5 7 5 ,
4 4 6 0 , 2 7 8 9 3 , 2 . 2 , 1 3 2 9 9 8 , 2 5 0 2 0 ,
4 4 6 1 , 2 7 7 3 3 a 1 , 1 , 1 4 4 7 7 6 , 2 5 7 4 0 ,
4 4 6 2 , 2 7 5 7 2 , 2 , 2 , 1 4 9 9 0 8 , 2 4 0 5 0 ,
_4 6 3 . 2 9 8 5 4 , ........  5 a . _1555J . 3 . ___ 2705LO..
■ 4 4 6 4 , 3 0 1 3 7 . 1 2 , i  i ; 1 7 2 4 9 3 , 1 1 9 5 0 ,
4 6 6 5 , 3 0 7 7 3 . 7 , 7 , 1 9 8 4 3 1 , 1 3 0 5 0 ,
4 4 6 6 , . 30841 , 5 , 5 , 2 0 1 6 8 9 , 1 2 9 5 0 ,
4 4 6 1 . 1(1910. , 1 0 , 4 . 2 3 3 0 9 4 , 1 4 4 5 0 .
4 4 6 8 , 3 1 8 5 2 , 7 , 6 , 2 7 1 7 6 5 , 1 6 9 5 0 ,
4 4 6 9 , 3 0 7 6 7 , 3 1 , 2 6 , 2 8 9 2 3 6 , 1 9 2 5 0 ,
4 4 7 0 , 2 9 6 8 3 , 2 4 , 2 3 , 3 0 8 1 2 9 , 2 1 5 7 5 ,
4 5 6 0 ,  _ ...... . ........  63  , .......... 25_. _ . 1 3 2 9 9 8 , 2 5 0 2 0 . .
4 6 6 1 , 2 7 7 3 3 , 1 0 0 , 4 4 , 1 4 4 7 7 6 , 2 5 7 4 0 .
4 5 6 2 , 2 7 5 7 2 , 8 2 , 3 8 , 1 4 9 9 0 8 , 2 4 0 5 0 ,
4 5 6 3 , 2 8 8 5 4 , 6 7 , 3 0 , 1 5 5 5 7 3 , 2 7 0 5 0 ,
4 5 6 4  . 3 0 1 3 7 , 5 5 , 1 5 , 1 7 2 4 9 3 . 1 1 9 5 0 .
4 4 6 5 , 3 0 7 7 3 , 9 0 , 2 1 , 1 9 8 4 3 1 , 1 3 0 5 0 .
4 5 66  • 3 0 8 4 1 , 1 1 8 , 2 9 , 2 0 1 6 8 9 , 1 2 9 5 0 .
4 S 6 7 , 3 0 9 1 0 , 9 9 . 1 9 , 2 3 3 0 9 4 , 1 4 4 5 0 .
4 5 6 8 , 3 1 8  5 . 2 ^ 121  « _ . .......4 6 ,  „ . 2J  l J i i 5 . . . ____169511.
4 ' 5 6 9 , 3 0 7 6 7 , 8 2 , 2 7 , 2 8 9 2 3 6 , 1 9 2 5 0 ,
4 5 7 0 , 2 9 6 8 3 , 1 4 5 , 5 6 , 3 0 8 1 2 9 , 2 1 5 7 5 ,
4 6 6 0 , 2 7 8 9 3 , 5 3 , 2 0 , 1 3 2 9 9 8 , 2 5 0 2 0 ,
4 6 6 1 . 2 7 7  3 3 , 8 5 . 1 2 . 1 4 4 7 7 6 , 2 5 7 4 0 ,
4 6 6 2 . 2 7 5  72 . 4 9 . 1 0 , 1 4 9 9 0 8 , 2 4 0 5 0 ,
4 6 63  o 2 8 8  5 4 , 4 7 , 6 , 1 5 5 5 7 3 , 2 7 0 5 0 ,
4 b 6 4 , 3 0 1 3 7 , 7 2 , 6 , 1 7 2 4 9 3 , 1 1 9 5 0 ,
4 h 6 5 . 3 0 7 7 3 , ____ 1.9. .  - 1 9 . 8 4 3 1 ,  .. ’ .
4 6 66  a 3 0 8 4 1 , ' 8 4 ^ 1 9 , 2 0 1 6 8 9 , 1 2 9 5 0 ,
4 6 6 7 , 3 0 9 1 0 , 8 2 , 1 7 , 2 3 3 0 9 4 , 1 4 4 5 0 ,
4 6 6 8 , 3 1 8 5 2 , 1 0 2 , 1 1 , 2 7 1 7 6 5 , 1 6 9 5 0 ,
4 b 6 9 . ___ 3 0 7 6 . 7 , ____ 1 2 3 , 3 0 , 2 8 9 2 3 6 , 1 9 2 5 0 .


















































6 6 . 
6 7 .




2 8 8 5 .4 , 
3 0 1 3 7 .  
3 0 7 7 3 .  
3 0 8 4 1 .  
3 0 9 1 0 .  
FTü3%. 
3 0 7 6 7 .  
2 9 6 8 3 .  
2 7 8 9 3 .  
2 7 7 3 3 .  
2 7 5 7 2 .  
2 8 8 5 4 .  
■30.137..,
3 0 7 7 3 .
3 0 8 4 1 .
3 0 9 1 0 .
2 9 6 8 3 .
2 0 0 0 9 .
■■"C.. " T " 6 1 . r 9 6 ? 7 .
ü OR K ' = ZERO
5 1 62 . 1 9 3 6 4 .
___ 0 OR K = ZERO
5 I ” 6 3 . 19 6 '8 4 .
5 1 6 4 . 2 0 0  0 4 .
5 1 6 5 . 2 0 3 5 4 .
0 OR K = ZERO
5 " l 6 6 . 2 0 3  8 1 .
0 OR K = ZERO
5 1 6 7 . 2 0 4 0 9 .
Û_ ÜR K = .ZERO ,
3 " 2 6 8 .  ' 2 1 1 6 7 .
5 1 6 9 . 2 0 4 4 2 .
0 OR K = ZERO
5 1 7 0 . 1 9 7 1 3 .
5 2 6 0 . 2 0 0 0 9 .
0 OR K = ZERO
5 2 6 1 . 1 9 6 8 7 .
0 OR K = ZERO
5 2 6 2 . 1 9 3 6 4 .
n OR K = ZERO
5 2 6 3 . 1 9 6 8 4 .
0 OR K = ZERO
'5 " Z  ' ■ 6 4 . 2 0 0 0 4 .
5 2 6 5 . 2 0 3 5 4 .
5 2 6 6 . 2 0 3 8 1 .
5 2 6 7 . 2 0 4 0 9 .
' 3 2 6 8 . 2 1 1 6 7 .
0 OR K = ZERO
5 2 6 9 . 2 0 4 4 2 .
0 OR K = ZERO
5 " 2 / Ü. 19  Z1 8 o
5 3 6 0 . 2 0 0 0 9 .
5 3 6 1 . 1 9 6  8 7 .
5 3 6 2 . 1 9 3 6 4 .
5 3 -------- 6 3 . 196  8 4 ,
^ ^ 8 :
1 8 6 . 
2 2 6 .
2 4 5 .
2 0 0 .
1 62'. 
2 3 0 .  
3 0 3 .
21. 




































































m m : 1 ^ 8 :
1 4 9 9 0 8 . 2 4 0 5 0 .
1 5 5 5 7 3 . 2 7 0 5 0 .
1 7 2 4 9 3 . 1 1 9 5 0 .
1 9 8 4 3 1 . 1 3 0 5 0 .
2 0 1 6 8 9 . 1 2 9 5 0 .
2 3 3 0 9 4 . , 1 4 4 ^ 0 ,
2 7 1 7 6 5 . 1 6 9 5 0 .
2 8 9 2 3 6 . 1 9 2 5 0 .
3 0 8 1 2 9 . 2 1 5 7 5 .
1 3 2 9 9 8 . 2 5 0 2 0 .
1 4 4 7 7 6 . 2 5 7 4 0 .
1 4 9 9 0 8 . 2 4 0 5 0 .
1 5 5 5 7 3 . 2 7 0 5 0 .
1 7 2 4 9 3 . 1 1 9 5 0 ,  _
1 9 8 4 3 1 . 1 3 0 5 0 .
2 0 1 6 8 9 . 1 2 9 5 0 .
2 3 3 0 9 4 . 1 4 4 5 0 .
2 7 1 7 6 5 . 1 6 9 5 0 .
2 3 9 2 3 6 . 1 9 2 5 0 .
3 0 8 1 2 9 . 2 1 5 7 5 .
9 1 3 7 5 . 2 2 5 5 0 .
9 1 0 7 7 . 2 6 0 0 0 .
8 2 7 8 0 . 23CÜ0 .
9 1 2 5 0 . 2 4 1 5 0 .
9 4 1 0 8 . 2 4 8 3 0 .
1 0 0 1 3 3 . 2 8 1 6 0 .
1 0 9 1 1 1 . ' 1 9  9 5 0 .
1 2 0 9 9 6 . 2 0 8 0 0 .
1 4 0 2 3 3 . 2 2 0 2 6 .
1 5 1 5 4 3 . 2 3 8 0 3 .
1 7 8 8 6 3 . 2 7 6 9 9 . ,
' 9 1 3 7 5 . 2 2 5 5 0 .
9 1 0 7 7 . 2 6 0 0 0 .
8 2 7 8 0 . 2 3 0 0 0 .
9 1 2 5 0 . 2 4 1 5 0 .
9 4 1 0 8 . ' 2 4 8 3 0 .
1 0 0 1 3 3 . 2 8 1 6 0 .
1 0 9 1 1 1 . 1 9 9 5 0 .
1 2 0 9 9 6 . 2 0 8 0 0 .
1 4 0 2 3 3 . 2 2 0 2 6 .
1 5 1 5 4 3 . 2 3 8 0 3 .
" 1 7 8 ^ 6 3 . 2 7 6 9 9 .
9 1 3 7 5 . 2 2 5 5 0 .
9 1 0 7 7 . 2 6 0 0 0 .
8 2 7 8 0 . 2 3 0 0 0 .
9 1 2 5 0 . 2 4 1 5 0 .
lO
1 1
5 3 6 6 .
. 5 . 3 6 7 .
5 3 6 8 .
5 3 6 9 .
5 3 7 0 .r 4 6 0 .- 5— 4 6 1 .
OR K = ZERO
5 4 6 2 .
OR K = ZERO
5 4 6 3 .
5 4 6 4 .
5 4 6 5 .
-5- . - -4- .......... -  - 6 6 .
5 4 6 7 .
5 4 6 8 .
5 4 6 9 .
5 4 -
5 q 6 0 .
5 5 6 1 .
5 5 6 2 .
5 5 . . 63.-.
m î t - .
2 0 3 8 1 .
2 0 4 0 9 .
2 1 1 6 7 .
2 0 4 4 2 .
1 9 7 1 9 ,
















6 6 . 




196  9 7 ,
1 9 3 6 4 ,
196 8 4 .  
2 0 0 0 4 .  
2 0 3 5 4 .
■ 2038.1. . -  
2 0 4 0 9 .  
2 1 1 6 7 .  
2 0 4 4 2 .  
1 9 1 1 8 .  
2 0 0 0 9 .  
1 9 6 8 7 .  
1 9 3 6 4 .
■ L96M-. _ 
2 0 0 0 4 .  
2 0 3 5 4 .  
2 0 3 8 1 .  
2 0 4 0 9 .  
2 1 1 6 7 .  
2 0 ^ 4 2 .  
1 9 7 1 8 .
5 6 6 1 . 196  8 7 .
5 6 6 2 . 1 9 3 6 4 .
5 6 63 . 1 9 6 8 4 .
«=i 6 __  6-ft. -  2 0 0 0 4 .
5 6 65 . 2 0 3 5 4 .
5 6 66. 2 0 3 8 1 .
5 6 6 7 . 2 0 4 0 9 .
5 6 6 8 . _
5 6 6 9 . 2 0 4 4 2 .
5 6 7 0 . 1 9 7 1 8 .
5 7 6 0 . 2 0 0 0 9 .
____________5 _____ 7 6 1-._ ____1 9 6  8 7 .
5 7 6 2 . 1 9 3 6 4 .
5 7 6 3* 1 9 6 8 4 .
5 7 6 4 . 2 0 0 0 4 .
5 7 6 5 ,  .. 2 0 3 5 4 .
5 ........ 7 6 6 . Z 7 ) 3 8 r x
5 7 6 7 . 2 ü 4 u 9 .
5 7 6 8 . 2 1 1 6 7 .
5 7 6 9 . 2 0 4 4 2 .
---------- 5 ' “.......... 7 7 0 . 1 9 7 1 8 .
5 8 6 0 . 2 0 0 0 9 .
5 8 61 u 1 9 6 8 7 .c; a 62.-  - 1 9 3 6 4 .
5 8 6 3 , 1 9 6 8 4 .
5 8 6 4 . 2 0 0 0 4 .
5 8 6 5 . 2 0 3 5 4 .

















1 2 2 .
6 7 .
4 8 ,  
7 1 .  
7 1 .
lîi:
1 3 1 .
8 9 .
3 4 .
4 9 .  
3 6 .
79%
1 4 9 .
1 1 1 .
Ill:
3 4 1 .  
2 2 9 .  
3 3 7 .  
2 6 3 .  
2 3 4 .  
1 9 2 .  
2X0. 
2 8 6 .  




























7 .  
1 5 .
21 .
8 .  



























1 0 9 1 1 1 .
1 2 0 9 9 6 .
1 4 0 2 3 3 .
1 5 1 5 4 3 .
1 7 8 8 6 3 .
9 1 3 7 5 .
9 1 0 7 7 .
8 2 7 8 0 .
9 1 2 5 0 .
9 4 1 0 8 .
1 0 Û 1 3 3 .
1 0 9 1 1 1 .
1 2 0 9 9 6 .
1 4 0 2 3 3 .
1 5 1 5 4 3 .
1 7 8 8 6 3 .
9 1 3 7 5 .
9 1 0 7 7 .
9 1 2  50% 
9 4 1 0 8 .  
1 0 0 1 3 3 .  
1 0 9 1 1 1 .  
1 2 0 9 9 6 .  
1 4 0 2 3 3 .  
1 5 1 5 4 3 .  
1 7 8 8 6 3 .  
-91-375.  
9 1 0 7 7 .  
8 2 7 8 0 .  
9 1 2 5 0 .  
9 4 1 0 8 .  
1 0 0 1 3 3 .  
1 0 9 1 1 1 .  
1 2 0 9 9 6 .  
1 4 - 0 2 3 3 .  
1 5 1 5 4 3 .  
1 7 8 8 6 3 .  
9 1 3 7 5 .  
9 1 0 7 7 .  
8 2 7 8 0 .  
9 1 2 5 0 .  
9 4 1 0 8 .
1 2 0 9 9 6 .
1 4 0 2 3 3 .
1 5 1 5 4 3 .
1 7 8 8 6 3 .
9 1 3 7 5 .
9 1 0 7 7 .
„82Z80 , .
9 1 2 5 0 .
9 4 1 0 8 .
1 0 0 1 3 3 .
1 0 9 1 1 1 .
1 2 0 9 9 6 .
1 9 9 5 0 .
2 0 8 0 0 .
2 2 0 2 6 .
2 3 8 0 3 .
2 7 6 9 9 .
2 2 5 5 0 .
2 6 0 0 0 .
2 3 0 0 0 .
2 4 1 5 0 .  
2 4 8 3 0 .  
2 8 1 6 0 .  
1 9 9 5 0 .  
2 0 8 0 0 .  
2 2 0 2 6 .  
2 3 8 0 3 .  
2 7 6 9 9 .  
2 2 5 5 0 .  
2 6 0 0 0 .  
2 3 0 0 0 .  
2 4 1 5 0 .  
2 4 8 3 0 .  
2 8 1 6 0 .  
1 9 9 5 0 .  
20  6 0 0 .  
2 2 0 2 6 .  
2 3 8 0 3 .  
2 7 6 9 9 .  
2 2 5 5 0 .  
2 6 0 0 0 .  
2 3 0 0 0 .  
2 4 1 5 0 .  
2 4 8 3 0 .  
2 8 1 6 0 .  
1 9 9 5 0 .  
2 0 8 0 0 .  
22 02 6-. 
2 3 8 0 3 .  
2 7 6 9 9 .  
2 2 5 5 0 .  
2 6 0 0 0 .  
2 3 0 0 0 .  
2 4 1 5 0 .  
2 4 8 3 0 .  
- 2 - 6 1 6 0 .  
1 9 9 5 0 .  
2 O 8 0 0 .  
2 2 0 2 6 .  
2 3 8 0 3 .  
2 7 6 9 9 .  
2 2 5 5 0 .  
2 6 0 0 0 .  
- 2300-0.  
2 4 1 5 0 .  
2 4 8 3 0 .  
2 8 1 6 0 .  
1 9 9 5 0 .  
2 0 8 ) 0 .
1 § ‘ ï : I t î l l : T l g g î :
5 8 7 0 . 1 9 7 1 3 . 1 7 . 3 . 1 7 8 8 6 3 . 2 7 6 9 9 .
Q DR K = ZERO
6 i 6 0 . 388 59 . 0 . 0 . 1 9 2 8 2 0 . 7 8 2 4 .
6 1 61 . 3 9 4 7 5 . 1 . 1 . 1 8 8 5 5 5 . 9 9 4 5 .
6 1 62 . 4 0 0 9 2 . i  . 1 . 1 9 0 4 4 6 . 7 8 5 0 .
6 1 6 3 . 409 8 7 . I j  _ - . - 0 .. _1 9 9 0 8  5 . ....1 1 8 9 2 .
n OR K = ZERO 
6 1 6 4 . 4 1 8 8 2 . 0 . 0 . 2 0 2 4 5 9 . 1 1 5 1 2 .
6 1 65 . 4 3 1 6 4 . 1 . 1 . 2 3 0 8 0 0 . 1 2 8 6 1 .
6 1 66 . 4 3 3 7 4 . 2 . 2 . 2 4 3 2 2 6 . 1 9 8 7 5 .
6 1 6 7 . 4 4 5 8 5 . 4 . 4 . 2 9 3 4 7 5 . 2 2 6 9 7 .
6 1 6 8 . 4 5 2 7 5 . 2 . 2 . 3 4 3 9 1 7 . 2 9 1 4 0 .
6 1 6 9 . 4 4 6 4 1 . 2 . 2 . 3 5 9 2 5 3 , 2 6 2 5 0 .
6 __ 1___ 7 0 . ____4 4 0 0 8 . 1 . 3 8 8 4 0 3 . 2 4 9 3 1 , .........
-----Q OR- K“'^Z'EF“Cr
1 9 2 8 2 0 . 7 8 2 4 .6 2 6 0 . 3 8 8 5 9 . 0 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO 
6 2 61 , 3 9 4 7 5 . 0 . 0 . 1 8 8 5 5 5 . 9 9 4 5 .
0 OR K = ZERO 
6 2 6 2 . 4 0 0 9 2 . 0 . 0 . 1 9 0 4 4 6 . 7 8 5 0 .
6 2 6 3 . 4 0 9 8 7 . 2 . 0 . 1 9 9 0 8 5 . 1 1 8 9 2 .
6 6 4 . .... 1^ . i N s ü o I
1 1 5 1 2 . .........
1 2 8 6 1 .
..... ..............- ....- —— — - —— ——
6 - 6 5 . 4 3 F 6 4 . T . 1 .
6 2 66 . 4 3 8 7 4 . 2 . 2 . 2 4 3 2 2 6 . 1 9 8 7 5 .
6 2 6 7 . 4 4 5 8 5 . 3 . 3 . 2 9 3 4 7 5 . 2 2 6 9 7 .
G UR K -  ZERO 3 4 3 9 1 7 . 2 9 1 4 0 .2 68 . 4 5 2 7 5 . 0 . 0 .
6 2 6 9 . 44641  « 1 . 1 . 3 5 9 2 5 3 . 2 6 2 5 0 .
6 2 7 0 . 4 4 0 0 8 . 1 . 0 . 3 8 8 4 0 3 . 2 4 9 3 1 .
0 OR K = ZERO
U # T 9 2 8 2 0 . ” 7 8 2 4 .
- . _____ _______________3 60 . - -  - 3 8359T cr.'
6 3 6 1 . 3 9 ^ 75 . 5 . 1 . 1 8 8 5 5 5 . 9 9 4 5 .
6 3 6 2 . 4U 092 . 5 . 0 . 1 9 0 4 4 6 . 7 8 5 0 .
6 3 63 . 4 3 9 8 7 . P. 0 . 1 9 9 0 8 5 . 1 1 8 9 2 .
6 3 6 4 . 4 1 8 8 2 . 3 . 2 . 2 0 2 4 5 9 . 1 1 5 1 2 .
0 ÜR K = ZERO 2 3 0 8 0 0 . 1 2 8 6 1 .6 3 6 5 . 4 3 1 6 4 . 0 . Cl.
6 3 6b . 4 3 8 7 4 . 11 . 4 . 2 4 3 2 2 6 .  2 9 3 4 7 5 .
_ __ . ___________  _____
6 “ 6 7 . 445 8 5 . T 4 . 1 4 .
6 3 6 f  . 4 5 2 7 5 . 6 . 3 . 3 4 3 9 1 7 . 2 9 1 4 0 .
6 3 6 9 . 4 4641  . 11 . 2 . 3 5 9 2 5 3 . 2 b 2 5 0 .
6 3 4 4 0 0 8 , 10 , 2 . 3 8 8 4 0 3 . 2 4 9 3 1 .
0 OR K = ZFRO 1 9 2 8 2 0 . 7 8 2 4 .6 4 6 0 . 3 6 8 5 9 . 0 . 0 .
6 4 61 . 3 9 4 7 5 . 'T # 4 . 1 8 8 5 5 5 . 0 9 4 5 .
0 OR K = ZERO 0.“  “ 19(14% . 7 8 5 0 .
_ _ ___  __  _______
4 "677"' 4 0 0 9 2 . 0 .
6 4 6 3 . 4 0 9 8 7 . 4 . 0 . 1 9 9 0 8 5 . 1 1 8 9 2 .
6 4 6 4 . 4 1 8 8 2 . 14 . 9 . 2 0 2 4 5 9 . 1 1 5 1 2 .
6 4 6 5 . 4 3 1 6 4 . 9 . 6 . 2 3 0 8 0 0 . 1 2 8 6 1 .— ^ ------- -667“ “ 4 3 8 7 4 . I I . 5 . 2 4 3 2 2 6 . 1 9 8 7 5 .
6 4 6 7 . 4 4 5 3 5 . 2 2 . 1 5 . 2 9 3 4 7 5 . 2 2 6 9 7 .
6 4 6 8 . 4 5 2 7 5 . 4 6 . 3 0 . 3 4 3 9 1 7 . 2 9 1 4 0 .
6 4 6 9 . 4 4 6 4 1 . 4 2 . 4 1 . -6 4 7Ü'.“' 4 4 0 0 8 . ZTT. v ;  “
6 5 6 0 . 3 8 8 5 9 . 1 4 0 . 4 4 . 1 9 2 8 2 0 . 7 8 2 4 .
6 5 61 . 3 9 4 7 5 . 1 3 4 . 4 6 . 1 8 8 5 5 5 . 9 9 4 5 .
6 5 6 2 . 4 0 0 9 2 . 1 3 7 . 6 6 . 1 9 0 4 4 6 . 7 8 5 0 .

















7 0 .  
6 0 .
4 3 8 7 4 .  
-  4 4 5  85 .-  
4 5 2 7 5 .  
4 4 6 4 1 .  
4 4 0 0 8 .  
3 8 8 5 9 .
2 0 9 .
3 1 5 .
3 0 5 .
3 4 2 .
3 1 9 .
5 9 .  -
3 8 .
1 4 7 .
7 3 .
1 5 3 .
4 4 .
_ -19-. -
2 4 3 2 2 6 .
2 9 3 4 7 5 .
3 4 3 9 1 7 .
3 5 9 2 5 3 .
3 8 8 4 0 3 .
1 9 8 7 5 .  
2 2 6 9 7 .  
2 9 1 4 0 .  
2 6 2 5 0 .  
2 4 9 3 1 .  
-......7 8 2 4 .
6 6 6 1. 3 9 4 7 5 . 7 5 . 1 4 . 1 8 8 5 5 5 1 9 9 4 5  .
6 6 62 . 4 0 0 9 2 . 8 0 . A. 1 9 0 4 4 6 . 7 8 5 0 .
6 6 6 3 . 4 0 9 8 7 . 8 4 . 0 . 1 9 9 0 8 5 . 1 1 8 9 2 .
h 6 64  . ___ 4 1 8 8 2 . 1 1 3 . 1 7 . 2 0 2 4 5 9 . 1 1 5 1 2 .
6 6 6 5 . 4 3 1 6 4 . 1 9 1 . 1 5 . 2 3 0 8 0 0 . 1 2 P 6 1 .
6 6 6b . 4 3 8 7 4 . 2 3 4 . 2 8 . 2 4 3 2 2 6 . 1 9 8 7 5 .
6 6 6 7 , 4 4 5 8 5 . 2 8 8 . 5 0 . 2 9 3 4 7 5 . 2 2 6 9 7 .
6 6 6 8 . 4 5 2 7 5 .  . 2 8 2  .. - ___2^ ..... 3 4 3 9 1 7 . - 2 9 -1 4 0 .
6 6 6 9 . 4 4 6 4 1 . 3 3 2 . 3 6 . 3 5 9 2 5 3 . 2 6 2  5 0 .
6 6 7 0 . 4 4 0 0 8 . 3 9 5 . 4 7 . 3 8 8 4 0 3 . 2 4 9 3 1 .
6 7 6 0 . 3 6 8 5 9 . 5 2 0 . 1 7 5 . 1 9 2 8 2 0 . 7 8 2 4 .
...........  _ _ 6 7 - ... 3 9 4  7 5 . 5 5 0 . 1 4 8 . 1 8 8 5 5 5 . 9 9 4 5 .
h 7 6 2 . 4 0 0 9 2 . 6 3 2 . 1 1 1 . 1 9 0 4 4 6 , 7 8 5 0 .
6 7 6 3 , 4 0 9 8 7 . 5 5 1 . 0 . 1 9 9 0 3 5 . 1 1 8 9 2 .
6 7 6 4 . 4 1 8 8 2 . 5 7 6 . 8 7 . 2 0 2 4 5 9 . 1 1 5 1 2 .
h 7 6 5 . 4 3 1 6 4 . 7 3 0 . . - .......... -9 0 .^ - -  z a o  a û o .  - ......1 2 6 6 1 .
6 7 6 6 . 4 3 8 7 4 . 5 8 6 . 5 6 . 2 4 3 2 2 6 . 1 9 8 7 5 .
6 7 6 7 . 4 4 5  8 5 . 6 9 7 . 1 4 6 . 2 9 3 4 7 5 . 2 2 6 9 7 .
6 7 6 8 . 4 5 2 7 5 . 5 6 3 . 1 2 3 . 3 4 3 9 1 7 . 2 9 1 4 0 .
_6 7 6 9 . . - - 4 -4 6 4 1 . - 7 0 8 . 1 7 0 . 3 5 9 2 5 3 . 2 6 2 5 0 .
6 7 7 0 . 4 4 0 0 8 . 8 0 1 . 5 8 . 3 8 8 4 0 3 . 2 4 9 3 1 .
b d 6 0 . 3 8 8 5 9 . 1 2 9 . 1 1 . 192  8 2 0 . 7 8 2 4 .
6 8 6 1 . 3 9 4 7 5 . 9 0 . 1 2 . 1 8 8 5 5 5 . 9 9 4 5 .
6 a 6 2 . 4 0 0 9 2 . ___9 ._ - 1-9JÜ4-46..- . 7 -850 .
6 8 6 3 . 4 0 P 8 7 . 7 4 . 0 . 1 9 9 0 8 5 . 1 1 8 9 2 .
6 8 6 4 . 4 1 8 8 2 . 1 4 5 . 5 6 . 2 0 2 4 5 9 . 1 1 5 1 2 .
6 A 6 5 . 4 3 1 6 4 . 1 1 0 . 2 . 2 3 0 8 0 0 . 1 2 8 6 1 .
6 8 -  4 3 1 7 -4 ......... 1 1 2 . 4 6 . 2 4 3 2 2 6 . 1 9 8 7 5 .
6 8 67% 4 4 5 8 5 . 6 5 . 3 0 . 2 9 3 4 7 5 . 2 2 6 9 7 .
6 8 68 . 4 5 2 7 5 . 7 8 . 3 3 . 3 4 3 9 1 7 . 2 9 1 4 0 .
6 8 6 9 . 4 4 6 4 1 . 7 0 . 5 1 . 3 5 9 2 5 3 . 2 6 2 5 0 .
6 A 7 0 . .....4 4 0 0 8 ._____ __ 8 1 .- 3 3 8 4 0 3 . ... -2-4931-.------- 7 1 6 0 . 6 1 6 9 7 . 4 . 4 . 1 9 7 0 3 8 . 2 2 8 5 0 .
7 1 6 1 . 6 3 0 7 5 . 7 . 7 . 2 4 5 5 8 2 . 3 0 5 5 0 .
7 1 6 2 . 6 4 4 5 3 . 5 . 5 . 2 5 9 9 6 0 . 3 3 9 2 7 .
7 1 ...  6 3 . 6 6 7 5 0 . 4 , 4 . 2 5 7 6 6 4 . 3 2 9 5 8 .
1 6 4 . 6 9 0 4 7 . 7 . 7 . 2 9 7 3 1 5 . 3 7 9 0 0 .
7 1 6 5 . 7 1 8 6 8 . 7 . 7 . 3 1 7 4 9 5 . 4 2 0 7 0 .
7 1 6 6 . 7 6 6 8 8 , 6 . 5 . 3 7 0 0 7 6 . 5 1 6 7 5 .
7 1 6 7 . 8 1 5 0 8 . 7ju_ 5 . -  4 0 4 5 3 0 ._ ___6 3 -0 0 0 .
■■"sr. S 37E T . ' ‘ 9 . ' 8  .“ 4 7 3 3 7 2 . 7 3 8 0 0 .
7 1 6 9 . 7 9 1 2 7 . 4 . 3 . 5 4 6 0 2 5 . 8 3 9 5 7 .
7 1 7 0 . 7 4 4 7 0 . 5 . 3 . 6 8 4 7 8 0 . 8 6 6 0 3 .
7 2 6 0 , 6 1 6 9 7 , ____7 . 6 . 1 9 7 0 3 8 . 2 2 8 5 0 .
7 2 6 1 . 6 3 0  7 5 . 6 . 4 . 2 4 5 5 8 2 . 3 0 5 5 0 .
7 2 6 2 . 6 4 4 5 3 . 3 . 0 . 2 5 9 9 6 0 . 3 3 9 2 7 .
7 2 6 3 . 6 67 5 0 . 9 . 7 . 2 5 7 6 6 4 . 3 2 9 5 8 .
7 _______ 2 _____ 6 4 . 6-9047-. -...11-. - - 2-923-15 . 3-7-900.
7 2 6 5 . 7 1 8 6 8 . 1 1 . 7 . 3 1 7 4 9 5 . 4 2 0 7 0 .
7 2 6 6 . 7 6 6 8 8 . 2 2 . 7 . 3 7 0 0 7 6 . 5 1 6 7 5 .
7 2 6 7 . 8 1 5 0 8 . 2 7 . 1 4 . 4 0 4 5 2 0 . 6 3 0 0 0 .
7 2 6 8 . ___ 8 3 7 8 5 . 2 0 . 1 1 . 4 7 3 3 7 2 . 7 3 8 0 0 .
7 2 6 9 . 7 9 1 2 7 . 3 1 . 1 4 . 5 4 6 0 2 5 . 3 3 9 5 7 ,
iS-GO-
------- ---- ....... 7 ............. 2 7 0 . 7 4 4 7 0 .
7 3 6 0 . 6 1 6 9 7 .
7 3 6 1 . 6 3 0 7 5 .
7 3 .......  ^.62»____ 64453_.
7 3 63 . 6 6 7 5 0 .
7 3 6 4 . 6 9 0 4 7 .
7 3 6 5 . 7 1 8 6 8 .
___________ _7____ ____ _ 3 66 « 7 6 6 8 8 .
6 7 . 8 1 5 0 8 .
7 3 68 . 8 3 7 8 5 .
7 3 6 9 . 7 9 1 2 7 .
7 3 7 0 .  . 7 4 4 7 0 .
7 4 6 0 . 6 1 6 9 7 .
7 4 6 l . 6 3 0 7 5 .
7 4 6 2 . 6 4 4 5 3 .
7 4 6 3 .  .. 6 6 7 ^ .
4 6 4 . ^ 9 0 4 7 .
7 4 6 5 . 7 1 8 6 8 .
7 4 6 6 . 7 6 6 8 8 .
7 4 _6 7 . ___ - 8 1 5 0 8 ,
7 4 6 8 . 8 3 7 8 5 .
7 4 6 9 . 7 9 1 2 7 .
7 6 7 0 . 7 4 4 7 0 .
7 5 _______ 6 0 , _____ 6 1 6 9 7 .
■ ■ ...............7  " - 5 63ÎT 75 .
7 5 62% 6 4 4 5 3 .
7 5 6 3 . 6 6 7 5 0 .
7 5 64 . 6 9 0 4 7 .
7 5 ------  6 5 . 7 1 3 6 8 .
7 5 6 6 . 7 6 6 8 8 .
7 5 6 7 . 8 1 5 0 8 .
7 5 .6 8 , .  _ 8 3 7 8 5 .
7 ? T 2 7 ;r 5 6 9 .
7 5 7 0 . 7 4 4 7 0 .
7 6 60 . 6 1 6 9 7 .
_ 7 6 6 1 , 6 3 0 7 5 ,
‘ 6 6 2 . 6 4 4 5 3 .
7 6 6 3 . 6 6 7 5 0 .
7 6 6 4 . 6 9 0 4 7 .
7 6 6 5 . -  -................... ....7------------ 6' 5 6 . 7 6 6 8 8 .
7 6 6 7 . 8 1 5 0 8 .
7 6 6 8 . 8 3 7 8 5 .
...7____ ____ 6 6 9 , 7 9 1 2 7 ,
6 7 0 . 7 4 4 7 0 .
7 7 6 0 . 6 1 6 9 7 .
7 7 6 1 . 6 3 0 7 5 .
7 7 6 2 . 6 4 4 5 3 .
7 ... . " .... 7 6 3 . 6 6 f 5 ü .
7 7 6 4 . 6 9 0 4 7 .
7 7 6 5 . 7 1 8 6 3 .
7 ..... 7 ^ 6 6 . 7 6 6 8 8 .------------------7 ---------- 6T . -------- 8 1 5 0 8 .
7 7 6 8 . 8 3 7 8 5 .
7 7 6 9 . 7 9 1 2 7 .
7 7 7 0 .  ... _ 7 4 4 7 0 .
■ 7 ------------- ' g- 6 0 . 6 1 6 9 7 .
7 3 6 1 . 6 3 0 7 5 .
7 8 6 2 . 6 4 4 5 3 .
7 8 6 3 , _____ 6 6 7 5 0 .










1 2 0 . 
2 9 .  
4 1 .  
2 8 .  
S3 ,  
T f ) . '  
1 7 2 .  
2 1 9 .  
2 8 8 .  
3 0 0 .  
2 9 7 .  
3 1 0 .  
3 6 1 .  
35T . 
3 9 4 .  
5 0 0 .  
4 9 4 .  
5 0 4 .  
5 5 0 .  
6 8 7 .  
8 3 9 .
—9 7 3 7
1 2 0 5 .
1 2 1 .
l l k
2 7 8 .  
4 5 1 .  
4 6 6 .  
~ 6 7 2 V  
7 3 7 .  
8 5 4 .  
8 7 3 .  
1 2 3 9 .  
1 2 5 6 .  
12 9 8 .  
1 4 0 4 .  
T 3 5 4 V  
1 5 0 2 .  
1 1 9 7 .  
1 6 1 6 .  
1 7 7 7 .  
2 0 2 7 .  
1 7 4 3 .  
1 6 3 2 .  
-T T 9 V  
1 8 6 .  
1 7 6 .  
2 3 1 .  
2 0 2 .
1 0 . 6 8 4 7 8 0 . 8 6 6 0 3 .
1 0 . 1 9 7 0 3 8 . 2 2 8 5 0 .
1 9 . 2 4 5 5 8 2 . 3 0 5 5 0 .
1 5 , 2 5 9 9 6 0 . 3 392  7 .
2 3 . 2 5 7 6 6 4 . 3 2 9 5 8 .
1 7 . 2 9 7 3 1 5 . 3 7 9 0 0 .
1 6 . 3 1 7 4 9 5 . 4 2 0 7 0 .
8 . 3 7 0 0 7 6 , ___ 51 6 7 5 -.-  „
' 2 1 . 4 0 4 5 2 0 . 6 3 0 ) 0 .
3 0 . 4 7 3 3 7 2 . 7 3 8 0 0 .
2 0 . 5 4 6 0 2 5 . 8 3 9 5 7 .
2 1 . 6 8 4 7 8 0 . 8 6 6 0 3 .
2 7 . 1 9 7 0 3 8 . 2 2 8 5 0 .
4 2 . 2 4 5 5 8 2 . 3 0 5 5 0 .
2 8 . 2 5 9 9 6 0 . 3 3 9 2 7 .
72_. 2 5 7 6 6 4 , 3_295A._
1 1 1 . 2 9 7 3 1 5 . 3 7 9 0 0 .
1 4 4 . 3 1 7 4 9 5 . 4 2 0 7 0 .
1 4 5 . 3 7 0 0 7 6 . 5 1 6 7 5 .
1 7 8 . 4 0 4 5 2 0 . 6 3 0 0 0 .
2 0 1 . 4 7 3 3 7 2 . 7 3 8 0 0 .
1 9 2 . 5 4 6 0 2 5 . 8 3 9 5 7 .
7 9 . 6 8 4 7 8 0 . 8 6 6 0 3 .
1 6 4 . 1 9 7 0 3 8 , 2 2 8  5 0 ,
1 4 1 . 2 4 5 5  82 . 3 0 5 5 0 .
1 0 1 . 2 5 9 9 6 0 , 3 3 9 2 7 .
1 7 1 . 2 5 7 6 6 4 . 3 2 9 5 8 .
1 1 0 . 2 9 7 3 1 5 . 3 7 9 0 0 .
1 8 3 . 3 1 7 4 9 5 . 4 2 0 7 0 .
1 1 1 . 3 7 0 0 7 6 . 5 1 6 7 5 .
1 7 1 . 4 0 4 5 2 0 . 6 3 0 0 0 .
2 7 6 . 4 7 3 3 7 2 . 7 3 8 0 0 ,
1 4 9 . - 5 4 6 ü  2 5 r  ■" 8 3^5^7.
1 4 7 . 6 8 4 7 6 0 . 8 6 6 0 3 .
3 3 . 1 9 7 0 3 8 . 2 2 8 5 0 .
5 7 . 2 4 5 5 8 2 . 3 0 5 5 0 .
3 9 . 2 5 9 9 6 0 . 3 3 9 2 7 .
66  . 2 5 7 6 6 4 . 3 2 9 5 8 .
7 8 . 2 9 7 3 1 5 . 3 7 9 0 0 .
1 1 5 , 3 1 7 4 9 5 , 42.Q70
1 1 0 . 3 7 0 0 7 6 . 5 1 6 7 5 .
1 0 2 . 4 0 4 5 2 0 . 6 3 0 0 0 .
1 6 6 . 4 7 3 3 7 2 . 7 3 8 u O .
12 5 . 5 4 6 0 2 5 . 8 395  7 .
1 2 6 . 6 8 4 7 8 0 . 8 6 6 0 3 .
2 3 5 . 1 9 7 0 3 8 . 2 2 8 5 0 .
3 4 2 . 2 4 5 5 8 2 . 3 0 5 5 0 .
2 3 0 . 2 5 9 9 6 0 . 3 3 9 2 7 .24 r . - 2 57  66  4 . - 3 2 9 5 8 . -
1 4 7 . 2 9 7 3 1 5 . 3 7 9 0 0 .
2 3 1 . 3 1 7 4 9 5 . 4 2 0 7 0 .
2 6 6 . 3 7 0 0 7 6 . 5 1 6 7 5 .
3 8 1 . 4 0 4 5 2 0 . 6 3 0 0 0 .
5 0 4 . 4 7 3 3 7 2 . 7 3 8 0 0 .
2 1 4 . 5 4 6 0 2 5 . 8 3 9 5 7 .
1 2 8 . 6 8 4 7 8 0 . 8 6 6 0 3 .
T 4 . - - 2X 850 ,.
3 8 . 2 4 5 5 8 2 . 30  550, ,
5 2 . 2 5 9 9 6 0 . 3 3 9 27 . .
5 8 . 2 5 7 6 6 4 . 3 2958 , ,







0 OR K = ZERO
0 OR K = 
8 
8
0 OR K = 
fi 
8









6 7 . 8 1 5 0 8 . 2 8 0 . 6 0 .
68.0 8 3 7 8 5 . 2 7 5 . 9 8 .
6 9 . 7 9 1 2 7 . 2 7 8 . 4 1 .
7 0 . 7 4 4 7 0 . 2 2 7 . 4 6 .
6Ü*_ . . 1.7_4L9*_ - ---------Û»
6 1 .
6 2 .
1 7 4 8 3 .





0 OR K = 











1 7 9 7 7 .













1 9 7 2 8 .
2 0 8 4 3 .
2 0 9 4 9 .
L 9 8 7 5 .
1 8 8 0 2 .
1 7 4 1 9 .






0 OR K ZERO
8 2
8 2
. . .  0 QR K ..-  ZERO.
8 2
0 OR K = ZERO
8 2
. 0. _0&_X =._Z£RQ
8 2
0 OR K = ZERO
8 2
.  Q .OR K = ZERO
8 2







1 7 5 4 8 .
1 7 9 7 7 .
18 4 0 7 .










1 9 7 2 8 .
2 0 8 4 3 .
2 0 9 4 9 .
1 9 8 7 5 .







































60  .  
6 1 .  
6 2 .
1 7 4 1 9 .
1 7 4 8 3 .
1 7 5 4 8 .
1 7 9 7 3 .
1 8 4 0 7 .
1 8 6 1 3 .
1 9 7 2 8 .
2 0 8 4 3 .
2 0 9 4 9 .
1 9 8 7 5 .
1 8 8 0 2 .
1 7 4 1 9 .
1 7 4 6 3 .







3 .  
2 . 
2 .






4 6 4 .
L 1 'i 1 1 •
1 8 4 0 7 .
8 4 6 5 . 1 8 6 1 3 .
8 4 6 6 . 1 9 7 2 8 .
_8...... ..... 5-7-. _2û-8.43.

















































I f ? ? ? :
4 0 4 5 2 0 . 6 3 0 0 0 .
4 7 3 3 7 2 . 7 3 8 0 0 .
5 4 6 0 2 5 . 8 3 9 5 7 .
6 8 4 7 8 0 . 8 6 6 0 3 .
___ 6 4 5 7 3 * __ ......... —  0 .
6 4 6 3 0 . 1 5 7 8 7 .
7 4 3 8 7 . 1 3 9 9 9 .
7 3 0 0 0 . 1 3 6 3 8 .
8 5 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 0 0 .
____ -9 5 3 9 1 .__ - 1 7 X 1 2 *
9 6 3 6 3 . 1 8 4 9 9 .
1 2 4 0 5 5 . 2 1 1 4 2 .
1 2 7 0 5 9 . 2 2 2 7 4 .
1 3 0 3 2 2 . 2 3 1 4 8 .
1 4 3 8 4 2 . 2 4 7 6 5 .
6 4 5 7 3 . 0 .
. 6 4 6 3 0 * .- —1 5-78X.-
7 4 3 8 7 . 1 3 9 9 9 .
73 0 0 0 . 1 3 6 3 8 .
8 5 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 0 0 .
9 5 3 9 1 . 1 7 1 1 2 .
9 6 3 6 3 . 1 8 4 9 9 .
1 2 4 0 5 5 . 2 1 1 4 2 .
1 2 7 0 5 9 . 2 2 2 7 4 .
1 3 0 3 2 2 . 2 3 1 4 8 .
1 4 3 -8 4 2 . .. _ _ 2 4 7 6 5 .
6 4 5 7 3 . 0 .
6 4 6 3 0 . 1 5 7 8 7 .
7 4 3 8 7 . 1 3 9 9 9 .
7 3 0 0 0 . 1 3 6 3 8 .
8 5 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 0 0 .
9 5 3 9 1 . 1 7 1 1 2 .
9 6 3 6 3 . 1 8 4 9 9 .
___1-24(15-5. - 21X 42-.
1 2 7 0 5 9 . 2 2 2 7 4 .
1 3 0 3 2 2 . 2 3 1 4 8 .
1 4 3 8 4 2 . 2 4 7 6 5 .
6 4 5 7 3 . 0 .
6 4 6 3 0 . 1 5 7 8 7 .
7 4 3 8 7 . 1 3 9 9 9 .
7 3 0 0 0 . X X 6 -ia ..
8 5 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 0 0 .
9 5 3 9 1 . 1 7 1 1 2 .
9 6 3 6 3 . 1 8 4 9 9 .
1 2 4 0 5 5 . 2 1 1 4 2 *










































































7 0 .  





































6 7 ._6 8 .
6 9 .
7 0 .
1 7 4 1 9 .
1 7 9 7 7 .
1 8 4 0 7 .
1 8 6 1 3 .
'U rrT 5 V ~
2 0 8 4 3 .
2 0 9 4 9 .
1 9 3 7 5 .
1 8 8 0 2 .
1 7 4 1 9 .
1 7 4 8 3 .
1 8 4 0 7 .
1 8 6 1 3 .
i m ï î l
2 0 9 4 9 .
1 9 3 7 5 .
1 7 4 8 3 .
1 7 5 4 8 .
VnWrl
1 3 6 1 3 .
1 9 7 2 8 .
2 0 8 4 3 .
'2094PT;
1 9 8 7 5 .
18 3 0 2 .  
1 7 4 1 9 .  
1748  3 .  
1 7 5 4 8 .  
1 7 9 7 7 .  
1 8 4 0 7 .  
m e i T .  
1 9 7 2 8 .  
2 0 8 4 3 .  
2 0 9 4 9 .  
1 9 0 7 5 .  
1 8 3 0 2 .
1 2 .
81 .







1 0 3 .




— 2 3 T  







3 0 6 .
2 7 0 .
H I :
1 2 2 .
1 3 6 .
1 6 1 .
2 2 7 T
2 3 0 .










OR K = 
9
ZERO




1 6 1 . 3 7 8 9 9 . 0 .
Q 1 6 2 . 3 9 7 4 1 . 1 .
9 1 6 3 . 4 1 7 2 9 . 1 .
9 6 4 .  ' 4 3 7 1 7 . 3 .
9 1 6 5 . 5 3 5 4 4 . 1 .
OR K = 
9
ZERO
6 6 . 5 4 9 3 6 . 0 .
'2T-...... "9 % 6 7 . 56T29^
9 1 6 8 . 5 8 6 0 4 . 1 .
9 1 6 9 . 5 3 3 5 9 . 1 .
9 1 7 0 . 4 8 1 1 4 . . 1 .
........  9 ' 6 0 . ------ 3 6 0 5 8 .' 2 .
l i m :
1 0 . 6 4 5 7 3 .
1 1 . 6 4 6 3 0 .
2 1 . 7 4 3 8 7 .
1 9 . 7 3 0 0 0 .
2 1 . 8 5 0 0 0 .
__1_8. 9 5 3 9 1 .
9 6 3 6 3 .
16 l 1 2 4 0 5 5 .
1 3 . 1 2 7 0 5 9 .
2 1 . 1 3 0 3 2 2 .
2 4 . 1 4 3 8 4 2 .
4 . 6 4 5 7 3 .
5 . 6 4 6 3 0 .
3 , 7 4 3 8 7 .
- - "5 .  ' 7 3 0 0 0 .
5 . 8 5 0 0 0 .
9 . 9 5 3 9 1 .
5 . 9 6 3 6 3 .
8 . 1 2 4 0 5 5 .
5 . 1 2 7 0 5 9 .
1 3 . 1 3 0 3 2 2 .
6 , 143842.^
4 4 . 6 4 5 7 3 .
4 3 . 6 4 6 3 0 .
4 3 . 7 4 3 8 7 .
4 0 . 7 3 0 0 0 .
8 8 . 8 5 0 0 0 .
6 7 . 9 5 3 9 1 .
4 7 . 9 6 3 6 3 .
2 3 . 1 2 4 0 5 5 .
?-4. T 2 7 0 5 9 .
2 8 . 1 3 0 3 2 2 .
3 5 . 1 4 3 8 4 2 .
7 . 6 4 5 7 3 .
5 . 6 4 6 3 0 .
4 . 7 4 3 8 7 .
11 . 7 3 0 0 0 .
1 6 . 8 5 0 0 0 ,
I T . 9 5 3 9 1 .
5 . 9 6 3 6 3 .
4 . 1 2 4 0 5 5 .
3 . 1 2 7 0 5 9 .
2 . 1 3 0 3 2 2 .
6 . 1 4 3 8 4 2 .
0 . 9 7 4 3 4 .
0 . 1 0 9 3 6 2 .
1 . 1 2 3 3 2 1 .
0 . 1 4 5 1 7 1 .
3 . 1 5 7 7 4 5 .
1 . 1 6 5 5 0 7 .
0 . 2 1 9 4 8 8 ,
"  1 .  ' 2 6 3 7 9 0 .
0 . 3 0 5 0 2 3 .
1 . 3 3 6 4 3 1 .
1 . 3 6 5 0 2 1 .
0 . 9 7 4 3 4 .
i m :
0 .
1 5 7 3 7 .
1 3 9 9 9 .  
1 3 6 3 8 .
1 4 0 0 0 .
-illi-l:
2 1 1 4 2 .
2 2 2 7 4 .
2 3 1 4 8 .
2 4 7 6 5 .
0 .
1 5 7 8 7 .
iilll:-
1 4 0 0 0 .  
1 7 1 1 2 .  
1 8 4 9 9 .  
2 1 1 4 2 .  
2 2 2 7 4 .  
2 3 1 4 8 .  
2 4 7 6 3 .  
0 .
1 5 7 8 7 .
1 3 9 9 9 .  
1 3 6 3 8 .
1 4 0 0 0 .  
1 7 1 1 2 .  
1 8 4 9 9 .Mlfi:
2 3 1 4 3 .
2 4 7 6 5 .
0 .
1 5 7 8 7 .
1 3 9 9 9 .
1 3 6 3 8 .
ÈV
1 8 4 9 9 .
2 1 1 4 2 .
2 2 2 7 4 .
2 3 1 4 8 .
2 4 7 6 5 .
1 0 1 5 0 .
1 2 8 4 2 .
1 6 4 3 4 .
1 9 8 0 8 .
2 0 7 0 3 .
1 1 9 0 0 .
1 5 9 6 9 ,
1 6 3 5 D .
1 8 2 0 0 .
1 6 1 7 5 .
1 4 8 6 2 .



















6 3 .  
_____64 s
6 5 .
6 6 .  
6 7 .
4 1 7 2 9 .
4 3 7 1 7 .
5 3 5 4 4 .
5 4 9 3 6 .





. .  ________
9 2 6 8 . 5 3 6 0 4 . 2 .
9 ? 6 9 . 5 3 3 5 9 . 1 .
9 2 7 0 . 4 3 1 1 4 . 6 .
9 . 1 _ ..........................6.Q . __________ 3 6 0 5 8 . 4 #
9 3 6 1 . 3 7 8 9 9 . 9 .
9 3 62 . 3 9 7 4 1 . 7 .
9 3 6 3 . 4 1 7 2 9 . 5 .
9 3 6 4 .  _ 43.7.17.  ................. 15..  _
9 3 6 5 . 5 3 5 4 4 . 1 0 .
9 3 6 6 . 5 4 9 3 5 . 7 .
9 3 6 7 . 563  2 9 . 2 .■a
—  --------------- 6 8~.— — 5,860,4 . ..................................5 .
9 3 6 9 . 5 3 3 5 9 . 6 .
9 3 7 0 . 4 8 1 1 4 . 9 .
0 OR K = ZERO
9 4 6 0 . 3 6 0 5 8 .  .................
9 4 6 1 . 3 7 8 9 9 . “  1 .
9 4 6 2 . 3 9 7 4 1 . 4 .
9 4 6 3 . 4 1 7 2 9 . 5 .o 4 A4. 4 3 7 1 7 . 1 7 .
9 4 6 5 . 5 3 5 4 4 . 2 8 .
9 4 6 6 . 5 4 9 3 6 . 6 2 .
9 4 6 7 . 5 6 3 2 9 . 3 2 .
9 4 6 8 . 5 8 6 0 4 . 4 8 .
9 4 6 9 . 5 3 3 5 9 . 8 2 .
9 4 7 0 . 4 8 1 1 4 . 1 0 6 .
9 5 6 0 . 3 6 0 5 8 . 1 2 0 .
9 5 6 1 . 3JS_9_9. - 2 1 9 .
9 5 6 2 . 3 9 7 4 1 , 2 0 8 .
9 K 6 3 . 4 1 7 2 9 . 2 3 7 .
9 5 64 . 4 3 7 1 7 . 2 3 8 .
9 5 6 5 . 5 3 5 4 4 . 2 6 7 ......
9 5 66 . 5 4 9 3 6 , 2 0 9 ,
9 5 6 7 . 5 6 3 2 9 . 2 1 4 .
9 5 68 . 5 8 6 0 4 . 2 0 9 .
9 _ .  5 . ..........- ____________6,9-.-------------------- 5,3 35,9. 2 3 2 .
9 7 0 . 4 8 1 1 4 . 2 9 5 .
9 6 6 0 . 3 6 0 5 8 . 1 3 4 .
9 6 6 1 . 3 7 8 9 9 . 1 3 7 .
9 6 62 . 3 9 7 4 1 , -  1-51.
9 6 6 3 . 4 1 7 2 9 . 11^8.
9 6 6 4 . 4 3 7 1 7 . 2 1 8 .
9 A 6 5 . 5 3 5 4 4 . 2 5 7 .
9 6 _  _ 6 6 . 549,3,6._ , 2 8 0 .
9 6 6 7 . 5 6 3 2 9 . 2 8 2 .
9 6 6 8 . 5 8 6 0 4 . 4 0 6 .
9 6 6 9 . 5 3 3 5 9 . 4 4 1 .
9 A 7 0 . 4-8.1.14..-.. _.. 4 4 3 . ...
9 7 6 0 . 3 6 0 5 8 . 4 8 6 .
9 7 6 1 . 3 7 8 9 9 . 4 3 2 .
9 7 6 2 . 3 9 7 4 1 . 5 4 2 .
9 - 63 . - 4 1 7 2 9 . , ........ 4,77 .
9 7 64* 4 3 7 1 7 . 4 5 2 ,
g ;
0 . 1 4 5 1 7 1 . 1 9 8 0 8 .
1 . 1 5 7 7 4 5 . 2 0 7 0 3 .
1 . 1 6 5 5 0 7 . 1 1 9 0 0 .
0 . 2 1 9 4 8 8 . 1 5 9 6 9 .
4u.,,- _-2A379D.__ ,^ 15350 .» -
2 . 3 0 5 0 2 3 . 1 8 2 0 0 .
0 . 3 3 6 4 3 1 . 1 6 1 7 5 .
5 . 3 6 5 0 2 1 . 1 4 8 6 2 .
0 . 9 7 4 3 4 . 1 0 1 5 0 .
5 . 1 0 9 3 6 2 . 1 2 8 4 2 .
3 . 1 2 3 8 2 1 . 1 6 4 3 4 .
0 . 1 4 5 1 7 1 . 1 9 8 0 8 .
1 5 7 7 ,4 5 ., - ,Z Q 7 0 3 .-
2 . 1 6 5 5 0 7 . 1 1 9 0 0 .
5 . 2 1 9 4 8 8 . 1 5 9 6 9 .
1 . 2 6 3 7 9 0 . 1 6 3 5 0 .
2 . 3 0 5 0 2 3 . 1 8 2 0 0 .
5 . 3 3 6 4 3 1 . 1 6 1 7 5 .
5 . 3 6 5 0 2 1 . 1 4 8 6 2 .
, 9 7 4 3 4 . -  1 0 1 5 0 . -
1 . 1 0 9 3 6 2 . 1 2 8 4 2 .
4 . 1 2 3 8 2 1 . 1 6 4 3 4 .
0 . 1 4 5 1 7 1 . 1 9 8 0 8 .
1 5 . 1 5 7 7 4 5 . 2 0 7 0 3 .
2 8 . 1 6 5 5 0 7 . 1 1 9 0 0 .
5 8 . 2 1 9 4 8 8 . 1 5 9 6 9 .
3 2 . 2 6 3 7 9 0 . 1 6 3 5 0 .
- 4 7 .__ , 3 Û5Q23 .  -- - 1 8 2 0 0 ,.
7 5 . 3 3 6 4 3 1 . 1 6 1 7 5 .
9 8 . 3 6 5 0 2 1 . 1 4 8 6 2 .
0 . 9 7 4 3 4 . 1 0 1 5 0 .
2 9 . 1 0 9 3 6 2 . 1 2 8 4 2 .
3 1 . 1 2 3 8 2 1 . 1 6 4 3 4 .
0 . 1 4 5 1 7 1 . 1 9 8 0 8 .
3 3 . 1 5 7 7 4 5 . 2 0 7 0 3 .
,_ 7 7 . - 1 6 5 -5 0 7 ._ , „ 1 1 9 0 Ü . ,
2 1 9 4 8 8 . 1 5 9 6 9 .
SB. 2 6 3 7 9 0 . 1 6 3 5 0 .
8 1 . 3 0 5 0 2 3 . 1 8 2 3 0 .
7 2 . 3 3 6 4 3 1 . 1 6 1 7 5 .
7 9 . 3 6 5 0 2 1 . 1 4 8 6 2 .
0 . 9 7 4 3 4 . 1 0 1 5 0 .
6 . 1 0 9 3 6 2 . 1 2 8 4 2 .
I L . , __l2 ,i5 ,2 ,l,.__ __ L6.434 . ,
0 . 1 4 5 1 7 1 . 1 9 8 0 8 .
3 0 . 1 5 7 7 4 5 . 2 0 7 0 3 .
3 6 . 1 6 5 5 0 7 . 1 1 9 0 0 .
3 9 . 2 1 9 4 8 8 . 1 5 9 6 9 .
4 2 . 2 6 3 7 9 0 . 1 6 3 5 0 .
5 0 . 3 0 5 0 2 3 . 1 8 2 0 0 .
4 1 . 3 3 6 4 3 1 . 1 6 1 7 5 .
- 4 1 .  - , „36.5 Û Z 1._ - ___L 4 8 6 2 .-
0 . 9 7 4 3 4 . 1 0 1 5 0 .
3 7 . 1 0 9 3 6 2 . 1 2 8 4 2 .
4 2 . 1 2 3 8 2 1 . 1 6 4 3 4 .
0 . 1 4 5 1 7 1 . 1 9 8 0 8 .






































6 0 .  
6:









6 4 .  










5 6 3 2 9 ,
586 04 , .
5 3 3 5 9 .
4 8 1 1 4 .
3 6 0 5 8 .
3 1 8 9 9 ,
■397517
4 1 7 2 9 .
4 3 7 1 7 .
5 3 5 4 4 .
5 4 9 3 6 .
5 6 3 2 9 .
5?rT7Tr
3 8 0 5 9 .  
3 3 2 3 0 .  
3 8 4 0 2 .  
3 8 6 6 3 .  
3 8 9 2 5 ,  
3 8 8 3 2 .
4 9 9 .
I l l :
5 3 9 .
2 8 .
n: m W ,r  \ m
ÎB
10
  iJÜL ____





















































7 0 .  









3 8 8 3 0 .
3 8 8 2 8 .
3 7 3 3 1 .  
3 8 0 5 9 .  
3 8 2 3 0 .  
3 8 4 0 2 .  
3 8 6 6 3 .  
3 8 9 2 5 .  





T 0 8 7
0 .
1 .























3 8 8 3 0 .
3 8 8 2 8 .
3 9 1 4 7 .
3 7 3 3 1 .  
3 8 0 5 9 .  
38 2 3 0 .  
3 8 4 0 2 .  
3 8 6 6 3 .  
3 8 9 2 5 .  







3 8 8 2 8 .  
3 9 1 4 7 .  
3 8 2 3 9 .  
3 7 3 3 1 .  
3 8 0 5 9 .  
3 8 2 3 0 .  
3 8 4 0 2 .
3 8 9 2 5 .
3 8 8 3 2 .
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2 5 .  
2 5 .  
4 7 .
8 7 .
1 0 3 .
8 3 .  
1 5 4 .  




































2 6 3 7 9 0 .
3 0 5 0 2 3 .
3 3 6 4 3 1 .
3 6 5 0 2 1 .
9 7 4 3 4 .
m i i î î
1 5 7 7 4 5 .  
1 6 5 5 0 7 .  
2 1 9 4 8 8 .  
2 6 3 7 9 0 .  
3 0 5 0 2 3 .  
3 3 6 4 3 1 .  
5 6 5 0 2 1 7
1 8 4 0 0 0 .  
1 8 6 0 0 0 .  
192 8 8 0 .  
2 0 0 5 8 5 .  
2 2 4 1 5 9 .
2 5 1 6 8 2 ^
2 6 1 5 0 3 .
3 0 7 0 0 5 .
3 1 9 7 7 0 .
3 7 4 6 2 4 .
4 4 8 2 7 8 .
1 R4000 .
T9Y 8§§!'
2 0 0 5 8 5 .
2 2 4 1 5 9 .
2 5 1 6 8 2 .
2 6 1 5 0 3 .  
3 0 7 0 0 5 .
4 4 8 2 7 8 .
1 8 4 0 0 0 .
1 8 6 0 0 0 ,
1 9 2 8 8 0 .
2 0 0 5 8 5 .
2 2 4 1 5 9 .
2 5 1 6 8 2 .
“2 6 T 5 0 X .
3 0 7 0 0 5 .
3 1 9 7 7 0 .
3 7 4 6 2 4 .
4 4 9 2 7 8 .
1 8 4 0 0 0 .  
1 8 6 0 0 0 .
i U U k
2 2 4 1 5 9 .
2 5 1 6 8 2 .
2 6 1 5 0 3 .
3 0 7 0 0 5 .
9(
1 6 3 5 0 .
1 8 2 0 0 .
1 6 1 7 5 .
1 4 3 6 2 .
1 0 1 5 0 .
128A2^_
1 6 4 3 4 .
1 9 8 0 8 .
2 0 7 0 3 .
1 1 9 0 0 .
1 5 9 6 9 .
1 6 3 5 0 .
1 8 2 0 0 .
ilHI:
2 8 0 0 0 .
ROOOO.
3 2 0 0 0 .
3 4 0 0 0 .
3 5 4 2 3 .
. 3 4 5 2 5 ,
3 2 1 1 0 .
2 8 2 0 0 .
3 2 7 3 1 .
2 9 1 2 4 .
3 6 5 0 0 .
2 8 0 0 0 .
m g g t
3 4 0 0 0 .
3 5 4 2 3 .
3 4 5 2 5 .
3 2 1 1 0 .  
2 8 2 0 0 .  3 2 7 3 1 ,
2 9 1 2 4 .  
3 6 5 0 0 .  
2 8 0 0 0 .  
3 0 0 0 0 .  
3 2 0 0 0 .  
3 4 0 0 0 .  
3 5 4 2 3 .  
3 4 5 2 5 .  
371 TO.  
2 8 2 0 0 .  
3 2 7 3 1 .  
2 9 1 2 4 .
3 6 5 0 0 .  
2 8 0 0 0 .  
3 0 0 0 0 .
i i ü & o i
3 5 4 2 3 .
3 4 5 2 5 .
3 2 1 1 0 .





10 4 7 0 . 3 7 3 3 1 .
. 5 . . .  — 6 0  . 3 8 0 5 9 .
10 5 6 1 . 3 8 2 3 0 .
10 5 6 2 . 3 3 4 0 2 .
10 5 6 3 . 3 8 6 6 3 .
10 5 6 4 .  . 3 3 9 2 . 5 ,
10 5 6 5 . 3 8 8 3 2 .
10 5 6 6 . 3 8 8 3 0 .
10 5 6 7 . 3 8 8 2 8 .
.... 5.......... ____68  *. — 3 9 1 4 7 .
10 5 6 9 . 3 8 2 3 9 .
10 5 7 0 . 3 7 3 3 1 .
10 6 6 0 . 3 8 0 5 9 .
10 6 6 1 .  ... 3 8 2 3 0 .
10 6 6 2 . 3 8 4 0 2 .
10 6 6 3 . 3 8 6 6 3 .
10 6 6 4 . 3 8 9 2 5 .
__  G..... . .. — — 6 5 , ------ 3 8 8 8 2 .
10 6 66 . 3 8 8 3 0 .
10 6 6 7 . 3 8 8 2 8 .
10 6 6 8 . 3 9 1 4 7 .






























7 0 .  
6 0 .  
6 1 . 
6 2 . .
6 5 .  










0 ÜR K = ZERO
TI 1
ü OR K = ZERO
11 1
_Q__Q&_K ___
0 OR K = ZÉRO
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3 8 0 5 9 .  
3 8 2 3 0 .  
3 8 4 0 2 .  
3 8 6 6 3 .  
3 8 9 2 5 .  
3 8 8 3 2 .  
3 8 8 3 0 .  
3 8 8 2 8 .  
3 9 1 4 7 .  
3 8 2 3 9 .  
3.73.31. 
3 8 0 5 9 .  
3 8 2 3 0 .  
3 8 4 0 2 .  





3 6 9 6 2 .














4 0 9 2 5 .
4 1 9 0 2 .
.4£5_79 .
5 5 2 5 7 .
3 8 9 2 5 .  
3 8 8 3 2 .  
3 8 8 3 0 .  
3 882  8 .  
3 9 1 4 7 .  
3 8 2 3 9 .  
3 7 3 3 1 .
3 3 41 27
3 5 1 8 7 .
§ 8 : ...........
5 4 . 3 2 .
1 1 3 . 4 9 .
1 5 5 . 5 1 .
1 6 6 . 4 3 .
1 1 9 .
__Z 94 ,_ .
J 4 .
3 1 5 . 58%
3 4 6 . 4 9 .
2 5 5 . 5 8 .
2 8 7 . 5 2 .
2 4 8 . 1 7 .
3 0 1 . 3 3 .
7 2 . 1 7 .
1 0 4 ,—._______ 2 5 .,- .
1 0 9 . 2 5 .
8 9 . 2 0 .
9 6 . 9 .
1 3 0 . 1 9 .
1 7 0 . 2 1 .
2 1 2 . 4 5 .
3 2 8 . 2 9 .
_ _3 5 j1 , __ . __  . 4 6 .
4 5 9 . 2 6 .
5 2 9 . 1 0 5 ,
6 2 4 . 8 1 .
5 9 4 . 1 0 4 .
4 7 7 . 7 5 .
5 1 8 . 5 6 .
5 3 1 . 6 3 .
_-_6JL7.,_ 9 3 ,
4 5 6 . 7 5 .
4 3 6 . 5 3 .
3 4 0 . 3 8 .
4 2 7 . 1 3 .
6 0 . 1 9 .
1 0 0 . 2 4 .
6 0 . 2 1 .
_  . — &2. —
1 2 3 . 3 2 .
1 0 9 . 4 .
1 3 2 . 1 3 .
8 1 . 1 3 .
8 7 . 4 2 .
1 3 8 . 2 5 .
1 2 3 . 1 7 .
Ü. 0 .
0 . 0 .
0 . 0 .
0 . 0 .
— - —
1 . 1 .
Ü » ............ 0 .
3 . 3 .
m i:
4 4 8 2 7 8 .
1 3 4 0 0 0 .
1 8 6 0 0 0 .
1 9 2 8 8 0 .
2 0 0 5 8 5 .
.224:15.9....
2 5 1 6 8 2 .
2 6 1 5 0 3 .
3 0 7 0 0 5 .
3 1 9 7 7 0 .
3 7 4 6 2 4 .
4 4 8 2 7 8 .
1 3 4 0 0 0 .
l a ô û a a .
1 9 2 8 8 0 .
2 0 0 5 8 5 .
2 2 4 1 5 9 .
2 5 1 6 8 2 .
2 6 1 5 0 3 .
3 0 7 0 0 5 .
3 1 9 7 7 0 .
374£l24.
4 4 8 2 7 8 .
1 8 4 0 0 0 .
1 8 6 0 0 0 .
1 9 2 8 8 0 .
2 0 0 5 8 5 .
2 2 4 1 5 9 .
2 5 1 6 8 2 .
2615-0 .3 ..
3 0 7 0 0 5 .
3 1 9 7 7 0 .
3 7 4 6 2 4 .
4 4 8 2 7 8 .
1 8 4 0 0 0 .
1 8 6 0 0 0 .
1 9 2 8 8 0 .
2005.85.-
2 2 4 1 5 9 .
2 5 1 6 8 2 .
2 6 1 5 0 3 .
3 0 7 0 0 5 .
3 1 9 7 7 0 .
3 7 4 6 2 4 .
4 4 8 2 7 8 .
1 2 5 8 ? 1 . '
1 3 1 7 4 1 .
1 4 0 1 8 7 .
1 4 3 8 3 0 .
1 5 6 9  0 8 .'  
1 6 7 0 5 4 .
2 0 7 8 0 1 .
2 5 9 7 3 8 .
3 6 5 0 0 .  
2 8 0 0 0 .  
3 0 0 0 0 .  
3 2 0 0 0 .  
3 4 0 0 0 .
3 5 4 2 3 ..  
3 4 5 2 5 .  
3 2 1 1 0 .  
2 8 2 0 0 .  
3 2 7 3 1 .  
2 9 1 2 4 .  
3 6 5 0 0 .  
2 3 0 0 0 .
30.0110... 
3 2 0 0 0 .  
3 4 0 0 0 .  
3 5 4 2 3 .  
3 4 5 2 5 .  
3 2 1 1 0 .  
2 8 2 0 0 .  
3 2 7 3 1 .  
2 9 .1 2 4 .  
3 6 5 0 0 .  
2 8 0 0 0 .  
3 0 0 0 0 .  
3 2 0 0 0 .  
3 4 0 0 0 .  
3 5 4 2 3 .  
3 4 5 2 5 .  
3 2 1 1 0 .  
2 8 2 0 0 .  
3 2 7 3 1 .  
2 9 1 2 4 .  
3 6 5 0 0 .  
2 8 0 0 0 .  
3 0 0 0 0 .  
3 2 0 0 0 .
3 4 0 0 .0 .  
3 5 4 2 3 .  
3 4 5 2 5 .  
3 2 1 1 0 .  
2 8 2 0 0 ,  
3 2 7 3 1 .  
2 9 1 2 4 .  
3 6 5 0 0 .
1 0 5 8 0 .
1 2 1 8 0 .
12 5 0 0 .
1 2 6 0 0 .
1 5 7 4 5 .
1 6 0 0 0 .
1 9 0 7 5 .
2 2 2 7 5 .
ro
§
0  OP ZERO
0 OR < = ZERO
Ü OR 
























5 7 4 7 5 .
3 3 4 1 2 .
3 5 1 8 7 .
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6 5 T  
66 .
6 7 .
6 8 .  
6 9 V  
7 0 .
= ZERO
6 0 .  
6 1 .
3 8 9 4 3 .
4 0 9 2 5 .
4 1 9 0 2 .
4 8 5 7 9 .
5 4 7 9 6 .
5 2 1 1 7 .
3 6 9 6 2 .  
3 8 9 4 3 .  
4 0 9 2 5 .  
4 1 9 0  V .  
4 8 5 7 9 .  
5 5 2 5 7 .  
5 7 4 7 5 .  
5 4 7 9 6 .  
5 2 1 1 7 .

































3 6 9 6 2 .
4 1 9 0 2 .
4 8 5 7 9 .













5 4 7 9 6 .
5 2 1 , 1 7 .
3 6 9 6 2 .
3 8 9 4 3 .
4 0 9 2 5 .
? T 9 0 7 V
4 8 5 7 9 .
5 5 2 5 7 .
5 7 4 7 5 .
5 4 T 9 6 .
5 2 1 1 7 .
3 3 4 1 2 .
3 5 1 8 7 .
3 ^ 6 2 7 '
3 8 9 4 3 .
4 0 9 2 5 .
4 1 9 0 2 .
4 8 5 7 9 .
0 . 0 . 2 9 7 6 4 8 . 2 5 6 5 0 .
0 . 0 . 3 1 1 6 5 1 . 2 5 0 9 0 .
4 . 2 . 3 8 7 0 2 5 . 6 1 2 0 0 .
3 . 2 . 1 2 5 8 4 1 . 1 0 5 8 0 .
1 . 1 . 1 3 1 7 4 1 . 1 2 1 8 0 .
1 f _ ... - 1 4 0 1 8 7 , _ T 2 5 O 0 L ,  .
0 . 0 . 1 4 3 8 8 0 . 1 2 6 0 0 .
0 . 0 . 1 5 6 9 0 8 . 1 5 7 4 5 .
0 . 0 . 1 6 7 0 5 4 . 1 6 0  ) 0 .
6 . 0 . 2 0 7 8 0 1 . 1 9 0 7 5 .
___ 3 . ___ 1 , 2 5 9 7 3 8 , ^ . 2 2 2 7  5 . __
3^ -.....  1 . 2 9 7 6 4 8 . 2 5 6 5 0 .
1 . Û . 3 1 1 6 5 1 . 2 5 0 9 0 .
2 . 2 . 3 8 7 0 2 5 . 6 1 2 0 0 .
2 . 0 . 1 2 5 8 4 1 . 1 0 5 8 0 .
5 . 1 . 1 3 1 7 4 1 . 1 2 1 8 0 .
4 . 1 . 1 4 0 1 8 7 . 12  5 0 0 .
4 . 1 . 1 4 3 8 8 0 . 1 2 6 0 0 .
2 . 0 . 1 5 6  9g8_t ... 1 5 7 4 5 .  .
2 . .............. 2 . ......... 1 6 7 0 5 4 . 1 6 0 0 0 .
6 . 2 . 2 0 7 8 0 1 . 1 9 0 7 5 .
8 . 7 . 2 5 9 7 3 8 . 2 2 2 7 5 .
8 . 6 . 2 9 7 6 4 8 . 2 5 6 5 0 ,
7 . 1 . 3 1 1 6 5 1 . 2 5 0 9 0 .
7 . I . 3 8 7 0 2 5 . 6 1 2 0 0 .
0 . 0 . 1 2 5 8 4 1 . 1 0 5 8 0 , _
- n T 3 1 T 4 T ; ' ------1 2 1 8 0 .
0 . 0 . 1 4 0 1 8 7 . 1 2 5 ) 0 .
1 . 1 . 1 4 3 8 8 0 . 1 2 6 0 0 .
7 . 6 . 1 5 6  9 0 8 . 1 5 7 4 5 .
1 9 . 1 6 . 1 6 7 0 5 4 . 1 6 0 0 0 .
2 4 . 1 0 . 2 0 7 8 0 1 . 1 9 0 7 5 .
11 . 4  . 2 5 9  7 3 8 , _ 2 2 2 7 5 .
----------- V 7 . ...- 2 9 7 6 4 8 . 2 5 6 5 0 .
3 9 , 3 6 . 3 1 1 6 5 1 . 2 5 0 9 0 .
1 7 . 1 5 . 3 8 7 0 2 5 . 6 1 2 ) 0 .
6 9 . 2 5 . 1 2 5 8 4 1 . 1 0 5 8 0 .
5 8 . 1 4 . 1 3 1 7 4 1 . 1 2 1 8 0 .
1 0 4 . 1 9 . 1 4 0 1 8 7 . 12  5 0 0 .
1 3 0 . 2 8 . 1 4 3 8 8 0 . 1 2 6 0 0 .
2 3 2 . ...... 2 8 .__ _ 1 5 6 9 0 8 . 1 5 7 4 5 .
2 0 4 .- 1 6 T 0 5 4  .  - l  e  a o i)-. "
3 2 8 . 6 8 . 2 0 7 8 0 1 . 1 9 0 7 5 .
3 1 1 . 8 7 . 2 5 9 7 3 8 . 2 2 2 7 5 .
3 0 4 . 3 2 . 2 9 7 6 4 8 . 2 5 6 5 0 .
3 7 7 . 4 7 . 3 1 1 6  5 1 . 2 5 0 9 0 .
4 5 2 . 7 6 . 3 8 7 0 2 5 . 6 1 2 3 0 .
1 9 2 . 1 8 . 1 2 5 8 4 1 . 1 0 5 8 0 .
1 7 8 . 1 8 . 1 3 1 7 4 1 . 1 2 1 8 0 .
3 X 6 .  ~ I? 0 T .8 T 7 - 1 2 3 0 0 .
2 7 2 . 2 7 * 1 4 3 8 8 0 . 1 2 6 0 0 .
3 5 1 . 3 4 . 1 5 6 9 0 8 . 1 5 7 4 5 .
3 1 5 . 3 2 . 1 6 7 0 5 4 . 1 6 0 0 0 .
3 2 7 . 2 0 . 2 0 7 8 0 1 . 1 9 0 7 5 .
roo- w
1} Ê g: i l k mi:
1 1 6 6 9 . 5 4 7 9 6 . 4 3 5 . 5 9 . 3 1 1 6 5 1 .
i t 6 7.0 . 5 2 1 1 7 . 5 3 6 . 1 1 7 . 3 8 7 0 2 5 . 6 1 2 0 0 .
11 7 6 0 . 3 3 4 1 2 . 5 9 7 . 6 3 . 1 2 5 8 4 1 . 1 0 5 8 0 .
11 7 6 1 . 3 5 1 8 7 . 5 4 5 . 5 7 . 1 3 1 7 4 1 . 1 2 1 8 0 .
11 7 6 2 . 3 6 9 6 2 . 7 2 7 . 5 3 . 1 4 0 1 8 7 . 1 2 5 0 0 .
11 7 6 3 .  _ ... 2 .a 3 4 3 . - 6 1 1 _____5 0  .  _ -L435B.Q. 1 2 6 0 0 .
11 7 6 4 . 4 0 9 2 5 . 6 6 8 . 4 6 . 1 5 6 9 0 8 . 1 5 7 4 5 .
11 7 6 5 . 4 1 9 C 2 . 5 3 1 . 1 8 . 1 6 7 0 5 4 . 1 6 0 0 0 .
11 7 66 . 4 8 5 7 9 , 5 2 8 . 1 2 . 2 0 7 8 0 1 . ^ 0 7 5 .
11 7 - 5 5 2 5 7 . 6 1 0 . 1 7 . 2 5 9 7 3 8 . 2 2 2 7 5 .
11 7 6 8 . 5 7 4 7 5 . 6 1 7 . 3 9 . 2 9 7 6 4 8 . 2 5 6 5 0 .
11 7 6 9 . 54  7 9 6 . 4 9 4 . 1 7 . 3 1 1 6 5 1 . 2 5 0 9 0 .
11 7 7 0 . 5 2 1 1 7 . 6 1 9 . 2 8 . 3 8 7 0 2 5 . 6 1 2 0 0 .
11 3 6 0 .  _ 3 3 4 1 2 . 3 5 . 9 » L2.5M LL ld.580.^
11 8 6 1 . 3 5 1 8 ? . 4 0 . 1 3 . 1 3 1 7 4 1 . 1 2 1 8 0 .
11 9 6 2 . 3 6 9 6 2 . 60  . 1 1 . 1 4 0 1 8 7 . 12 5 0 0 .
11 8 6 3 . 3 8 9 4 3 . 4 6 . 1 0 . 1 4 3 8 8 0 . 1 2 6 0 0 .
L i 9 64  . _ 4 0 9 2 5 . 7 8 . 2 3 . 1 5 6 9 0 8 . 1 5 7 4 5 .
11 8 6 5 . 4 1 9 0 2 . 8 1 . 1 8 . 1 6 7 0 5 4 . 1 6 0 ) 0 .
11 a 66 . 4 8 5 7 9 . 7 7 . 2 5 . 2 0 7 8 0 1 . 1 9 0 7 5 .
11 8 6 7 . 5 5 2 5 7 . 7 4 . 1 3 . 2 5 9 7 3 8 . 2 2 2 7 5 .
11 8 6 8 . _5 .Z 4I5 , ..— -6 7 . - . . 2 7 . 2J9.7648. 2 5 6 5 0 .
11 8 6 9 . 5 4 7 9 6 . 6 0 . 1 0 . 3 1 1 6  5 1 . 2 5 0 9 0 .
11 8 7 0 . 5 2 1 1 7 . 7 6 . 1 3 . 3 8 7 0 2 5 . 6 1 2 0 0 .
12 1 6 0 . 3 2 4 2 5 3 . 2 5 . 2 1 . 1 5 7 6 4 3 7 . 2 0 1 3 4 8 .
12 JL_ 6 1 . 3 3 1 0 2 7 . ........1 8 . 1 7 . 1 6 5 7 0 8 5 . 2 1 4 2 4 4 .
12
- ---------- W- - - -
3 3 7 8 0 1 . 2 9 . 2 7 . 1 6 6 2 9 2 5 . 2 3 7 4 2 9 .
12 1 63% 3 4 4 1 1 0 . 2 2 . 1 6 . 1 7 5 3 1 0 3 . 2 5 3 6 3 8 .
12 1 64e 3 5 0 4 1 9 . 2 1 . 2 0 . 2 0 5 3 8 3 5 . 2 9 5 7 2 1 .
12 1 6 5 . 3 6 1 8 2 6 . 2 7 . ......... 27._ 21-6^ 959^ - 2 9.71 5 8-,...
.....................T2 ' T ' 66  . 3 6 4 5  88 . 3 4 . 3 0 . 2 3 5 1 5 5 5 . 3 3 0 1 0 3 .
12 1 6 7 . 3 6 7 3 5 1 . 3 6 . 3 6 . 2 8 3 0 9 2 4 . 3 9 1 1 4 3 .
12 1 6 8 . 3 7 1 5 6 1 . 3 6 . 3 3 . 3 0 8 4 7 7 9 . 4 6 9 0 0 1 .
12 1 6 9 , 36 9 0 2 1 , 4 4 . 4 1 . 3 6 1 3 2 5 4 . 4 9 3 0 6 7 .
12 7 0 . 3 6 6 4 8 1 . 3 2 . 3 2 . 4 2 1 9 8 8 3 . 5 8 1 9 8 4 .
12 2 6 0 . 3 2 4 2  5 3 . 3 3 . 1 8 . 1 5 7 6 4 3 7 . 2 0 1 3 4 8 .
12 2 6 1 . 3 3 1 0 2 7 . 5 7 . 4 3 . 1 6 5 7 0 8 5 . 2 1 4 2 4 4 .
12 2 6 2 .  _.._ 3 -i.ia .o i... ________J .9^ _ - ................LB..- _ 1 6 6 2 9 2 5 . 2 3 1 4 2 9 .
1? 2 6 3 . 3 4 4 1 1 0 . 6 1 . 2 4 . 1 7 5 3 1 0 3 . 2 53 63 8 .
12 2 6 4  . 3 5 0 4 1 9 . 8 0 . 3 5 . 2 0 5 3 8 3 5 . 2 9 5 7 2 1 .
12 2 6 5 . 3 6 1 8 2 6 . 6 4 . 1 8 . 2 1 6 2 9 5 9 . 2 9 7 1 5 8 .
JL2 ________ 2 6-6 « 3 6 4 5  8 8 . 9 4 . 5 2 . 2 3 5 1 5 5 5 . 3 3 0 1 0 3 .
12 6 7 . 3 6 7 3 5 1 . 1 1 3 . 7 7 . 2 8 3 0 9 2 4 . 3 9 1 1 4 3 .
12 2 6 8 . 3 7 1 5 6 1 . 1 1 7 . 66  . 3 0 8 4 7 7 9 . 4 6 9 0 0 1 .
12 2 6 9 . 3 6 9 0 2 1 . 9 5 . 5 1 . 3 6 1 3 2 5 4 . 4 9 3 0 6 7 .
12 2 7 0 . 3 6 6 4 8 1 . — -----—— .—- ......... _^2.19j6 8.3^ - 3 8 1 9 8 4 .
3 6 0 . 3 2 4 2 5 3 . 2 8 4 . 1 3 4 . 1 5 7 6 4 3 7 . 2 0 1 3 4 8 .
12 3 6 1 . 3 3 1 0 2 7 . 3 3 6 . 1 1 7 . 1 6 5 7 0 8 5 . 2 1 4 2 4 4 .
12 3 6 2 . 3 3 7 8 0 1 . 3 8 8 . 1 0 6 . 1 6 6 2 9 2 5 . 2 3 7 4 2 9 .
12 3 6 3 . 3 4 4 1 1 0 . 489. 1 2 3 . 1 7 5 3 1 0 3 . 2 5 3 6 3 8 .
12 6 4 . 3 5 0 4 1 9 . 5 1 8 . 1 3 5 . 2 0 5 3 8 3 5 . 2 9 5 7 2 1 .
12 3 6 5 . 3 6 1 3 2 6 . 4 8 8 . 1 5 8 . 2 1 6 2 9 5 9 . 2 9 7 1 5 8 .
12 3 6 6 . 3 6 4 5 8 8 . 4 6 3 . 1 4 6 . 2 3 5 1 5 5 5 . 3 3 0 1 0 3 .
12 3 6 7 . 3 6 7 3 5 1 . ...... _ 2.83D_92iL.. - 3.9J1143^.
12 3 6 8 . 3 7 1 5 6 1 . 4 8 2 . ' 1 6 8 . 3 0 8 4 7 7 9 . 4 6 9 0 0 1 .
12 3 6 9 . 3 6 9 0 2 1 . 5 3 4 . 166  . 3 6 1 3 2 5 4 . 4 9 3 0 6 7 .
12 3 7 0 . 3 6 6 4 8 1 . 5 4 8 . 1 6 9 . 4 2 1 9 8 8 3 . 5 8 1 9 8 4 .
12 _________O d .____ _ 1 2 4 2 1 3 . ____  1 1 2 . 9 6 . 15 7 6 4 3 7 . 2 0 1 3 4 8 .




12 4 6 4 . 3 5 0 4 1 9 . 5 0 6 .
12 4 6 5 , 3 6 1 8  2 6 , 3 7 1 .
12 4 6 6 . 3 6 4 5 8 8 . 3 6 8 .
12 4 6 7 . 3 6 7 3 5 1 . 4 9 5 .
12 4 6 8 . 3 7 1 5 6 1 . 5 7 5 .
12 4 6 9 . 3 6 9 0 2 1 , 783,_ .
12 4 7Û . 3 6 6 4 8 1 . 6 4 7 ;
12 5 6 0 . 3 2 4 2 5 3 . 3 3 1 0 .
12 5 6 1 . 3 3 1 0 2 7 . 3 8 3 7 .
12 5 6 2 , 3 3 7 8 0 1 . 3 7 7 2 .
12 - 5 6 3 . 3 4 4 1 1 0 . 4 3 3 6 .
12 5 6 4 . 3 5 0 4 1 9 . 43  8 7 .
12 5 6 5 . 3 6 1 8 2 6 . 3 7 7 3 .
12 5 66  . . . 3 6 4 5 8 8 , ______ _40A 6jL _
12 5 6 7 . 3 6 7 3 5 1 . 4 3 5 5 .
12 5 6 8 . 3 7 1 5 6 1 . 5 3 2 8 .
12 5 6 9 . 3 6 9 0 2 1 . 5 5 6 5 .
12 5 7 0 , 3 6 6 4 8 1 . 5 6 5 6 .
12 6 6 0 . 3 2 4 2 5 3 . 5 1 2 .
12 6 6 1 . 3 3 1 0 2 7 . 5 7 5 .
12 6 6 2 . 3 3 7 8 0 1 . 7 4 0 .
12 6 6 3 . 3 4 4 1 1 0 . 5 6 4 j.
12 6 6 4 . 35T14T9. 7 0 7 .
12 6 6 5 . 3 6 1 8 2 6 . 5 5 6 .
12 6 66  . 3 6 4 5 8 8 . 606  .
12 6 6 7 , 3 6 7 3 5 1 . 1 6 4 3 ,
12 6 6 8 . 3 7 1 5 6 1 . 1 8 2 6 .
12 6 6 9 . 3 6 9 0 2 1 . 1 3 3 9 .
12 6 7 0 . 3 6 6 4 8 1 . 1 8 4 3 .
12 7 6 0 . 2 2 4 2 5 3 . 5 9 0 6 .—x—fK - —--—
12 7 6 1 . 5 7 1 0 2 7 . 6 1 4 2 .
12 7 6 2 . 3 3 7 8 0 1 . 6 8 2 3 .
12 7 6 3 . 3 4 4 1 1 0 . 6 6 4 3 .
12 7 6 4 . 3 5 0 4 1 9 . 7 2 3 4 .
12 7 6 5 . 3 6 1 8  2 6 . 6 5 9 0 .
12 7 66  . 3 6 4 5 8 8 . 6 3 4 6 .
12 7 6 7 . 3 6 7 3 5 1 . 7 4 9 8 .
12 7 6 8 . 3 7 1 5 6 1 . 7 4 3 5 .
12 6 9 . 3 6 ? o ? r . 7 0 T 2 .
12 7 7 0 . 3 6 6 4 8 1 . 3 4 4 2 .
12 8 6 0 . 3 2 4 2 5 3 . 1 6 3 8 .
12 8 6 1 . 3 3 1 0 2 7 . 1 6 4 3 ........... 12 ■ 6 2 . 3 378  0 1 . 1 9 2 6 .
12 8 6 3 . 3 4 4 1 1 0 . 1 9 4 4 .
12 8 6 4 . 3 5 0 4 1 9 . 1 8 9 9 .
12 8 6 5 . 3 6 1 8 2 6 . 1 8 4 6 .
12 6 6 . 3 6 4 5  8 8 . 17781,
12 8 6 7 . 3 6 7 3 5 1 . 1 3 7 8 .
12 8 68 . 3 7 1 5 6 1 . 1 7 7 4 .
12 A 6 9 . „  3 6 9 0 2 1 . 2 1 8 0 .
12 "8 " - 715/ — 3 6 6 4 8 1 . 2 5 3 8 .
0 OR K = ZERO
13 1 6 0 . 1 5 9 5 1 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
13 T 6 1 . 16Û2 8 . 0 .
13 I 6 2 . 1 6 1 0 6 . 1 #
13 1 6 3 . 1 6 0 5 1 . 1 #
13 6 4 jl 1 5 9 9 6 . ___ 1 •
13 6 5 t 7 6 4 0 4 . 1 .
2 1 4 .
1 5 7 .
2 0 1 .
3 3 0 .
3 3 1 .
5 6 6 .
5 8 1 .
7 7 1 .
6 5 3 .
8 5 9 .
9 2 1 .  
_  1L6_,
961  .  
1 0 7 2 .
\ i l \ :
2 1 0 .
2 6 1 .
1 4 6 .
? l :
9 3 .
1 5 5 .
‘ I I :
1 0 5 .
1 9 8 .
7 1 5 .
7 8 3 l
9 2 2 .  
8 5 9 .
1 0 6 1 .
1 0 1 6%
1 3 6 7 .
3 5 2 .
3 5 0 .
3 2 2 .
3 3 8 .
2 9 0 .
2 5 0 .
3 3 3 .
3 3 6 .
3 1 8 .
3 4 7 .
4 6 9 .
0 .
2 0 5 3 8 3 5 .
2 3 5 1 5 5 5 !
2 8 3 0 9 2 4 .
3 0 8 4 7 7 9 .
1 5 7 6 4 3 7 .
1 6 5 7 0 8 5 .
1 6 6 2 9 2 5 .
1 7 5 3 1 0 3 .
2 0 5 3 8 3 5 .





2 8 3 0 9 2 4 .
3 0 8 4 7 7 9 .
3 6 1 3 2 5 4 .
4 2 1 9 8 8 3 .
1 5 7 6 4 3 7 ,
1 6 5 7 0 8 5 ,
1 6 6 2 9 2 5 .
2 1 6 2 9 5  9 .  
2 3 5 1 5 5 5 .  
2 8 3 0 9 2 4 .  
3 0 8 4 7 7 9 .  
3 6 1 3 2 5 4 .  
4 2 1 9 8 8 3 .  
1 5 7 6 4 3 7 ,  
1 6 5 7 0 8 5 !  
1 6 6 2 9 2 5 .  
1 7 5 3 1 0 3 .  
2 0 5 3 8 3 5 .  
2 1 6 2 9 5 9 .  
2 3 5 1 5 5 5 .  
2 8 3 0 9 2 4 .  
3 0 8 4 7 7 9 .  
3 6 1 3 2 5 4 .  
4 2 1 9 8 8 3 .  
1 5 7 6 4 3 7 .  
1 6 5 7 0 8 5 .  
1 6 6 2 9 2 5 .  
1 7 5 3 1 0 3 .  
2 0 5 3 8 3 5 .  
2 1 6 2 9 5 9 .  
T 3 7 1 5 5 5 .  
2 8 3 0 9 2 4 .  
3 0 9 4 7 7 9 .  
3 6 1 3 2 5 4 .  
4 2 1 9 8  8 3 .
6 4 6 1 5 .
-  -650'80T 
6 6 3 2 3 .  
6 8 9 3 0 .
2 9 5 7 2 1 .
2 9 7 1 5 3 .
3 3 0 1 0 3 .
3 9 1 1 4 3 .
4 6 9 0 0 1 .
493j)67jL
5 0 1 9 8 4 .
2 0 1 3 4 8 .
2 1 4 2 4 4 .
2 3 7 4 2 9 .
2 5 3 6 3 8 .
2 9 5 7 2 1 .
2 9 7 1 5 8 .
33CL103..
3 9 1 1 4 3 .
46  9 0 0 1 .
4 9 3 0 6 7 .
5 8 1 9 8 4 .
2 0 1 3 4 8 .
2 1 4 2 4 4 .
2 3 7 4 2 9 .
2 9 7 1 5 8 .
3 3 0 1 0 3 .
3 9 1 1 4 3 .
4 6 9 0 0 1 .
4 9 3 0 6 7 .
5 8 1 9 8 4 .
I Î 4 2 4 4 !
2 3 7 4 2 9 .
2 5 3 6 3 8 .
2 9 5 7 2 1 .
2 9 7 1 5 8 .
3 3 0 1 0 3 .
3 9 1 1 4 3 .
4 9 3 0 6 7 T
5 8 1 9 3 4 .
2 0 1 3 4 8 .
2 1 4 2 4 4 .
2 3 7 4 2 9 .
2 5 3 6 3 8 .
2 9 5 7 2 1 .
2 9 7 1 5 8 .
3 3T5103.~
3 9 1 1 4 3 .
4 6 9 0 0 1 .
4 9 3 0 6 7 .
5 8 1 9 8 4 .
1 3 5 6 6 .
1 2 7 4 4 /
1 2 5 2 6 .
1 4 5 7 4 .
1 5 8 7 6 .




0 OR K = 
1 3  -
ZERO
1 166  4 4 .— 0 . 0 . 1 0 0 7 4 2 . 1 4 1 3 5 .
0 OR K = 
13
ZERO
1 6 9 . 1 5 9 1 2 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 8 7 5 1 . 2 2 5 5 3 .



























1 5 9 6 1 .
1 6 0 2 8 .
1 6 1 0 6 .























1 5 9 9 6 .
1 6 4 0 4 .
L 64.3J.-
1 6 5 7 0 .
1 6 6 4 4 .

















1 5 1 8 0 .
1 5 9 5 1 .
1 6 0 2 8 .
1 6 1 0 6 .
1 6 0 5 1 .












1 6 4 P 7 .
1 6 5 7 0 .
1 6 6 4 4 .
1 5 9 1 2 .
1 5 1 8 0 .





















I 3 4 61 . 1 6 0 2 8 . l l . . , .
13 4 6 2 . 1 6 1 0 6 . 1 1 .
13 4 6 3 . 1 6 0 5 1 . 7 .
13 4 6 4 . 1 5 9 9 6 . 1 5 .
4 ______ 6,5,._____ , 1 6 4 0 4 . 5 .
13 4 6 6 . 1 6 4 8 7 . 2 .
13 4 6 7 . 1 6 5 7 0 . 2 .
13 4 6 8 . 1 6 6 4 4 . 3 .
13 4 6 9 . 1 5 9 1 2 . 4 .
TJ 4 7 0 . 1 5 1 8 0 . 3 .
13 5 6 0 . 1 5 9 5 1 . 4 7 .
13 5 6 1 . 1 6 0 2 8 . 5 4 .
13 5 62 . 1 6 1 0 6 , 8 2 .-------------------------------------------- " " 5 6 3 . 1 6 0 5 1 . 4 6 .
13 5 6 4 . 1 5 9 9 6 . 6 6  .
13 5 6 5 . 1 6 4 0 4 . 5 5 .
1 3 5 6 6 . 16487..*, ,  ________ __95,.,,.
13 5 6 7 . 1 6 5 7 0 . 5 6 .
13 5 6 6 . 1 6 6 4 4 . 1 3 8 .
13 5 6 9 . 1 5 9 1 2 . 1 2 0 .
......................5 ______ . - ,713.,, —— , 2 5 1 3 0 .  , 1 0 4 .
13 6 6 0 . 1 5 9 5 1 . 2 7 .
0 . 6 4 6 1 5 . 1 3 5 6 6 .
0 . 6 5 0 8 0 . 1 2 7 4 4 .
2 . 6 6 3 2 3 . 1 2 5 2 6 .
0 . 6 8 9 3 0 . 1 4 5 7 4 .
0 . 7 3 8 0 2 . '  15“8 7 6 . “"
0 . 7 8 1 1 3 . 1 3 5 6 4 .
1 . 8 3 1 1 9 . 1 3 6 3 4 .
3 . 0 2 5 7 9 . 1 4 5 8 0 .
1 . 1 0 0 7 4 2 . 1 4 1 3 5 .
________ D,.______ „ 1Dj3Z5,1.^,-„, , 2 2 ,5 5 3 . ,
0 . 1 1 1 8 1 8 . 1 8 2 9 6 .
U . 6 4 6 1 5 . 1 3 5 6 6 .
1 . 6 5 0 8 0 . 1 2 7 4 4 .
Û . 6 6 3 2 3 . 1 2 5 2 6 .
1 . 6 8 9 3 0 . 1 4 5 7 4 .
1 . 7 3 8 0 2 . 1 5 8 7 6 .
,  , J & 2 1 8 . , ........... „ 1356Æ .
l ‘ 8 3 1 1 9 . 1 3 6 3 4 .
1 . 9 2 5 7 9 . 1 4 5 3 0 .
1 . 1 0 0 7 4 2 . 1 4 1 3 5 .
0 . 1 0 8 7 5 1 . 2 2 5 5 3 .
3 . 1 1 1 8 1 8 . 1 8 2 9 6 .
2 5 . 6 4 6 1 5 . 1 3 5 6 6 .
, 1 1 .  -, ,6 5 0 8 0 .  , ,, — 1,2744^.—
1 1 . 6 6 3 2 3 . 1 2 5 2 6 .
7 . 6 8 9 3 0 . 1 4 5 7 4 .
1 4 . 7 3 8 0 2 . 1 5 8 7 6 .
5 . 7 8 1 1 8 . 1 3 5 6 4 .
2 . 8 3 1 1 9 . 1 3 6 3 4 .
2 . 9 2 5 7 9 . 1 4 5 8 0 .
3 . 1 0 0 7 4 2 . 1 4 1 3 5 .
___ 4 ,1 ,0 8 7 5 1 , ,2 2 5 ,5 ,3 .,,
3 , 1 1 1 8 1 8 , 1 8 2 9 6 .
1 5 . 6 4 6 1 5 , 1 3 5 6 6 .
1 9 . 6 5 0 8 0 . 1 2 7 4 4 .
2 0 . 6 6 3 2 3 . 1 2 5 2 6 .
1 3 . 6 8 9 3 0 . 1 4 5 7 4 .
1 1 . 7 3 8 0 2 . 1 5 8 7 6 .
3 8 . 7 8 1 1 8 . 1 3 5 6 4 .
______ 6 2 . ______ ,,,8 3 1 .1 -9 ,... , , 1 3 6 3 4 . ....
2 1 . 9 2 5 7 9 . 1 4 5 8 0 ,
7 9 . 1 0 0 7 4 2 . 1 4 1 3 5 .
4 9 . 1 0 8 7 5 1 . 2 2 5 5 3 .
1 0 4 . 1 1 1 8 1 8 . 1 8 2 9 6 .















66  » 
6 7 .
1 6 0 5 1 .
1 6 4 0 4 0
1 6 4 8 7 .
1 6 5 7 U .
1 6 6 4 4 .
13 6 6 9 . ■■ 1 5 9 1 7 7  ' '
13 6 7 0 . 1 5 1 8 0 .
13 7 6 0 . 1 5 9  5 1 .
13 7 .6.1 ._ 1 . 6 0 2 8 .
13 7 6 2 . 1 6 1 0 6 .
13 7 6 3 . 1 6 0 5 1 .
13 7 6 4 . 1 5 9 9 6 .
13 7 6 5 . 1 6 4 0 4 ^  _
13 7 6 6 . 1 6 4 8 7 .
13 7 6 7 . 1 6 5 7 0 .
13 7 6 8 . 1 6 6 4 4 .
13 7 6 9 .  ... 1 5 9 1 2 ,
13 7 7 0 . 1 5 1 8 0 .
13 8 6 0 . 1 5 9 5 1 .
13 8 6 1 . 1 6 0 2 8 .
13 8 6 2 , 1 6 1 0 6 , ____ .
13 8 6 3 . 1 6 0 5 1 .
13 8 6 4 . 1 5 9 9 6 .
13 8 6 5 . 1 6 4 0 4 .
13 8 6 6 . 1 6 4 8 7 .
13 8 6 7 . 16  5 70 .
13 8 6 8 . 1 6 6 4 4 .
13 8 6 9 , 1 5 9 1 2 .
13 8 7 0 , 1 5 1 8 0 .
14 1 6 0 . 2 4 4 l i .
14 1 6 1 . 2 2 4 7 1 .
0 OR K = ZLRO
14 _ _ 1 ____ 6 2 . 2 0 5 3 1 .
0 OR K = ZERO
14 1 6 3 . 2 4 8 2 0 .
14 1 6 4 . 2 9 1 1 0 .
0 OR K = ZFRO
14 - - Y - 6 5 . 2971197
14 1 66  . 2 8 3 9 2 .
0 OR K = ZERO
14 1 _______ M  _ 2 7 5 7 5 .------Q OR' ZERO
14 1 6 8 . 2 7 6 7 3 .
0 OR K = ZERO
14 1 6 9 . 2 6 8 0 6 .
ü ' UR K = TTR’Cr
14 1 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
14 _______ 6 0 ..____ 2 4 4 1 1 .
OR K = ZERO
14 2 6 1 . 2 2 4 7 1 .
14 2 6 2 . 2 0 5 3 1 .
0 OR K •= ZERO
14 ... ? 63 . 2 4 8 2 0 .
0 OR K = ZFRO
14 7 6 4 , 2 9 1 1 0 .
0 OR K = ZER_0
14 ' '2 ' 6 5 . 2 9 2 0 9 .
2 2 . 4 .
2 1 . 4 .
3 0 . 7 .
4 6 , 5 .
1 1 . 3 .
2 0 . 9 .
2 0 . 9 .
2 4 . 1 5 .
” 3 1 . 3 3."'
36  . 3 6 .
2 8 1 . 4 7 .
2 5 3 . 4 6 .
2 4 8 . 4 3 .
2 6 3 . 6 1 .
2 1 9 , 5 8 .
1 4 6 .  ...... . 5 1 ,
1 2 4 . 4 3 .
1 0 6 . 1 1 1 .
9 5 , 9 5 .
7 3 . 4 7 .
6 3 . 6 3 .
1 2 . 5 .
2 0 . 6 .
_ 2_6 ._ . _. 1..5.... ^
2 3 . 2 0 .
1 7 . 1 5 .
1 8 . 6 .
1 2 . 9 .
7 . 5 .
1 1 . 6 .
6 . 1 .
6 . 6 .
” 1 ." 1 .
1 . 0 .
0 . 0 .
0 . 0 .
1 . 1 .
---- ■ " 0 .
3 . 3 .
0 . 0 .
0 , 0 .
_ 0 ,^ ____ 0 .
0 . 0 .
0 . 0 .
0 . 0 .
1 . 1 .
— -------- 75.
0 . 0 .
0 . 0 .
6 8 9 3 0 .
7 3 8 0 2 .
7 8 1 1 8 .
8 3 1 1 9 .
9 2 5 7 9 .m u t
1 1 1 8 1 8 .
6 4 6 1 5 .
6 5 C 8 0 .
6 6 3 2 3 .
6 3 9 3 0 .
7 3 8 0 2 .
u n i:
9 2 5 7 9 .
1 0 0 7 4 2 .
1 0 8 7 5 1 ,
1 1 1 8 1 8 .
6 4 6 1 5 .
6 5 0 8 0 .
6 6 3 2 3 .
6 8 9 3 0 .
7 3 8 0 2 .
7 8 1 1 8 .
8 3 1 1 9 .
9 2 5 7 9 .
1 0 0 7 4 2 .
1 0 8 7 5 1 .
1 1 1 8 1 8 .
1 8 3 6 7 0 '.
1 7 9 9 1 3 .
2 0 3 6 3 8 .
2 1 8 7 9 1 .
2 3 2 8 6 3 .
2 3 8 8 7 8 .
2 4 4 8 9 3 .
264*r00 .
2 7 2 2 1 2 .
2 9 0 8 1 0 ,
3 2 8 1 5 4 .
1 8 3 6 7 0 .
1 7 9 9 1 3 .
2 0 3 6 3 8 .
2 1 8 7 9 I .
2 32 8 6 3 .
2 3 8 8 7 8 .
m n :
1 4 5 7 4 .
1 5 8 7 6 .
1 3 5 6 4 .
1 3 6 3 4 .
1 4 5 8 0 .
m i t
1 8 2 9 6 .
1 3 5 6 6 .
1 2 7 4 4 .
1 2 5 2 6 .
1 4 5 7 4 .
1 5 8 7 6 .
1 3 , 564 .
1 3 6 3 4 ,
1 4 5 8 0 .
1 4 1 3 5 .
2 2 5 5 3 .
1 8 2 9 6 .
1 3 5 6 6 .
1 2 7 4 4 .
1 2 5 2 6 ,
1 4 5 7 4 .
1 5 8 7 6 .
1 3 5 6 4 .
1 3 6 3 4 .
1 4 5 8 0 .
1 4 1 3 5 .
2 2 5 5 3 .
1 8 2 9 6 .
4 6 8 4 5 .
5 2 3 2 4 .
4 6 7 3 8 .
5 0 5 6 9 .
5 0 3 1 1 .
4 8 0 9 0 .
4 5 8 6 9 .
4 2 3 4 5 .
4 1 3 4 5 .
4 0 2 6 3 .
4 7 5 6 2 .
4 6 8 4 5 .
5 2 3 2 4 .
4 6 7 3 8 .
'6CT569.
5 0 3 1 1 .
4 8 0 9 0 .
roo
0 OR ZERO 2 66  » 2 8 3 9 2 . 0 . 0 . 2 4 4 8 9 3 . 4 5 8 6 9 .
2 6 7 . 2 7 5 7 5 . 5 . 4 . 2 6 4 4 0 0 . 4 2 3 4 5 .
2 6 8 *, 2 7 6 7 3 * 2 . 1 . 2 7 2 2 1 2 . 4 1 3 4 5 .
14 2 6 ° . 2 6 8 0 6 . 2 . 2 . 2 9 0 8 1 0 . 4 0 2 6 3 .
0 OR K = ZERO 
14 2 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 0 . 0 . 0 . 3 2 8 1 5 4 . 4 7 5 6 2 ,
6 0  . 2 4 4 1 1 .  — *5 # 4 # __1,83.6.7,0*..... ... 46  845  *—
14 3 6 1 . 2 2 4 7 1 . 1 . 0 . 1 7 9 9 1 3 . 5 2 3 2 4 .
l 4 3 6 2 . 2 0 5 3 1 . 2 . 2 . 2 0 3 6 3 8 . 4 6 7 3  8 .
14 3 6 3 . 2 4 8 2 0 . 2 . 0 . 2 1 8 7 9 1 . 5 0 5 6 9 .
14 3 64* , 2 9 1 1 0 * 2 . 2 3 2 8 6 3 . 5 0 3 1 1 .
14 3 6 5 . 2 9 2 0 9 . 1 . 1 . 2 3 8 8 7 8 . 4 8 0 9 0 .
14 •a 6 6 . 2 8 3 9 2 . 4 . 4 . 2 4 4 8 9 3 . 4 5 8 6 9 .
14 3 6 7 . 2 7 5 7 5 . 5 . 1 . 2 6 4 4 0 0 . 4 2 3 4 5 .
1 4 3 6 8 - 2 7 6 7 3 . „  ,  __3* _ ! * _ , 2 7 2 2 1 2 . , , ,,_4JJ3,45. ,,
14 3 6 9 . 2 6 8 0 6 . 2 . 1 . 2 9 0 8 1 0 .  3 2 8 1 5  4.
4 0 2 6 3 .
14 3 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 0 . 4- e 3 . 4 7 5 6 2 .
14 4 6 Ü. 2 4 4 1 1 . 8 . 8 . 1 8 3 6 7 0 . 4 6 8 4 5 .
14 4 2 2 4  7 1 ...... 1 0 . 0 . 1 7 9 9 1 3 . 5 2 3 2 4 .
14 4 6 ?C 2 0 5 3 1 . 5 . 3 . 2 0 3 6 3 8 . 4 6 7 3 8 .
14 4 6 3 . 2 4 8 2 0 . 9 . 0 . 2 1 8 7 9 1 . 5 0 5 6 9 .
14 4 6 4 . 2 9 1 1 0 . 8 . 8 . 2 3 2 8 6 3 . 50 3 1 1 .1 6 4 6 5 . 2 9 2 0 9 . 6 . ______6 ,  2 3 3 8 7  8 .  -, 4 E 0 9 Û .
14 4 66  . 2 8 3 9 2 . 6 . 5* 2 4 4 8 9 3 . 4 5  8 6 9 .
14 4 6 7 . 2 7 5 7 5 . 3 . 3 . 2 6 4 4 0 0 . 4 2 3 4 5 .
14 4 6 8 . 2 7 6 7 3 . 1 5 . 5 . 2 7 2 2 1 2 . 4 1 3 4 5 .
J . 4 4 6Q. , 2 6 8 0 0 . , , , ,  1 0 . 7 . 2 9 0 8 1 0 . 4 0 2 6 3 .
14 4 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 0 . B. 7 . 3 2 8 1 5 4 . 4 7 5 6 2 .
14 5 6 0 . 2 4 4 1 1 . 1 0 1 . 4 0 . 1 8 3 6 7 0 . 4 6 8 4 5 .
14 4 6 1 . 2 2 4 7 1 . 1 2 4 . 0 . 1 7 9 9 1 3 . 5 2 3 2 4 .
1 4 5 6 2 . 2 0 5 3 1 .  _,,..........1 3 2 ._____ , 3 A .  ,. -20,3,63,8*, „4 ,6J3  Sl.  5 0 5 6 9 .14 5 63 . 2 4 8 2 0 . 7 6 . 0 . 2 1 8 7 9 1 .
14 5 64 . 2 9 1 1 0 . 5 7 . 1 2 . 2 3 2 8 6 3 . 5 0 3 1 1 .
14 5 6 5 . 2 9 2 0 9 . 1 0 7 . 3 3 . 2 3 8 8 7 8 . 4 8 0 9 0 .
14 5 A 6 *____ 2 A 3 9 2 ........ 1 1 5 . 3 8 . 2 4 4 8 9 3 . 4 5 8 6 9 .
14 5 6 7 . 2 7 5 7 5 . 1 3 0 . 5 1 . 2 6 4 4 0 0 . 4 2 3 4 5 .
14 5 6 8 . 2 7 6 7 3 . 1 1 8 . 1 2 . 2 7 2 2 1 2 . 4 1 3 4 5 •
14 5 6 9 , 2 6 0 0 6 . 1 4 4 . 4 5 . 2 9 0 8 1 0 . 4 0 2 6 3 .
1 4 S 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 0 . -145-* ____ 2 4* .. _ 3 2 B  i5 -4 * „ . 4J7562*
14 6 6 0 . 2 4 4 1 1 . 4 2 . 1 2 . 1 8 3 6 7 0 . 4 6 8 4 5 .
14 6 6 1 . 2 2 4 7 1 . 4 4 . 0 . 1 7 9 9 1 3 . 5 2 3 2 4 .
14 6 6 2 . 2 0 5 3 1 . 3 5 . 1 1 . 2 0 3 6 3 8 . 4 6 7 3 8 .
14 _63 . 2 4 8 2 0 . 6 0 . 0 . 2 1 3 7 , 91 . 5 0 5 6 9 .
14 6 64 . 2 9 1 1 0 . 3 6 . 1 5 . 2 3 2 8 6 3 . 5 0 3 1 1 .
14 6 6 5 . 2 9 2 0 9 . 4 2 . 1 1 . 2 3 8 8 7 8 . 4 8 0 9 0 .
14 6 66 . 2 8 3 9 2 . 5 8 . 8 . 2 4 4 8 9 3 . 4 5 8 6 9 .
14 6 6 7 . 2 7 5 7 5 . _ , 77L. ____ 1,5,*__ ,_|6,4,40.Q*-... 4 2 3 4 5 *  ... 4 1 3 4 5 .14 6 6 8 . 2 7 6 7 3 . 9 9 . 3 .
14 6 6 9 . 2 6 8 0 6 . 1 0 2 . 3 . 2 9 0 8 1 0 . 4 0 2 6 3 .
14 6 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 0 . 1 3 3 . 1 2 . 3 2 8 1 5 4 . 4 7 5 6 2 .
14 7 6.Q.*____ , 2 4 4 , 1 1 . ---- ____ 2 3 7 . 1 0 6 .0 .
1 8 3 6 7 0 .
1 7 9 9 1 3 .
4 6 8 4 5 .
5 2 3 2 4 .14 7 6 1 . 2 2 4 7 1 . 1 7 9 .
14 7 6 2 . 2 0 5 3 1 . 1 4 5 . 4 6 . 2 0 3 6 3 3 . 4 6 7 3 8 .
14 7 6 3 . 2 4 8 2 0 . 8 6 . 0 . 2 1 8 7 9 1 . 5 0 5 6 9 .
14 7 64 . 2 9 1 1 0 . ____69*-,, ,_2 i2a^ 63 ,* , ,_ 5 ,0 3 1 1 .
14 7 6 5 . 2 9 2 0 9 . 1 4 0  . 5 4 . 2 3 8 8 7 8 . 4 8 0 9 0 .
14 7 66  . 2 8 3 9 2 . 8 6 . 8 . 2 4 4 8 9 3 . 4 5 86 9 .
14 7 6 7 . 2 7 5 7 5 . 9 3 . 1 6 . 2 6 4 4 0 0 . 4 2 3 4 5 .
14 ~L 6 8 . 2 7 6 7 3 . _____2 2 5 . 1 2 . 2 7 2 2 1 2 . 4 1 3 4 5 .


















6 8 .  
__ 6 9 .
7 0 .  
6 0 .  
6 1 .  
62 .
i i m :
2 5 6 2 8 .
2 5 3 5 1 .
2 5 0 7 5 .
2 4 3 2 6 .









2 0 .  
1 2 .  
2 0 .  
1 9 .  
0 .  
__ 2.8..
1 5 2 9 8 6 .
1 6 9 1 0 0 .
1 8 1 6 0 0 .
1 0 9 5 7 8 .
1 0 7 3 2 2 .
3 5 0 7 2 .  
3 6 9 0 0 .  
3 7 5 5 0 .  
2 0 9 2 0 .  
2 1 9 2 0 .  
____ 2 2 7 2 0 .
15 5 6 3 . 2 5 5 5 0 . 9 8 . 0 . 1 1 6 5 5 0 . 2 2 9 2 0 .
15 5 6 4 . 2 5 6 7 9 . 1 3 7 . 4 0 . 1 2 0 5 0 0 . 2 4 5 5 0 .
15 5 6 5 . 2 5 4 5 0 . 1 5 4 . 5 7 . 1 2 2 1 2 5 . 2 4 1 2 5 .
15 5 6 6 . 2 5 6 6 2 . 1 3 4 . 3 0 . 1 2 8 1 1 4 . 2 4 4 1 5 .
15 5 6 7 . 2 5 8 7 4 . 1 4 2 . 4 0 . 1 3 8 5 0 0 . 2 8 9 7 5 .
15 5 6 8 . 2 5 6 2 8 . 1 2 0 . 3 0 . 1 5 2 9 8 6 . 3 5 0 7 2 .
15 5 6 9 . 2 5 3 5 1 . 1 5 4 . 3 2 . 1 6 9 1 0 0 . 3 6 9 0 0 .1 5 5 7 0 . 1 6 4 . 15 .  ^ _iei_600_._ ____ 3 1 5 6 0 .. .  .
15 6 6 0 . 2 4 3 2 6 . 6 2 . 1 1 . 1 0 9 5 7 8 . 2 0 9 2 0 .
15 6 6 1 . 2 4 8 7 4 . 4 4 . 0 . 1 0 7 3 2 2 . 2 1 9 2 0 .
15 6 6 2 . 2 5 4 2 2 . 2 8 . 9 . 1 1 1 6 5 0 . 2 2 7 2 0 .
1 5 6^ 63 ... ....... 2 5 5 5 0 . 5 0 . 0 . 1 1 6 5 5 0 . 2 2 9 2 0 .
15 6 6 4 . 2 5 6 7 9 . 9 8 . 2 4 . 1 2 0 5 0 0 . 2 4 5 5 0 .
15 6 6 5 . 2 5 4 5 0 . 1 4 6 . 5 0 . 1 2 2 1 2 5 . 2 4 1 2 5 .
15 6 6 6 . 2 5 6 6 2 . 1 2 3 . 3 0 . 1 2 8 1 1 4 . 2 4 4 1 5 .
1 S 5 67. 2 5 8 7 4 . ___  _ 1 1 5 .. . 3 1 . 1 ^ 8 5 0 0 . ____ 2B9JZ6.__
15 6 66  . 2 5 6 2 8 . 1 2 4 . 2 4 . 1 5 2 9 8 6 . 3 5 0 7 2 .
15 6 6 9 . 2 5 3 5 1 . 1 7 4 . 2 9 . 1 6 9 1 0 0 . 3 6 9 0 0 .
15 6 7 0 . 2 5 0 7 5 . 1 6 2 . 1 7 . 1 8 1 6 0 0 . 3 7 5 5 0 .
15 7 60^ .. 2 4 3 2 6 .  - 2 3 4 . 1 6 . 1 0 9 5 7 8 . 2 0 9 2 0 .
15 7 61 . 2 4 8 7 4 . 1 4 9 . 0 . 1 0 7 3 2 2 . 2 1 9 2 0 .
15 7 6 2 . 2 5 4 2 2 . 1 3 1 . 1 0 . 1 1 1 6 5 0 . 2 2 7 2 0 .
15 7 6 3 . 2 5 5 5 0 . 2 3 8 . 0 . 1 1 6 5 5 0 . 2 2 9 2 0 .
1 5 7 6 4 . 2 5 6 7 9 . 3 1 0 . 5 4  • ..... 12Ü 5D 0,. ____ 2 4 5 6 0 .._ ..
15 7 6 5 . 2 5 4 5 0 . 2 1 ' .^ 5 7 . 1 2 2 1 2 5 . 2 4 1 2 5 .
15 7 6 6 . 2 5 6 6 2 . 2 2 6 . 4 6 . 1 2 8 1 1 4 . 2 4 4 1 5 .
15 7 6 7 . 2 5 8 7 4 . 2 9 4 . 4 6 . 1 3 8 5 0 0 . 2 8 9 7 5 .
l a ____2 5 6 2 8 . ........ 2 5 2 . 4 5 . 1 5 2 9 8 6 . 3 5 0 7 2  o
15 6 9 , 2 5 3 5 1 . 3 1 2 . 3 8 . 1 6 9 1 0 0 . 3 6 9 0 0 .
15 7 7 0 , 2 5 0 7 5 . 2 4 0 . 1 6 . 1 8 1 6 0 0 . 3 7 5 5 0 .
15 3 6 0 . 2 4 3 2 6 . 4 4 . 1 1 . 1 0 9 5 7 8 . 2 0 9 2 0 .
15 8 6 1 . 2 4 8 7 4 .  .. 61 .. 10.73 2 2 . . ....._Z152Ja._.
15 8 6 2 . 2 5 4 2 2 . 5 0 . 1 9 . 1 1 1 6 5 0 . 2 2 7 2 0 .
15 8 6 3 . 2 5 5 5 0 . 5 7 . 0 . 1 1 6 5 5 0 . 2 2 9 2 0 .
15 3 6 4 . 2 5 6 7 9 . 9 1 . 2 9 . 1 2 0 5 0 0 . 2 4 5 5 0 .
1 5 .. ...... 6 5 . ____ 2 5 4 5 0 . 7 0 . 1 9 . 1 2 2 1 2 5 . 2 4 1 2 5 .
15 ~g 66  . 2 5 6 6 2 . 7 6 . 2 8 . 1 2 8 1 1 4 . 2 4 4 1 5 .
15 8 6 7 . 2 5 8 7 4 . 8 4 . 2 0 . 1 3 8 5 0 0 . 2 8 9 7 5 .
15 8 6 8 . 2 5 6 2 8 . 5 1 . 1 1 . 1 5 2 9 8 6 . ^ 5 0 7 2 .
15 8 .......2 5 .2 5 1 . .69.,__________L2_. _ 1 6 5 1 0 .0 .  _....._669-0Q .......
15 8 7 0 . 2 5 0 7 5 . 9 3 . 1 6 . 1 8 1 6 0 0 . 3 7 5 5 0 .
16 1 6 0 . 2 3 9 6 5 . 1 . 0 . 8 4 4 1 1 . 8 7 4 3 .
0 OR K = ZERO
16 1 6 1 . 24l7 4 6 . 0 . 0 . , 9 4 5 0 8 . , 8 5 9 3 .
16 1------- 6 2 . ------ 2 5 5 2 8 . 1 . 1 1 0 0 5 5 . 1 2 5 9 3 .
0 OR K = ZERO
16 1 6 3 . 2 6 1 3 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 1 1 5 4 8 . 1 4 1 0 0 .
G OR K = ZFRO
16 1 6 4 . 2 6 7 4 6 . 0 . Ô7 13 0 5 3 5 . ' 1 8 4 6 0 .  ^
0 OR K = ZERO
16 1 6 5 . 2 6 3 9 9 . 0 . U. 13 7 7 0 0 . 20  6 ) 0 .
L6 1 ÔJ5 #L ____2 2 1 1 4 . . . 2 . 2 . 1 4 9 5 6 1 . 2 0 4 8 8 .
16 1 6 7 . 2 7 3 3 0 . 1 . 1 . 1 6 2 5 5 0 . 2 2 0 2 5 .
ro
-fo-
14 7 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 0 . 2 1 2 . 1 4 .
14 8 6 0 . 2 4 4 1 1 . 2 2 . 1 1 .
14 8 6 1 . 2 2 4 7 1 . 4 0 . 0 .
14 8 ........6 ,2 ,___ 2 0 5 3 1 ,, .......... 3 0 , 7 .
14 8 6 3 . 2 4 8 2 0 . 2 9 . ^ 0 .
14 8 6 4 . 2 9 1 1 0 . 3 6 . 2 4 .
14 8 6 5 . 2 9 2 0 9 . 2 2 . 1 1 .
14 8 66 • 2 8 3 9 2 . 3 7 ,  _ 1 3 , „
14 8 6 7 . 2 7 5 7 5 . 4 8 . 2 2 .
14 8 6 8 . 2 7 6 7 3 . 2 8 . 1 3 .
14 8 6 9 . 2 6 8 0 6 . 5 9 . 2 2 .
14 8 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 0 . 4 4 . 1 9 .
15 I 6 0 . ■ 243  2 6 . 1 . 1 .
15 1 6 1 . 2 4 8 7 4 . 1 . 0 .
Ü OR K = ZERO
1 5 1 6 2 . 2 5 4 2 2 . ................. . 0 ,  „ _______0 , __
0 OR K = TERTT
15 1 6 3 . 2 5 5 5 0 . 0 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
1 5 1 ____ _64.___ 2 5 6 7 9 . 0 . 0 .
15 Î 6 5 . 2 5 4 5 0 . 2 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
15 1 6 6 . 2 5 6 6 2 . 0 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
15
_ .
6 7 . 2 5 3 7 4 . 0 . ..........  0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
15 1 6 8 . 2 5 6 2 8 . 0 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
15 ------ 6 9 . 2 5 3 5 1 . 0 . 0 .
15 1 7 0 . 2 5 0 7 5 . 2 . 1 .
15 2 6 0 . 2 4 3 2 6 . 2 . g .
15 2 6 1 . 2 4 8 7 4 . 1 . 0 .
1 5 " 2 6 2 . 2 5 4 2 2 . “1 . I .
15 2 6 3 . 2 5 5 5 0 . 1 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
15 2 6 4 . 2 5 6 7 9 . 0 . 0 .
15 2 6 5 . 2 54  5 0 . 1 . 0 .
15 2 66  . 2 5 6 6 2 . 1 . 0 .
0 OR K = ZERO
15 2 6 7 . 2 5 3 7 4 . _________ ,0 , ___ ______ 0,. ,
u UR K =■ zfrt:  ■
15 2 6 6 . 2 5 6 2 8 . 0 . 0 .
15 2 6 9 . 2 5 3 5 1 . 3 . 0 .
15 2 7 0 . 2 5 0 7 5 . 1. 0 .
15 3 6 0 . 24 3 2 6 . 3 . 0 .
15 3 6 1 . 2 4 8 7 4 . 2 . 0 .
15 3 6 2 . 2 5 4 2 2 . 3 . 2 .
15 3 6 3 . 2 5 5 5 0 . 3 . 0 .
15  ' " -3-  - 6 4 . 2^56 / 9 . 6 . 1 .'
15 3 6 5 . 2 5 4 5 0 . 2 . 1 .
15 3 66  . 2 5 6 6 2 . 5 . 2 .
15 3 6 7 . 2 5 8 7 4 . 5 . 2 ,
15 3 6 8 . 2 5 6 2 8 . 1. u .
15 3 6 9 . 2 5 3 5 1 . 1 . 0 .
15 3 7 0 . 2 5 0 7 5 . 5 . 1 .
15 4 6 0 . 2 4 3 2 6 . 2 . 1 .
15 61 ;  ■ ■■ 2 4 8 7 4 . 3 . D .
15 4 6 2 . 2 5 4 2 2 . 1 . 1 .
15 4 6 3 . 2 5 5 5 0 . 9 . g .
15 4 6 4 . 2 5 6 7 9 . 1 0 . 7 .
15 4 6 5 . 2 5 4 5 0 . 5 . 5 .
1 8 3 6 7 0 .
1 7 9 9 1 3 .
2 0 3 6 3 8 .
2 1 8 7 9 1 .
2 3 2 8 6 3 .
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I t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  dep ic t  the r e l a t i v e  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  crime 
among c i t i e s  in  severa l ways. The common method devised by the FBI is  
to  compute o ffen se  r a te s  per 100,000 pop u la tio n .  Offenses per 
1,000,000 popula tion  were ca lcu la ted  and used as the dependent v a r ia b le  
in  Chapter V. Mean values fo r  offense  r a te s  per 1,000,000 population 
a re  dep ic ted  in  Table 21. I t  is  p o ss ib le  to  make comparisons of 
r e l a t i v e  crime in  th e  c i t i e s  by using the  c a lc u la te d  ra te s  depicted 
in  p r in to u ts  o f  th e  r e s u l t s  of c a lc u la t io n s  used in Chapter V.
An a l t e r n a t iv e  method th a t  f a c i l i t a t e s  comparisons is  to  
c a lc u la te  the  r a t i o  o f  the  percentage o f  t o t a l  offenses to  the  
percentage o f  t o t a l  population fo r  each c i t y ,  a quo tien t th a t  may be 
considered  as a r e l a t i v e  incidence index. I f  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  of  
o ffenses  were uniform according to  po p u la t io n ,  the  r e l a t iv e  incidence 
index would be equal to  one fo r  each c i t y .
Three r e l a t i v e  incidence indexes were ca lcu la ted  fo r  th e  
Oklahoma c i t i e s  fo r  each year from 1960 through 1970. Table A1 
d isp la y s  the  r e s u l t s  fo r  the v io le n t  o f fen se s :  homicide, fo r c ib le
rap e ,  robbery , and aggravated a s s a u l t .  Table A2 provides the inc idence  
index f o r  p roperty  crimes: bu rg la ry , the  two la rc e n ie s ,  and auto t h e f t .  
Table A3 provides the  incidence measures fo r  a l l  Index offenses  combined.
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The purpose o f  t h i s  appendix i s  the lim ited  one o f providing 
some in d ic a t io n  o f  o ffense  le v e l s  in the seventeen c i t i e s  not d e a l t  
with in  th e  chap ter  proper. Nonetheless, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  avoid 
poin ting  ou t the  r e l a t i v e l y  high lev e ls  fo r  Oklahoma C ity ,  T u lsa , and 
Lawton. Although th i s  i s  q u i te  as expected from p u b l i c i ty ,  the  
d if fe ren c es  between th e se  th re e  c i t i e s  and the  o th e rs  a re  probably 
not as g rea t  as popular impressions suggest. I t  would a lso  be worth­
while fo r  planning groups a t  the  s t a t e  level to  use inc idence  measures 
as th e se ,  with a t te n t io n  to  changes over time, in  the  a l lo c a t io n  o f  
monies fo r  law enforcement. No evidence was found to  suggest th a t  t h i s  
is  p re sen tly  being done in th e  s t a t e .
Appendix C examines severa l o f  the a l t e r n a t iv e  methods t h a t  can 
be used in  a l lo c a t in g  a v a i la b le  police  manpower among d i s t r i c t s  in  a 
s in g le  c i t y .  Although in  Oklahoma th e re  is  not any s ta tew ide  a l lo c a t io n  
o f  po lice  manpower among c i t i e s  by a cen tra l  law enforcement o rg a n i­
z a t io n ,  i f  the encouragement o f  LEAA leads to  t h i s  type o f  c en tra l  
coord ination  measures such as th e  incidence ind ices  shown here would be 
highly u se fu l .
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TABLE Al
RELATIVE INCIDENCE INDEX FOR VIOLENT CRIMES IN OKLAHOMA CITIES; 
PERCENT OF VIOLENT CRIMES DIVIDED BY PERCENT OF
POPULATION: 1960-70
City 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970
Ada 0.1408 0.3093 0.0970 0.4285 0.1297 1.0476
Al tus - - - 0.9136 0.5198 0.0142 — — —
Ardmore 0.5721 0.5665 1.2412 0.3977 0.6101
B a r t l e s v i l l e 0.0722 0.1865 0.2971 0.1622 0.1679 0.3466
Duncan 0.4723 0.1117 0.1475 0.2457 0.2931 0.2514
Enid 0.0000 0.1102 0.2135 0.3306 0.5000 0.2573
Lawton 1.1742 0.8644 1.4802 2.1482 1.9753 2.2202
McAlester 0.1156 0.3352 0.4880 0.9294 0.2151 0.4339
Midwest C ity 0.1727 0.2609 0.4225 0.7019 0.3983 0.8970
Muskogee 0.2189 0.2707 0.6292 0.5598 0.5341 0.8168
Norman 0.1566 0.1002 0.1093 0.4138 0.2902 0.2036
Oklahoma City 1.4863 1.9431 1.6016 1.4689 1.3637 1.3017
Okmulgee 1.7848 0.8782 0.5890 0.1690 0.1250 0.1640
Ponca City 0.6008 0.2864 0.1879 0.2540 0.2995 0.1636
Shawnee 0.3429 0.1457 0.3106 0.2579 0.4714 0.5235
S t i l lw a te r 0.1302 0.2298 0.2040 0.3304 0.1637 0.1136
Tulsa 1.3279 0.8729 0.9703 0.9613 1.2478 1.1038
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TABLE A2
RELATIVE INCIDENCE INDEX FOR PROPERTY CRIMES IN OKLAHOMA CITIES; 
PERCENT OF PROPERTY CRIMES DIVIDED BY PERCENT OF 
POPULATION: 1960-70
City 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970
Ada 0.4295 0.7410 0.6343 0.7218 0.6793 0.6825
A1 tus - - - — — — 0.2590 0.4702 0.3981 ----
Ardmore 0.5273 0.8128 0.6080 -  -  - 0.6353 0.8474
B a r t le s v i l l e 0.5595 0.3955 0.4057 0.4528 0.3473 0.5378
Duncan 0.8090 0.7827 0.5683 0.8114 0.6206 0.6646
Enid 0.7803 0.7461 0.7447 0.8862 0.7526 0.8659
Lawton 1.0895 1.0845 1.1943 1.3570 1.3236 1.3740
McAlester 0.8092 0.6352 0.3571 0.4294 0.5058 0.5408
Midwest City 0.7604 0.7984 0.7075 0.6786 0.5601 0.6838
Muskogee 0.7308 0.7989 0.8258 1.1137 0.8043 0.8354
Norman 0.9578 0.9693 1.0106 0.8851 0.6843 0.7895
Oklahoma City 1.2551 1.2693 1.2645 1.1705 1.2224 1.1978
Okmulgee 0.8227 0.7564 0.6780 0.5140 0.4485 0.3281
Ponca City 0.5884 0.5376 0.3157 0.3565 0.4713 0.4863
Shawnee 0.6818 0.3724 0.7702 0.7420 0.5904 0.6226
S t i l lw a te r 0.4201 0.4516 0.4244 0.4248 0.6858 0.5416
Tulsa 1.1143 1.1207 1.1422 1.1740 1.1961 1.1361
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TABLE A3
RELATIVE INCIDENCE INDEX FOR INDEX CRIMES IN OKLAHOMA CITIES; 
PERCENT OF INDEX CRIMES DIVIDED BY PERCENT OF 
POPULATION: 1960-70
City 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970
Ada 0.4225 0.7266 0.6044 0.7067 0.6488 0.6984
Al tus — — — 0.3000 0.4752 -  — -
Ardmore 0.5323 0.8029 0.6482 0.6187 0.8305
B a r t le s v i l l e 0.5451 0.3843 0.3985 0.4377 0.3358 0.5258
Duncan 0.7989 0.7606 0.5464 0.7771 0.6034 0.6347
Enid 0.7571 0.7179 0.7135 0.8544 0.7311 0.8284
Lawton 1.0960 1.0749 1.2116 1.4027 1.3642 1.4263
McAlester 0.7919 0.6235 0.3690 0.4588 0.4825 0.5345
Midwest C ity 0.7437 0.7771 0.6900 0.6807 0.5497 0.6960
Muskogee 0.7176 0.7774 0.8146 1.0808 0.7888 0.8322
Norman 0.9337 0.9331 0.9573 0.8588 0.6610 0.7511
Oklahoma City 1.2665 1.2973 1.2844 1.1877 1.2309 1.2042
Okmulgee 0.8607 0.7628 0.6712 0.4929 0.4264 0.3125
Ponca C ity 0.5967 0.5276 0.3082 0.3483 0.4581 0.4681
Shawnee 0.6694 0.3643 0.7446 0.7149 0.5857 0.6179
S t i l lw a te r 0.4117 0.4435 0.4122 0.4163 0.6548 0.5151
Tulsa 1.1246 1.1104 1.1320 1.1618 1.1994 1,1340
APPENDIX C 
ALLOCATION OF PATROL MANPOWER
I t  is  o f te n  a s se r te d  t h a t  law enforcement a c t i v i t y  i s  a pure 
public  good s im ila r  to  the  c l a s s i c  example, national defense . The 
basic  na tu re  o f  a pub lic  good i s  t h a t  once provided the  good y ie ld s  
b e n e f i ts  to  a l l  persons in  a given a re a ,  the  exclusion  p r in c ip le  i s  not 
a p p l ic ab le .  There a r e ,  however, s ig n i f i c a n t  d i f fe ren c es  between 
na tiona l defense as  a public  good and po lice  p ro te c t io n .
In the case  o f  na tiona l defense a l l  persons in  the  defended area 
a re  l ik e ly  to  b e n e f i t  equally  in  terms o f  p ro te c t io n  from r i s k  while 
p o lice  p ro tec t io n  i s  in f req u e n t ly  d is t r ib u te d  in  a manner t h a t  provides 
equal p ro tec t io n  from criminal r i s k .  For a given level o f  law en fo r­
cement resources th e re  a re  severa l a l t e r n a t iv e  methods t h a t  can be used 
in a l lo c a t in g  ihese resources  over an a re a .  A 1968 study on a l lo c a t io n  
o f  p o lice  resources  in the  c i t y  o f Chicago i s  useful in  amplifying 
t h i s  po in t.^
In m atte rs  involving deployment o f  p o lice  manpower, the  po lice  
ad m in is tra to r  can id e n t i fy  severa l possib le  goals each o f  which may lead 
to  a d i f f e r e n t  method o f  a l lo c a t io n .  Complete e ra d ic a t io n  o f  crime i s
U .S ., Department o f  J u s t i c e ,  National I n s t i t u t e  o f  Law Enforce­
ment and Criminal J u s t i c e ,  A llocat ions  o f  Resources in  th e  Chicago Police 
D é p a r te n t  (Washington, D.C.: Government P r in t in g  O ff ice ,  1972), 
pp. 18-30. This appendix draws heavily  from t h i s  s tudy.
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an o ccas iona lly  s ta te d  goal although th i s  i s  c l e a r ly  impossible to  
achieve . An o ften  s ta te d  goal is  to  attem pt achievement o f  an 
" i r re d u c ib le  minimum" level o f  criminal a c t i v i t y .  However, the  meaning 
o f  i r r e d u c ib le  minimum is  not known, i t  i s  a purely  conceptual goal.
The following rep resen ts  various approaches t h a t  could be used 
in  d i s t r ib u t in g  pa tro l  manpower. This may communicate the  s e n s i t i v i t y  
o f  resource  a l lo c a t io n  to  the  s p e c if ic  in t e n t  o r  goal o f  manpower 
a l lo c a t io n .  In what fo llow s, a l lo c a t io n  is  made by a l lo c a t in g  a fixed  
number o f  men in  20 d i s t r i c t s  with the  d i s t r i c t s  f ixed  and the  number 
o f  men on pa tro l  in  each v a r ia b le .  The ac tua l d i s t r i b u t io n  is  shown 
in  column 2 o f  Tables A4 and A5.
1. Equalized Per Capita Service  (Column 3)
This goal attem pts to  achieve a d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  p a tro l which 
genera tes  a cons tan t r a t i o  o f  po lice  to  popu la tion . The approach does 
no t consider crime incidence , c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  o f  th e  neighborhood, o r  
a re a .  R ather, i t  seems based on an in te n t  to  provide equal s e rv ice  o f  
p o l ic e  ( in  terms o f time) fo r  a l l  people in the community.
2. Equalized Density o f Po lice  Service  (Column 4)
This goal d i r e c t s  no a t t e n t io n  to  popu la tion , o f fe n s e s ,  and
fa c to r s  a sso c ia ted  with c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  o f  people. The approach uses 
as i t s  c r i t e r i o n  the  number o f  po lice  per square m ile .
3. Index Crimes Per 100,000 (Column 5)
This c r i t e r i o n  assumes offense  d i f fe ren c es  among d i s t r i c t s  a re  
most im portant in  th e  a l lo c a t io n  method. I t  uses Index crimes per 
100,000. A d i s t r i c t  with tw ice as many Index o ffenses  as another 
d i s t r i c t  would have twice the  level o f  p a tro l manpower. (The approach 
t r e a t s  a l l  Index offenses  as equally  re p re h en s ib le ) .
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4. Victim-Oriented D is tr ib u tio n
The Index crime approach (#3 above) does not consider the
d if fe ren ces  in  r e l a t i v e  importance o f  d i f f e r e n t  o ffen se s .  One exemplary
2
weighting scheme i s  t h a t  known as the  Sell in-Wolfgang index. The 




Aggravated A ssau lt 7
Burglary 3
Theft ($50. and over) 3
Auto T heft 2
Due to  the da ta  requ ired  in th i s  approach a l lo c a t io n s  are  not shown in
the  accompanying t a b l e s .  The procedure used would be:
(1) Id e n t ify  number o f  Index offenses o f  each type in each 
d i s t r i c t .
(2) M ultiply each by weights above o r an app rop ria te  weighting 
system derived from an a t t i t u d e  survey (or Sell in-Wolfgang 
in d ex ) .
(3) Total weighted Index offenses fo r  each d i s t r i c t .
(4) A llocate  a v a i la b le  manpower in r e l a t io n  to  population 
through d iv is io n  of to ta l  weighted Index offenses by 
proportion o f  to ta l  population in each d i s t r i c t .
5. Shoup-Dosser Method
This method cannot be explained simply. The approach attempts 
to  minimize the  average crime r a te  fo r  a c i t y .  The general so lu tion  fo r  
a c i t y  with 20 d i s t r i c t s  and 6,700 patrolmen would be:
2
Ivan Sell in  and Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Measurement of 
Delinquency (New York: John Wiley, 1964).
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TABLE A4
ALLOCATION OF POLICE MANPOWER IN CHICAGO DISTRICTS 
USING DIFFERENT CRITERIA: IN PERCENT FOR 1968
(1)
















2 7.68 4.4 1.9 9 .0
3 6.66 4.9 2.4 5 .9
4 3.80 4.8 11.6 2 .5
5 4.15 5.0 8 .8 3 .4
6 3.53 4.6 7.1 2 .4
7 7.10 4.4 2.9 7.1
8 3.80 6.7 10.4 1 .8
9 4.81 5.0 5.8 2 .4
10 5.69 4.8 3.2 7 .0
11 5.96 3.5 2.1 11.4
12 5.24 3.6 2.8 6 .9
13 5.32 4.0 2.3 7 .5
14 4.16 5.2 3 .4 3.1
15 4.27 5.6 5.2 3 .5
16 3.53 5.9 12.5 1.7
17 2.63 4 .8 4 .6 2.4
18 6.48 3.8 1.9 8 .6
19 4.59 5.8 2.5 3 .9
20 5.20 8 .2 5.1 3.1
21 5.28 3.7 2.2 6 .2
Total® 99.88 98.7 98.7 99.8
^Totals  may not add to  100 percen t due to  rounding.
Source: U .S .,  Department of J u s t i c e ,  National I n s t i t u t e  o f  Law Enforce­
ment and Criminal J u s t i c e ,  A lloca tions  of Resources in  the  
Chicago P o lice  D é p a r te n t  (Washington, D.C.: Government 
P r in t in g  O ff ic e ,  l972), pp. 19, 23, and c a lc u la t io n s .
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TABLE A5
COMPARATIVE ALLOCATIONS OF POLICE MANPOWER IN CHICAGO 
DISTRICTS IN 1968
(1)
















2 487 295 137 604
3 422 329 161 396
4 241 322 778 168
5 263 335 590 228
6 224 309 476 161
7 450 295 195 475
8 241 449 698 121
9 305 335 389 161
10 361 322 215 470
11 378 235 141 765
12 332 241 188 463
13 337 268 154 503
14 264 349 228 208
15 271 376 349 235
16 224 396 838 114
17 167 322 309 161
18 411 255 127 577
19 291 389 168 262
20 330 550 342 208
21 335 248 148 416
Total 6,334 6,620 6,631 6,697
Source: U .S .,  Department o f  J u s t i c e ,  National I n s t i t u t e  o f  Law Enforce­
ment and Criminal J u s t i c e ,  A llocations  o f  Resources in  the
Chicago P o lice  DeparWent (Washington, 
P r in t in g  O ff ic e ,  1972), p. 24, and cal
D .C .: Government









number o f  d i s t r i c t s  = 20. 
the  p a r t i c u la r  d i s t r i c t :  i = 1, 2 , " ,  20.
average number o f  crimes in  each d i s t r i c t ,  
an e f fe c t iv en e ss  constan t fo r  a patrolman in  each d i s t r i c t ,  
number o f  patrolmen assigned to  each d i s t r i c t .
% t t o t a l  number o f  patrolmen: 6,700.
The Shoup-Dosser method involves an e f fe c t iv e n e s s  constan t (K)
fo r  patrolmen. But, how can th e  e f fe c t iv en e ss  o f  patrolmen be judged?
One approach has been suggested by opera tions  research  a c t i v i t y  during
World War II  when attem pts  were made to  c a lc u la te  sweep ra te s  for 
3
in fa n try .  T ran s la t in g  th e  m i l i t a r y  a p p l ic a t io n  where:
sweep r a t e  o r  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  r a t e ,  
number o f  a r r e s t s ,  
a rea  p a t ro l le d .
number of o ffenses  in an a rea .
to ta l  time spent by p a tro l  u n i ts  in  an a re a .
The e f fe c t iv en e ss  o f  patrolmen may be rep resen ted  as:
CA
K = NT .
At the  p resen t time many departments use the  c learance  r a te
4
which i s  approximated by C/N, as a measure o f  e f fe c t iv e n e s s .  The 
in tro d u c tio n  o f  a rea  and p a tro l  time enables th e  e f fe c t iv en e ss  measure 
to  r e f l e c t  the  e f f e c t  o f  p a tro l  d en s i ty  which undoubtedly rep resen ts  an 
improvement over th e  c lea rance  r a te  a lone . At th e  p re sen t time i n a b i l i t y  
o f  p o lice  to  know the  value o f  t h i s  c lea rance  r a t e  in  a f fe c t in g  offense  
r a te s  i s  a m atte r  o f  se r ious  concern in  t h i s  paper.
P.M. Morse and E.E. Kimball, Methods o f  Operations Research 
(Washington, D.C.: O ffice  o f  Chief o f  Naval O perations, 1946), pp. 32-34. 
4
A lloca tions  o f  Resources in  th e  Chicago Po lice  Department,
pp. 106-08.
APPENDIX D
PROJECTED COSTS OF CRIME IN OKLAHOMA
I t  is  p o ss ib le  to  use the  p ro jec ted  o ffenses  o f  Table 31 to
estim ate  the  v ictim  cos ts  th a t  w ill  l ik e ly  occur in  the  period from
1971 through 1980. Though th e re  is no completely accep tab le  measure
of v ic tim  co s ts  a sso c ia ted  with th e  indiv idual o ffen se s ,  the
P r e s id e n t 's  Commission in i t s  s tu d ie s  provided es tim ates  t h a t  a re
used here . Without tak ing  in f l a t i o n  or changes in  the  s e v e r i ty  of the
ind iv idual offenses in to  account th e  c o s t  f ig u res  used fo r  each offense 
5a re :
Homicide $85,700.
Forc ib le  Rape 1,000.
Robbery 275.
Aggravated A ssault 350.
Burglary 170.
Larceny ($50. and over) 120.
Auto Theft 200.
The r e s u l t s  o f  simple m u l t ip l ic a t io n  a re  shown in Table A6.
Though th e  t o t a l s  o f  $20.8 to  $24.5 m il l io n  may be o f some in t e r e s t  i t
i s  probably more im portant to  note the  r e l a t i v e  co s ts  o f  the  d i f f e r e n t
o f fen se s .  Homicide i s  th e  most c o s t ly ,  followed by b u rg la ry , la rceny .
5
Crime and I t s  Impact—An Assessment, pp. 42-43. The f ig u res  
used here a re  ne t o f  re co v e r ie s .  Some adjustment was made on the 
Commission's e s t im a te s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  in the  case o f  rape . Nonetheless 
only d o l l a r  costs  a re  estim ated with no cognizance o f  psychological 
lo s s e s ,  changes in  p a t te rn s  o f  behavior, p ro tec t io n  c o s ts ,  e tc .
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aggravated a s s a u l t ,  auto t h e f t ,  f o r c ib le  rap e ,  and robbery, in th i s  
o rder .  As t h i s  ranking i s  q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  from public  perception of 
the  importance o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  offenses  i t  i s  apparent t h a t  many 
a l t e r n a t iv e  methods o f  co s t  measurement a re  p o ss ib le .
TABLE A6
ESTIMATES OF VICTIM COSTS DUE TO INDEX OFFENSES IN OKLAHOMA 
FROM 1971 THROUGH 1980 
(Thousands o f  D ollars  Using 1965 Costs)
Offense 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Homicide 12,600.0 12,600.0 12,600.0 12,687.5 12,687.5 12,687.5 12,775.0 12,775.0 12,775.0 12,862.5
F orcib le
Rape 389.0 402.0 415.0 429.0 442.0 456.0 469.0 483.0 496.0 509.0
Robbery 368.2 382.5 396.8 411.1 425.4 440.0 454.3 468.6 482.9 497.2
Aggravated
A ssau lt 1 ,119.0 1,183.4 1,254.1 1,325.1 1,395.8 1,466.5 1,537.2 1,607.9 1,679.0 1,749.7
Burglary 3,262.3 3,393.2 3,524.1 3 ,655.0 3,785.9 3,918.5 4 ,049.4 4,180.3 4,311.2 4,442.1
Larceny— 
$50, and 
over 1,822.8 1,928.4 2,032.8 2,138.4 2,242.8 2,348.4 2,454.0 2,558.4 2,664.0 2,769.6
Auto Theft 1 ,282.2 1,327.6 1,373.0 1,418.4 1,463.8 1,509.2 1,554.6 1,600.0 1,645.4 1,690.8
Total fo r  
a l l  Index 
Offenses 20,843.5 21,217.1 21,596.1 22,064.5 22,443.2 22,826.1 23,293.5 23,673.2 24,053.5 24,520.9
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